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SUMMARY
South African company law has provided for the rescue of financially distressed
companies since 1926 when the statutory procedure of judicial management was
introduced by the Companies Act 46 of 1926. Unfortunately, judicial management
has never been regarded as a successful corporate rescue procedure and for most
of its existence it has been severely criticised on many grounds. The Companies Act
61 of 1973 that replaced the Companies Act 46 of 1926 did very little to improve this
situation and judicial management remained underutilised. As a result, the
Companies Act 71 of 2008 now introduces two newly-created corporate rescue
procedures in the form of business rescue proceedings and the compromise with
creditors. 
This study analyses judicial management and the new corporate rescue
procedures to establish whether the identified weaknesses of judicial management
have been adequately and effectively addressed in the new procedures. A
comparative study with similar procedures in England and Germany is undertaken
to determine whether the South African legislature has delivered on its promise to
create a system of corporate rescue that will meet the needs of a modern South
African economy.    
Several weaknesses in the new procedures are identified and a number of
recommendations are made to improve the relevant provisions and to assist in
providing South African company law with an efficient and acceptable corporate
rescue regime.      .     
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1 THE NEED FOR BUSINESS RESCUE
A company is an integral part of the community in which it does business, and it has
a direct impact on the economic and thus the social well-being of that community
through its employees, suppliers and distributors, to mention but a few.1
Consequently, the failure of a company affects far more people than merely its
employees and creditors. In the case of a large mining company, for example, a
whole community or town could be ruined if that company collapses.  It is also true2
that company shareholders are no longer an elitist group of cash-flush investors: as
a result of privatisation, demutualisation and the special issue of shares to historically
disadvantaged South Africans,  individual shareholding has increased in South3
Africa. Furthermore, behind the corporate veil of the institutional investor, one now
finds the majority of a country’s working population because institutional investors
such as trade unions, pension funds and other retirement funds are investing their
money in listed companies in particular.  4
This said, one of the advantages of a successful corporate rescue is that it
prevents or limits job losses. In a country such as South Africa where unemployment
figures are unacceptably high,  this is even more relevant. Having a successful and5
effective corporate rescue regime or procedure is thus of great importance to the
economic growth and stability of this country. 
A further argument for an effective business  rescue regime is that this is6
INTRODUCTION-2-
 This was stated by Mr Roger Baxter, Chief Economist of the Chamber of Mines of South Africa, at7
a lecture, “Black Economic Empowerment - Transformation in the Mining Industry”, delivered to
participants in the Certificate in Advanced Corporate Law and Securities Law Programme at the
University of South Africa, Pretoria on 17 July 2008.
 For the history of bankruptcy reform in the United States, see Rochelle “Lowering the Penalties” at 315.8
 Keay “To Unify” at 62-63; Rajak and Henning “Business Rescue” at 263.9
 Milman and Durrant Corporate Insolvency at 32; Belcher Corporate Rescue at 13 and 116. As far10
as South Africa is concerned, this is only true of the compromise in terms of s 311 of the Companies
Act 61 of 1973 which provides for a compromise or arrangement between a company, its members
and creditors. The compromise with creditors in terms of s 155 of the Companies Act of 2008 is
specifically intended as a rescue procedure and will be discussed in Chapter 2, part 4. 
 Milman and Durrant Corporate Insolvency at 32.11
 Hereafter the Companies Act of 1926. 12
 Rochelle “Lowering the Penalties” at 315-316.13
 8 Edw VII 7 (c 69).14
apparently one of the factors that foreign investors take into account when deciding
whether to invest in a country.  7
In many legal systems, including those of the United States of America,  England,8
Australia, Germany and France the realisation that there are many good reasons for
attempting to rescue a company or its business if it has the potential to survive, has
resulted in special statutory provisions for business rescues being introduced.9
It is, of course, possible to rescue a company or other form of business
enterprise by using informal and thus unregulated methods or by using statutory
procedures that are not specifically aimed at business rescue, such as liquidation
and compromise.  There are certain disadvantages attached to these procedures,10
varying from their high cost and the cumbersome processes involved to the lack of
protection of company assets against individual creditors who are unwilling to support
an informal rescue attempt.  However, these procedures fall outside the ambit of this11
thesis which concentrates on formal, dedicated statutory business rescue procedures
enjoying the protection and advantages specific to a regulated rescue regime.
 
2 JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT
South African company law has made provision for a formal corporate business
rescue procedure in the form of judicial management since the inception of the
Companies Act 46 of 1926.  This was before the principles of a fresh start or a12
rescue culture had found general acceptance in most comparable systems,  and the13
English Companies (Consolidation) Act of 1908  on which the Companies Act of14
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 Cilliers, Benade et al Corporate Law par 2.06.15
 The Minister of Justice explained to Parliament that the procedure was derived from English and16
American law which provided for the appointment of receivers in equity to assist an important concern
when it was feared it might go into liquidation: Union of South Africa House of Assembly Debates, 25
February 1926, vol 6, col 1138-1139.
 Some of the criticism is discussed in Chapter 2, part 2.17
 Hereafter the Companies Act of 1973. 18
 [2001] 1 All SA 223 (C) at 238. See Smith “Major Creditor” for a discussion of this case.19
 The Commission of Enquiry into the Companies Act appointed in 1963 under the chairmanship of20
Mr Justice J Van W yk de Vries: see Cilliers, Benade et al Corporate Law par 2.15.
 Main Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Companies Act (RP 45 of 1970) at 525. 21
 However, this rate is described as “far from unfavourable” when compared to those of rescue22
procedures in England and the USA: see Brown Corporate Rescue at 824.
 Main Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Companies Act (RP 45 of 1970) at 524. 23
 South African Company Law for the 21  Century: Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform GN 1183 in24 st
Government Gazette No 26493 of 23 June 2004.
 Par 4.6.2.25
1926 had largely been based,  did not provide for a rescue procedure.   15 16
However, judicial management was never regarded as an effective rescue
measure for companies in financial distress.  This remained the general view even17
after the present Companies Act 61 of 1973  came into operation and effected18
substantial amendments to the judicial management procedure.
In his judgment in Le Roux Hotel Management (Pty) Ltd v E Rand (Pty) Ltd
Josman J referred to judicial management as “a system which has barely worked
since its initiation in 1926”.  This is, with respect, not completely true. The Van Wyk19
de Vries Commission  specifically based its decision to retain judicial management20
in the Companies Act of 1973 on the fact that judicial management had been
extremely successful in a number of cases.  In spite of receiving representations for21
the abolition of judicial management because of a low success rate  and instances22
of abuse, the Commission expressed the view that the notable successes that had
been achieved justified its retention.  23
3 COMPANY LAW REFORM 
In the policy paper published by the Department of Trade and Industry in May 2004  which24
contained guidelines on its corporate law reform project, insolvency and corporate rescue
were specifically mentioned as areas that needed to be reviewed and improved in a new
company law.  The policy paper stated that judicial management was rarely used and25
even more rarely led to a successful rescue. It therefore expressed the intention “to create
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 Par 4.6.2.26
 Drafted by the Centre for Advanced Corporate and Insolvency Law at the University of Pretoria as27
part of a project which resulted in the Final Report Containing Proposals on a Unified Insolvency Act
that was published in August 2000.
 This Bill reflected comments received by the Law Reform Commission after the publication of its28
previous draft Bill in 1996: Review of the Law of Insolvency: Draft Insolvency Bill and Explanatory
Memorandum, W orking Paper 66, Project 63 (1996).
 As an interim measure the current provisions on judicial management were retained with only a few29
amendments until more research had been done: Burdette “Unified Insolvency Legislation” at 55ff.
 Similar provisions contained in the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 were also included.30
This was announced in the Cabinet Statement of 5 March 2003 reported at  <http://www.gcis.gov.za31
/newsroom/releases/cabstate/2003/030305.htm> accessed on 7 February 2010.
 Business Day 11 February 2004 at 1; Business Report 11 February 2004 at 17 reported this32
announcement.
 Business Day 22 April 2004 at 1.33
 Act 71 of 2008, hereafter the Companies Act of 2008. 34
 I have consistently expressed reservations (for example at the W orkshop on Business Rescue to35
which I was invited by the Department of Trade and Industry in 2007) about this name because it is
also the generic name for all business or corporate rescue procedures in other jurisdictions and will
inevitably lead to confusion. The procedure could have been termed “supervision” or even “company
supervision” since the definition of business rescue specifically refers to supervision of the company
(in s 128(1)(b)) and the business rescue practitioner was termed a supervisor in all versions of the
Companies Bill up to the very last one, the Companies Bill B61D-2008 published in November 2008.
a system of corporate rescue appropriate to the needs of a modern South African
economy”.  26
Prior to this, there had been at least two other initiatives to reform our business
rescue regime. Firstly, Cabinet approved a draft Insolvency and Business Recovery Bill27
that combined the Law Reform Commission’s draft Insolvency Bill  with those provisions28
in the Companies Act of 1973 regulating the liquidation of companies, judicial
management  and compromise,  to form the basis of a new consolidated Act, although29 30
several amendments to the original draft Bill were apparently deemed necessary.  31
The other project, announced on 11 February 2004 by the Chief State Law
Adviser,  involved plans by the Government to make a fund of R2 billion a year32
available to assist in the rescue of struggling companies. In a further development
it was reported in April 2004  that a new Business Rescue Bill was being drafted to33
regulate this rescue procedure and was expected to be ready in May 2004. Nothing
further happened regarding this project and it was apparently abandoned. 
However, in any event it is clear that these two initiatives have now been
superseded by the new Companies Act,  which introduces a new business rescue34
procedure (rather unimaginatively called “business rescue proceedings”)  in Chapter35
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 The new Act is expected to come into operation in July 2010 or soon thereafter. In terms of s 22536
of the Act it may not come into operation until at least a year after the President has assented to it,
which happened on 8 April 2009: Government Gazette No 32121 of 9 April 2009.
 See Chapter 2, part 4.37
 The draft Bill was first published on 13 February 2007. The Companies Bill B61 - 2008 was published38
by the Department of Trade and Industry on 27 June 2008 and introduced into Parliament in the same
week in terms of GN 677 in Government Gazette No 31104 of 30 May 2008.
 Keay “To Unify” at 63 specifically points out that the legislative measures reforming insolvency law39
in the United States, England and Australia were all preceded by substantial delay and scrutiny after
comprehensive reports by commissions created for this purpose. He also (at 67) refers to the serious
defects in the first Insolvency Bill in England caused by its hurried drafting and relatively little “public
airing” and debate on the Bill. The same could be said of the Companies Act of 2008. 
 The Commission was appointed in 1963 under the chairmanship of Mr Justice J van W yk de Vries40
and is generally known as the Van W yk de Vries Commission. 
 Main Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Companies Act (RP 45 of 1970).41
 Begründung des Regierungsentwurfs der Insolvenzordnung (3 March 1992) Bundestags-Drucksache42
12/2443.
6 to replace judicial management when the new Companies Act comes into force.36
The Companies Act of 2008 also introduces a new procedure for a compromise with
creditors which provides an alternative to the business rescue procedure.37
It is of some concern that in spite of the substantial changes that the Companies
Act of 2008 will effect to many of the existing statutory and common-law principles
of corporate law, including the introduction of a completely new rescue procedure,
it was introduced into Parliament only 16 months after the publication of the first draft
Bill  and was approved by Parliament on 19 November 2008 – barely five months38
later. It seems inevitable that some serious weaknesses and problems will emerge
when the Companies Act of 2008 is implemented, particularly as the Act was not
preceded, as is usually the case with new legislation effecting a total reform of the
existing law, by an investigation and full report of a commission of experts.  For39
example, the current Companies Act 61 of 1973 was the result of a detailed report
by the Commission of Enquiry into the Companies Act explaining and substantiating
every single proposed provision.  The report  of this Commission is still, more than40 41
thirty years after the Act came into operation, of great assistance in interpreting the
provisions of the Companies Act. 
Commentators on the German insolvency legislation have also remarked that the
interpretation and explanation of some of its provisions would have been impossible
without consulting the detailed explanatory notes that accompanied the official draft
legislation  and the later amendments effected by the parliamentary portfolio42
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 Bericht des Rechtsausschusses des Deutschen Bundestages (13 April 1994) Bundestags-Drucksache43
12/7302. See Uhlenbruck and Berscheid Insolvenzordnung at 5 and Chapter 4, part 1. See also Chapter
3 on the importance of the report of the Cork Committee that preceded the relevant legislation in England.
 The policy document published by the Department of Trade and Industry only described in very general44
terms the policy considerations that were to be followed in drafting the new legislation: see South African
Company Law for the 21  Century: Guidelines for Corporate Reform GN 1183 in Government Gazette Nost
26493 of 23 June 2004. A Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Bill, 2008 was attached to the
Bill but again described only the general objects of the legislation without going into any detail on specific
provisions. As far as the business rescue proceedings are concerned, these objects deal mainly with the
protection of workers’ interests. 
 A perfect example is provided by the provision on uncompleted contracts which is in direct45
contradiction to basic principles of our law of contract: see Chapter 2, part 3.6.2.
 “History and Culture” at 4.46
 Regulated by Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, Title 11, United States Code. 47
 “History and Culture” at 35.48
committee.  Unfortunately, South African practitioners will not have anything43
resembling these reports to assist them in the interpretation of the provisions of our
new companies legislation.  Therefore I have attempted to identify some of the44
provisions regulating the business rescue proceedings which may be difficult to
interpret owing to a lack of clarity in their drafting, confusing terminology and
contradictions.
A further complicating factor is that the main drafter of the Companies Act of 2008
was a Canadian consultant who to all appearances was not very familiar with South
African law in general or corporate law in particular. One cannot therefore assume that
a particular provision was drafted with an existing South African common-law principle
or statute in mind. Some provisions also appear to directly contradict established
principles of South African law, and it will have to be left to the courts to decide whether
this was unintended or intentional.  The danger of using a foreign drafter who is not45
familiar with South African conditions, rather than any of the many available South
African experts on corporate law, is further illustrated by Martin  in her discussion on the46
attempt by some other countries to transplant the American Chapter 11 reorganisation
procedure  into their legal systems without taking into consideration that “[i]nsolvency47
systems profoundly reflect the legal, historical, political, and cultural context of the
countries that have developed them”. A country adopting a new system (particularly in
respect of business rescue or discharge of debts) should therefore “consider local culture
when enacting new laws”.   48
Another factor that needs to be considered in any evaluation of the Companies Act
of 2008 is the intention of the Department of Trade and Industry to phase out the close
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 A decision described by Du Plessis “Reflections and Perspectives” at 268-269 as “surprising” and49
“difficult to justify”, considering its undoubted success as a business form in South Africa. This view
is supported by many corporate lawyers, including the eminent British commentator Prof JH Farrar,
who states that the reasons for this decision are “far from clear”: “Corporate Governance” at 228.
 Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Bill, 2008 at 217. 50
 Schedule 5 (Part 2) to the Companies Act, 2008.51
 Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Bill, 2008 at 217.52
 Schedule 5 (Parts 4-8) to the Companies Act, 2008. 53
 Schedule 5 (Part 6) to the Companies Act, 2008, discussed in Chapter 2, part 3.2. 54
corporation as a business form  on the basis that under the new legislation the49
simplified incorporation and running of small companies will make close corporations
redundant.  Therefore, no further close corporations will be registered nor will any more50
companies be permitted to convert to close corporations once the Companies Act of
2008 comes into operation.  Existing close corporations will be allowed to continue as51
such for an indefinite period  but will be encouraged to convert to companies under the52
new dispensation. As a preliminary to the eventual disappearance of close corporations,
and to harmonise the law regulating the two business forms in the interim period, several
provisions of the Companies Act of 2008 are made applicable to close corporations in
place of the existing ones in the Close Corporations Act, 69 of 1984.  Included among53
these are the provisions regulating the new business rescue proceedings, which will thus
apply to close corporations as well.  54
This thesis examines, in a comparative study, some of the defects and
weaknesses of judicial management which could be blamed for its failure to function
as an effective corporate rescue procedure. The purpose of this comparative study
is to identify some of the main weaknesses of judicial management and to establish
the extent to which they have been successfully or adequately addressed in the new
business rescue proceedings contained in the Companies Act of 2008. For that
reason judicial management is discussed in some detail in spite of the fact that soon
it will no longer be part of South African company law. 
4 METHODOLOGY
In the first part of Chapter 2, a general overview of judicial management in South
Africa is given, and some of the specific weaknesses or contentious issues that might
have contributed to its failure, are highlighted. The problematic issues that will be
examined in the comparative studies are then identified.
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 Cilliers, Benade et al Corporate Law pars 2.03-2.17. 55
 Corporate Insolvency at vii.56
 The Insolvency Service is currently engaged in a project (with completion date expected to be April57
2011) to amend and modernise the Insolvency Rules and combine them with all the other secondary
In the second part of Chapter 2, the corresponding provisions of the new
business rescue proceedings contained in the Companies Act of 2008 are discussed
and compared with judicial management. The chapter closes with a discussion of the
new compromise procedure introduced by the Companies Act of 2008 as an
alternative to business rescue proceedings.
In Chapters 3 and 4, the problem areas identified in Chapter 2 are examined by
way of a comparative study of statutory business rescue procedures in two other
legal systems – the English and the German – showing how they regulate or deal
with the same issues or situations. Where a specific business rescue procedure
applies to all business debtors, and not only to companies, this is explained at an
early stage in the discussion on the entities to which the procedure applies. However,
the rest of the discussion of such a procedure is mainly restricted to its specific
application to ordinary companies. 
Chapter 3 deals with the statutory business rescue procedures in English law. The
law of England was chosen for two reasons: firstly, because of the influence that English
law has had on South African law in general and company law in particular.  Secondly,55
English insolvency law, which includes corporate insolvency law, has twice been
subjected to extensive reforms. The first reform resulted in insolvency legislation that for
the first time made specific provision for two dedicated statutory business rescue
procedures. The second reform was aimed at rectifying deficiencies that had been
identified in these business rescue procedures and resulted in major amendments to
both procedures. However, many other changes have been introduced by way of several
amendments to the Insolvency Rules, which unfortunately makes finding the most recent
and applicable law an extremely complicated task as textbooks struggle to keep up.
According to Goode,  one needs “to find one’s way around provisions which are56
randomly dispersed among the body of the Act, the bizarrely numbered Schedules A1
and B1 and the Insolvency Rules, with seemingly no logic in the distribution nor any
conception that it might be useful if all the provisions dealing with the same subject were
brought together...”.  57
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legislation in one piece of legislation: The Insolvency Service Modernisation and Consolidation of
Secondary Insolvency Legislation - Update March 2009 available at <http://www.insolvency.gov.uk>
accessed on 23 March 2009.
 South African Company Law for the 21  Century: Guidelines for Corporate Reform  GN 1183 in58 st
Government Gazette No 26493 of 23 June 2004, par 4.6.2.
The German system of insolvency and business rescue is discussed in Chapter
4. The German insolvency legislation was the result of a long reform process in
which, as also initially intended by the South African authorities, American legislation
originally served as a model for its drafters although the final result differs quite
substantially from the American procedure. The German model was chosen because
it is a fairly recent one and its drafters had the advantage of being able to learn from
the experience gained by other reformers of insolvency laws. It also differs from most
other procedures in that it is not a dedicated business rescue procedure, but merely
one option available as part of normal insolvency proceedings. The German
procedure resembles judicial management in some aspects, notably the fact that it
must be commenced by order of court, as well as the existence of an unregulated
profession of insolvency administrators. It was also chosen because there is very
little research on the new German insolvency legislation by South African
researchers. 
This comparative study is intended to indicate the best way of dealing with the
identified problems and to consider the extent to which the new corporate rescue
procedures conform to the generally accepted principles of modern statutory business
rescue regimes. In addition, this study investigates whether the new procedures present
us with solutions more viable than those presented by judicial management. The
conclusion in Chapter 5 thus consists mostly of my recommendations to improve the
existing provisions of Chapter 6 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 where I consider them
to be deficient or problematic.
Although the policy paper on the reform of South African corporate law issued
by the Department of Trade and Industry specifically mentioned that the provisions
of the American business rescue procedure would be considered in creating an
appropriate corporate rescue system for South Africa,  the United States of America58
was not chosen as one of the countries for this comparative study. There are several
reasons for this decision. Firstly, many South African researchers on business rescue
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 See generally Rajak and Henning “Business Rescue”; Rochelle “Lowering the Penalties”; Smits59
“Corporate Administration”; Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform , par 4.6.2.
  Franken “Bankruptcy Regimes” at 650; Moss “Bankruptcy Cultures” at 121; Rochelle “Lowering the60
Penalties” at 318.
 See Chapter 2, part 3.1.61
 See Chapter 2, part 3.7.2 on the powers of the directors.62
have included America in their comparative studies, partly because of its accessibility
to English speakers but also because over time several critics of judicial management
have proposed that South Africa should introduce a business rescue procedure based
on the American business rescue model.  There is therefore considerable research59
available in South Africa on the American Chapter 11 reorganisation procedure.
Furthermore, the United States of America has a debtor-friendly insolvency system, as
opposed to the creditor-friendly system of South Africa and other countries such as
England.  As will be shown in this thesis, there is very little in the proposed new South60
African business rescue proceedings that indicates a change in this culture but rather the
opposite, including the special provisions that have been created to strengthen the
position of employees in their capacity as post-commencement creditors of the
company.  Another reason is the fact that the most prominent feature of the American61
rescue procedure, namely the concept of debtor in possession where the business
owner retains full control of the running of the business, has not been incorporated into
the new South African procedure.62
5 ISSUES THAT ARE EXAMINED
For the purposes of the comparative study contained in Chapters 3 and 4, the
problems that have been identified for further examination in this thesis have been
classified into the following eight main issues:
É Entities to which the procedure applies. This encompasses the identification of the
forms or types of business enterprise to which a particular statutory business rescue
procedure applies.
II Power to initiate the procedure. Under this heading I deal with the persons who
may or who, under certain circumstances, are obliged to initiate the procedure
and the sanctions against them if they fail to do so. 
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 Flessner Sanierung at 222 describes this as one of the most important questions to be answered63
right at the beginning of a rescue procedure. As will appear from the discussion on South Africa’s new
rescue procedure, this is one of the questions that have not been answered very clearly: see Chapter
2, part 3.7.2.
ÉÉÉ Requirements for opening a business rescue procedure. The circumstances or
conditions under which a business will qualify for the rescue procedure in each legal
system are considered. This is an important aspect of any business rescue
procedure since the chances of successfully rescuing a business are obviously
much better if an attempt is made at the first signs of financial difficulties, rather than
waiting until the company is hopelessly insolvent.
ÉV Procedure to commence the procedure. I investigate the nature or form of the
procedure initiating the rescue which could either be a formal application to court
resulting in a court order, as required for judicial management, or a more
informal procedure, such as the filing of documents with the court or another
regulatory body. In those cases where an application to court is required, the
discussion under this point investigates whether there must be a specific
application for the rescue procedure or whether it can also be initiated by an
application for liquidation or even a neutral application that leaves it to the court
to decide on the appropriate form of relief.
V The moratorium. A moratorium on actions and other judicial processes against
a company is generally regarded as an important, if not essential part of any
business rescue procedure. The issues that are specifically examined are
whether a moratorium automatically results from the rescue procedure, at what
moment it starts and whether its duration is limited to a stipulated period. The
extent of, and exceptions to, the moratorium are also discussed.
VÉ Managing the rescue procedure. This concerns the question whether the debtor is
in charge of the business during the rescue operation or whether an outsider, such
as an insolvency practitioner, is appointed to take over.  Where an outsider is63
appointed, the qualifications required for appointment to this position are
considered, as well as how and by whom he or she is appointed to and removed
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from this position. In dealing with the issue of management of the rescue procedure,
I have concentrated on the appointment, required qualifications and removal from
office of any outsider who is appointed to manage or oversee the rescue procedure.
I have not gone into the specific powers of such a person in great detail, except to
the extent that I discuss the residual powers (if any) of the previous management,
that is, the board of directors. It is my view that the relevant Act must contain
provisions that ensure the appointment of a suitably qualified, competent and
regulated professional who can be removed from office if necessary. In this case,
the specific powers assigned to this person become less important than when
inadequate or almost no regulation (as is presently the case in South Africa) enables
the appointment of an incompetent, inexperienced or untrustworthy person.
VÉÉ The rescue plan. In this section, I investigate the role, if any, of a formal rescue
plan as part of a particular business rescue procedure. This includes looking at
the contents and nature of a rescue plan as well as at what stage in the rescue
procedure and by whom a plan should be submitted and the parties who must
approve it. The effects of approval or adoption of the plan are also considered.
VÉÉÉ Termination of the rescue procedure. I examine whether the rescue procedure
is terminated automatically after a specified period, or whether a court order or
other formal act is required. This includes consideration of the question whether
the duration of a rescue procedure should be strictly limited or whether it should
be decided by the court or by the person managing the business during the
rescue process.
It should be noted that the thesis does not attempt to examine every issue or
problem associated with judicial management or the new business rescue
proceedings. Many of these aspects constitute viable topics for extensive research
on their own. Examples of such topics include the role that shareholders should be
allowed play in the rescue process, the exact division of powers between the existing
management of the company and the business rescue practitioner who may be
appointed, the extent to which employees and employment contracts should be
INTRODUCTION-13-
 In Chapter XV.64
 See Chapter 2, part 2.4. On the other hand, the provisions on the new business rescue proceedings65
probably do not contain sufficient information on this aspect: see Chapter 2, part 3.7.2.
protected, the financing of a business during a rescue procedure (the so-called post-
commencement financing), the effect of a rescue procedure on uncompleted
contracts and the powers of the person in charge of the rescue process to have
detrimental dispositions by the debtor set aside, to name but a few. I do, however,
briefly mention or discuss some of these aspects where necessary or relevant. 
In my research I focus most particularly on the commencement and initial stages of
a rescue procedure, that is, who may take the first steps, what the requirements are, how
the procedure is commenced and who should be in charge of the company during the
rescue process. It is my belief that if the fundamentals are in place to enable a company
to access a rescue procedure timeously and fairly easily, but without the procedure
lending itself to abuse, and steps are taken to ensure that the rescue is managed by a
suitably qualified and supervised person, the exact details of the actual rescue process
become less important and should not be prescribed too rigidly, to allow some business
and commercial factors to be taken into account. I believe that this view is supported by
the fact that although the Companies Act of 1973  contains detailed and clear provisions64
setting out the powers and duties of a judicial manager during judicial management,
these provisions are of no consequence because it has become almost impossible to
place a company under judicial management.65
6 ABBREVIATIONS AND REFERENCES
In the text, the surname of the writer(s) and keywords taken from the title are used
when reference is made to textbooks and articles. The full reference of every cited
source is in the bibliography and follows directly underneath the short reference used
in the text and footnotes. The full citation of court cases is provided every time
reference is made to the case.
Although I attempted to use a consistent style of referencing, this has not always
been possible or practical. German textbooks, for example, tend to show the name
of the specific writer of each chapter, and normally I would have done the same in
my references. However, in some instances it is the name of the textbook and not so
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much those of the writer and the chapter that he or she wrote that is relevant and
then I have used the name of the textbook. This is particularly in the case of
textbooks that seem to represent the views of a group of academics and practitioners
who have associated themselves with a specific place, such as the Hamburger
Kommentar, Frankfurter Kommentar and Heidelberger Kommentar. In my view, the
identification of the groups is far more relevant than the name of the individual who
wrote the particular chapter. 
Another important point in regard to German legal texts is the fact that cases are not
referred to by their names but by the court, the seat of the court and the date on which
the decision was made, followed by a reference to the journal in which the decision was
published. In the index of cases, German cases have therefore been arranged according
to the status of the court and then its seat. Although the references are to journals, they
follow the German style of referencing, namely the abbreviated name of the journal
(without italics), the year of publication (without brackets), followed by the page numbers:
for example, Oberlandesgericht Brandenburg ZIP 2001, 1153-1154. This is intended to
distinguish them very clearly from references to articles that may have appeared in these
journals. Since the German insolvency courts are more or less the equivalent of our local
magistrates’ courts, their decisions are not binding on other courts and their significance
lies in the fact that they show different views on statutory provisions and procedures.
These decisions are summarised by the writers of textbooks to indicate general trends,
and I have therefore not referred to many of these decisions directly but rather to the
relevant textbooks. Judgments by the Federal High Court or the Constitutional Court are
of course binding, and I have referred directly to the important ones where relevant. 
The abbreviations used for journals in references to decided cases are the
following: NJW - Neue Juristische Wochenschrift; NZI - Neue Zeitschrift für das Recht
der Insolvenz und Sanierung; ZInsO - Zeitschrift für das gesamte Insolvenzrecht; ZIP -
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht und Insolvenzpraxis. 
For practical reasons the masculine form is used throughout and should be
assumed to include the feminine form.
With the approval of my promoter, Prof Alastair Smith, I have not included a word
index at the end of this thesis because every country tends to have its own very specific
terminology in respect of business rescue procedures. A specific term would therefore
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be found on every page of one chapter, but almost nowhere else. To facilitate finding a
reference to any particular topic I have, instead, compiled a very detailed Table of
Contents and I have also used the same structure and numbering of parts in each
chapter. Part 2.4, for example, always deals with the requirements for commencement
of the procedure in every chapter, while part 2.7.2 consistently covers the powers and
duties of the directors of the company during a rescue procedure. 
To the best of my knowledge and belief, the law stated in this thesis was correct
as at 30 November 2009.
 See Olver Judicial Management at 4-12 for a history of the problems experienced in practice and1
amendments effected to the relevant legislative measures to counter these problems.
 See in particular part 2.4.4 below on this aspect. The conservative approach of the courts as an2
impediment to the success of judicial management is also mentioned in Le Roux Hotel Management
(Pty) Ltd v E Rand (Pty) Ltd [2001] 1 All SA 223 (C) at 238. 
 Burdette “Unified Legislation” at 57. See also Burdette “Business Rescue Model (Part 1)” at 248-250;3
Kloppers “Judicial Management” at 423; Kloppers “Judicial Management Reform” at 371ff; Olver “Law
Reform” at 86-87; Rajak and Henning “Business Rescue” at 267-268; Smits “Corporate Administration” at
85-86. However, not all the criticism is justified, such as Cilliers, Benade et al Corporate Law par 26.03
stating that one of the major disadvantages of judicial management is that it negatively affects the
creditworthiness of the company. This cannot be regarded as an inherent or particular weakness of judicial
management since most, if not all, rescue procedures have this effect: see Finch Corporate Rescue at 372
and 457 regarding the damage to a company’s reputation that administration in England can cause, or that
directors fear it will cause.
 Hereafter referred to as the Companies Act of 2008.4
 Government Gazette No 32121 (Notice 421) of 9 April 2009.5
 The new procedures are discussed in parts 3 and 4, respectively, of this Chapter.6
 Section 7(k) of the Companies Act of 2008.7
CHAPTER 2
SOUTH AFRICA
1 INTRODUCTION
Although judicial management has been part of South African company law for almost
a century, it has never been widely accepted or used, in spite of attempts to improve it
by amendments to the relevant legislation.  As will be illustrated in the first part of this1
Chapter, this is partly due to some inherent weaknesses of the procedure itself but also
to the extremely conservative approach initially adopted by the courts when dealing with
judicial management applications, thereby establishing a body of precedents to which
other courts were bound.  Legal commentators have also been almost unanimous in2
their criticism of judicial management, even referring to it as a “dismal failure”.  3
The Companies Act 71 of 2008  was passed by Parliament on 19 November4
2008 and assented to by the President on 8 April 2009.  The Act is expected to come5
into force on or shortly after 1 July 2010 and contains the provisions regulating the
new business rescue proceedings that will replace judicial management, as well as
providing for a compromise with creditors outside business rescue proceedings.  The6
two new procedures are intended to give effect to one of the purposes of the Act
contained in section 7. This purpose is to “provide for the efficient rescue and
recovery of financially distressed companies” but in such a way that “the rights and
interests of all relevant stakeholders” will be balanced.7
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 See Chapter 1, part 5.8
 All references to sections of an Act in part 2 of this Chapter will be to the Companies Act of 19739
unless specifically stated otherwise.
 Sections 427 and 432.10
 See Millman NO v Swartland Huis Meubileerders (Edms) Bpk: Repfin Acceptances Ltd intervening11
1972 (1) SA 741 (C) at 744-745; Ben-Tovim v Ben-Tovim and Others 2000 (3) SA 325 (C) at 332;
Blackman et al Companies Act at 15–3.
 The requirements for a provisional and a final judicial management order are discussed in part 2.4 below.12
In this Chapter I will first discuss judicial management, concentrating on those
issues I have identified as most problematic,  followed by a discussion of the same8
aspects in respect of the new business rescue proceedings, incorporating some
comparisons between the two procedures. As far as possible, I will endeavour to follow
the same structure and headings in the discussions of both judicial management and
business rescue proceedings to facilitate a comparative study between the two
procedures. Finally, I will discuss the compromise with creditors that has now been
introduced as an alternative rescue procedure for a company. 
 
2 JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT
2.1 Definition and purpose
The Companies Act of 1973  does not contain a definition of judicial management,9
and one therefore has to rely on the requirements for and contents of both a
provisional and a final judicial management order to explain its nature and purpose.
Essentially, a judicial management order vests the management of an unsuccessful
company in a judicial manager under the supervision of the court, and divests the
persons currently managing the company of their powers of management, if the court
is satisfied that the company has the ability to become a successful concern.  10
It is clear from the requirements as well as case law that judicial management
has only one recognised purpose, namely the rescue of the company itself, in its
entirety. The rescue of only its business or a viable part thereof is not an acceptable
outcome and neither is a better return for creditors of shareholders.  11
 
2.2 Entities to which judicial management applies
The court may grant a judicial management order in respect of “any company” that
meets the requirements stipulated in section 427(1) of the Companies Act of 1973.12
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 See generally Loubser “Business Rescue” for a discussion of the significance and effect of the type of13
Act (ie Companies Act, Insolvency Act or separate Act) in which a business rescue procedure is contained.
 A company is defined in s 1 of the Act as being a company incorporated under this Act or a company14
which existed immediately prior to commencement of this Act under any law repealed by this Act. 
 See part 3.2 below on the (in my view misguided) application of business rescue proceedings to15
close corporations.
 See Loubser “The Unincorporated Business” at 446-449 regarding the procedures available for other16
business forms.
 See, for example, Burdette “Unified Legislation” at 48-49; Keay “To Unify” at 73-74; Kloppers “Judicial17
Management” at 418; Kloppers “Judicial Management Reform” at 368; Rajak and Henning “Business
Rescue” at 268ff; Smits “Corporate Administration” at 94.
 See part 3.2 below.18
 Section 12(1) of the Companies Act of 1973.19
 Section 427 of the Companies Act of 1973.20
 Kloppers “Judicial Management Reform” at 371; Rajak and Henning “Business Rescue” at 268ff.21
 See part 3.3.1 below.22
 Section 427(2). 23
The wording of this provision, coupled with the very fact that judicial management is
regulated by the Companies Act,  very clearly limits the application of judicial13
management to a company as defined in the Companies Act of 1973.  Therefore,14
other forms of business such as close corporations,  partnerships and business15
trusts cannot be rescued by using judicial management.  Although this aspect of16
judicial management has been criticised on the grounds that there should be only one
formal rescue procedure which applies to all business forms,  the new business17
rescue proceedings will once again apply primarily to companies.  18
2.3 Power to initiate judicial management
An order of the division of the High Court within whose area the registered office or
main place of business of the company is situated,  is required to place a company19
under judicial management.  This is one of the grounds on which judicial20
management has frequently been criticised since the formal application to, and order
of, the court required to place a company under judicial management render this
procedure expensive and onerous, making it unsuitable for smaller companies in
particular.  The simplification of the procedure to commence business rescue21
proceedings must therefore be recognised as one of its major benefits.22
The application for a judicial management order may be brought by anyone who is
entitled to apply for the winding up of the company.  Therefore, the application may be23
made by the company itself, one or more of its creditors (including contingent or
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 W ho must have been registered as a member for at least six months immediately before the24
application (s 346(2)). 
 Section 346(1). Although the liquidator of a company is not specifically authorised by the Act to apply25
for judicial management, the courts have on occasion allowed it: Common Fund Investment Society
Ltd v C O C Trust Co Ltd 1968 (4) SA 137 (C). According to Olver “Judicial Management” at 51, the
explanation is that the courts probably regard this as an application by the company itself. 
 Ex parte Russlyn Construction (Pty) Ltd 1987 (1) SA 33 (D); Ex parte Screen Media Ltd 1991 (3) SA26
462 (W ). The opposite had, however, previously been held in Ex parte Edenvale Wholesalers and
General Suppliers (Pty) Ltd 1959 (2) SA 477 (W ). 
 1993 (3) SA 488 (W ).27
 2000 (4) SA 670 (E).28
 2008 (4) SA 341 (W ).29
 At 343.30
 This problem has been avoided in the new rescue proceedings because neither the directors nor the31
company may apply to court for a business rescue order: see part 3.3.2 below.
prospective creditors), one or more of its members  or jointly by any of them.24 25
A substantial degree of uncertainty exists in respect of the power of directors to
apply for the winding up of the company (and by implication thus also for a judicial
management order). This was caused by some earlier decisions in which it was held
that an application for winding up by “the company” had to be interpreted as the
company in general meeting, which meant that such an application could be brought
only with the consent of the general meeting.  A contrary position was taken by the26
courts in Ex parte Tangent Sheeting (Pty) Ltd  and in Ex parte Graaff-Reinet Roller-27
meule (Edms) Bpk,  where it was decided that an application for liquidation of the28
company could be authorised by a resolution of the directors. 
The matter seemed to be settled, but once again, there is some uncertainty about
the authority of the board of a company to apply for liquidation (and thus also for judicial
management) as a result of the decision in Ex parte New Seasons Auto Holdings (Pty)
Ltd,  where the court held that such an application was not part of the management29
of a company and could also be abused by directors who have been guilty of
mismanagement and want to cover their tracks.  Even if this is accepted as correct,30
the question is whether the same argument would apply to an application for judicial
management which is specifically intended to rescue the company and ensure its
survival. A strong argument could be made that this is one of the main duties of the
management of company. However, since the power to apply for judicial management
is expressed with direct reference to the power to apply for liquidation, it must probably
be presumed that if directors may not apply for liquidation, the same rule applies to
judicial management.  31
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 In terms of s 427(3).32
 See part 3.5.2.4 below.33
 For a detailed discussion of the requirements for a judicial management order, see Loubser “Judicial34
Management” at 141-150. 
 Issued in terms of s 428(1): see part 2.5.1 below. 35
 See part 2.4.3 below.36
 See Loubser “Judicial Management” at 142.37
A judicial management order may also be granted when an application for the
winding up of a company is before the court if the stipulated requirements of the
Companies Act of 1973 for a judicial management order are met.  Although it is32
unlikely that the courts have made much use of this power, considering their general
reluctance to grant judicial management orders even when specifically applied for,
it at least probably influenced the decision to grant a similar power to the courts in the
provisions regulating the new business rescue proceedings.  33
2.4 Requirements for a judicial management order
Section 427(1) of the Companies Act of 1973 provides that a company may be placed
under judicial management if, by reason of mismanagement or for any other cause,
the company is unable to pay its debts or is probably unable to meet its obligations,
has not become or is prevented from becoming a successful concern and there is a
reasonable probability that if the company is placed under judicial management, it will
be enabled to pay its debts or meet its obligations and to become a successful
concern. In addition, the section also requires that it must appear just and equitable
to the court to grant a judicial management order.34
Although the heading of section 427 suggests that this section contains the
requirements for both a provisional and a final judicial management order, the
requirements contained in this section are those for a provisional judicial
management order.  The wording of section 432 that sets out the requirements for35
a final order differs to some degree from that of section 427(1) although the
requirements were probably intended to be the same.  36
The reference to mismanagement as a possible cause for the company’s
financial problems is a remnant of the original provisions contained in section 195(1)
of the Companies Act of 1926 in which mismanagement constituted separate and
specific grounds for a judicial management order.  Since this is not the case under37
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 Olver “Judicial Management” at 47; Meskin et al Henochsberg at 925; and Blackman et al Companies38
Act at 15–6 all share the view that judicial management is available to a company irrespective of the
reason for its problems. This was confirmed by the court in Gushman v TT Gushman & Son (Pty) Ltd
and Others [2009] JOL 23589 (ECM) at 18-19. However, Cilliers, Benade et al Corporate Law  par
26.01 refers to “mismanagement or other special circumstances” as being the reasons for the
company’s setback, although there is nothing in the wording of s 427(1) to substantiate the view that
there must have been special circumstances causing the problems. 
 Discussed in part 2.4.3 below. 39
 This requirement is discussed in part 2.4.4 below. The importance of the reasons for the company’s40
failure in determining whether judicial management is appropriate is stressed by Meskin et al
Henochsberg at 925, and this view was confirmed in Ex parte Onus (Edms) Bpk; Du Plooy NO v Onus
(Edms) Bpk en Andere 1980 (4) SA 63 (O) at 66; and Porterstraat 69 Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v PA Venter
Worcester (Pty) Ltd 2000 (4) SA 598 (C) at 615. 
 Section 427(1)(a).41
 Section 345, which describes these circumstances for the purposes of an application for winding up42
of a company, has not been made applicable to judicial management. In spite of this, Olver “Judicial
Management” at 49 states that the meaning of “inability to pay debts” in s 427 is the same as in s 345,
but provides no authority for this view. Meskin et al Henochsberg at 926 holds the contrary, and, I
submit, correct view that s 345 does not apply in this context.
 A possible exception would be where an application for the winding up of a company is made based43
on one of the situations set out in s 345 and it appears to the court that the grounds for the company’s
winding up may be removed if it is placed under judicial management. In terms of s 427(3) the court
may then make an order placing the company under judicial management if it also appears that the
company will become a successful concern and it would be just an equitable: see further part 2.4.5
the Companies Act of 1973,  the reference to mismanagement was not only38
unnecessary but also perpetuated the perception that the management of a company
was always to blame for the company having to be placed under judicial
management. This almost certainly played a role in directors remaining hesitant to
apply for judicial management to avoid this stigma. 
However, the reasons for the company’s financial difficulties are not irrelevant in
an application for judicial management, since they will have to be considered by the
court in determining whether the company will probably be enabled to become a
successful concern and to pay its debts if placed under judicial management,  and39
possibly even whether it is just and equitable to grant the order.40
 
2.4.1 Inability to pay debts
The first specific requirement for a provisional judicial management order is that the
company must be unable to pay its debts or must probably be unable to meet its
obligations.  Since there is no provision in terms of which a company will be deemed41
to be unable to pay its debts for the purposes of a judicial management application,42
the inability to pay debts, also referred to as commercial insolvency, must be
proved.  Actual or balance-sheet insolvency where the liabilities of the company43
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below. However, Blackman et al Companies Act at 15–5 believes that even here the application for
liquidation must have been based on the inability to pay debts.
 This differs from the grounds for business rescue proceedings in terms of the Companies Act of 200844
where both alternatives are recognised: see part 3.4.1.1 below.
 “Judicial Management” at 50.45
 See Kloppers “Judicial Management Reform” at 375-376; Smits “Corporate Administration” at 87.46
 See Chapter 3, part 2.3.2; Chapter 4, part 2.4.2.47
 In s 427(1)(b).48
exceed the value of its assets, is not recognised as grounds for a judicial
management order.  44
As an alternative to the inability to pay its debts, it may be proved that the
company is probably unable to meet its obligations. The Act does not contain any
explanation of what is meant by “obligations” but it may be assumed to have a wider
meaning than merely the payment of debts, and to include any contractual obligations
that the company must perform. According to Olver this also includes the probable
future inability of the company to meet its obligations.  However, since the45
requirement is stated in the present tense in the Act, I submit that this would only
apply to an inability to meet its obligations in the immediate or foreseeable future. 
The requirement that the company must already be unable to pay its debts
results in a substantially reduced chance of the company being successfully rescued.
It is obvious, and generally accepted, that if remedial action is taken at an early stage
of a company’s financial problems, preferably before the company has become
insolvent or unable to pay its debts, the company has a considerably better chance
of surviving.  In most business rescue procedures therefore, if a company is likely46
to become unable to pay its debts, this is also accepted as one of the grounds for
commencement of such procedure.  47
2.4.2 Failure to become a successful concern
The reason for the second requirement,  namely that the company has not become,48
or is prevented from becoming, a successful concern is not clear since a company
that is unable to pay its debts or probably unable to meet its obligations is very
obviously not a successful concern. The Act also does not indicate at what point or
under what circumstances a company would be regarded as not being a successful
concern, and this rather vague requirement is thus an unnecessary addition to the
very difficult requirements that have to be proved for a judicial management order.
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 Section 427(1). This was also stressed by the Appellate Division (as it was then) in Noordkaap49
Lewendehawe Ko-operasie Bpk v Schreuder en ’n Ander 1974 (3) SA 102 (A) at 110. However, the
court did not require a strong probability as was the case in Silverman v Doornhoek Mines Ltd; Smith
v Doornhoek Mines Ltd 1935 TPD 349 at 353.
 Kotzé v Tulryk Bpk en ’n Ander 1977 (3) SA 118 (T) at 122.50
 Marais v Leighwood Hospitals (Pty) Ltd 1950 (3) SA 567 (C); Irvin & Johnson Ltd v Oelofse Fisheries51
Ltd 1954 (1) SA 231 (E); Millman v Swartland Huis Meubileerders (Edms) Bpk 1972 (1) SA 741 (C);
Tenowitz and Another v Tenny Investments (Pty) Ltd 1979 (2) SA 680 (E). 
 See part 3.1 below.52
 1979 (2) SA 680 (E) at 683. See Hahlo at 603. The court found the reason for the more onerous53
burden of proof in the fact that on the return day, when the granting of a final order has to be
considered, the court would be in a much better position to judge the prospects of the company
because of the various reports that have to be submitted (see par 4.3 below). Cilliers, Benade et al
Corporate Law pars 26.10 and 26.27 seems to support this interpretation, although it is mentioned in
par 26.10 fn 12 that there are conflicting opinions on the matter. 
 1980 (4) SA 63 (O). The court (at 66) referred to two cases in which no heavier burden of proof54
seemed to have been required: Kotzé v Tulryk Bpk en ’n Ander 1977 (3) SA 118 (T) and Ladybrand
Hotel (Pty) Ltd v Segal and Another 1975 (2) SA 357 (O).
2.4.3 Reasonable probability that it will be enabled to pay debts or meet
obligations and become a successful concern
A very heavy burden of proof rests on the applicant as a result of the requirement that
the court must be satisfied that a reasonable probability (and not merely a possibility)
exists that the company will be enabled to pay its debts or meet its obligations and
become a successful concern if placed under judicial management.  Therefore, a49
provisional judicial management order may not be used to establish whether judicial
management will succeed in rescuing the company,  nor will a judicial management50
order be granted because it would achieve a better result for creditors than an
immediate winding-up order.  By contrast, a better result for creditors is specifically51
recognised as an acceptable outcome of the new business rescue proceedings,
although the benefits of such a provision are doubtful.  52
It appears as though section 432 places an even heavier burden of proof on the
applicant to obtain a final judicial management order. One of the requirements of this
section is that it must appear to the court that the company will be enabled to become
a successful concern, rather than a probability that it will become a successful concern.
In Tenowitz and Another v Tenny Investments (Pty) Ltd  the court interpreted this53
wording as setting a higher standard of proof, but in Ex parte Onus (Edms) Bpk; Du
Plooy NO v Onus (Edms) Bpk en Andere  the court did not agree with this view and54
held that the same burden of proof applied to an application for a provisional and a final
order, namely that of a reasonable probability.
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 Henning “Judicial Management” at 306 and cases cited there. See also Ben-Tovim v Ben-Tovim and55
Others 2000 (3) SA 325 (C) at 332. However, see Loubser “Judicial Management” at 145 for a discussion
of the apparent contradiction of this provision by the inclusion of a judicial manager as one of the persons
who may enter into a compromise with creditors (and members) of the company in terms of s 311.
 See Porterstraat 69 Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v PA Venter Worcester (Pty) Ltd 2000 (4) SA 598 (C) at56
616 and 620; BOE Bank Ltd v Upbeatprops 63 (Pty) Ltd and Others 2001 JDR 0821. 
 This was also the interpretation of Van Heerden J in Ben-Tovim v Ben-Tovim and Others 2000 (3)57
SA 325 (C), referred to with approval by Nhlangulela J in Gushman v TT Gushman & Son (Pty) Ltd and
Others [2009] JOL 23589 (ECM) at 3. Section 432(2), which contains the requirements for a final
judicial management order, refers only to the company becoming a successful concern and not to
payment of its debts.
 Smalberger J in Tenowitz and Another v Tenny Investments (Pty) Ltd 1979 (2) SA 680 (E) at 683 said58
as much when he stated that “the company becoming a successful concern presupposes that it will be able
to pay its debts”. This interpretation is echoed by Cilliers, Benade et al Corporate Law par 26.10.
 To achieve this, the company would have to be wound up and the liquidator given the authority to59
continue the business and to sell the viable part of it as a going concern in terms of s 386(3) and (4)
of the Companies Act of 1973. 
 Rajak and Henning “Business Rescue” at 267-268; Smits “Corporate Administration” at 86; Burdette60
“Unified Legislation” at 58. See part 3.1 below regarding the possibility of a rescue of only the business
of a company by the use of the new business rescue proceedings. 
However, there is general consensus that the requirement that the company
must be enabled to pay its debts means that all debts must be paid in full and within
a reasonable time.  Usually this leads to the further requirement that the court must55
be satisfied that the company will be able to find the necessary funds or financing to
pay its debts.56
I submit that the provision requiring the applicant to show that judicial
management will enable the company to pay its debts and become a successful
concern should be viewed as a single requirement, although the wording of section
427(1) is not clear in this regard.  It may safely be assumed that once a company57
becomes able to pay its debts it will be a successful concern.58
It is clear from this requirement that the corporate entity itself must be rescued
by judicial management, and not just the business of the company, or a viable part
thereof.59
This requirement and its restrictive interpretation by the courts have been
severely criticised as being too stringent and so difficult to prove that most companies
with financial difficulties are precluded from obtaining a judicial management order.60
Considering the fact that at the time of the application to court for a provisional order
it must be proved that the company is already unable to pay its debts, it will always
be extremely difficult and often quite impossible to satisfy the court that all the
company’s debts will be paid if a judicial management order is granted. 
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 In s 195(1).61
 See Loubser “Judicial Management” at 147-150 for a discussion of the origins and history of this62
requirement and the resulting incorrect interpretation attached to it.
 In terms of s 344(h) of the Companies Act of 1973, “just and equitable” is one of the grounds on63
which a company may be wound up, and this was found to be sufficiently vague for the courts to
compile a list of categories into which cases constituting this ground would usually fall: see Rand Air
(Pty) Ltd v Ray Bester Investments (Pty) Ltd 1985 (2) SA 345 (W ).
 See, for example, Silverman v Doornhoek Mines Ltd; Smith v Doornhoek Mines Ltd 1935 TPD 349;64
Ladybrand Hotel (Pty) Ltd v Segal and Another 1975 (2) SA 357 (O) at 359; Kotzé v Tulryk Bpk en ’n
Ander 1977 (3) SA 118 (T) at 122; Ben-Tovim v Ben-Tovim and Others 2000 (3) SA 325 (C) at 331;
Le Roux Hotel Management (Pty) Ltd v E Rand (Pty) Ltd [2001] 1 All SA 223 (C) at 233; Gushman v
TT Gushman & Son (Pty) Ltd and Others [2009] JOL 23589 (ECM) at 24. As Kloppers “Judicial
Management” at 426 correctly points out, there is nothing in the legislation that merits the treatment
of judicial management as an extraordinary measure.
 For example, in Rustomjee v Rustomjee (Pty) Ltd 1960 (2) SA 753 (D) at 758; Ronaasen and Others v65
Ronaasen & Morgan (Pty) Ltd 1935 CPD 562 at 563. The opposite and, I submit, more correct view that
other considerations such as the size and activities of the business should determine whether judicial
management is an appropriate remedy was expressed in Tobacco Auctions Ltd v AW Hamilton (Pvt) Ltd
1966 (2) SA 451 (R) at 453.
 Makhuva and Others v Lukhoto Bus Service (Pty) Ltd and Others 1987 (3) SA 376 (V); Repp v66
Ondundu Goldfields Ltd 1937 CPD 375 at 379-380; Ben-Tovim v Ben-Tovim and Others 2000 (3) SA
325 (C). But see Meskin et al Henochsberg at 925 where it is submitted that the mere fact that a
company’s domestic procedures could be invoked to overcome its difficulties is not a sufficient ground
for refusing a judicial management order; the moratorium may in fact be necessary in some cases to
enable the company to use these procedures after termination of judicial management. 
2.4.4 Just and equitable
The requirement that it must appear just and equitable to the court to grant a judicial
management order, is probably the most problematic one of all the requirements
contained in section 427(1). This requirement was taken over from the requirements
for judicial management contained in the Companies Act of 1926  where it was set61
in a completely different situation, namely where a court was authorised to issue an
order for judicial management even though the application before it was for the
winding up of the company.  Since no indication is given in the Companies Act of62
1973 as to what circumstances would satisfy this requirement,  the courts adopted63
several interpretations. The most widely accepted one, largely based on the
interpretation of this requirement as set in the Companies Act of 1926, is that judicial
management is a special privilege and an extraordinary procedure that infringes on
the rights of creditors to liquidate a company to obtain payment of their claims and
should therefore be ordered only under very special and exceptional circumstances.64
Other interpretations of this requirement include that judicial management is
probably not intended for a small private company  or that it should be granted only65
if there is no other appropriate remedy available.  66
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 See part 3.4.2 below.67
 “Judicial Management” at 42.68
 Section 427(2) read with s 346(4)(a) of the Companies Act of 1973. The notice requirement is far69
more limited than that required for an application for winding up: see Loubser “Corporate Rescue and
Labour Legislation” at 61-64 for a discussion of the notice requirements set by labour legislation for an
application for winding up and the problems created by the fact that judicial management was not
included or considered in the relevant legislation. 
I submit that this requirement is completely unnecessary considering the already
strenuous requirements that an applicant for judicial management has to meet, and
probably contributed quite substantially to the failure of judicial management to
become a popular and successful corporate rescue measure. A similar, and equally
vague requirement also appears in the Companies Act of 2008, although fortunately
only as one of the grounds on which a court may issue an order commencing
business rescue proceedings, and not as a requirement in all instances.  67
2.4.5 Requirements where the application is for winding up
In terms of section 427(3) of the Companies Act of 1973 the court may grant a judicial
management order when an application is heard for the winding up of a company. A
provisional judicial management order may be issued if it appears to the court that
such an order would remove the grounds for winding up the company, would result
in the company becoming a successful concern, and granting such an order would
be just and equitable. Although these requirements seem to differ quite substantially
from those that apply when the application is for judicial management, Olver  argues68
that it is unlikely that the courts would adopt a different test here from the one used
to decide whether a provisional order should be granted in terms of section 427(1).
2.5 Procedure to commence judicial management
The applicant for a judicial management order must lodge a copy of the application and
every supporting affidavit with the Master of the High Court at the seat of the court
before presenting his application to court.  The Act requires only this limited prior69
notification of the intended application, thereby also limiting the potentially damaging
result to a company’s reputation and business which wider prior notification would
almost certainly have. This is in sharp contrast to the very unfortunate requirement in the
Companies Act of 2008 which requires prior notification of an application to court for the
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 See part 3.5.2.1 below.70
 Section 428(1).71
 See part 2.5.2 below.72
 “Judicial Management” at 55.73
 Paragraph 51.05 at 528.74
 See part 3.5.2.1 below.75
 Section 428(1).76
commencement of business rescue proceedings to every shareholder, creditor and
employee or trade union representing employees of the company.  70
2.5.1 The provisional judicial management order
If the court is satisfied that all the requirements have been met, it may grant a
provisional judicial management order, dismiss the application, or make any other
order that it deems just.  Since commentators agree that the power of the court to71
make any order it deems just when refusing to make a final judicial management
order does not include the power to order the winding up of the company, it must be
assumed that the same principle applies here.  This means that if the court72
dismisses the application for judicial management, a specific application for winding
up of the company will have to be brought in a separate action. 
There is some uncertainty as to whether “any other order” includes the power to
grant a final judicial management order immediately. Olver  submits that a provisional73
order must first be granted, and that “any other order” does not include a final order
although it has been so interpreted in some instances. 
The introduction of a provisional order was in fact recommended in the Van Wyk
de Vries Report  to provide an opportunity for creditors in particular to voice their74
opinion and oppose the making of a final order if they wish to do so. This offsets the
disadvantages of not being notified of the intended application before it is heard by
the court for the first time. Although it is clear that having to approach the court twice
before a final judicial management order is obtained, adds to the already substantial
costs of the procedure, the alternative of notifying creditors before the application is
presented to court is, I submit, too harmful to the company’s business and reputation
and its chances of being successfully rescued, to be acceptable.  75
A provisional judicial management order must stipulate a return day on which the
court will decide whether to grant a final order.  The return day may not be more than76
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 Section 432(1). This date may be extended by the court on good cause shown.77
 Section 429(b)(i). See part 2.7.1.1 below regarding the appointment of both the provisional and the78
final judicial managers. 
 Section 429(a).79
 In terms of s 429(b)(i) the Master must appoint such a provisional judicial manager without delay.80
 The same problem has been identified in the English system of administration: see Chapter 3, part 2.4.81
 His duties are set out in s 430.82
 Section 430(c)(i)-(v).83
 Section 430(c)(vi).84
 Section 429(b)(ii). See part 3.7.1.1 below on the difference in the procedure in business rescue85
proceedings and the potential problems it may cause.
sixty days after the date of the provisional order.77
It is the duty of the Master of the High Court to appoint a provisional judicial
manager as soon as a provisional judicial management order has been issued.78
A provisional judicial management order has the effect that all the property of the
company is deemed to be in the custody of the Master until the appointment of a
provisional judicial manager.  This measure is intended to prevent the directors from79
disposing of company assets during the inevitable delay between the issuing of the
provisional judicial management order and the appointment of the provisional judicial
manager.  However, there is no provision to protect the company from being stripped80
of its assets by directors before the provisional order is made.  81
The most important duty of a provisional judicial manager,  apart from taking82
control of all the assets and of the management of the company, is to prepare a report
containing a description of the general state of affairs of the company, a list of the
company’s assets and liabilities with details of each creditor and his claim, an
explanation of the reasons for the company’s problems and how the capital required to
continue the business will be raised.  The provisional judicial manager is also required83
to express his opinion on the prospects of the company becoming a successful concern
and the removal of the facts or circumstances that are preventing the company from
becoming a successful concern.  84
Another duty of the Master is to convene separate meetings of the creditors, members
and debenture-holders of the company after a provisional judicial management order has
been issued.  These meetings are held to consider the above-mentioned report of the85
provisional judicial manager and decide whether judicial management is desirable;
nominate a person for appointment as final judicial manager if the order is made final; give
creditors the opportunity to prove their claims against the company; and to decide whether
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 Section 431(2).86
 Section 432(2).87
 Section 432(3)(a).88
 Section 432(2).89
 Section 346(1)(f) of the Companies Act of 1973 specifically authorises a provisional judicial manager90
to apply for the winding up of the company if the provisional judicial management order is discharged.
Meskin et al Henochsberg at 941 submits that this does not exclude the locus standi of a creditor or
any of the other possible applicants listed in s 346(1) in such a case.
 Meskin et al Henochsberg at 941; Blackman et al Companies Act at 15–19. See part 3.5.2.5 below91
on the express power now given to the courts to order liquidation of the company when dismissing an
application for the commencement of business rescue proceedings.
the creditors should pass a resolution to accord preference over unsecured pre-judicial
management claims to post-commencement liabilities incurred in the conduct of the
company’s business during judicial management.  86
The reports of the proceedings of each of these meetings, prepared by the
chairperson, must be taken into account by the court when deciding whether to grant a
final judicial management order.  87
2.5.2 The final judicial management order
In terms of section 432(2), the court must consider the opinions and wishes of
creditors and members of the company as reported by the chairperson, and the
reports of the provisional judicial manager, the Master and the Registrar of
Companies on the return day stipulated in the provisional order. The court may grant
a final judicial management order if it appears that the order will enable the company
to become a successful concern and that it is just and equitable. The final order must
direct that the management of the company will vest in the final judicial manager,
subject to the supervision of the court, and order the provisional manager to hand
over all matters to the final judicial manager if he is not the same person.88
Alternatively, the court may discharge the provisional order or make any other
order it may deem just.  There is general consensus that “any other order” does not89
include a winding-up order, even if the court refuses to order judicial management
and believes that the company should be liquidated. A winding-up order may be
issued only if there is a proper application to wind up the company before the court;90
otherwise the court should simply discharge the provisional order.91
The detailed duties and powers of the judicial manager set out in the Companies
Act of 1973 are subject to the memorandum and articles of association of the company,
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 Section 433.92
 Section 434(2). It is clear that the payment of creditors is always an important issue in judicial93
management.
 Section 431(2) and (4).94
 Section 434(3).95
 Blackman et al Companies Act at 15–29.96
 See part 3.2 below.97
 Section 434(1). A judicial manager was given leave by the court to sell all the assets of the company98
as a going concern in Ex parte Vermaak 1964 (3) SA 175 (O) and in Ex parte Joubert 1970 (3) SA 511
(T), but in Ex parte Paterson NO: In re Goodearth Estates (Pty) Ltd 1974 (4) SA 281 (E) it was refused.
W ith respect, the last-mentioned decision seems to be correct, since one of the reasons for this
restriction is to prevent judicial management from being turned into an unofficial (and thus
unsupervised) liquidation of the company by the judicial manager: Olver “Judicial Management” at 9-10;
Blackman et al Companies Act 15–27ff. 
in so far as they are not inconsistent with the judicial management order.  92
Section 434(2) provides that if any money becomes available to the judicial
manager he must, in so far as circumstances permit, use the funds to pay the claims
of creditors dating from before the judicial management order was issued, but only
after payment of the costs of judicial management and of conducting of the
company’s business.  93
The requirement that creditors must prove their claims in the same way as in a
winding-up procedure,  coupled with the provision that payment must be made in94
accordance with the law relating to insolvency,  implies that only creditors who have95
formally lodged their claims may be paid. This seems an anomaly when considering
that judicial management is supposed to result in the full recovery of the company
and the ability to pay all its debts, but has evidently been accepted without question
in practice.  This must surely be one of the reasons why judicial management is96
widely regarded as merely a first (and mostly unnecessary) step towards liquidation!
The question whether the provisions regulating the rescue of a company or its
business should be contained in a Companies Act or whether it properly belongs in an
Insolvency Act is pertinently raised by these provisions. It has now once again been
raised by the provisions regulating business rescue proceedings which are housed in
the Companies Act of 2008 but include several references to insolvency law.  97
Although a judicial manager takes over the control and management of the
company, he is not authorised to dispose of the company’s assets except in the
ordinary course of the company’s business or with the approval of the court.  98
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 Section 432(4). 99
 See parts 2.7.1.3. and 2.9 below.100
 A member, the applicant for the judicial management order, a creditor, the provisional judicial manager101
or the Master may apply for variation or discharge of a provisional judicial management order: s 428(3). 
 In terms of s 412, which has been made applicable to judicial management by s 439, this would102
presumably include only creditors who have proved their claims against the company. 
 Meskin et al Henochsberg at 942. See further part 2.7.1.3 below on the uncertain legal position103
regarding a judicial manager’s removal from office.
 Section 428(2). In Lief NO v Western Credit (Africa) (Pty) Ltd 1966 (3) SA 344 (W ) it was held that no104
concursus creditorum is created by a judicial management order. As a result, in Transkei Development
Corporation Ltd v Oshkosh Africa (Pty) Ltd 1986 (1) SA 150 (C) at 154 it was held that set-off automatically
takes place between debts incurred before and those incurred after judicial management even if the judicial
management order puts a moratorium on claims against the company. 
The terms of the final judicial management order may be varied by the court that
granted it, on application by the Master, the final judicial manager or a representative
acting on behalf of the general body of creditors by virtue of a resolution passed by
a majority in value and number of them at a creditors’ meeting.  Apart from an99
application for cancellation of the judicial management order,  this is the only100
measure available to creditors (but not to members)  who have concerns about the101
course of the judicial management process or the actions of the judicial manager. The
usefulness of this measure to prevent a judicial manager from acting in a harmful or
incompetent manner is doubtful when one considers that a meeting of “the general
body of creditors”  would first have to be arranged (obviously without any assistance102
from the judicial manager) to obtain the required mandate. The section furthermore
requires a mandate in terms of a resolution by a majority in value and number of
“such” creditors (that is, the general body of creditors) and not merely of those
creditors attending the meeting – an almost impossible task! Even if all these hurdles
are overcome successfully, there is some doubt as to whether a court would be
prepared to allow the use of this measure to challenge the conduct of a judicial
manager, since the prevailing view seems to be that the court should vary the order
only if it is necessary for the purposes of the judicial management of the company.103
2.6 The moratorium
2.6.1 Moratorium on legal proceedings
A provisional judicial management order may provide that all actions, proceedings, the
execution of all writs, summonses and other processes against the company will be
stayed during judicial management and may only proceed with the leave of the court.104
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 Cilliers, Benade et al Corporate Law par 26.01-26.02; Blackman et al Companies Act at 15–12 and105
15–21; Henning “Surchéance” at 538. 
 Both s 359(1)(a) of the Companies Act in respect of the effect of liquidation on legal proceedings106
and s 20(1)(b) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 in respect of the effect of sequestration on an
insolvent’s property, specifically refer to a stay on civil proceedings. 
 See part 3.6.2 below.107
 Cilliers, Benade et al Corporate Law par 26.29 fn 42.108
A moratorium on enforcement actions against the company is thus not an automatic
result of a judicial management order but must specifically be applied for. Since a
moratorium is one of the major advantages of any rescue procedure, judicial
management is unlikely to succeed without such an order.  It is unclear whether a105
court may order a moratorium on only some actions or whether it has to order a total
moratorium on all actions or none at all. Furthermore, the moratorium is not specifically
limited to civil actions,  and it would seem that a general moratorium will also include106
a stay on criminal actions against the company.
However, what is clear from the wording of this provision is that a moratorium
does not discharge or release the company from payment of its debts, but merely
protects the company from enforcement of these claims during judicial management.
Although this would seem to be the obvious meaning of a moratorium, the drafters
of the Companies Act of 2008 seem to have confused these two completely different
principles in dealing with uncompleted contracts to which the company is a party at
the commencement of business rescue proceedings.107
Section 432(3) does not provide for a moratorium in the case of a final judicial
management order, but it must be assumed that it will automatically be included if a
provisional order containing a moratorium is made final. Some commentators have
interpreted the fact that section 432(3) does not contain any reference to a
moratorium as having the effect that the court cannot grant leave for the lifting of a
stay after the final judicial management order has been given.  I submit that this108
interpretation is probably not correct since this section’s complete omission of any
reference to a moratorium in the case of a final judicial management order is unlikely
to mean that one part of the provisions dealing with the moratorium in respect of a
provisional order would still apply (that is, the possibility that a moratorium may be
ordered), but not the other part of the provisions which allows the court to lift the
moratorium on a particular legal action.
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 As regulated by ss 26-34 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936.109
 Section 436.110
 See part 2.4.1 above.111
 See part 3.6.2 on the rather otiose provision regulating voidable transactions in the case of business112
rescue proceedings. 
 Section 339.113
 See Bertelsmann et al Mars at 222-225 regarding the effect on uncompleted contracts if the114
company is in liquidation.
 This is in contrast to liquidation where they are immediately suspended by a liquidation order and115
automatically terminated 45 days after appointment of a final liquidator: s 38 of the Insolvency Act 24
of 1936 read with s 339 of the Companies Act. All the provisions of labour legislation applicable to
There seems to be no discernible reason why the legislation should not have
provided for an automatic moratorium resulting from both a provisional and a final
order, but there are compelling reasons why it should. The court has been given a
clear discretion whether to order a stay, and it is thus possible that for some reason
a court could decide to grant a judicial management order but refuse to order a
moratorium. In such a case the judicial management is virtually doomed to failure
because the company is not protected from creditors enforcing their claims. 
2.6.2 Effect on contracts
The judicial manager is specifically authorised to apply to court for the setting aside
of voidable and undue preferences  made by the company before the application109
for judicial management was presented to court, if the company is unable to pay its
debts.  As the inability to pay its debts is one of the requirements for a company to110
be placed under judicial management,  it is unclear why this condition should be111
specifically stated. However, the provision itself is a major advantage since it creates
the possibility that a judicial manager may reverse financially prejudicial contracts
entered into by the company before judicial management or to retrieve assets that are
important for the continuation of the company’s business.  112
Contrary to the case of liquidation,  other provisions of insolvency law have not113
been made applicable to judicial management, which means that existing contracts
are not affected. The judicial manager cannot refuse to perform in terms of any
uncompleted contracts since the company will not be protected against orders for
specific performance, except to the extent that a moratorium applies, which can be
lifted by the court.  Employment contracts are not mentioned at all and therefore114
also remain unaffected by a judicial management order.  115
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solvent companies will therefore apply to a company under judicial management: see generally
Loubser “Corporate Rescue and Labour Legislation”. On the other hand, the effect of the new business
rescue proceedings on employment contracts, are expressly stipulated in the Companies Act of 2008:
see part 3.1 below. 
 Section 15(1A). See further below.116
 Section 429(b)(i).117
 In terms of s 368, which also does not prescribe any specific procedure for the appointment of a118
provisional liquidator.
 No legal basis exists for the appointment of such a panel and in Germany a similar practice was119
declared unconstitutional by the German Constitutional Court: see Chapter 4, part 2.7.1.2.5. 
 This is referred to as the “requisition system” that attempts to ensure continuity by appointing a120
person who will be supported by the majority of creditors for appointment as final liquidator or judicial
manager. See Calitz and Burdette “Insolvency Practitioners” at 732-735; and Loubser “Insolvency
Practitioners” at 124-126.
 See 2.4.4 above.121
 Although the Companies Act falls under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Trade and Industry, the122
reference here is to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development: see the definition of
“Minister” in s 1(1) of the Companies Act. 
 Act 16 of 2003.123
 See eg Financial Mail of 28 February 2003 at 25; Business Day 28 August 2002 reported at <http://124
www.bday.co.za> visited on 30 August 2002.
 In s 15(1A)(a).125
2.7 Managing the procedure
2.7.1 The provisional and final judicial managers
2.7.1.1 Appointment
2.7.1.1.1 Provisional judicial manager
As soon as a provisional judicial management order has been granted, the Master of
the High Court must appoint a provisional judicial manager in accordance with the
policy determined by the Minister,  to take over the management of the company.116 117
Since the Companies Act of 1973 does not contain a prescribed procedure for such
appointment, the Master will usually follow the same procedure as that for the appointment
of a provisional liquidator  by appointing a provisional judicial manager from his panel118 119
of insolvency practitioners who enjoys the support of the majority of creditors.120
The consistent view of our courts that judicial management is an infringement of
the rights of creditors to liquidate the company and obtain immediate payment of their
claims,  also ensures that the Master would invariably appoint a provisional judicial121
manager favoured by the creditors. 
The requirement that this appointment must be in accordance with a policy
determined by the Minister,  was introduced into the Companies Act by the Judicial122
Matters Amendment Act,  partly in reaction to persistent allegations of corruption in the123
appointment of liquidators in particular.  The Minister is authorised  to determine a124 125
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 Memorandum on the Objects of the Judicial Matters Amendments Bill, 2003 par 2.2.126
 Section 15(1A)(b).127
 Meskin et al Insolvency Law at 4.1 (in fn 9A) and again at 4.22 (fn 3A) refers to two such judgments,128
namely Distributive Catering Hotels and Allied Workers’ Union v The Master of the High Court and
Others [2006] JOL 17093 (T) and SACCAWU v Master of the High Court [2007] 4 All SA 1034 (T) and
describes the basis for these decisions as “doubtful” and the internal policy document as having “no
standing in law” .
 Section 374 authorises the Master to appoint a co-liquidator, and this provision will also apply to129
judicial managers in terms of s 431(4), which makes those provisions relating to the nomination and
appointment of a liquidator applicable to the nomination and appointment of judicial managers.
policy for the appointment of provisional judicial managers (as well as curators bonis,
trustees, provisional trustees, co-trustees, liquidators and co-liquidators) by the Master
of the High Court. The purpose of the legislation was explained as being first to create
uniform procedures in all the Masters’ offices for the appointment of these functionaries
and thereby promoting the image of insolvency practitioners and of the Masters’
Division, and secondly to promote consistency, fairness, transparency and the
achievement of equality (for persons previously disadvantaged by unfair discrimination)
in these appointments.  However, no such policy has yet been published in the126
Government Gazette or tabled in Parliament as required by the legislation.  In spite of127
this, some judges seem to regard themselves bound to apply an internal policy
document issued by the Minister long before the introduction of section 15(1A)(a) and
which clearly has no legal basis.  128
Strictly speaking, any such policy can apply only to those functionaries who are
appointed by the Master, such as the provisional judicial manager, and not to those
whose nomination by creditors must merely be accepted and confirmed (or not) by
the Master, such as the final judicial manager. However, the Master is authorised to
appoint a co-judicial manager in addition to the one nominated by creditors, and in
such a case the official policy would apply once it has been properly proclaimed.129
By all appearances, the Master is already using this power to enforce his unofficial
policy by the appointment of co-liquidators and co-judicial managers. 
2.7.1.1.2 Final judicial manager
The person or persons whose names are to be submitted to the Master for
appointment as final judicial manager(s) are nominated at the meetings of creditors
and members convened by the Master after a provisional judicial management order
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 Section 431(2). See part 2.5.1 above.130
 Section 431(4).131
 Convened by the Master in terms of s 429(b)(ii): see part 2.5.1 above.132
 In terms of s 431(4).133
 Sections 370(1) and 431(4). See further Loubser “Shareholders” at 375-376.134
 Section 346(1) authorises the provisional judicial manager, inter alia, to apply for winding up of the135
company. 
 As set out in ss 372 and 373.136
has been issued.  The nomination and appointment of a final judicial manager are130
regulated mutatis mutandis by the provisions which apply to the nomination and
appointment of a liquidator of a company which is being wound up.  In most cases131
the same person who was appointed as provisional judicial manager will be
nominated by the creditors at their meeting  and then appointed as final judicial132
manager by the Master.  However, the Master is authorised to refuse to appoint the133
nominated person without having to supply reasons for his refusal.  134
If the judicial management order is not made final on the return day, the court may
make an order for the winding up of the company if a proper application for such order
is before it.  The Companies Act does not prohibit the subsequent appointment of135
either a provisional or final judicial manager as liquidator for the same company.
2.7.1.2 Qualifications
The Master may appoint any person as a judicial manager, except the auditor of the
company or a person disqualified under the Companies Act of 1973 from being
appointed as a liquidator in a winding up.  136
The disqualifications for nomination or appointment as a liquidator of a company
that is being wound up are found in section 372 of the Companies Act and are very
general in nature. The list includes the normally disqualified persons namely
insolvents, minors and other persons under legal disability, non-residents of South
Africa, corporate bodies, agents of creditors who hold power of attorney to vote on
behalf of these creditors at creditors’ meetings, any person removed from an office
of trust by the Court for misconduct or a person disqualified from being a director by
an order of court. Furthermore, any person who has been convicted anywhere in the
world of the crimes of theft, fraud, forgery or uttering a forged document, or perjury,
and sentenced to imprisonment without the option of fine or to a fine exceeding R20,
is also disqualified, as is a person who has influenced or attempted to influence
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 Section 372(i). An auditor is also disqualified but subject to an exception. This will obviously not137
apply to judicial management, as there is a blanket prohibition on the appointment of the company’s
auditor as judicial manager. 
 In terms of s 373.138
 Section 373(a) and (b).139
 See part 2.7.1.1.2 above.140
 Sections 429(b)(i) and 375(1) respectively. But see part 3.7.1.2 below regarding business rescue141
practitioners who will generally not be required to provide security. 
 Olver “Judicial Management” at 2 explains that already in 1926, when the introduction of judicial142
management was debated in Parliament, Sir Drummond Chaplin suggested that special business
qualifications should be required for appointment as judicial manager. See also Burdette “Unified
Legislation” at 57; Rajak and Henning “Business Rescue” at 268; Loubser “Insolvency Practitioners”
at 125-126. 
someone by means of any misrepresentation or reward, to nominate or vote for, or
effect his appointment as liquidator of any company. A director or officer of the
company acting as such at any time during the immediately preceding twelve months
is specifically disqualified.  137
Finally, a person may be disqualified from appointment as a liquidator permanently
or for a limited period, in terms of an order of court on application by any interested
person as a result of dishonest conduct in his capacity as liquidator or proposed
liquidator.  The grounds for such an order relate to accepting or soliciting payment of138
part of the remuneration or commission of a person employed in the liquidation of the
company or improperly obtaining votes for his nomination or appointment as
liquidator.  139
As already mentioned above, the Master of the High Court may also refuse to
appoint or to confirm the appointment of a person whom he believes to be unsuitable,
and in such a case need not supply any reasons for his decision.140
The only positive qualification for appointment as provisional or final judicial
manager is that the person must furnish security for the proper performance of his
duties.  The fact that judicial managers (and liquidators) are not required to have141
any professional training and that membership of a professional body is not
compulsory means that there is virtually no control over the activities of negligent,
dishonest or incompetent judicial managers. 
There is wide consensus that this complete lack of requirements for appointment
as judicial manager is one of the main reasons why judicial management in South
Africa does not have a high success rate.  Since a judicial manager is not142
disqualified from appointment as liquidator where judicial management fails and the
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 This omission is addressed in the Companies Act of 2008 that contains a blanket prohibition on the143
appointment of the business rescue practitioner as liquidator in a subsequent winding up of the
company: see part 3.9.1.1 below .
 Section 429(b)(i).144
 Section 440(1). See part 2.9 below for a discussion of the cancellation of the order.145
 Section 440(2).146
 The Act is clear about the fact that the directors are divested of their management powers: see147
further part 2.7.2 below.
 In s 196(2).148
 In Samuels v Nicholls and Another 1948 (2) SA 255 (W ) at 260 the court therefore held that an149
unsuitable judicial manager did not make the judicial management itself undesirable and an application
for cancellation of the judicial management order was not the appropriate remedy in this instance.
company is subsequently wound up, the failure of judicial management could even
have a financial advantage for a judicial manager.143
2.7.1.3 Vacation of or removal from office
The term of office of a provisional judicial manager lasts until the court grants a final
judicial management order or discharges the provisional order.  144
A final judicial manager is automatically divested of his functions if the court
cancels the judicial management order.  The court must then give whatever145
directions may be necessary for the future management and control of the company
by its officers, including directions for the convening of a general meeting of members
to elect directors.  The last-mentioned provision could be an indication that the146
directors of a company are automatically removed from office when the company is
placed under judicial management, but could also merely refer to the possibility that
none of the previous directors are still in office at the time that the final judicial
management order is cancelled.147
In contrast to the Companies Act of 1926 that specifically provided for an
application to court for the removal and substitution of a judicial manager  (who was148
directly appointed by the court in the original order),  the Companies Act of 1973149
makes no express provision for the removal of a judicial manager. I submit that
section 379 of the Act, which provides for the removal of a liquidator by the Master
or the court, does not apply to judicial management since section 431(4) makes only
those provisions of the Companies Act of 1973 dealing with “the nomination and
appointment of a liquidator” applicable to a judicial manager. Furthermore, section
431 very specifically deals only with the first meetings of creditors and members
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 In Ex parte the Judicial Manager of Die Transvaalse Begrafnis Genootskap (Eiendoms) Beperk 1946150
TPD 649 at 651, De Villiers J stated that provisions applicable to liquidation could not by implication
apply to judicial management as well because the two processes were not parallel. However, see
Meskin et al Henochsberg at 944 for the opposite view. Blackman et al Companies Act at 15–18 seems
ambivalent about the issue, first admitting that s 379 does not, “strictly speaking”, deal with the
nomination and appointment of a liquidator, then arguing for a broad interpretation of this phrase to
include the removal of a liquidator but conceding that the context of s 431(4), namely the meetings of
creditors and members, would present a problem when applying this broader meaning to the section.
 The Master v Bell NO 1955 (3) SA 100 (T) cited with apparent approval by Blackman et al151
Companies Act at 15–25.
 This omission is not repeated in the Companies Act of 2008 where provision is made for the removal152
of a business rescue practitioner by an order of court: see part 3.7.1.3 below. 
 Section 378(2).153
 Section 377.154
 In terms of s 431(4).155
where the nomination of a final judicial manager takes place and cannot be presumed
to include provisions dealing with his resignation or removal.  150
Section 432(4) of the Companies Act of 1973 which provides for an application to
court for the variation of the terms of the order is also not applicable since the judicial
manager is not appointed by the court as part of the judicial management order, but by
the Master of the High Court. In at least one instance, the court held that it had an
inherent power to remove a judicial manager.  The only alternative would be an151
application for cancellation of the judicial management order, which would be a very
drastic step to take merely to remove an incompetent or dishonest judicial manager.152
The same uncertainty exists in respect of the question whether a judicial manager
may resign from office. The Companies Act of 1973  provides that a liquidator may153
request the Master to relieve him of his office or direct him to resign, and also, in a
different section,  prescribes the procedure that must be followed to nominate and154
appoint a liquidator to fill any vacancy that may occur in the office of liquidator. Although
the last-mentioned section could be regarded as one relating to the nomination and
appointment of a liquidator and thus applicable to judicial management,  the provision155
regulating his resignation cannot. In the absence of a specific provision allowing the
judicial manager to resign, it cannot simply be assumed that he has such a right. The
resignation of a judicial manager would probably be interpreted by creditors as a sign
that the judicial management is failing, with a resultant loss of faith in the process, while
the break in continuity during this particularly sensitive period in a company’s business
will almost certainly impact negatively on the outcome of the rescue attempt. It is
therefore not surprising that in some jurisdictions the person steering the rescue process
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 See Chapter 3, part 2.7.1.3 and Chapter 4, part 2.7.1.3.156
 See part 3.7.1.3 below regarding the apparent unrestricted right of a business rescue practitioner157
to resign from office.
 Sections 428(2)(a) and 432(3)(a).158
 Section 433(f)-(g). This was also stated very clearly in Alpha Bank Bpk en Andere v Registrateur159
van Banke en Andere 1996 (1) SA 330 (A) at 352.
 See part 6 below regarding the termination of judicial management.160
 Blackman et al Companies Act at 15–21 are the only commentators who make a pertinent statement161
to the effect that directors cease to hold office on the making of a judicial management order. Others
merely state that directors are divested of their powers (which could mean the same thing): Cilliers,
Benade et al Corporate Law par 26.18; Meskin et al Henochsberg at 936 and 945. 
 Section 433(a).162
has no, or only a limited right to resign from office.  However, it could be argued that156
forcing a person to remain in office against his will could also harm the process. In my
view, the solution to this problem would be to restrict the right of such a person to resign
from office to ensure that he may only resign if he is no longer able to perform his duties
properly.  157
2.7.2 Powers and duties of the directors
Any person vested with the management of the affairs of a company is divested of
this power from the date of a provisional judicial management order in respect of the
company.  Therefore, the directors of a company lose their powers and authority to158
manage the company as soon as the company is placed under provisional judicial
management, and apparently lose even other powers such as the power to call the
annual general meeting or to perform other routine duties since these are specifically
vested in the judicial manager.  159
It is not clear whether the directors also cease to hold office on the granting of a
judicial management order, or whether they are merely divested of all, or most of their
powers. Section 440(2) provides that when cancelling a judicial management order, the
court may give directions for the convening of a general meeting of members to elect
directors for the company,  which implies that a judicial management order has the160
effect of removing the directors from office.  However, the subsection specifically refers161
to “such directions as may be necessary” which could also mean that the court should
order a general meeting only if it is necessary because there are no directors left to
resume management of the company. Since the Act specifically states that the judicial
manager “shall ... assume the management of the company”  and no mention is made162
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 This is also the view held by Blackman et al Companies Act at 15–43 and, apparently, Meskin et al163
Henochsberg at 959. Both these textbooks refer to Ex parte Niven 1957 (1) SA 10 (SR) in which it was
held that the local predecessor of s 440(2) also authorised the court to appoint a manager until the
general meeting of members could elect directors. 
 See part 2.5.1 above.164
 Kloppers “Judicial Management” at 427; Rajak and Henning “Business Rescue” at 286; and Smits165
“Corporate Administration” at 103.
 See part 3.8 below on the detailed requirements for a business rescue plan that is compulsory in166
all business rescue proceedings.
 In Keens Electrical (Jhb) (Edms) Bpk en ’n Ander v Lightman Wholesalers (Edms) Bpk 1979 (4) SA167
186 (T) at 189, De Villiers AJ stated that the Court had a discretion to determine a fixed period for
judicial management but that it was usually undesirable to do so. The courts have made it clear,
however, that judicial management must fulfill its purpose within a reasonable time, as creditors should
not be expected to wait indefinitely for payment of their claims: see Marsh and Another v Plows (SA)
of any duties to be fulfilled by the directors, it must be assumed that the directors of a
company are automatically divested of their office when the company is placed under
judicial management.163
2.8 Rescue plan
There is no statutory provision for the development or drafting of a rescue plan as
part of the judicial management process. The report of the provisional judicial
manager setting out the current situation of the company, the reasons for its
problems, the manner in which capital will be raised to enable the company to
continue trading and the chances of a successful rescue of the company, is the
closest to any formal rescue plan contained in the current procedure.  Several164
commentators on judicial management have argued that a reasonably detailed plan
of action to save the company plays an important role in a successful rescue and
have identified the lack of any provisions for the formulation and acceptance of such
a rescue plan as one of the reasons for the failure of judicial management.  The lack165
of a compulsory and proper rescue plan, combined with the fact that the process is
managed by a judicial manager who is not required to have any qualifications, training
or experience in running, let alone rescuing a company, unavoidably creates a
substantial risk to the possible success of the rescue process.  166
2.9 Termination of judicial management 
The Companies Act of 1973 does not stipulate a period for the duration of judicial
management, and as a rule the order is granted for an indefinite period.  Therefore,167
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Limited 1949 (1) PH E4 (C) at 10-11; Marais v Leighwood Hospitals (Pty) Ltd 1950 (3) SA 567 (C) at
572; Irvin & Johnson Ltd v Oelofse Fisheries Ltd 1954 (1) SA 231 (E) at 237. 
 Section 440(1).168
 Section 440(1) does not stipulate who would qualify as a person with an interest in the company,169
but according to Meskin et al Henochsberg at 959, it would include a member, a creditor (including a
prospective or contingent creditor), and a person who has a pecuniary or proprietary interest as a result
of a section 311 compromise or arrangement which provides for the cancellation of judicial
management.
 Section 433(l).170
 Section 440(1).171
 Section 433(l).172
 Meskin et al Henochsberg at 958; Blackman et al Companies Act at 15–43; Cilliers, Benade et al173
Corporate Law par 26.43. The case law supplied to substantiate this view unfortunately deals only with
the Companies Act of 1926. As already illustrated in this Chapter, the application of such case law to
the present Companies Act of 1973 is often not reliable. 
the only way to terminate the judicial management of a company is by an order of the
court that granted the judicial management order.  168
The judicial manager or any person having an interest in the company may apply
for cancellation of a judicial management order.  The judicial manager is compelled169
to apply for the cancellation of the judicial management order and for an order for the
winding up of the company if he comes to the conclusion during the process that
judicial management will not succeed.170
The court may, on application, cancel a judicial management order if it appears
that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or that, for whatever reason, it is
undesirable for the judicial management order to remain in force.  In those cases171
where the application is brought on the grounds that judicial management has failed
in its purpose to rescue the company, it will usually (and must, if brought by the
judicial manager)  include an application for a winding-up order in respect of the172
company. Section 440(1), in terms of which an application for cancellation of a judicial
management order is brought, does not prescribe that a rule nisi should be issued
before the final order is granted. However, the general view seems to be that a rule
nisi would first be issued, except if all interested parties have consented to the
cancellation of the order or the cancellation order is sought by the judicial manager
as a preliminary to applying for liquidation of the company.  173
2.10 EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT
It is clear that the failure of judicial management to function as a viable business
rescue regime is at least partly due to the fact that judicial management has always
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 See part 2.4.4 above.174
been regarded as an extraordinary remedy which infringes on the rights of creditors
and should consequently be available only under very special circumstances.  This174
approach ignores the fact that the rescue of a company would have benefits
extending much further than the company’s immediate creditors.
It is also clear that the procedure suffers from a number of shortcomings. These
include the unavoidable involvement of the court which renders the procedure costly,
slow and cumbersome. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that only a
provisional order is issued on the first application and an applicant therefore has to
approach the court for a second time to obtain a final judicial management order. 
Another serious disadvantage is the excessively stringent requirements for both
a provisional and a final judicial management order and the burden of proof on the
applicant which is almost impossible to discharge.
The lack of a provision for an automatic moratorium on all actions, proceedings,
execution of writs, summonses and other processes against the company during
judicial management creates a degree of uncertainty because there is no guarantee
that the court will include a moratorium in a judicial management order. 
The uncertainty over whether directors are merely divested of all their powers by
a judicial management order or whether they are in fact automatically removed from
office is another problem. It furthermore appears that in all cases, directors are
assumed to be directly responsible for the failure of a company and no provision is
made for their knowledge of and experience in the business of the company to be
made available to the judicial manager.
One of the most important and serious defects in judicial management is the
complete lack of regulatory control over and qualifications for judicial managers as
well as the absence of a provision in the Act for the removal of judicial managers in
cases of incompetence or abuse. This means that a judicial manager may be
appointed without having the necessary experience or expertise, and is then left to
carry out his functions without any real oversight or control. It also opens the door to
abuse of the process through the control of a judicial manager by a major creditor
who is not really interested in a rescue of the company or the business. 
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 In parts 3 and 4 of this Chapter, all references to statutory provisions will be to the Companies Act175
of 2008, unless specifically stated otherwise. 
 As defined in s 128(1)(f) and discussed in part 3.4 below.176
 Defined in s 128(1)(j) as the oversight imposed on a company during its business rescue177
proceedings. See part 3.7.1 below for a discussion on the business rescue practitioner who is
appointed to fulfil this duty. 
The absence of any requirement for a formal rescue plan to be submitted by the
judicial manager indicating how the rescue of the company would be approached is
another contributing factor that allows the judicial manager to act without any
identifiable policy or plan for which he could be held accountable. 
Lastly, the fact that only an order of court can terminate judicial management
means that a judicial manager is not under any pressure to complete his task within
a specified period and can continue to earn fees for an indeterminate period without
making any real progress. Again, the lack of any control by a professional
organisation means that he will not be held accountable for any unprofessional or
dubious actions.
3 BUSINESS RESCUE PROCEEDINGS
3.1 Definition and purpose
The term “business rescue” is defined in section 128(1)(b) of the Companies Act 71
of 2008  as proceedings to facilitate the rehabilitation of a company that is175
financially distressed  by means of three measures: “(i) the temporary supervision176 177
of the company, and of the management of its affairs, business and property; (ii) a
temporary moratorium on the rights of claimants against the company or in respect
of property in its possession; and (iii) the development and implementation, if
approved, of a plan to rescue the company by restructuring its affairs, business,
property, debt and other liabilities, and equities in a manner that maximises the
likelihood of the company continuing in existence on a solvent basis or, if it not
possible for the company to so continue in existence, results in a better return for the
company’s creditors or shareholders than would result from the immediate liquidation
of the company.” 
Although the definition refers to the rehabilitation of a company that is financially
distressed, this is not the only (or always a) requirement for the commencement of
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 See parts 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 below.178
 See Chapter 5, part 2.4.1 on my proposal for an amended definition of financial distress that will also179
remove this objection. 
 My emphasis.180
 The definition of “rescuing the company” in s 128(1)(h) that equates this phrase with achieving the181
goals contained in the definition of “business rescue” does not change the position because, apart from
the reference to a better return for creditors and shareholders, these goals all refer to the rehabilitation
or rescue of the company, never the business of the company
 See part 2.1 above.182
 Section 427(1) of the Companies Act of 1973 discussed in part 2.4.3 above.183
 See part 3 below.184
 For this reason, during business rescue proceedings and until the rescue plan has been185
implemented in full, a company should be excluded form the provisions of s 22(1)(b), which prohibits
insolvent trading by a company: see part 3.7.1.3.2. 
business rescue proceedings. As will become clear from the discussion below, this
is only one of the two requirements for initiating the proceedings and in the case of
commencement by order of court, the requirement of financial distress can be
substituted by two other possibilities that may not necessarily be an indication of
financial distress.  The definition is therefore slightly misleading in this respect.178 179
In spite of naming the procedure “business rescue proceedings”, thereby implying
that it concerns the rescue of a company’s business (or part of its business), it is clear
from the definition that the main purpose of the proceedings is to rescue the company
as a whole. The definition refers to the rehabilitation of a company  and a plan to180
rescue the company in a manner that maximises its chances of surviving in a solvent
state. It is therefore more a corporate rescue procedure than a business rescue.  In181
this respect it resembles judicial management, except to the extent that survival of the
whole company is the only acceptable outcome of judicial management.182
The reference to the continued existence of the company in a state of solvency is
also problematic since it shows some similarity with the requirement for a judicial
management order of a reasonable probability that the company will be able to pay all its
debts if placed under judicial management.  A business rescue plan may provide for a183
moratorium on the payment of debts until payment can eventually be made from future
earnings of the company, or post-commencement financing may replace the claims of
some creditors.  In both these instances the company will not immediately become184
solvent, but will be given the opportunity to become solvent by being allowed to continue
trading.  The reference to the solvency of the company should therefore be removed.185
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 See Chapter 3, part 2.3.2.186
 See also Loubser “Shareholders” at 387-388.187
 See further part 3.2 below.188
 A perfect example can be found in the sale of all the assets (including the buildings) of a company189
(only referred to as Darbel) after the company’s liquidation. The company had manufactured Rolux and
W olf lawn mowers under licence. The purchasers of the assets believed that the business was still
viable, particularly since the names of these products were well-known, and they thus proceeded to
successfully save the business: see Sunday Times 22 November 2009 at 10. 
 Section 386(3) and (4)(f) of the Companies Act of 1973.190
The second possible outcome of a rescue plan, namely a better return for creditors
or shareholders, echoes the second stated object of the administration procedure in
English law.  It is significant, however, that the English provision only refers to a better186
return for creditors and not for shareholders. As will become clear in the discussion
below, shareholders play almost no role in the proposed business rescue proceedings,
and it is doubtful whether their interests will be given any serious consideration in a
rescue plan; any benefit for them resulting from a successful rescue of the company will
be purely incidental.  The use of the words “a better return than ... immediate187
liquidation” also clearly implies eventual liquidation and payment of a dividend rather
than full payment to creditors. In most insolvent liquidations there are insufficient funds
available even for the payment of a dividend to concurrent creditors, and there would
certainly not be any payment to shareholders. Their inclusion in the definition is therefore
essentially meaningless: the only possible benefit for them lies in a rescue of the
company as a whole and its return to profitability.
 Even the inclusion of a better return for creditors than in immediate liquidation as
one of the objects of business rescue is misleading and not really beneficial. Apart from
the inevitable and highly undesirable association with insolvency that it creates,  it is188
difficult to understand how this could be achieved by business rescue proceedings.
Although it is often argued that a sale of the business as a going concern during
business rescue, rather than a piecemeal sale of the company’s assets, will result in a
higher price being reached, this argument assumes that a liquidator will always sell the
assets individually rather than the whole business. This is not the reality of today:
liquidators can, and often do sell a viable business owned by a company in liquidation
as a going concern.  A liquidator may also be authorised to continue running the189
business if necessary for the beneficial winding up thereof.  There is thus no need for190
a business rescue to be commenced simply to keep the business running until a
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 A cost that can be limited during winding up by only retaining the services of employees who are191
necessary for continued trading by the company: see the discussion below.
 Section 136(1)(a).192
 Section 136(2).193
 Section 135(3)(a).194
purchaser is found. Furthermore, if the company is put through the whole process of a
business rescue before an unavoidable liquidation, this will result in substantial extra
costs that must be paid from the company’s already insufficient assets. These costs are
the remuneration and expenses of the business rescue practitioner and the costs of the
business rescue, including the remuneration payable to employees after
commencement of business rescue proceedings.  It will also take longer before191
creditors are paid. All of these factors will prejudice the creditors, particularly the
concurrent creditors, instead of resulting in a better return for them. This appendage to
the definition of business rescue should thus simply be removed. 
Ironically, the only group of people who will be able to gain substantial benefits from
business rescue proceedings preceding a liquidation, namely the employees, are not
mentioned in the definition at all. The Companies Act of 2008 provides in no uncertain
terms that “employees of the company immediately before the beginning of [business
rescue] proceedings continue to be so employed on the same terms and conditions”.192
Employment contracts are also specifically excluded from a business rescue
practitioner’s power to cancel or suspend agreements to which the company is a
party.  Furthermore, section 135(1) classifies any remuneration, reimbursements or193
other payments that become due and payable by the company to its employees during
business rescue proceedings, as post-commencement finance. These claims are
afforded super-preference rights, ranking them just after the costs of the business
rescue proceedings and the business rescue practitioner’s remuneration and costs, and
before any claims for other forms of post-commencement finance, whether secured or
not, and all unsecured claims against the company.  Should the business rescue194
proceedings be superseded by a liquidation order, these preferent rights will remain in
force, without any limit on either the amounts or the period of remuneration. 
If one compares these rights to those of employees of a company that is
liquidated immediately, the benefits to be gained by employees from preceding
business rescue proceedings become abundantly clear. In terms of section 38(1) of
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 Act 24 of 1936. Section 38 is made applicable to the winding up of a company unable to pay its195
debts by s 339 of the Companies Act of 1973.
 Section 38(2).196
 Section 38(9).197
 See part 3.3.2.3 on their right to apply for a business rescue order.198
 In Chapter 6 that deals with business rescue and compromises with creditors.199
 Section 1 defines a company as “a juristic person incorporated in terms of this Act”, once it comes200
into operation, as well as one that was registered or converted from a close corporation to a company
in terms of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, and a company that was in existence and recognised as a
company by the Companies Act of 1973 immediately before the date on which the Act comes into
operation. 
 In terms of Item 6 of Schedule 3 to the Companies Act of 2008. See Chapter 1, part 2 for the201
reasons behind this decision.
 Section 2(1) of the Close Corporations Act limits it to a maximum of ten members.202
the Insolvency Act  the liquidation of an employer company suspends all contracts195
of service with its employees from the date on which an order of winding up is issued.
During this period of suspension of their contracts, employees are not required to
render services nor are they entitled to remuneration in terms of the contracts.  The196
suspended contracts will, however, automatically terminate 45 days after the date of
appointment of a final liquidator, except in respect of those employees who have
reached agreement with the liquidator on their continued employment.  197
The special rights granted to employees in the Companies Act of 2008 therefore
present them with an opportunity to earn remuneration for a few extra months and a
very real potential for abuse.  198
3.2 Entities to which business rescue proceedings apply
Just like judicial management, the new business rescue proceedings are contained
in the new Companies Act  and not in the present or in a future Insolvency Act. This199
inevitably means that the proceedings were designed for and will apply primarily to
companies  and not to other business forms. 200
However, the rescue proceedings will also apply to close corporations in the interim
period until this business form finally disappears.  I believe that this decision will not201
achieve any identifiable benefits or advantages in respect of the rescue of close
corporations. Apart from the fact that the business rescue proceedings are far too
onerous and complicated for the close corporation with its small membership,  and202
generally inappropriate as a result of the vast differences in structure and management
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 For example, a close corporation does not have directors, and management functions are exercised203
by all or some of its members: s 46(a) of the Close Corporations Act. No guidance is given in the
Companies Act of 2008 whether the directors of a company should be substituted by all the members
of a close corporation or merely those members who are actively involved in the management of the
close corporation. A written resolution signed by all members is required for the voluntary winding up
of a close corporation (s 67 of the Close Corporations Act) and it could be argued that the same should
apply to a resolution to enter business rescue proceedings: see part 3.3.1 below. 
 Section 72 (that is not repealed) provides for a composition that may be offered to creditors at any204
time after commencement of liquidation. Section 72(11) specifically allows the composition to provide
for an application to court for the setting aside of the winding up of the corporation if the composition
is accepted by the required majority of creditors. If successful, this would obviously result in a rescue
of the corporation. The process is managed by the liquidator and is thus also cost-effective. 
 Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Bill, 2008 at 217. See Chapter 1, part 2 regarding205
a future consolidated Insolvency Act. In terms of Item 9 of Schedule 5 to the Companies Act of 2008,
the provisions of the Companies Act of 1973 relating to the winding up of insolvent companies will
continue to apply until adequate alternative legislation (presumably the new consolidated insolvency
legislation) has been brought into force.
 See part 3.4 below regarding the requirements for commencement of business rescue proceedings.206
 Institute of Directors Comments at 7; KPMG Comments at 7; TMA Comments at 33. See also207
generally on the issue of unified legislation, Burdette “Unified Legislation”; Burdette “Business Rescue
Model (Part 1)” at 256; and Keay “To Unify”. 
 See Loubser “Business Rescue” at 161-162 and 169-170. See also Brown Corporate Rescue at208
654-657; Finch Corporate Insolvency at 372 and Parry “Introduction” at 15 on the similar view of
directors in England regarding company administrations. 
between a company and a close corporation,  it was also unnecessary to create a new203
rescue procedure for close corporations. The drafters of the Companies Act of 2008
seem to have been completely unaware of a very effective and adequate business
rescue procedure contained in the Close Corporations Act itself.  Under the204
circumstances I submit that close corporations are unlikely to use the new rescue
procedure and I will therefore not include the provisions as they would apply to close
corporations in my discussion of the business rescue proceedings. 
The decision to keep the business rescue proceedings in the new Companies Act
rather than moving it to the planned consolidated Insolvency Act  has been severely205
criticised in submissions on the Companies Bill to the Portfolio Committee on Trade
and Industry. These critics argue that business rescue is an insolvency procedure
because it is triggered by insolvency or imminent insolvency of the company  and206
its provisions should therefore be aligned with those of insolvency law.  It is my207
submission that the legislation should strive for the exact opposite: business rescue
should not be tainted by an association with insolvency law as the stigma of
bankruptcy has been identified as one of the reasons why company boards have
been unwilling to apply for judicial management.  Business rescue should be208
regarded as an independent corporate procedure to assist companies in financial
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 See further my comments in this regard on the requirements for business rescue proceedings in part209
3.4 below. 
 See part 3.4 below.210
 This is particularly true of the prescribed contents of the business rescue plan: see part 3.8 below.211
 Sections 129 and 131 respectively. See part 3.5 below for a detailed discussion of the procedure212
that has to be followed in each instance.
 See part 2.3 above. The first Draft Companies Bill published in 2007 did provide that the213
shareholders could by ordinary resolution decide to commence voluntary business rescue proceedings,
but this option was no longer present in the Companies Bill 2008. However, it probably explains the
reference to a company resolution and not a board resolution in the heading of this section. 
 In the absence of any specific requirement in this regard in the Memorandum of Incorporation, the214
resolution would have to be taken by the majority of the directors at a board meeting (s 73(5)) or by
written consent of the majority of directors without a meeting being held (s 74). 
 See Chapter 3, part 2.3.1.215
difficulties, preferably before actual or commercial insolvency has set in, to survive
these crises and not as merely another route to inevitable liquidation.  Unfortunately209
the Department of Trade and Industry, although confirming this view in its reaction
to the criticism mentioned above, did not follow through in the legislation on its policy
to separate business rescue proceedings from insolvency. Instead, the two are linked
by requiring that the company must be on the verge of insolvency to enter business
rescue proceedings,  and by repeatedly making some principles of insolvency law210
applicable to the rescue proceedings, such as the order of preference in which
creditors must be paid.  211
3.3 Power to initiate business rescue proceedings 
The Companies Act of 2008 provides for two ways of commencing business rescue
proceedings: a resolution by the board of directors or an order of court.  212
3.3.1 Resolution by the board
Although the heading of section 129 uses the term “Company resolution”, which
would usually also include a resolution by the members in general meeting,  only213
the board of a company may take a resolution to begin business rescue proceedings
voluntarily.  In this respect the procedure differs from administration in England,214
where both the company (in general meeting) and the directors are specifically
authorised to take such a resolution.  As the directors would be the first to know215
about impending financial problems, and calling a meeting of members would
furthermore take time and publicise the company’s financial situation before the
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 See part 3.6 below.216
 By contrast, the High Court must be approached at least twice to obtain a final judicial management217
order: see part 2.5 above.
 Section 131(1).218
 Section 128(1)(a).219
 The Act recognises the possibility that a director can be an affected person: see s 130(2) discussed220
in part 3.5.1.3 below. A director will often be an affected person by virtue of being a shareholder. Since
a director can also be an employee of the company if a contract of service has been concluded (Cilliers,
Benade et al Corporate Law par 10.05), it would be interesting to see whether such a director will be
recognised by our courts as an affected person in his capacity as an employee and entitled to all the
special rights afforded to employees.
 Although a director may not apply directly for a business rescue order in his capacity as director, a221
court may make such an order in appropriate circumstances where a director has applied for relief from
oppressive or prejudicial conduct by the company (s 163(2)(c)). See part 3.5.2.5 below. 
 Section 129(2)(a) discussed in part 3.5.1.1 below. 222
company were protected by a moratorium,  it is probably unnecessary to grant this216
power to members as well.
This procedure constitutes a major improvement on judicial management as
there is no involvement by the court at this stage.  The procedure is thus faster,217
simpler and much less expensive to commence than judicial management. It also
allows the board of directors to act immediately once they realise that the company
is heading for insolvency and needs the protection and the breathing space that
business rescue proceedings will provide, during which a rescue of the company or
its business can be attempted. 
3.3.2 Application to court
An application to court for an order commencing business rescue proceedings may
be brought by any “affected person”,  defined as a shareholder, a creditor, any218
registered trade union representing employees of the company and any employee (or
his representative) who is not represented by a registered trade union.  Neither the219
company nor the directors (in their capacity as such)  are therefore authorised to220
apply.  The exclusion of both the board and individual directors from the list of221
applicants is regrettable since no board resolution to commence rescue proceedings
may be taken after liquidation proceedings have been initiated, even if the board is
convinced that the company can be rescued.  Furthermore, a director who believes222
that the company is financially distressed and should be placed under supervision,
but who is outvoted by other directors, will not be able to apply to court in his capacity
as director for a business rescue order, in spite of being subject to, among other
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 In terms of ss 22(1)(b), 77(3)(b) and 214(1)(c) respectively. 223
 Individual directors in Germany have been given the power to apply for the opening of insolvency224
proceedings for this very reason: see Chapter 4, part 2.3. In England, where directors also run the risk
of liability for wrongful trading, individual directors may not apply for an administration order but the
board may do so if the decision is supported by the majority of the directors: see Chapter 3, part 2.3.2.
 See part 2.3 above.225
 In England the company may apply in terms of a resolution by the general meeting but individual226
members may not: see Chapter 3, part 2.2.2. In Germany shareholders are not allowed to apply
individually or collectively: see Chapter 4, part 2.3. 
 See part 3.4 below.227
 See, for example, part 3.7.1 below regarding the creditors’ right to make the final decision on the228
choice of business rescue practitioner and part 3.8 on the very limited rights of shareholders with
regard to the approval of a rescue plan. See also, generally, Loubser “Shareholders”. 
 Bertelsmann et al Mars at 372.229
things, the risk of personal and criminal liability for trading under insolvent
circumstances.  I submit that the risk of potential liability of a director for failing to223
act, or to act in good time, should be mitigated by giving individual directors the power
to act when the board refuses to do so.224
3.3.2.1 Shareholders
As in the case of judicial management,  individual shareholders have been given the225
power to apply to court for business rescue proceedings. This power could be a
remnant from judicial management where every person who was authorised to apply
for liquidation could apply for judicial management, or merely the result of the blanket
authority given to every affected person without much consideration having been
given to its meaning or consequences. No other comparable system allows a single
shareholder to bring such an application, and even allowing shareholders to apply as
a group and representing the company is rare.  226
Shareholders will seldom have the information available to prove the
requirements for such an order,  and since they are effectively excluded from227
playing any meaningful role during course of the rescue of the company, it is doubtful
whether this power will amount to any real benefit for shareholders.  228
3.3.2.2 Creditors
In spite of the fact that the meaning of the term “creditor” is well established and fully
understood in South African law to be a creditor in the usual sense of the word,  and229
not even the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 contains such a definition, the first draft of the
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 Bill B 61A - 2008.230
 As s 128(1)(e).231
 In England only creditors, the company and its directors may apply: see Chapter 3, part 2.2.2. In232
Germany only the debtor company, directors and creditors may apply: Chapter 4, part 2.3. In the United
States of America a petition for a Chapter 11 reorganisation under the Bankruptcy Code (Title 11,
United States Code) may be filed only by the debtor company or by its creditors: Bankruptcy Rules
Companies Bill  introduced into Parliament contained a definition of a creditor for230
the purposes of business rescue proceedings.  231
A creditor was defined as a person to whom the company owed money under any
arrangement immediately before the start of business rescue proceedings, irrespective
of whether the money was already due and payable. A person providing post-
commencement finance to the company was specifically excluded, except to the extent
that this person was a creditor before providing such finance. In my submission on the
Companies Bill to the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry, I pointed out that the
definition was flawed in several respects: firstly, the definition referred only to persons to
whom the company owed money although a person could also be a creditor as a result
of services, products or property that the company was obliged to deliver in terms of a
contract. Secondly, the reference to “arrangement” limited the obligation to some form
of agreement although performance by the company could be due as a result of, for
example, a court order or statutory obligation. Thirdly, although stating right at its
beginning that only a person to whom the company owed money before business rescue
was a creditor, the definition specifically excluded post-commencement finance (which
was already excluded because it arose after the beginning of business rescue) but then
qualified that to exclude once again any debt due to such a person before business
rescue started. I submitted that this was an unnecessary complication of a fairly simple
matter and would undoubtedly cause considerable uncertainty. My recommendation that
the definition should be removed was accepted by the Department of Trade and Industry
and the Portfolio Committee, and the definition was accordingly scrapped.  
 
3.3.2.3 Trade unions and employees
The inclusion of trade unions and even individual employees – who do not have to
be creditors of the company to qualify – in the list of persons who may apply for an
order commencing business rescue proceedings seems excessive and has no
equivalent in any other comparable system.  However, this must be seen as part232
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1002(a) and 9001(1)-(3).
 Explanatory Memorandum on the Companies Bill part 12 at 222.233
 In terms of the definition in s 1, these would include annual and provisional annual financial234
statements, interim or preliminary reports, group and consolidated financial statements, and any
financial information contained in a prospectus, circular or provisional announcement of results. Since
these would have been published already, it is unclear why the company should be required to make
them available, unless the intention behind this subsection is to give trade unions access to confidential
and unpublished financial information of the company.
 The Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (hereafter referred to as “the Commission”)235
will be established in terms of s 185 of the Companies Act of 2008 and will be the successor to the
current CIPRO. 
of the protection of “the interests of workers” which is prominently featured as an
object of the new business rescue proceedings.  233
The disadvantage mentioned above in respect of shareholders, namely that they
would not usually have access to the information required to prove the grounds for
commencement of rescue proceedings, has been eliminated in the case of trade
unions by section 31(3) of the Companies Act of 2008. This section gives any trade
union the right to demand access to company financial statements  through the234
Commission  and subject to such conditions as the Commission may determine, for235
the purpose of initiating business rescue proceedings. The use of the word “must” in
this subsection makes it very clear that neither the company nor the Commission may
refuse a trade union’s demand for such access even if they suspect that the trade
union is abusing this power and has no serious intention to apply for the
commencement of business rescue proceedings. There is no limit on how often this
demand may be made and no liability for abuse of the right, in spite of the fact that
the reputation and creditworthiness of a company can be seriously damaged if it
becomes known that such a demand has been made. 
The right to apply for business rescue proceedings to commence grants a very
powerful right to a single employee who may be tempted to abuse it because of a
completely unrelated grievance against the company. It may also be used as a
bargaining tool by a trade union in wage negotiations: if the company refuses a
demand for higher wages because it cannot afford to pay it, the trade union or
employees may threaten to use that as proof of inability to pay debts and thus
grounds for business rescue proceedings. An unfounded application will eventually
be refused by the court, but by the time the application is heard, substantial damage
would have been done to the company’s reputation, credit rating and its business in
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 In terms of s 131(2)(b) read with s 128(1)(a).236
 Section 347(1A) of the Companies Act of 1973.237
 See 3.5.1 below for a discussion of the prescribed procedure and formalities. 238
 Section 129(1).239
 In Australia, s 436A(1)(a) of the Corporations Act, 2001 contains a similar requirement that the240
directors who vote for the resolution initiating administration must be of the opinion that the company
is insolvent or likely to become insolvent at some future time. This has been interpreted to mean that
the directors must form a real bona fide opinion to this effect: Robson Corporations Law 483. 
general, especially as prior notice of the application must be given to all creditors,
shareholders and employees of the company.  A company would therefore go to236
great lengths to avoid such an occurrence. 
The risk it poses to a company at the very least needs to be counterbalanced by
a section providing that the court may issue an order for payment of damages to the
company against an applicant for business rescue who abuses the procedure, or
whose application is found to be malicious or vexatious. Such a provision could be
similar to the one providing for personal liability for abuse of the process in winding
up applications that is presently found in the Companies Act of 1973.  237
3.4 Requirements for commencement of business rescue
proceedings 
3.4.1 Resolution to begin business rescue proceedings 
The board of directors of a company may take a resolution  to voluntarily commence238
business rescue proceedings in respect of the company if they have reasonable
grounds for believing that the company is financially distressed and there seems to
be a reasonable prospect of rescuing it.239
The stipulation that the board must have reasonable grounds for believing that
the two preconditions for such a resolution exist seems to indicate that the directors
voting in favour of the commencement of business rescue proceedings must first
really believe that these requirements are present,  and secondly that they must240
have good reasons for this belief. It is assumed that the omission of the words “and
did believe” does not mean that the directors need not actually believe that the
requirements for business rescue have been satisfied, although section 76(4)(a)(iii),
for example, stipulates that a director would have satisfied his duty of care and skill
if he “had a rational basis for believing, and did believe that the decision was in the
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 Section 130(1)(a)(i) and (ii). See part 3.5 below. 241
 Section 76(3)(c) requires a director to exercise his duties with the care and skill reasonably expected242
from a person carrying out the same functions (objective test) and having the general knowledge, skill and
experience of that director (subjective test). Section 76(4)(a)(iii), which specifically deals with decisions
taken by a director, also provides for a test that considers whether the director, based on his knowledge
of the matter, had a rational basis for believing that the decision was in the best interests of the company.
 Section 128(1)(f)(i).243
 Although its meaning is clear because of the alternative requirement of inability to pay its debts in244
s 128(1)(f)(i), the use of the term “insolvent” as opposed to the full description of the liabilities
exceeding the assets is unfortunate since the word “insolvent” can also refer to commercial insolvency
(the inability to pay debts as they fall due).
 Section 128(1)(f)(ii).245
 In the Companies Bill, 2008.246
best interests of the company.” In the interests of clarity and certainty it would have
been preferable if all sections in the Act dealing with the belief or opinion of a director
had been similarly worded in so far as they were intended to have the same meaning.
The requirement that the board must have reasonable grounds for believing, and
not merely that reasonable grounds must exist, implies that the test is both objective and
subjective: whether a reasonable person, with the knowledge, experience and insight
(or lack of it) of the directors, would believe that these circumstances exist. However,
one of the grounds for applying to court to have such a resolution set aside is that “there
is no reasonable basis” for the belief that the company is financially distressed, and
another is “that there is no reasonable prospect for rescuing the company”.  This241
seems to require a purely objective test. Clearly the same test should consistently apply,
and I submit that the test encompassing both a subjective and objective element should
be used to conform with the general standards set for the conduct of directors in the
Companies Act of 2008.  242
3.4.1.1 Financially distressed 
According to the definition in the Companies Act of 2008, a company will be
financially distressed if at any particular time “it appears to be reasonably unlikely that
the company will be able to pay all of its debts as they fall due and payable within the
immediately ensuing six months”,  or “it appears to be reasonably likely that the243
company will become insolvent”  within the next six months.244 245
The original definition  also contained as a first possibility that a company would246
be financially distressed if it is unable to pay its debts as they fall due and payable, and
its liabilities exceed its assets. In my submission to the Portfolio Committee on Trade
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 Financial distress is also one of the grounds on which a court may order business rescue247
proceedings to commence: s 131(4)(a)(i). See part 3.4.2 below.
 Corporate Insolvency at 248.248
 See Chapter 3, part 2.4.1 where the present and future inability of a company to pay its debts are249
contained in the same requirement for the commencement of the administration procedure in England.
and Industry I submitted that there was no discernible reason why a double insolvency
test – both commercial and actual – should be set when the resolution (or court order)247
was based on the present financial situation of the company, but only one of the two
was required when it was based on the company’s expected situation in the six months
immediately following. If a company is at present unable to pay its debts, it is also
reasonably unlikely to be able to pay all of them as they fall due in the next six months,
and the company would therefore automatically qualify under the second option.
Furthermore, an inherently viable and healthy company may experience an unexpected
and temporary cash-flow problem, possibly caused by external factors such as an
earthquake, a factory fire, failure of an important supplier or labour unrest. Although it
would be unable to pay its debts, such a company would not be able to use business
rescue proceedings to obtain protection against claims by creditors while its problems
were being solved, because its liabilities would not exceed its assets. A company should
be allowed to enter business rescue proceedings at the first signs of financial problems,
and insisting that it must be actually insolvent as well as unable to pay its debts forces
the company to wait until its chances of being successfully rescued have been greatly
diminished. It is an obvious and widely accepted fact that the sooner a rescue procedure
is invoked, the greater the chances of a successful rescue are. Finch  refers to248
intervention at a sufficiently early stage once a company encounters financial difficulties
as a key issue in the success of a rescue procedure.
My submission was accepted, and as a result the first option in the test for financial
distress, based on the company’s present financial situation, was removed. However,
my recommendation that the company’s present insolvency or inability to pay its debts
should constitute financial distress was not implemented. The difference is probably
more academic than real as proof of the company’s present insolvency or inability to pay
its debts will surely also be proof of the same situation prevailing in the immediately
ensuing six months. However, amplifying the remaining two tests to include the
company’s present financial situation would have been preferable and easy.  249
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 KPMG Comments at 13.250
 In England it is accepted that the inability to pay must occur in the not too distant future, but this is251
not indicated in the relevant provisions (see Chapter 3, part 2.3.1); in Australia s 436A(1)(a) of the
Corporations Act, 2001 merely requires a company to be likely to become insolvent at some future time
to qualify for voluntary administration but in New Zealand even this was regarded as setting the
threshold too high and thus changed to “may in the future become insolvent” (Brown “New Zealand”
at 270-271). See Chapter 4, part 2.4.2 on the uncertainty in German insolvency law resulting from the
lack of a specified period. 
 Section 427(1)(a) discussed in part 2.4.1 above.252
 See 2.4.3 above.253
 Section 129(1)(b).254
 Oxford Thesaurus at 378.255
 This is also the meaning attributed to “a real prospect” in English case law. See Chapter 3 in part256
2.3.2 on this and on the problems experienced in England where there was uncertainty whether proof
of a possibility or a probability of achieving the purpose of administration was required. 
In their submission to the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry, KPMG
auditors suggested that the period of six months stipulated in the tests for financial
distress should be increased to 12 months.  This proposal was not accepted and the250
period remains at six months. In other jurisdictions with a comparable requirement, no
future period is specified but as this has led to uncertainty in at least one country, a
specified period is probably preferable.  A period of six months, however, is too short251
and may deprive a company of the opportunity to take the necessary steps to protect
itself in good time from a financial risk or impending crisis that is foreseeable more than
six months prior to its occurrence, such as a claim for damages or other legal action.
Since the financial planning of a company usually stretches over the next (financial)
year, a period of 12 months seems more appropriate.
Generally, however, this is a major improvement on the equivalent requirement
for judicial management which requires proof that the company is (already) unable
to pay its debts.252
 
3.4.1.2 Reasonable prospect of rescuing the company
Contrary to the very stringent requirements of judicial management, where proof is
required of a probability that the company will become a successful concern,  the253
board only needs reasonable grounds to believe that there appears to be a
reasonable prospect of rescuing the company.  The choice of the word “prospect”,254
which could mean either a possibility or a probability  is regrettable, but must be255
taken to mean a reasonable possibility in this instance.  It would have been256
preferable if the drafters had chosen the word “possibility” and used it consistently
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 To add to the confusion, the word “likelihood” (of the company’s continued existence) is used in the257
definition of “business rescue” in s 128(1)(b)(iii).
 Section 128(1)(h). 258
 Section 128(1)(b)(iii).259
 Section 131(4)(a).260
throughout Chapter 6 to avoid any uncertainty and, considering our experience with
and case law on judicial management, to make it clear that it differs from judicial
management in this respect.  257
The term “rescuing the company” is defined in the Companies Act of 2008 to
mean achieving the goals contained in the definition of “business rescue”.  The258
purpose of the definition of “rescuing the company” is unclear, as the definition of
“business rescue” refers to two goals that are merely aspects of the rescue procedure
(the temporary supervision and moratorium) and not independent goals, while the
third goal primarily refers to the rescue of the company: it thus becomes a circular
definition.  If the intention was to indicate that rescuing the company could also259
mean something else, such as a rescue of the business only, or achieving a better
return for creditors or shareholders, the definition has failed in its purpose. The
definition of “business rescue” does not contain any reference to a rescue of a
company’s business or part of it, and the mention of a better return for creditors or
shareholders as something of an afterthought right at the end is difficult to reconcile
with the term “rescuing the company”. The reference to the “rehabilitation” of a
company in the main body of the definition of “business rescue” is also not covered.
The definition of “rescuing the company” is a clumsy attempt to widen the
meaning of a phrase that should not have been used in the first place if something
else was intended, and is in any event not supported by the other provisions that all
point towards a rescue of the company itself.
 
3.4.2 Court order to begin business rescue proceedings 
A court may make an order commencing rescue proceedings if satisfied on the same
two requirements discussed above, namely that the company is financially distressed
and there is a reasonable prospect for the rescue of the company.  Compared to260
the requirements for a board resolution, the test is stricter in this instance: the court
must not merely be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
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 See 2.4.3 above.261
 W ith the possible exception of trade unions who may request financial information from the262
company, although it would depend on exactly how much information they may demand: see part
3.3.2.3 above. 
 In s 345 of the Companies Act of 1973. See Chapter 3, part 2.4.1 regarding such deeming263
provisions for the administration procedure in England, and Chapter 4, part 2.4.1 for the situation in
Germany where the Federal High Court has laid down certain guidelines in this regard. 
 Section 131(4)(a)(ii).264
 According to COSATU in its submission on the Companies Bill to the Portfolio Committee on Trade265
and Industry: Business Report 21 August 2008 at 1. This trend was also confirmed by the Institute of
Retirement Funds specifically in relation to deductions for employee benefits which employers in
financial difficulties were increasingly keeping instead of paying it over to the retirement funds:
Business Report 28 July 2009 at 4. 
company is financially distressed and that there appears to be a reasonable prospect
of rescuing the company, but must be satisfied that the company is financially
distressed and there is a reasonable prospect of rescuing the company. Although the
applicant bears a substantially lighter burden of proof than in the case of judicial
management,  it is doubtful whether this in itself will be of much use since in most261
instances it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for an outsider to prove that a
company is financially distressed.  Therefore, it is unfortunate that there is no262
provision for a deemed inability of the company to pay its debts based on external
evidence and similar to the provisions for the winding up of a company.263
The Companies Act of 2008 also provides for two alternative grounds in
substitution for the requirement of financial distress, on which an order for business
rescue proceedings may be made by the court.
The first of these is that the company has failed to pay over any amount that is due
in terms of a contractual or statutory obligation relating to employment matters.  The264
Act does not provide any further details on these payments, but non-payment of salaries
to employees will almost certainly fall into this category since salaries are due in terms
of contractual obligations relating to employment. The statutory obligations referred to
in this subsection will include payments due to medical aid funds, pension funds, the
South African Revenue Service, the Workmen’s Compensation Fund and the
Unemployment Insurance Fund. The reason for this ground is that companies with cash-
flow problems allegedly sometimes retain these contributions to alleviate their
problem.  However, the provision in its present form requires only one payment to be265
missed, which could be as a result of an administrative or systems failure by the
company or its bank, or other reasons not indicative of or related to financial difficulties.
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 In Belgium, the failure to pay such amounts triggered an official financial investigation and possible266
business rescue measures, but only after payments had been missed for at least six months: s 7 of the
now repealed (with effect from 1 April 2009) Judicial Composition Act (W et betreffende het Gerechtelijk
Akkoord) of 17 July 1997.
 Section 131(4)(a)(iii).267
 See part 2.4.4 above.268
 See Chapter 5, part 2.4.1.269
Therefore, I submit that non-payment of these amounts should occur over a
stipulated minimum period or frequency before it constitutes a ground for rescue
proceedings, and at least two consecutive payments should be missed.  266
The second ground that may substitute financial distress is if the court is satisfied that
“it is otherwise just and equitable ... for financial reasons”.  The Companies Act of 2008267
does not provide any definition or explanation of this extremely vague ground and it is not
at all clear what circumstances would be required to constitute this ground. It is also not
clear whether these financial reasons should be related to insolvency but not covered by
the definition of financial distress, such as a company that may become insolvent or
unable to pay its debts over a longer time than stipulated in the definition. It could possibly
also be relied on by shareholders or employees who are of the opinion that as a result of
the current mismanagement of the company, it is likely to fail over the longer term. On the
other hand, because the definition is completely open to interpretation, it could be argued
that anything connected to the finances of the company should be considered by the
court, even if the company is completely solvent and not presently running any risk of
becoming insolvent or unable to pay its debts. However, the second requirement for an
order commencing business rescue proceedings, applicable to all instances, namely that
there must be a reasonable prospect of rescuing the company, seems to indicate that the
financial reasons must be connected to financial problems and failure of the company.
Everything will depend on the interpretation given by the courts to this requirement and
what would be regarded as just and equitable. Considering the very restrictive
interpretation given by our courts to the requirement of just and equitable for judicial
management orders, it is unlikely that the courts will allow this commencement ground to
be used to widen the scope of business rescue proceedings.268
In the light of the above difficulties I recommend that the two alternative grounds
in their present form should be removed and should instead be incorporated into a
provision for deemed financial distress.269
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 Set out in ss 73-74.270
 Section 73(5) (especially s 73(5)(d)) and (7).271
 Section 129(2)(a). By contrast, a court order commencing business rescue proceedings will suspend272
any liquidation proceedings that have already commenced: see part 3.5.2 below. Similar provisions
exist regarding the administration procedure in England: see Chapter 3, parts 2.3.2 and 2.5.1. 
 Sections 348 and 352, respectively, of Act 61 of 1973. As already mentioned above in part 3.2, the273
provisions of the Companies Act of 1973 on insolvent winding up will, for the time being, continue to
apply after promulgation of the new Companies Act. 
 In England, where the same rule applies, the provision has been phrased very clearly that a274
resolution appointing an administrator may not be taken if the company is already “in liquidation”: see
Chapter 3, parts 2.2 and 2.5.1.
 Section 352(1) of the Companies Act of 1973. 275
 In terms of s 199(1) this must be at least 21 days before the meeting is held.276
 Section 348. See further in this regard part 3.5.2.6 below.277
 As required by s 346(4)(a).278
 Section 131(6) of the Companies Act of 2008 refers to the suspension of liquidation proceedings that279
have already been commenced when an application for business rescue proceedings is made. 
 Section 129(2)(b).280
 3.5 Procedure to commence business rescue proceedings 
3.5.1 Board resolution to begin business rescue
3.5.1.1 Formalities and effects
A resolution by the board of directors of a company to voluntarily begin business rescue
proceedings will have to comply with the requirements for board meetings and resolutions
in general.  This means that, unless the Memorandum of Incorporation provides270
otherwise, the resolution need not be unanimous, but must be taken by majority vote.271
Such a resolution may not be adopted, however, if liquidation proceedings have
already been initiated by or against the company.  The choice of the term “initiated” is272
unfortunate as it is not clear whether this is intended to be the same as the
commencement of winding up, which is specifically defined in the Companies Act,  or273
whether an earlier moment is meant.  A voluntary winding up commences on274
registration of the special resolution authorising it,  but one could argue that it is initiated275
as soon as notice of the meeting at which the resolution will be proposed is given,  or as276
soon as the resolution has been passed. A winding up by the court is deemed to
commence at the time of presentation of the application to court,  but here it could be277
argued that it is initiated as soon as a copy of the application is lodged with the Master of
the High Court  or even sooner. It would be advisable to use the word “commence”278
consistently where the statutorily established point in the procedure is meant.  279
The business rescue resolution will come into force only when it is filed with the
Companies and Intellectual Property Commission,  and the rescue proceedings officially280
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 Section 132(1)(a)(i).281
 See Chapter 3, part 2.5.1 for a discussion of such a requirement in England.282
 The possibility exists that formal requirements may be prescribed in the regulations made in terms of283
the Act although it seems unlikely in the absence of any indications to this effect in s 129. Regulation 134(8)
of the Companies Regulations, 2010 published for public comment in Notice 1664 Government Gazette
No 32832 of 22 December 2009 (hereafter referred to as the draft Companies Regulations) requires only
that a Notice of Commencement of Business Rescue Proceedings (Form CoR 134.1,  which has not as
yet been published for comment) must be attached to a resolution that is filed in terms of s 129.
 The company may apply to the Commission for more time in which to comply: s 129(3). The drafters284
of this Act seemed to be unaware of the existence of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 in which the
reckoning of days is laid down (in s 4) and thus deemed it necessary to define the term in very much the
same way in s 5(3).
 In terms of s 128(1)(a) this means every shareholder, creditor, registered trade union representing285
the company’s employees and every employee (or his representative) who is not represented by a
registered trade union. 
 Section 129(3)(a) requires that the company must publish the notice in the prescribed manner. The only286
section dealing with publication of notices and other prescribed documents is s 6, which requires that it
must be in the prescribed form or in plain language (s 6(4)) and may be transmitted electronically directly
to the intended recipient on condition that it must be easy for the recipient to print it in reasonable time and
at reasonable cost (s 6(10)). This means that the company has to send this notice to each and every
affected person, and may not simply publish a notice in a newspaper or a website.Undoubtedly, this will
prove to be an extremely costly and onerous burden on the company, particularly as various notices have
to be sent to affected persons during the course of the proceedings. The Draft Regulations have
unfortunately not brought any relief: Regulation 134(2) requires that the notice must be delivered to every
affected person, as well as posted on the company’s website, on SENS if it is a listed company and at its
registered offices, and advertised in a daily newspaper.  
 Although the Act uses the word “company” in s 129(3)-(4) when dealing with the appointment of the287
business rescue practitioner and the resulting formalities that must be complied with, it is clear that in
this instance the word is inappropriate, as it is clearly the board of directors which has the right to
appoint the practitioner.
 Section 129(3)(b). See part 3.5.1 below regarding the appointment and qualifications of a business288
rescue practitioner. 
 Or “publish ... to each affected person” as s 129(4) rather quaintly puts it. 289
commence on the date of such filing.  The Act does not require any prior notice of an281
intention to file,  nor are any other formal requirements prescribed such as the registration282
of the board’s resolution.  The company must within five business days  after filing the283 284
resolution notify every affected person  of the resolution, the date on which it became285
effective and the grounds, set out in a sworn statement, on which it was taken.  286
Within the same period of five business days after filing the business rescue resolution,
the company  must also appoint a business rescue practitioner to oversee the287
company during its business rescue proceedings.  Notice of his appointment must be288
filed with the Commission within two business days after making the appointment, and
every affected person must be furnished with a copy of this notice  within five business289
days after the appointment. 
Failure to appoint a business rescue practitioner or to notify each affected person
of the business rescue resolution or the appointment of a business rescue practitioner
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 Section 129(5)(a).290
 The section also applies to an agreement, Memorandum of Incorporation or rules of a company.291
 Section 130(1)(a)(iii). See part 3.5.1.3 below.292
 See Chapter 5, part 2.5.1.1.293
 Section 129(5)(b).294
in the manner and within the periods prescribed by the Act will have the result that the
business rescue resolution lapses and becomes a nullity.  It is not clear whether this290
provision also falls under the rather strangely worded section 218(1) of the Companies
Act of 2008 in terms of which no resolution is rendered void by a provision to that effect
in the Act unless a court declares it to be void.  The question would be whether “a291
nullity” (the term used in section 129(5)(a)) was intended to mean the same as “void”,
or alternatively, whether it was intended to mean “pro non scripto”, that is, as if it never
existed. Depending on the interpretation attributed to this provision by the courts, it could
mean that the resolution would remain valid until a court order has been obtained
declaring it void, or it could mean that the resolution immediately and automatically
becomes of no force and effect as soon as the stipulated number of business days have
expired without the necessary requirements having been met. The last-mentioned
possibility seems to be a very extreme consequence of what could be a mere oversight
resulting in the notification being one or two days late. Although the addition of the word
“lapses” could be an indication that this was indeed the intended result, a contrary
interpretation is indicated by the fact that the failure to comply with the procedural
requirements of section 129 is listed as one of the grounds on which a court may set
aside the business rescue resolution taken by a board of directors.  If a business292
rescue resolution lapsed automatically, there would be no reason to apply to court for
an order setting it aside on these grounds. Until a court pronounces on the exact
meaning of these provisions, it remains one of the mysteries of the new Act. For that
reason I believe that it should simply be scrapped.  293
Failure by the company to comply with the above-mentioned requirements also
has the result that the company may not file another business rescue resolution
within three months after the date on which the lapsed resolution was taken, except
with the consent of the court, obtained on application by the company and for good
cause shown.  This relatively short period is to be welcomed considering how easily294
a company may fail to comply with all the requirements by, for example, accidentally
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 See Chapter 3, part 2.3.1 regarding the prohibition in English law against a board appointing an295
administrator within 12 months after a previous appointment ceased, to prevent serial filings. No such
general limit has been placed on the appointment of a business rescue practitioner. 
 There is only one resolution by the board, namely the one appointing the administrator, in the296
English administration procedure. The filing of this resolution constitutes the commencement of
administration: see Chapter 3, part 2.5.1. 
 Section 129(6).297
 In terms of s 349 of the Companies Act of 1973.298
 In terms of s 344(a) of the Companies Act of 1973.299
 Although this would not be an action against the company (because the company would be the300
applicant), it may nevertheless be covered by the moratorium (discussed in part 3.6 below) as an action
relating to property belonging to the company. 
not notifying some affected persons, or being a day late with the notification. All would
depend, of course, on whether a company which was in breach of one of these
requirements may assume that the resolution is valid until challenged in court, which
could take more than three months and therefore hardly seems worth the trouble!
Considering these uncertainties and the very limited benefit that would result from this
provision, it should ideally be scrapped.295
In the majority of cases a business rescue practitioner will probably be appointed
at the same time that the rescue resolution is taken since a board is unlikely to take
a business rescue resolution without having decided on, and obtained the consent
of a specific business rescue practitioner. There is no logical reason why the Act has
separated the two steps, whereas combining them will enable the company to save
costs by notifying affected persons of both events simultaneously.296
Once the directors have taken a resolution to commence business rescue
proceedings, and for as long as it is valid and the rescue proceedings are continuing,
the company may not adopt a resolution to begin liquidation proceedings.  The297
prohibition does not specifically refer to a special resolution for a voluntarily winding up
of the company  although the use of the word “begin” may indicate this to be the case.298
The question then arises whether a special resolution by the company that it be wound
up by the court  is still allowed.  For the sake of certainty, the prohibition should state299 300
clearly whether both a resolution for voluntary winding up and one to apply to court for
liquidation are prohibited during rescue proceedings.
3.5.1.2 Failure to adopt a business rescue resolution
If the board of a company does not adopt a resolution to commence business rescue
proceedings although it has reasonable grounds to believe that the company is
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 In the definition of “financially distressed” in s 128(1)(f) of the Companies Act of 2008.301
 Section 129(7).302
 See part 3.4.1.1 above.303
 A pre-packaged business rescue (or “pre-packs” as they are often referred to) is described by the304
Turnaround Management Association of Southern Africa as crafting and negotiating a business rescue
plan informally, with the intent of placing the company under voluntary business rescue only once that
financially distressed, the board must deliver a written notice to each affected person
explaining which of the stipulated grounds for financial distress  apply to the company301
and why no business rescue resolution has been taken.  The reason for this provision302
is clearly to prevent company boards from continuing to trade in spite of warning signs
that the company is in serious financial trouble and further to prevent them from leaving
the employees and creditors in the dark until the company is so hopelessly insolvent that
it cannot be rescued and simply has to close its doors. The aim is thus to furnish the
affected persons with information and also proof of the company’s financial distress to
enable them to apply for business rescue proceedings themselves while the possibility
of a successful rescue still exists. 
This provision was obviously drafted when the definition of “financial distress” still
included the company’s present insolvency or inability to pay its debts.  Since this303
requirement now refers only to a future situation that appears likely to occur but may
in fact not occur, it seems irresponsible to expect a board to send out such a
damaging notice in spite of the possibility that the expected insolvency or illiquidity
may not come about.
The delivery of such a notice will undoubtedly have severely damaging
consequences for a company: credit facilities and overdrafts will be cancelled, suppliers
will insist on being paid cash on delivery and creditors will demand immediate payment
of their claims. The company will be probably be unable to do any business and its
chances of being successfully rescued once an court order for the commencement of
rescue proceedings has been obtained are very slim. As a result this provision is
expected to be of little, if any, benefit to affected persons. 
A further problem is caused by the absence of any specified period within which a
company’s board must deliver such a notice after realising that the company is in
financial distress. It must therefore be assumed that the notice has to be delivered
immediately. This will make it almost impossible for a board to enter into negotiations
with creditors to agree on a pre-packaged business rescue plan  before taking the304
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is done: TMA Comments at 25. See also Chapter 3, part 2.8.2 for an official definition of pre-packaged
plans in England which differs slightly in that it refers only to pre-arranged sales of the business. 
 See Chapter 4, part 2.8.1 on the German procedure that specifically caters for such a pre-packaged305
plan to shorten the duration of the proceedings. See also Chapter 3, part 2.8.2 for the position in
England where special requirements for pre-packs have been introduced.
 Section 22(1)(b) prohibits trading under insolvent circumstances by the company and a director who306
knowingly acquiesced in the carrying on of the company’s business in contravention of s 22(1) can be
held liable for any resulting loss or damages suffered by the company (s 77(3)(b)), but this is unlikely
to be a major deterrent. “Insolvent” is not defined in the Act, and since the same term clearly refers only
business rescue resolution. In practice these pre-packaged rescue plans are often used
by turnaround practitioners because they substantially increase the possibility of a
successful rescue of the company. Among other advantages, such a plan shortens the
period in which a company is subject to formal business rescue proceedings by avoiding
long drawn-out negotiations with creditors because the major creditors would already
have agreed informally to the rescue plan.  It also encourages boards to initiate rescue305
proceedings because they know that they have the support of the major creditors. In
addition, creditors are warned of and consulted on the intended business rescue attempt
and are therefore more inclined to support it. However, if a board is compelled
immediately to inform all affected persons of the company’s financial distress before
they have had time to engage with creditors on a pre-packaged rescue plan, the
opportunity would be lost because any shareholder, creditor or trade union would now
have the necessary proof that the company is in financial trouble and could apply for
either business rescue proceedings or liquidation of the company.
The board of a company in financial distress that decides not to commence
business rescue proceedings or liquidation will probably do so for one of three
reasons: the first and most obvious reason would be that the board members do not
believe that there is a reasonable prospect of saving the company. Even in such a
case they are required to notify affected persons, in spite of the fact that they may
intend applying for liquidation of the company. The notice does not seem to serve a
discernible purpose in this situation and it would have been preferable to require the
existence of both preconditions for a business rescue resolution before such a notice
has to be delivered. 
The other two possible reasons for not taking a business rescue resolution are
that the directors either believe that they can trade the company out of its temporary
financial dilemma in the foreseeable future (perhaps having done so before),  or306
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to the situation of the liabilities exceeding the assets in s 128(1)(f), while the definition of “solvent” in
s 4(1)(a) also refers to the company’s assets being equal to or exceeding its liabilities, it could be
argued that trading while the company is unable to pay its debts (that is, while commercially insolvent)
will not amount to a contravention of s 22(1). This interpretation of “insolvent circumstances” has now
been confirmed by regulation 21(1) of the draft Regulations, which prescribes the notice that a
company must file if s 22(1)(b) applies to it. Regulation 21(1) refers only to trading when the company’s
“liabilities exceed its assets”. This corresponds to the position taken by our courts that trading while
commercially insolvent is not automatically regarded as reckless and thus grounds for the personal
liability of directors in terms of s 424 of the Companies Act of 1973, but only if directors incur debts
under circumstances where the reasonable businessman would realise that the company will not be
able to pay those debts: see Philotex (Pty) Ltd and Others v Snyman and Others ; Braitex (Pty) Ltd and
Others v Snyman and Others 1998 (2) SA 138 (SCA); Ex parte De Villiers and Another NNO: In re
Carbon Developments (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) 1993 (1) SA 493 (A).
 Although the possibility of personal liability exists in terms of s 218(2) for any contravention of the307
Act, this provision is too vague and too wide to be of any real assistance. It would also be extremely
difficult to prove contravention of the Act in this instance. 
 For the sake of certainty, a specific period that is determined by the Department of Trade and Industry308
after consultation with turnaround practitioners on what they regard as reasonable is preferable. In
Germany the period is three weeks: see Chapter 4, part 2.3. Smits “Corporate Administration” at 97 also
recommended the introduction of a provision compelling directors to file for the rescue procedure within a
specified number of days after becoming aware of the company’s financial distress.
 As set out in s 129(1) discussed in part 3.4 above.309
hope to award themselves some benefits or even strip the company of assets, before
closing down. In both cases the directors have good reasons to keep the situation a
secret from creditors in particular. It is doubtful, therefore, whether any board will
voluntarily comply with this section. No provision has been made for any sanction
against directors if they fail to deliver the notice, and in most cases, boards will
probably simply ignore this obligation.  307
In the light of the seriously detrimental effects such a notice will have on the
future of a company and the probability that it will not be of any real advantage to
affected persons, I believe that this provision should be scrapped. It should be
replaced by a provision compelling a board to take such a resolution within a
reasonable (or specified) period  after they become aware that the requirements for308
a business rescue resolution are present.  Failure to do so must result in the309
potential personal liability of the directors for debts of the company incurred during
the period of financial distress and which the company is unable to pay. However, the
potential disadvantage of forcing directors to commence business rescue
proceedings as soon as a company complies with the definition of financial distress
is that it may have exactly the opposite effect to that hoped for. Directors may
prematurely decide on liquidation of the company while there is still a possibility of a
rescue simply to avoid the risk of personal liability in terms of the Act.
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 Steiner “Insolvency Bill” at 62, in discussing the corporate rescue procedures in England, stated that310
it was almost impossible to reconcile the desire for a relatively cheap and straightforward moratorium
regime, with the need to prevent unscrupulous company directors from abusing the procedure. 
 Section 130(1), in terms of which the application must be brought, specifically refers to the adoption311
of a resolution and not the filing thereof, although the resolution will not have any force or effect until
it has been filed (section 129(2)(b)). An applicant will thus apparently not have to wait until the
resolution is filed before bringing the application, although he would then be running the risk that the
board may change its mind and not file the resolution at all.
 In terms of s 152, discussed in part 3.8 below.312
 See part 3.4.1 above regarding the apparent difference in the test for “reasonable” between the313
requirements for taking the resolution and having it set aside by the court. The test here seems to be
completely objective.
 Section 130(1)(a)(i).314
 Section 130(1)(a)(ii).315
 Section 130(1)(a)(iii). The procedure required by s 129 is discussed in part 3.5.1.1 above.316
3.5.1.3 Objections to a business rescue resolution  
The Act contains three measures that are intended as remedies against the very real
potential for abuse by company boards of their power to start business rescue
proceedings and appoint the business rescue practitioner of their choice. It is
debatable whether the costly and time-consuming remedy of obtaining an order of
court will prove to be a very effective weapon against abuse, but making it too easy
to reverse a board’s decisions will undoubtedly undermine the success of the
business rescue proceedings. The potential abuse of the procedure is an unavoidable
risk that must be taken in order to encourage boards to initiate business rescue
proceedings where and when necessary.310
 
3.5.1.3.1 Setting aside the business rescue resolution
After the directors of a company have taken  a resolution to commence business311
rescue proceedings, and until a business rescue plan has been formally adopted,  any312
affected person may apply to court to have the resolution set aside on the grounds that
there is no reasonable basis to believe  that the company is financially distressed,313 314
or there is no reasonable prospect that the company will be rescued,  or the company315
has failed to comply with the procedural requirements set out in section 129.  It is316
unclear whether the use of the present tense in phrasing the first two grounds for setting
aside the resolution (that “there is no reasonable ...”) is merely an example of bad
drafting, or was intended to mean that the court may consider the situation of the
company at the time of the application, rather than at the time that the resolution was
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 See s 129(1) and part 3.4.1 above.317
 Section 141(2)(a)(ii), discussed in part 3.9.1 below.318
 Section 141(2)(b)(ii), discussed in part 3.9.2 below.319
 See Chapter 3, part 2.9.2.320
 Section 130(2)(a).321
 See part 3.9 below.322
 Section 130(3). The subsection uses the word “notify” but in terms of s 6(10) this apparently means the323
same as to “publish a notice” which is used in s 129. Using the same term throughout would have been
preferable, unless the regulations under the Act, which have not as yet been published, indicate a
difference.
 Section 130(4). It must be hoped that they do not exercise this right, as the participation of just some324
of the shareholders, creditors and trade unions could result in a fairly simple application becoming a
costly, drawn-out affair with the resultant immeasurable damage to the company’s business.
 See part 3.7.1.2 on the qualifications and intended regulation of business rescue practitioners.325
taken in terms of the requirements stipulated in the Act.  Since the practitioner has317
specifically been given a duty to apply to court for the discontinuation of the business
rescue proceedings as soon as he becomes aware that there is no reasonable prospect
for the company to be rescued  or to file a notice of termination of the rescue318
proceedings if the company is no longer financially distressed,  there is no apparent319
reason why affected persons should be able to take over this power and to override the
decision of the practitioner not to end the business rescue proceedings. If this was the
intention of the legislature, a far better option would have been to allow creditors to take
a majority decision instructing the practitioner to terminate the proceedings, similar to the
power of creditors to do so under the English system of administration.   320
An affected person who is also a director of the company and in this capacity
voted in favour of the business rescue resolution may not apply unless he can satisfy
the court that he supported the resolution in good faith while relying on information
that later proved to be false or misleading.  Apart from this very limited possibility,321
the directors of a company do not otherwise have the power to terminate business
rescue proceedings that commenced as a result of their resolution, and have to rely
on the business rescue practitioner to do so.  322
The applicant must serve a copy of the application on the company and the
Commission and notify each affected person in the prescribed manner.  Every affected323
person has the right to participate in the hearing of this application.  This seems an324
unnecessary complication since the court should surely be able to decide the matter on
the evidence and information provided by the applicant, the directors and, in particular,
the practitioner who should provide an independent and professional opinion.325
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 Section 130(5)(a).326
 See part 2.4.4 above.327
 In terms of s 131(4)(a)(iii) the court may order the commencement of business rescue proceedings if328
the company is not financially distressed but it is just and equitable “for financial reasons”. However, there
is no indication that the meaning of “just and equitable” should be similarly qualified or limited here. 
 Section 130(5)(b)(i)-(ii).329
The court may set aside the business rescue resolution on any of the three
stipulated grounds on which such an application may be based, or simply because
the court regards it as otherwise just and equitable to do so.  There is no indication326
in the Companies Act of 2008 what would constitute a just and equitable ground for
setting aside a board’s resolution to commence business rescue proceedings. A
crucial question is whether our courts will interpret this phrase in the same way as in
cases decided on the just and equitable requirement for judicial management. This
would prove disastrous for the new procedure since any application by a creditor who
insists on immediate winding up of the company would then almost always be
regarded as a just and equitable reason to set aside the resolution unless very
special and extraordinary circumstances exist.  This has the potential to limit327
severely the chances of business rescue proceedings becoming accepted by
company boards, because of the possibility of a creditor being able to terminate the
process at any time and without any special grounds. Considering the history of this
requirement for judicial management, the drafters should have avoided this phrase
or at least attempted to indicate with more clarity exactly what it entails.  328
Should the court require more information before deciding whether or not to set
aside the resolution, it may ask the business rescue practitioner for a report indicating
whether, in his opinion, the company appears to be financially distressed, or whether
there is a reasonable prospect of rescuing it.  Although is it stipulated that the329
business rescue practitioner should be allowed sufficient time to form an opinion on
the matter, the business rescue practitioner will probably already have investigated
the company’s circumstances by the time the application is heard. The court is not
in any way bound by the practitioner’s report and must still come to its own
conclusion, albeit influenced by the report, on whether the company is financially
distressed or whether there is a reasonable prospect of rescuing the company. The
subsection does not make any reference to the court using this report to decide
whether it would be otherwise just and equitable to set aside the resolution. 
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 Section 130(5)(c)(i).330
 Section 130(5)(c)(ii).331
 In s 129(1)(a).332
If the court sets aside the resolution, it may make any further order that may be
necessary and appropriate, including an order that the company be placed under
liquidation.  Although probably intended to be the outcome if the court finds that the330
company has no reasonable chance of being rescued, this is not stipulated in the
relevant subsection, and a court should therefore be able to issue a liquidation order
irrespective of the grounds on which the resolution was set aside. 
If the court sets aside the resolution because there were no reasonable grounds
for believing that the company “would be unlikely to pay all of its debts as they
became due and payable”, the court may order any director who voted in favour of
the business rescue resolution to pay the costs of the application.  It is unfortunate331
that the subsection does not use the term “financially distressed” to describe the
circumstances under which a director may be held liable: this is, after all, how the
precondition for taking the resolution is stipulated.  The second situation described332
in the definition of financial distress, namely that the company is reasonably likely to
become insolvent in the ensuing six months, is not in any way covered by the phrase
describing the basis for holding a director liable for costs, and apparently a board
resolution based on this option does not carry the same risk! 
Furthermore, section 130(5)(c)(ii) refers to the belief that the company would be
unlikely to pay all its debts. The requirement for financial distress refers to the company
becoming “unable” to pay its debts. There could be many reasons, not connected to any
form of financial distress, why a company would be unlikely to pay all its debts, for
example because a creditor’s claim is disputed. That is surely not what the drafters of
the Companies Act of 2008 intended, and once again emphasises the importance of
consistency and correct terminology. 
Apart from the uncertainty created by the lack of consistency in the terminology,
the impression is also created that this is a purely objective test. If the court finds that
there were no reasonable grounds for believing that the company would be unable
to pay all its debts as they became due and payable, the possibility of personal
liability for costs arises. A director’s personal expertise, experience and knowledge
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 Section 130(5)(c)(ii). Section 76 sets out the standards of directors’ conduct and subsections (4) and333
(5) describe the circumstances in which a director will satisfy his obligations to act in the best interests
of the company and with the required degree of care, skill and diligence. 
 See part 3.4.1.1 above.334
may apparently not be taken into consideration to establish whether he had
reasonable grounds for his belief, in spite of the subjective element allowed
elsewhere. Considering the Department of Trade and Industry’s aim of encouraging
directors to make use of the rescue proceedings as soon as the first signs of financial
difficulties appear, the provision is counter-productive. Directors will hesitate to take
this route if there is a real danger of personal liability for costs if they eventually
appear to have been overcautious when viewed with the advantage of hindsight by
the court. Furthermore, it may actually encourage directors to choose liquidation over
business rescue proceedings since there is no risk of personal liability for an
application for winding up made in good faith.
However, the court may not make an order for costs against a director who can
satisfy the court that he acted in good faith and on the basis of information that he
was entitled to rely on in terms of section 76(4) and (5).  333
It is quite possible that section 130(5)(c)(ii) was intended to apply only to the
original first test for financial distress which was later scrapped and was based on the
current inability of the company to pay its debts.  This is what the wording of the334
provision seems to imply, apart from the fact that it would be extremely unfair to
penalise the directors for misjudging a struggling company’s ability to pay all its debts
in the next six months. Therefore the provision should be amended at least to reflect
a subjective test whether the grounds for deciding to commence rescue proceedings
were reasonable.
In general, it must be said that the possibility that a court may at any time, and
almost up to the end of the rescue proceedings, second-guess the board and the
business rescue practitioner and overturn a board’s decision to start these
proceedings could lead to an element of uncertainty that may not be conducive to a
successful rescue and could also be abused to delay its finalisation. However, it
remains to be seen whether this will have any serious effects on the potential success
of business rescue proceedings. 
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 This section prescribes the qualifications of business rescue practitioners and is discussed in detail335
in part 3.7.1.2 below.
 It is not clear why the independence of the practitioner should be stated as a separate ground for336
removal since it is already included in the qualifications contained in s 138(1)(d)-(e). It has merely
added to the uncertainty surrounding this qualification: see part 3.7.1.2 below.
 Section 130(1)(b)(i)-(iii).337
 See Chapter 4, part 2.7.1.2.2 regarding this requirement in Germany.338
 Section 130(2)(b).339
 See part 3.7.1.3 below. 340
 Section 130(3).341
 Section 130(4).342
 The drafters of the Companies Act of 2008 have chosen to ignore (if they were at all aware of it) the343
well-established concepts in South African law of majority in value and majority in number of creditors
3.5.1.3.2  Replacing the business rescue practitioner 
An affected person may also apply to court for an order setting aside the appointment of
the business rescue practitioner on the grounds that the practitioner does not satisfy the
requirements of section 138,  is not independent of the company or its management335 336
or lacks the necessary skills required by the company’s specific circumstances.  The337
last-mentioned ground is not stipulated as a requirement for appointment as a business
rescue practitioner, and this provision effectively introduces an additional requirement
through the back door. It is submitted that this requirement should have been added to
section 138(1). The suitability of a practitioner for the specific case is an important factor
and should always be taken into consideration before he is appointed.338
A director who voted in favour of the business rescue resolution is also
disqualified from bringing this application unless he satisfies the court that he acted
in good faith but on the basis of false or misleading information.  Since there is no339
such restriction if the application is brought in terms of section 139(2) and the
grounds for both applications are very similar, a director would be able to avoid this
obstacle by simply basing his application on section 139(2).340
The applicant must serve a copy of the application on the company and the
Commission and notify each affected person of the application.  Each affected341
person also has the right to take part in the hearing of the application by the court,342
and the same objections raised above on the right of every affected person to
become involved in the matter apply in this case.
If the court sets aside the appointment of a practitioner, it must appoint an
alternative one who meets the requirements of section 138 and is recommended by or
acceptable to the majority in value  of the independent creditors who were represented343
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(see Bertelsmann et al Mars 17.10-17.30). They have instead opted for a complicated and hitherto
unknown concept of “voting interest” of creditors to be calculated according to s 145(4) and which
finally comes down to a majority in value, albeit in a far more convoluted way. Furthermore, every
secured creditor has a voting interest equal to the full value of his claim, and not just to the unsecured
part: s 145(4)(a). 
 Section 130(6)(a).344
 Section 128(1)(g) read with ss 128(2) and 144(2).345
 In terms of s 2(1)(a)-(b) and s 2(2) an individual is related to a company if he has the ability to346
materially influence the policy of the company and can exercise an element of control, and is related
to a director or business rescue practitioner if they are married, live together in a relationship similar
to marriage or are relatives separated by no more than two degrees.
 See generally Calitz and Burdette “Insolvency Practitioners” and Loubser “Shareholders” at 375347
regarding the requisition system followed by the Master’s offices in the appointment of provisional
liquidators and judicial managers. 
 In actual fact the applicant could have been a shareholder or trade union and not necessarily a348
creditor: s 131(5) discussed in part 3.5.2.5 below.
 Or dies or resigns. See part 3.7.1.3 below on the vacation of and removal from office of a practitioner.349
in the hearing before the court.  Independent creditors are defined as those creditors,344
including employees, who have claims against the company that were payable before
the beginning of the business rescue,  and who are not related to the company, a345
director of the company or the business rescue practitioner.  No mention is made here346
of any requirement that the substitute practitioner must be suitable for the specific case.
Furthermore, this provision is based on the assumption that (some) creditors would be
represented during the hearing, but creditors may not always be prepared to incur the
costs this would involve. The Act does not provide for the possibility that the application
could have been brought by a shareholder or trade union who may not necessarily be
a creditor, and no independent creditors were represented in court. One can only hope
that the requisition system will not rear its ugly head in a mutated form in this instance,
with all the possibilities for abuse and corruption that accompanies it.347
To complicate matters even further, section 130(6)(a) that provides for the
appointment of a substitute practitioner by the court in this instance seems to be
contradicted by section 139(3) which states that the company or creditor,  as the348
case may be, who nominated the (original) practitioner must appoint a new
practitioner if a practitioner is removed from office.  Since section 139(1)(a) also349
refers to the removal of a practitioner in terms of section 130, such a removal should
be assumed to be included in the provisions of section 139(3). However, in view of
the conflict between these provisions, it must be accepted that the drafters did not
intend (and probably did not even realise that they were) including the situation where
a practitioner who was appointed by the board is removed by an order of court in
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 See part 3.5.1.3.1 above. 350
 See part 3.7.1.2 below on the intended regulation of the profession.351
terms of section 130. In such a case, his substitute must therefore be appointed by
the court as stipulated in section 130(6)(a). If such a practitioner is removed as a
result of an application in terms of section 139, however, the directors have the right
to appoint the substitute practitioner. 
Section 130(6)(b) contains a very curious provision relating to an order for the
replacement of a business rescue practitioner. This subsection states that if the court
makes such an order, the provisions of section 130(5)(b), if relevant, also apply to the
newly appointed practitioner. The last-mentioned subsection concerns the situation where
an application for the setting aside of the business rescue resolution is made and the court
requires the practitioner to provide more information on whether the requirements for such
a resolution are present or not.  It is not at all clear whether the legislature by inserting350
section 130(6)(b) intended that an application for the replacement of a business rescue
practitioner can result in the setting aside of the whole resolution of the directors, thereby
terminating the business rescue proceedings. If this is indeed the case (and it is difficult
to find any other possible explanation for this provision), at least two main objections can
be raised against the provision: first, there is the fact that a court may apparently mero
motu and without such an application before it, order the termination of the business
rescue proceedings based on the report of a practitioner who is new to the case and could
even have been nominated by the creditors with the specific intention (read: instructions)
to sink the process. Creditors who are opposed to a rescue attempt but who are unable
to prove the requirements for having the rescue resolution set aside could abuse this
possibility to achieve the same purpose.
The second objection is that it appears to be an unnecessary waste of time and
money to appoint a new business rescue practitioner only to terminate the rescue
proceedings shortly thereafter. I believe that this provision adds an unnecessary
complication to the procedure and should be removed. It is not the duty of the court
to judge the viability of the rescue proceedings if no such application has been made,
and even if it were, there is no reason why the original practitioner should not be
entrusted with the task of providing the report, considering that this is supposed to be
an independent professional and member of a regulated profession.  351
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 Section 130(1)(c). See part 3.7.1.2 below for a detailed discussion of this aspect. 352
 Sections 368, 375(1), 429(b)(i) and 431(4) respectively of the Companies Act of 1973, and ss 18(1)353
and 56(2) of the Insolvency Act of 1936.
 Institute of Directors King Code of Governance for South Africa 2009, recommendation 2.15.4. 354
 Section 131(1).355
 Section 131(2).356
 Section 133(1). That is, unless the proceedings commence before the order has been issued, as357
discussed in part 3.5.2.6. See further part 3.6 below on the moratorium.
3.5.1.3.3  Requiring the practitioner to provide security
The third measure provides for an application to court by an affected person for an order
requiring the business rescue practitioner to provide security for an amount and on
conditions that the court considers necessary to secure the interests of the company and
any affected persons.  It is an entrenched principle of South African corporate and352
insolvency law that any provisional or final liquidator, judicial manager or trustee must
provide security for the proper performance of their duties, and in the case of final
appointments it is a precondition for their official appointment by the Master of the High
Court.  Therefore it is difficult to understand why this principle was not adhered to in353
the appointment of a business rescue practitioner as well, considering that he is put in
control of the management and quite probably of substantial assets of a company. An
order of court should not be necessary to obtain security from the practitioner and
considering his wide powers and position of trust, it should be a precondition for his
appointment. The King Code of Corporate Governance also recommends that where
a board appoints a business rescue practitioner, it should ensure that the practitioner
furnishes security for the value of the assets of the company.354
 
3.5.2 Court order to begin business rescue proceedings
3.5.2.1 Notification of application
Any affected person may apply to court for an order to commence business rescue
proceedings and place a company under supervision if the company has not adopted
a resolution to commence business rescue proceedings.  The applicant must serve355
a copy of the application on the company and the Commission, and notify each affected
person.  The consequences of the required notification to every affected person will356
almost certainly be dire for the company. The moratorium that will protect the company
against legal action by creditors comes into effect only once business rescue
proceedings have commenced,  and creditors who have now been informed that this357
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 See Chapter 3, part 2.5.2 and Chapter 4, part 2.5 regarding the situation in England and Germany358
respectively where no general notification is required before the order is given or at least some
moratorium has been put in place to protect the company.
 Section 131(3).359
 See Chapter 3, part 2.5.2.360
is imminent will not waste any time in attempting to obtain payment and taking
enforcement action against the company while it is still possible. Apart from its dwindling
assets, the company will also not have access to further capital and find it almost
impossible to continue running its business.  Even a company that had not been in358
financial distress before will almost certainly become so after the required notification to
affected persons.
3.5.2.2 Right of affected persons to participate in hearing 
Each affected person also has the right to participate in the hearing of this
application.  Although the sentiments behind this provision are laudable, because359
employees in particular are often the last to know about their company’s financial
problems, it will almost certainly lead to protracted hearings and escalating costs,
especially in the case of larger companies, because of the adversarial nature that
now characterises the procedure. Trade unions and major creditors would feel
compelled to participate to ensure that their interests are protected. The Companies
Act of 2008 goes to great lengths to protect the interests of creditors and employees
right through the business rescue process, and I would submit that it is unnecessary
to complicate the matter at this early stage by affording each and every affected
person the opportunity of joining the fray. It should be left to the court to make a
decision purely on the basis of whether the company is in financial distress and
whether there is a reasonable possibility that it can be rescued, without the emotional
and subjective elements that employees, shareholders and creditors will bring into the
case. Forcing the court to weigh up all the various interests loses sight of the purpose
of this procedure, namely to afford a company with the potential to survive the best
chance of doing so. It would be advisable to follow the example of English law where
a restriction has been placed on persons who may participate in the hearing to
ensure that the court is not flooded with dissenting views based purely on self-interest
of the various persons.360
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 Section 131(6).361
 Section 348 of the Companies Act of 1973.362
 For example in s 358 of the Companies Act of 1973.363
 This is the more usual meaning of “proceedings” in South African law (Hiemstra and Gonin364
Regswoordeboek at 106) although often preceded by the word “legal” to make its meaning clearer. 
 This is the situation in England where there is a clear provision that only the liquidator may apply365
for an administration order in respect of a company that is in liquidation: see Chapter 3, part 2.3.2. 
 In terms of s 349 of the Companies Act of 1973.366
 See s 132 and part 3.9 below on the termination of rescue proceedings.367
 According to s 131(6) regulating an application during liquidation proceedings.368
 In terms of s 408 of the Companies Act of 1973. Confirmation has the effect of a final judgment (s 408).369
3.5.2.3 Application after liquidation has commenced 
An application for business rescue may be made even after liquidation proceedings
have been commenced by or against the company, and this will have the effect of
suspending the liquidation proceedings until the court has refused the application for
business rescue or, if the application is granted, until the business rescue
proceedings have ended.  361
The wording of this provision is problematic because the drafters chose not to
follow the wording of the Companies Act of 1973 where a clear distinction is made
between the commencement of winding up by the court  (which refers to the start362
of the process until the dissolution of the company) and legal proceedings, referring
to court proceedings.  The question now is whether the phrase “liquidation363
proceedings” in the Companies Act of 2008 refers to legal proceedings in a court,364
which would mean that an application for a business rescue order may only be made
until a final winding-up order has been issued and the legal proceedings have thus
ended.  It would also exclude the possibility of suspending a voluntary liquidation365
that was commenced by a members’ resolution since no court proceedings are
involved.  However, it could also have the same meaning as in the phrase “business366
rescue proceedings” which refers to the whole process, including everything that
follows after the order has been granted and right up to where the business rescue
terminates.  This interpretation seems highly probable when considering that the367
application is specifically stated to be in terms of section 131(1)  that, in turn,368
provides that the application may be made “at any time”. 
Depending on the interpretation given to this provision, it thus appears quite
possible that an application for business rescue proceedings may be made at any
stage during the winding up of a company until the Master has confirmed  the369
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 In terms of s 403 of the Companies Act of 1973.370
 See part 3.1 above. 371
 Section 131(7).372
 The courts have a sim ilar power to order judicial management when hearing an application for373
winding up: see part 2.4.5 above. In England, however, this is not possible since an administration
order may be granted only if there is a specific application for such an order before the court: see
Chapter 3, part 2.5.2.
 In terms of s 340 of the Companies Act.374
liquidation and distribution account filed by the liquidator.370
Needless to say, the uncertainty created by the confusing use of terminology is
highly undesirable and should be clarified by amending the provision. I submit that once
a final liquidation order has been issued, or the resolution for a voluntary winding up of
a company has been registered, it should not be possible for an affected person to apply
for a business rescue order. The possibilities for abuse are endless, particularly in view
of the considerable financial advantage to be gained by employees if liquidation of the
company is preceded by business rescue proceedings.371
3.5.2.4 Order during liquidation proceedings
The court has also been given the power to make an order for commencement of
business rescue proceedings “at any time during the course of any liquidation
proceedings or proceedings to enforce any security against the company”.  No372
specific application for a business rescue order therefore needs to be before the
court.  The use of the word “proceedings” is once again confusing and unclear,373
although in this provision it probably refers to legal or court proceedings because this
is where a court would mainly be involved and able to identify appropriate cases for
rescue proceedings.
However, the question remains open whether a court could issue an order for the
commencement of business rescue proceedings during legal proceedings at a later
stage of liquidation, for example when the liquidator applies for a disposition by the
company to be set aside.  Although the chances of successfully rescuing a374
company that is already in the advanced stages of a winding up are slim, special
circumstances could possibly arise in a specific situation which could make business
rescue proceedings desirable. I submit that in such a case the liquidator is the
appropriate person to decide whether these exceptional circumstances exist and to
bring the necessary application. Unfortunately, the careless use of the word
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 See Chapter 3, parts 2.2 and 2.3.2.375
 As discussed in part 3.4.2 above.376
 Section 131(4)(a).377
 Section 131(5). See further part 3.7.1.1 regarding the appointment of the interim and final business378
rescue practitioners, including the misleading use of the word “may”.
 Section 131(5).379
 Section 131(4)(b).380
 See part 2.5.2 above.381
“proceedings”, combined with the absence of any proper explanatory document, has
once again made it very difficult to ascertain whether the drafters of the legislation
have this situation in mind. By contrast, the provisions regulating the circumstances
under which an administrator may be appointed by a court in England clearly stipulate
that no administrator may be appointed for a company that is in liquidation, subject
to the specific exception that an administrator may be appointed by the court on
application by the liquidator of the company.375
3.5.2.5 Powers of the court
If the court is satisfied that the prescribed conditions and requirements  have been376
met, it may make an order placing the company under supervision and commencing
business rescue proceedings,  and may appoint an interim business rescue377
practitioner nominated by the applicant.  This interim practitioner must also meet the378
requirements for appointment set out in section 138, but the appointment is
provisional because it is subject to ratification by the first meeting of creditors.379
Alternatively, the court may dismiss the application and make any appropriate and
necessary order, including one for liquidation of the company.  The last-mentioned380
power is an improvement on the situation under judicial management where the court
does not have the power to order the winding up of the company when dismissing an
application for judicial management.381
Although it is not referred to in any of the provisions in Chapter 6 of the Companies Act
of 2008 regulating the commencement of business rescue proceedings by an order of
court, another possibility has been created by section 163 of the Act. This section
authorises a director or shareholder of a company to apply to court for relief from any
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial act, omission or conduct of its business by the company
or a related person, or the exercise of the powers of a director or prescribed officer of the
company that is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregards the interests of the
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 Section 163(1).382
 Section 163(2)(c).383
 In s 131(4)(a). See part 3.4.2 above.384
 Section 132(1)(b).385
 In terms of s 131(7).386
 Section 132(1)(c). From time to time, one gets the impression that the drafters could not decide whether387
to refer to the rescue procedure as commencing rescue proceedings or placing a company under
supervision. As a result, there is no consistency in references to the procedure: in this case there is only
reference to placing the company under supervision, and not to commencing rescue proceedings. 
 In terms of s 348 of the Companies Act of 1973.388
 See Nel and Others NNO v The Master and Others 2002 (3) SA 354 (SCA) at 358; Development389
Bank of Southern Africa Ltd v Van Rensburg and Others NNO 2002 (5) SA 425 (SCA) at 431-432. 
 My emphasis.390
applicant.  The court hearing such an application is specifically given the option of issuing382
an order placing the company under supervision and commencing business rescue
proceedings  if satisfied that the circumstances required for such an order apply.  383 384
3.5.2.6 Commencement of business rescue proceedings
The business rescue proceedings formally begin when a person applies to court in
terms of section 131(1)  or, if the order is made during the course of liquidation385
proceedings or proceedings to enforce a security interest,  when the actual order386
placing the company under supervision is made.  387
The stipulation that rescue proceedings begin when a person applies to court for such
an order is extremely unfortunate. Firstly, it is not clear whether “applies to court” has the
same meaning as presenting an application to court, which is the moment when a winding
up by the court commences  and which has been explained by case law to be the exact388
moment when the papers are lodged with the Registrar of the court.  This is probably389
what the drafters intended, but as they chose not to use the existing statutory expression
and no definition is provided in the Act, it could be argued that the words “applies to court”
mean the actual appearance in court by the applicant and his legal representative. 
Secondly, this provision is irreconcilable with the wording of section 131(1) that
provides for an application to court for an order commencing  business rescue390
proceedings. Therefore, although according to section 131(1) the proceedings are
commenced by an order of court, in terms of section 132(1)(b) they start much sooner.
Thirdly, there is substantial potential for unnecessary complications as a result of
business rescue proceedings possibly commencing before an order to this effect has
been issued. There was no similar provision in respect of judicial management, which
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 Unlike specific provisions in the Companies Act of 1973 which apply after commencement of winding391
up, such as the prohibition on transfer of shares or disposition of property in s 341. 
 Once again, the example of English law could have been used where administration commences392
with the appointment of an administrator, whether in terms of an order of court or a resolution by the
company or its directors: see Chapter 3, part 2.3.
 In terms of s 131.393
 Section 131(8)(a).394
 See part 3.5.1.1 above.395
 Section 131(8)(b).396
consequently started when a provisional order was issued, and for good reasons. No
specific legal consequences of the commencement of business rescue proceedings are
stipulated in the Companies Act of 2008.  Instead, the provisions contained in Chapter391
6 consistently use the words “during business rescue proceedings”. One cannot avoid
the impression that the drafters really had in mind the period after the court order had
been issued or the board resolution had been filed. If all the legal consequences of a
business rescue commenced by an order of court come into force before the order is
issued, which is what this provision implies, it would, for example, mean that the general
moratorium on legal proceedings that applies “during” the proceedings comes into effect
and the directors’ authority and powers to manage the company are curbed, but without
a practitioner to take over these duties. The obvious further question then is what
happens if the court refuses to grant an order for business rescue proceedings after the
process has already started! This must surely rank as one of the most ill-considered
provisions in the Companies Act of 2008.  392
A company that has been placed under supervision  may not “adopt a resolution393
placing itself in liquidation” until the business rescue has ended.  The wording of this394
provision differs slightly from the similar one that applies to a company whose board has
taken a business rescue resolution.  However, the wording of this prohibition seems395
to refer specifically to a voluntary winding up. Unfortunately, there is no detailed report
or proper explanatory memorandum available to explain whether the difference in
wording between the two provisions has any significance or is just one more example
of inconsistent and careless drafting.
The company must also “notify each affected person of the order within five business
days after the date of the order”.  The need for this provision, and the costs involved in396
informing every affected person, must be questioned. Every affected person has already
been informed of the applicant’s intention to apply, and those persons who regarded it as
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 Section 147(1). As stated above, the court may appoint an interim business rescue practitioner when397
granting the order.
 Section 144(2).398
 Section 144(3)(c).399
 Section 144(3)(d).400
 See, for example, the required notice to every trade union and employee not represented by a trade401
union (in terms of s 144(3)(a)), and to each creditor (in terms of s 145(1)(a)) of each court proceeding,
decision, meeting or other relevant event concerning the business rescue proceedings. 
 Regulation 134 of the draft Regulations specifically excludes the far less expensive possibility of merely402
advertising any notice concerning business rescue proceedings in a daily newspaper. Consequently,
regulation 8, read with Table CR 3 in Annexure 3 to the draft Regulations, will apply, requiring that notices
to affected persons must be sent to each individual person by fax, email or registered post. Apart from the
excessive direct costs involved, a listed company would probably not have any information in respect of
the holders of its uncertificated shares and would have to obtain it, at substantial additional cost, from
STRATE or the relevant Central Securities Depository Participants. 
 Corporate Insolvency at 395. The comment by Rajak “Rescue of Insolvent Companies” at 27 that403
administration was so expensive that a company had to be “very rich to afford administration
proceedings” could probably also apply to business rescue proceedings because of the many
administrative and notification requirements. 
necessary would have followed or intervened in the court proceedings. The business
rescue practitioner must furthermore convene a meeting of creditors and one for
representatives of the employees within ten business days after his appointment (which in
this case is the same date as the order) and will thus have to give notice to them again.397
Employees who are owed money by the company at the time of the order are classified as
preferred unsecured creditors  and will thus be included in the notice to creditors. All398
employees (or their trade unions), including those who are not creditors of the company,
have been given the right to form a committee of employees’ representatives  and are399
entitled to be consulted by the business rescue practitioner.  It seems to place an400
unnecessary administrative and cost burden on the company to require repeated
notification during the process to each individual affected person.  Notification should be401
limited to those specific instances where affected persons are able to influence the
outcome, such as the application to court or meetings where they have to vote on a
particular matter. 
The multiple and often quite unnecessary notifications that have to be given to
affected persons will add substantial costs to the procedure and ultimately discourage
its use.  Finch specifically mentions the notification requirements in the administration402
procedure in England and the resulting expenses as part of the “intricate procedural
burdens” which could lead to creditors opting for other procedures.403
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 See Loubser “Corporate Rescue and Labour Legislation” at 62-63.404
 Discussed in part 3.5.2.6 above.405
 See Chapter 3, part 2.6.1.406
 See Chapter 4, part 2.5.1407
3.6 The moratorium
3.6.1 Moratorium on legal proceedings
3.6.1.1 Interim moratorium 
No provision has been made for an interim moratorium that would protect the company
before the official commencement of business rescue proceedings. Although no such
provision exists in the case of judicial management either, the difference is that no prior
notification to creditors, shareholders or employees is required before an application for
judicial management is brought and most of them will be informed only after the
provisional judicial management order, which will probably include a moratorium, has
been issued.  Depending on the interpretation of the provision specifying the moment404
of commencement of business rescue proceedings started by an order of court,  it is405
possible that a company may be exposed to a run on its assets by creditors in the period
between the compulsory notification of the intended application and the order of the
court that would result in the automatic moratorium. Unfortunately, in the absence of any
explanatory document, it is unclear whether the drafters of the Companies Act of 2008
anticipated this risk.
A comparison with the legislation in England and Germany reveals that both
systems provide for some form of interim moratorium to protect the company during
this sensitive stage. In England an automatic interim moratorium provides essentially
the same wide-ranging protection against winding up and other legal processes
against the company or its property as the final moratorium, and is in force from the
making of an application to court for an administration order until the order is granted
or dismissed.  In Germany there is no provision for a general interim moratorium to406
come into effect automatically, but a stay of execution can be ordered by the
insolvency court as soon as an application for the opening of insolvency proceedings
has been filed and without any specific application for such a stay being necessary.407
3.6.1.2 Final moratorium
For the duration of the business rescue proceedings there is a general moratorium on
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 Section 133(1).408
 See Chapter 3, part 2.6.2.409
 See part 2.6 above.410
 Section 133(1)(a).411
 Section 133(1)(b). The court is specifically authorised to make its consent subject to suitable conditions.412
 Section 133(1)(c).413
 Section 133(1)(d). It is not clear why criminal proceedings against directors should be excluded414
since these are not proceedings against the company.
 Section 133(1)(e).415
commencing or continuing with legal proceedings, including enforcement actions,
against the company or in relation to any property owned by the company or lawfully in
its possession, in any forum.  Unlike the situation in England where both the passing408
of a resolution and the making of a court order for the winding up of a company in
administration are specifically prohibited,  winding up is not specifically mentioned in409
the moratorium applicable to business rescue proceedings. This effectively means that
an application for the winding up of the company may be brought without any obligation
on the applicant to first have the business rescue proceedings terminated or set aside
by satisfying the court that the rescue of the company is no longer a reasonable or
viable option. The only precondition would be the consent of the practitioner or the court
to institute this action against the company. This is clearly not an acceptable situation.
The moratorium automatically comes into effect on commencement of the
business rescue proceedings, and this constitutes a major improvement on judicial
management where a moratorium has to be specifically applied for and ordered by
the court.  The moratorium is not absolute, as several exceptions are listed in the410
Act. Firstly, legal proceedings may be instituted or continued with the written consent
of the business rescue practitioner  or leave of the court.  Furthermore, a set-off411 412
against a claim made by the company in legal proceedings commenced before or
after the start of the business rescue proceedings is allowed,  as are criminal413
proceedings against the company or any of its directors or officers.  Finally,414
proceedings regarding any property or rights over which the company exercises the
powers of a trustee are also excluded from the moratorium.  415
The moratorium allowed under judicial management does not specify that legal
proceedings in respect of the company’s property as well as other property lawfully in its
possession are stayed, but has the same effect as it contains a blanket moratorium on all
actions, proceedings, the execution of all writs, summonses and other processes against
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 Section 428(2) of the Companies Act of 1973.416
 Section 133(2).417
 Once again, the lack of a proper and detailed Explanatory Memorandum that may have contained418
a good reason for this decision is proving to be a source of frustration. 
 The wording of s 133(3) that contains this provision is unnecessarily convoluted: it provides that the419
measurement of the time must be suspended during business rescue proceedings if a claim against
the company is subject to a time limit. Nevertheless, at least it brings certainty to the question whether
prescription will run during the moratorium, which was not the case under judicial management: see
Blackman et al Companies Act at 15–22. 
the company without the leave of the court. It also does not provide for any exceptions.416
I submit that as far as the wording of the general moratorium is concerned, the
section in the Companies Act of 1973 is preferable to that of section 133(1): a blanket
prohibition against all (civil) legal actions against the company, irrespective of the
grounds or specific property rights concerned, provides more clarity than the attempt
to list all possibilities of rights that may be the subject of legal proceedings. 
The exceptions, however, are to be welcomed, particularly the option of obtaining
the business rescue practitioner’s consent to institute legal proceedings and not having
to approach the court. Although it is doubtful that business rescue practitioners would
often be prepared to give this consent, there may be cases where a business rescue
practitioner would prefer unavoidable legal proceedings to be instituted or finalised as
soon as possible.
Special provision is made for the enforcement of any guarantee or surety given
by a company, in that it may be enforced against the company only with the consent
of the court and subject to any conditions that the court may consider just and
equitable.  It is unclear why the drafters felt the need to provide for this situation in417
a separate subsection: a business rescue practitioner should surely be trusted to
refuse consent to any proceedings that would be harmful to the rescue process, in
which case the court has to be approached for its consent anyway.  418
As a result of the moratorium, prescription on a claim against the company will
not run during the company’s business rescue proceedings.419
3.6.2 Uncompleted contracts 
In addition to the moratorium, the Companies Act of 2008 also protects the company
against actions based on breach of any contract to which the company was a party
at the commencement of the rescue proceedings. In an unfortunately worded, unclear
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 In its presentation on the Companies Bill to the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry, the420
Banking Association of South Africa stated that this provision would introduce significant risks into
contracts, causing higher costs, and undermine South Africa’s corporate contractual law: Business
Report 14 August 2008 at 1. 
 Section 136(2). The provision is also made subject to ss 35A and 35B of the Insolvency Act of 1936,421
which respectively regulate transactions on an exchange on sequestration of the estate of a market
participant, and unperformed obligations arising from a master agreement if the estate of one of the parties
to the agreement is sequestrated. Since both these provisions specifically apply only after sequestration
of the debtor’s estate (or liquidation of the debtor company in terms of s 339 of the Companies Act of 1973)
and neither of these situations are present, this part of s 136(2) is meaningless. 
 Section 136(3).422
 In terms of s 135(3) the claimants would then enjoy preference rights to payment.423
and extremely contentious provision,  the business rescue practitioner is given the420
right to suspend or cancel entirely, partially or conditionally any provision of such an
agreement other than an agreement of employment, despite any provision to the
contrary contained in the contract.  Although not stipulated in the provision, it is421
obvious that the business rescue practitioner would also have this right in respect of
the whole agreement and not just individual sections. This view is supported by the
next subsection that refers to the right of any party to “an agreement that has been
suspended or cancelled” to claim damages from the company.  There is no422
indication whether such a claim will be regarded as part of the costs of the rescue
proceedings  but it is more likely to be treated as an ordinary unsecured claim.423
It must be assumed that what the drafters of the legislation intended was to regulate
the fulfilment or not of uncompleted contracts to which the company is a party at the
commencement of the rescue proceedings. There is a lot to be said for allowing the
business rescue practitioner a choice whether to fulfil an uncompleted contract or not,
especially contracts that are detrimental to the company or could defeat the rescue
attempt, without running the risk of a court ordering specific performance against the
company or the business rescue practitioner being held personally liable for breach of
any duty to the company. However, allowing the practitioner to suspend part or the
whole of a contract for an indefinite period, leaving the other contracting party in limbo,
is unacceptable, as is the right to cancel some provisions the business rescue
practitioner does not like, but to enforce those he does. Would that, for example, allow
the business rescue practitioner to demand delivery in terms of a contract of sale but to
cancel or suspend the payment provision or the one providing for retention of title? Or
to demand payment of a loan extended to the company but to cancel the condition
stipulating that the company must provide security? The wording of this provision also
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 However, this is how it was interpreted by the Banking Council of South Africa and the South African424
Property Owners’ Association, who both objected strenuously to this provision: respectively reported
in Business Times 14 August 2008 at 1 and Business Report 23 July 2008 at 1. 
 Solomon and Boltar “Section 136(2)” also argue that, given their ordinary meaning, this is exactly what425
the effect of the words used in s 136(2) will have, giving the practitioner not only the power to “cherry pick”
between different provisions of an agreement, but even between the rights and obligations in one provision
of an agreement. As an example, they use the absurd effect that this provision could have on a loan
agreement where the practitioner could retain the provision making a loan to the company, but could cancel
or suspend the provisions obliging the company to pay interest, provide security or even repay the loan.
 1965 (3) SA 517 (SRA).426
 Bertelsmann et al Mars at 222.427
seems to imply that the business rescue practitioner may cancel or suspend a term of
the contract that has already been fulfilled, such as security that has already been
provided for a loan or stopping payment for a leased asset while continuing to use it and
not being compelled to return possession to the owner. This would be contrary to every
established principle of our law of contract and would effectively amount to the
cancellation of vested rights.  I do not believe that any legislation could have this effect,424
even if it were the intention of the legislature. I would also argue that the power to
suspend or cancel a provision of an agreement does not include the power to cancel the
completed effects of this provision: the power to cancel a provision requiring the
registration of a bond as security for a loan, for example, could not possibly include the
power to cancel the already registered bond.
It seems obvious that all the above implications could not and should not have
been the intention, but there is nothing in the wording of this very wide provision that
limits the rights of the business rescue practitioner in this regard.  The drafters425
appear to have confused a moratorium, protecting the company from legal action,
with the option of terminating a contract and avoiding future liabilities of the company
because fulfilment would prejudice the business rescue proceedings. 
It is regrettable that the drafters of this provision did not take cognisance of the
manner in which the matter is regulated in our insolvency law as applied in judicial
management in CCA Little & Sons v Niven.  The basic common-law principle is that426
specific performance will not be ordered against an insolvent estate, and should the
liquidator of a company refuse to render performance under an uncompleted contract,
the other party will have merely a concurrent claim for damages based on breach of
contract as well as the right to cancellation for breach of contract.  If the liquidator427
chooses to continue an uncompleted contract, he has to offer full performance and
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 W here it has been deemed necessary, the Insolvency Act of 1936 has amended these principles428
in respect of certain specific types of contracts: see Bertelsmann et al Mars at 225ff.
 See Chapter 4, part 2.6.2.429
 Section 129(3)(b). The section actually refers to the “company” that must appoint the business430
rescue practitioner, but in this instance it must be assumed that the reference is to the board acting on
behalf of the company.
 Section 128(1)(d).431
may demand the same.  Almost the same result has been achieved by the German428
insolvency legislation in which the insolvency administrator has been given the right
to choose between fulfilment or not of uncompleted contracts, but does not have the
right to choose partial performance, and certainly also not to suspend any part of a
contract.  Special provisions furthermore protect the other party from being left in429
uncertainty over the future of the contract for longer than necessary – apparently not
a point of concern to the drafters of the Companies Act of 2008. 
The wording of this provision requires several drastic amendments. If this is not
done, one can only hope that the courts, when faced with this provision, will interpret it
according to the accepted principles of our law, in particular our law of contract, and not
allow what is essentially a unilateral amendment of a contract by the practitioner. If the
practitioner does not want to fulfil all the terms of an agreement, it should be regarded
as a repudiation of the contract which will release the other party from performance and
afford him the right to cancel the contract and claim damages from the company for
breach of contract. If, on the other hand, the practitioner chooses to demand
performance in terms of the contract, the company must be bound to fulfil all its
contractual obligations as well. 
3.7 Managing the procedure
3.7.1 The business rescue practitioner 
3.7.1.1 Appointment
If business rescue proceedings result from a resolution by the board of directors, the
board also appoints the business rescue practitioner and must do so within five
business days after filing the business rescue resolution.  Although the subsection430
refers to the appointment of a single business rescue practitioner, the definition of a
business rescue practitioner includes the possibility of two or more persons appointed
jointly to oversee a company during business rescue proceedings.  Every business431
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 In s 138 discussed in part 3.7.1.2 below.432
 Section 129(3)(b).433
 Section 129(4). See s 129(5) and the discussion in part 3.5.1.1 above on the consequences of434
failure by the directors to comply with these requirements.
 In terms of s 131(4) discussed in part 3.4.2 above.435
 Section 131(5).436
 In terms of s 147(1) this meeting must be convened by the business rescue practitioner within ten437
business days after his appointment. 
 Section 429(a) of the Companies Act of 1973.438
 Section 429(b)(ii).439
 On application by an affected person in terms of s 130(1)(b).440
 See part 3.5.1.3.2 above for a discussion of these requirements.441
rescue practitioner must meet the stipulated requirements  and provide his or her432
written consent to be appointed.  A notice of the business rescue practitioner’s433
appointment must be filed with the Commission within two business days, and must also
be published to every affected person within five business days after filing this notice.434
If the court makes an order for business rescue proceedings to commence,  it435
may appoint an interim business rescue practitioner nominated by the applicant.436
This appointment will, however, be subject to approval by the majority in value of the
independent creditors at the first meeting of creditors.  437
Although the use of the word “may” in section 131(5) appears to give the court a
discretion whether to appoint an interim business rescue practitioner or not, it is difficult
to imagine how an order for business rescue proceedings can be issued and
implemented without such an appointment. Unlike the position under a provisional
judicial management order,  there is no provision for the temporary custody of the438
company’s assets until the appointment of a business rescue practitioner. Furthermore,
whereas the Master of the High Court is tasked with convening the first meetings of
creditors in judicial management,  in business rescue proceedings this is the duty of439
the (interim) business rescue practitioner. Without a business rescue practitioner this will
simply not happen and the business rescue proceedings will not progress.
Under the circumstances I would suggest that the provision should be amended to
make the appointment of an interim business rescue practitioner by the court obligatory
if an order for commencement of business rescue proceedings is granted. 
If a court sets aside the appointment of a business rescue practitioner who was
appointed by the board of directors,  the court must appoint another business440
rescue practitioner who meets the stipulated requirements.   441
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 As set out in s 139(2): see part 3.7.1.3 below.442
 The subsection seems to assume that the original applicant, who may nominate the interim practitioner,443
was a creditor, although it could have been a shareholder, trade union or employee: s 131(5). 
 Section 139(3).444
 Section 138(1). Unlike the situation in England (see Chapter 3, part 2.7.1.2), there is unfortunately445
no provision for criminal liability for acting without the proper qualifications.
 The definition of “person” in s 1 of the Companies Act of 2008 states that it includes a juristic person,446
and s 2 of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 also provides that “a person” includes legal persons. 
If a business rescue practitioner dies, resigns or is removed from office by the
court in terms of its powers to remove a practitioner at any time on one of the
stipulated grounds,  a new business rescue practitioner must be appointed by the442
company (again, presumably, this means the directors) if the previous one was
appointed by them, or by the creditor  who nominated the previous one.  443 444
The reasoning behind this provision is difficult to understand in the case of a
business rescue practitioner having been removed by the court on one of the grounds
stipulated in the Act and which mainly refer to incompetence or dishonesty. Firstly, the
applicant who has gone to the trouble and incurred the costs of bringing the application
should surely at least have been given the opportunity to nominate a new practitioner.
Although the appointment of such a nominated person could then be made subject to
confirmation by the creditors, I do not recommend it since the new appointment could
happen at a late stage of the business rescue proceedings when the period of
uncertainty over who will be taking the process further should be limited as far as
possible. Secondly, the person or persons who appointed or nominated the first
business rescue practitioner have already demonstrated their lack of judgment in
choosing an inappropriate practitioner, and there is no reason why they should be given
another chance to do so. Removing this power may encourage company boards and
creditors to be very careful when appointing, or approving the appointment of a business
rescue practitioner at the start of the proceedings. 
 
3.7.1.2 Qualifications
Unlike the judicial manager, a business rescue practitioner has to meet certain
stipulated requirements to qualify for appointment.  The relevant provision refers to445
the appointment of a “person” as business rescue practitioner, which, according to
the definition contained in the Companies Act of 2008 itself, would include a legal
person or corporation.  Although there could have been some doubt as to whether446
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 Section 69, for example, also refers to the appointment of a person as director, but a juristic person447
is specifically disqualified by s 69(7)(a).
 Although s 138(1) does not provide for the appointment of a partnership, and a partnership is not448
included in the definition of a “person”, the drafters of the regulations seem to assume that a
partnership is somehow also eligible. One has to wonder whether they are aware of the fact that a
partnership does not enjoy legal personality in South African law. 
 Draft regulation 133(3).449
 These are profit or non-profit companies who hold assets in a fiduciary capacity for a broad range450
of people who are not related to the company, as well as certain non-profit companies. 
 Draft regulation 133(2)(a).451
 Draft regulation 133(2)(b).452
this was the intended meaning, or merely one more example of careless drafting,447
the draft Companies Regulations have now made it clear that a juristic person or
partnership  may be appointed as business rescue practitioner on condition that “the448
individual determined by that juristic person or partnership to be responsible for
performing the functions of practitioner in terms of Chapter 6 of the Act must satisfy
the requirements of this regulation.”  Regulation 133 (which is the one referred to)449
requires that until the Minister has promulgated minimum qualifications for the
accreditation of business rescue practitioners, the requirements for appointment as
the business rescue practitioner for a state-owned or public company or a company
required in terms of regulation 29(1)(a) or (b) to have its annual financial statements
audited,  are that the “person” must be an attorney, accountant, liquidator or450
business turnaround practitioner who has been admitted or registered as such for at
least ten years (and, in the case of an attorney or auditor, predominantly engaged in
commercial practice during that time), or must have a degree in law, commerce or
business management and have at least ten years experience in conducting business
rescue proceedings.  In the case of any other company, the period of ten years451
standing or experience in the above qualifications is reduced to five years.452
Although the word “person” is used in regulation 133(2), it must in this instance be
taken to mean an individual since no partnership or juristic person can meet these
requirements, for example by having a degree or being an attorney or liquidator! 
Several problems resulting from the draft regulation itself and its effect on section
138(1) can be identified. The first and most serious one is that in terms of the
regulation, the individual determined by the juristic person or partnership must satisfy
the requirements of the regulation itself but there is no reference to section 138(1),
 which contains the requirements for appointment as a practitioner. On the face of it,
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 The person may not be subject to an order of probation in terms of s 162(7): see part 3.7.1.2.2 below.453
 The person would not be disqualified from acting as a director of the company in terms of s 69(8):454
see part 3.7.1.2.3 below. 
 In terms of s 69(7) a juristic person is ineligible to be a director of a company and the455
disqualifications in s 69(8) are, as a result, quite obviously formulated to apply to an individual.
 Since a partnership is not recognised as a separate legal entity in South African law, it could be argued456
that every partner will have to satisfy the requirements set for individual business rescue practitioners.
 Defined in s 1 of the Auditing Profession Act 26 of 2005 as a partnership, company or sole proprietor.457
this appears to be correct since it is the juristic person or partnership that is appointed
as practitioner and that should therefore satisfy the statutory requirements. However,
both section 138(1)(b)  and section 138(1)(c)  refer to disqualifications in respect453 454
of directors and thus only apply to individuals.  Not only is it therefore impossible to455
apply them to a juristic person or partnership, but they cannot be applied to the
responsible individual determined by the juristic person or partnership either, since
he is not the formally appointed business rescue practitioner and these requirements
have not been made applicable to him by the relevant regulation or section 138. This
effectively means that a company may be appointed as a business rescue
practitioner in spite of the fact that its directors, members or employees are
disqualified by these two sections from being appointed directly. Furthermore, there
is nothing to prevent the company from then nominating one of these disqualified
individuals to perform the duties of a business rescue practitioner since such
individual is not required by the regulation or the Act to satisfy the requirements of
section 138(1). Although the possibility of nominating a disqualified individual will be
eliminated once a procedure and qualifications for accreditation as a business rescue
practitioner are in place, it will not alter the fact that two of the statutory qualifications
for appointment as a business rescue practitioner will have to be ignored when a
juristic person is appointed because they cannot be applied to a juristic person.  It456
is also difficult to see how juristic persons or partnerships can be accredited as
business rescue practitioners when they are unable to satisfy two of the requirements
stipulated in section 138(1). 
Regulation 133(3) is closely modelled on section 90(3), which allows a company
to appoint a firm  as its auditor and leaves it to the firm to determine the responsible457
individual. However, unlike regulation 133(3), section 90 requires both the appointed
firm and the individual auditor chosen by the firm to be responsible for the audit, to
satisfy all the stipulated requirements for appointment as an auditor of the
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 Section 90(2) contains the qualifications for a firm or person to be appointed as an auditor, and s 90(3)458
stipulates that the individual determined by the firm must also satisfy these requirements. In addition, the
Auditing Profession Act of 2005 requires the registration of the firm itself as an auditor, as well as of every
partner if it is a partnership, or of every shareholder and director in the case of a company. 
 See part 3.7.2 below.459
 In terms of s 131(5).460
company.  It is impossible to explain why neither section 138(1) nor draft regulation458
133(3) was similarly phrased, particularly when one considers that an auditor is an
outsider from a highly regulated profession who is appointed to perform a very
specific and limited task. By contrast, a business rescue practitioner takes almost
complete control of the management and assets of the company.  These are459
undoubtedly compelling reasons why it should be ensured that an appropriately
qualified individual takes responsibility for this function. 
I also regard it as highly undesirable that a court may appoint a juristic person or
partnership as practitioner without any indication or guarantee regarding the identity of
the specific individual who will be responsible for performing these functions. Neither the
court nor the affected persons will be able to judge whether a person who is capable and
experienced enough to act in this particular matter will be nominated. Furthermore, since
the appointment of a practitioner by the court is subject to ratification by the creditors at
their first meeting,  the question arises whether the creditors may merely reject the460
individual determined by the appointed practitioner firm without having to refuse
ratification of the appointment of the juristic person or partnership as business rescue
practitioner. Essentially it comes down to the degree of control the creditors will have
over the determination of a specific individual, and in this regard the regulations contain
no guidelines. There is also nothing in the Act or regulations preventing a partnership
or juristic person from nominating a different individual to replace the original nominee
at any time during the course of the proceedings; this could indeed be necessary if the
designated individual leaves the appointed juristic person or partnership. Needless to
say, this could lead to a further lack of confidence in the possibility of a successful
outcome of the procedure. 
Another obvious problem created by the interim provisions contained in
regulation 133(2) is that presently no official system exists for the registration or
admission to the profession of either liquidators or business turnaround practitioners.
It is not at all clear whether membership of any voluntary organisations such as the
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 See Chapter 2, part 2.7.1.2 on the specific provision in English law that only an individual can be461
authorised and qualified to act as an insolvency practitioner. See also Chapter 4, part 2.7.1.2.1
regarding the exclusion of corporate entities and firms and the various views on this matter in Germany.
 Section 429(b)(i) in respect of a provisional judicial manager, and s 375(1), which requires security462
for appointment as final liquidator and applies to the final judicial manager in terms of s 431(4). A
provisional liquidator is also required to give security (s 368) and so are the provisional trustee of a
sequestrated estate (s 18(1) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936) and the final trustee (s 56(2)). 
 Section 130(1)(c). See the discussion of this provision in part 3.5.1.3.3 above.463
Association of Insolvency Practitioners of South Africa (AIPSA) or the Turnaround
Management Association Southern Africa (TMA-SA) would be acceptable instead.
If not, all liquidators and business rescue practitioners without the stipulated degrees
will automatically be disqualified. This result  will almost certainly meet with strong
resistance from these persons and organisations.
Considering the many complications and disadvantages that the appointment of
a partnership or juristic person could create in respect of the qualifications, duties,
responsibilities and any personal liability of the business rescue practitioner, it is my
belief that only individuals should be eligible for appointment as business rescue
practitioners.461
The present requirement that both provisional and final judicial managers must give
security for the proper performance of their duties before they may be appointed  is not462
repeated in the Companies Act of 2008 as a requirement for appointment as business
rescue practitioner. A business rescue practitioner appointed by the board of a company
after taking a resolution to begin business rescue proceedings may be required to
provide security but only if so ordered by the court on application by an affected
person.  No corresponding provision exists for an interim or final business rescue463
practitioner appointed after a court has ordered the commencement of business rescue
proceedings. Requiring every business rescue practitioner to provide security will
provide some protection to affected persons. This is particularly important because they
have no say in the appointment of a business rescue practitioner by the board of the
company and can only have him removed by an order of court – an onerous and
expensive process that may take several weeks. 
 
3.7.1.2.1 Membership of a regulated profession
The first specific qualification for appointment as a business rescue practitioner is that
the person must be “a member in good standing of a profession subject to regulation by
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 In terms of s 138(2).464
 Section 138(1)(a).s465
 See Loubser “Insolvency Practitioners” at 128 and 131 in respect of the situation in England and466
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a regulatory authority prescribed by the Minister”  to regulate the practice of business464
rescue practitioners.  The wording of this provision implies that only one professional465
organisation will be designated to regulate business rescue practitioners, and that this
will be an organisation specifically intended for these practitioners, rather than an
existing organisation or organisations, such as the ones for attorneys or auditors.  466
A person or association may be designated as the regulatory body only if it is
committed to achieving the purposes of Chapter 6 of the Companies Act of 2008,
“functions predominantly to promote sound principles and good practice of business
turnaround or rescue” and either has the necessary human, financial and operational
resources, as well as administrative procedures and safeguards, to carry out its
duties in terms of Chapter 6, or presents the Minister with a credible plan on how
these resources will be developed or acquired.  The Minister may impose467
reasonable conditions on the designated regulatory body regarding its functions and
powers,  and make regulations prescribing minimum qualifications for admission to468
the profession of business rescue practitioner and the procedures that the designated
person or association will have to follow in carrying out its functions and powers.469
Although the wording of sections 138(1)(a) and 138(2) creates the impression that
the Minister can simply designate an appropriate and possibly already existing body for
this purpose, the matter has been complicated by the definition of a “regulatory authority”
in section 1. In terms of this definition, a regulatory authority is “an entity established in
terms of national or provincial legislation responsible for regulating an industry, or sector
of an industry”. The regulatory body for business rescue practitioners will therefore have
to be a statutory body established by legislation. As a result, regulation 129(1) of the draft
Companies Regulations establishes a Business Rescue Practice Regulatory Board as
“a juristic person, to function as an organ of state within the public administration, but as
an institution outside the public service.” The composition of the Board is prescribed in
regulation 130 to consist of a total of 18 persons (presumably meaning “individuals” here)
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of whom ten will be appointed directly by the Minister for a term of three years, including
the chairperson and deputy chairperson. Of the other persons appointed by the Minister,
two must be entitled to practise and have experience in practising as business rescue
practitioners, two must have successfully owned or managed a small or medium
enterprise for at least five years, two must be knowledgeable and experienced in
company law and another two in commercial accounting practice.  The other eight470
members of the Board must be designated by the Turnaround Management Association
– South Africa (two members), the Law Society of South Africa (also two members), and
one member each by the Banking Association of South Africa, Business Unity South
Africa, the South Africa Institute of Chartered Accountants, and the South Africa Institute
of Professional Accountants.  471
All members of the Board are subject mutatis mutandis to the same qualifications
and provisions applicable to members of the Companies Tribunal,  the Takeover472
Regulation Panel  and the Financial Reporting Standards Council.  This means473 474
that they must comply with the requirements of section 205 of the Act, which excludes
any individual who is an office-bearer of any political party, movement or body; has
a conflicting financial interest; is disqualified in terms of section 69 from serving as a
company director; or has been declared mentally unfit or disordered by an order of
court.  Members of the Board are also subject to section 206, which regulates475
conflicts of interest, and section 207, which regulates the resignation or removal from
office of a member.  Although the Business Rescue Practice Regulatory Board will476
thus ostensibly have the same standing and status as the other three regulatory
agencies mentioned above, it is regrettable that unlike the others, this Board was not
established in terms of a section of the Companies Act of 2008 itself but rather by
regulation. One cannot escape the impression that the drafters of the legislation did
not initially realise the implications of the definition of a “regulatory authority” and
were also under the impression that a much simpler and less formal procedure could
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be followed by the Minister to designate a professional body for business rescue
practitioners. Regulation 130 almost seems like an afterthought to solve this problem,
an impression that is strengthened by the fact that section 138(3) authorises the
Minister to impose reasonable conditions on the designated regulatory body
regarding its functions and powers, and to make regulations prescribing the
procedures to be followed in carrying out its functions and powers, but does not
contain any reference to the actual establishing of the Board by regulation.  
The creation of a professional body specifically for business rescue practitioners
must be welcomed since it will now be possible to set minimum standards of academic
and practical qualifications and act against delinquent and unethical members of the
profession. It is nevertheless unfortunate that the basic minimum standards are not
contained in the Companies Act of 2008 itself but will be prescribed by regulation. The
success of the new business rescue proceedings depends largely on the quality of the
professionals who have to use them, and it is difficult to judge the desirability or
effectiveness of many provisions without knowing the final standards that will be set for
business rescue practitioners, such as whether they will be qualified in law or
commerce, will be subject to some form of internship or minimum period of practical
experience and whether they will have to pass a standardised examination. Prescribed
requirements contained in an Act also afford more certainty because they are more
difficult to amend than regulations and have more status. In most jurisdictions where
similar professions are properly regulated, fairly detailed qualifications are prescribed in
the relevant Act itself.  The Board will now be required to advise the Minister on the477
qualifications for and accreditation of business rescue practitioners  within two years478
after the Regulations have come into operation, after which the Minister will promulgate
the requirements for accreditation by way of regulation.  This means that for a period479
of at least two years after the Act has come into operation there will be uncertainty over
the exact requirements and qualifications for business rescue practitioners.
Another issue that requires clarification in the Act is that section 138(1)(a) merely
requires that a person must be a member of the regulated profession. However,
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regulation 133 refers to the requirements for “accreditation” as business rescue
practitioners, and regulation 132(1)(b) lists the “accrediting, and suspending or
withdrawing the accreditation” of business rescue practitioners as part of the duties
of the Business Rescue Practice Regulatory Board. It will obviously not be possible
to be a member of the regulatory body in the way that an attorney is a member of the
Law Society of South Africa, for example, and much more than mere membership of
the profession is required. The wording of the Act should thus be amended to require
that a person must be an accredited business rescue practitioner to qualify for
appointment in a particular case.
3.7.1.2.2 Not subject to order of probation
The second requirement for appointment as business rescue practitioner is that the
person may not be subject to an order of probation in terms of section 162(7).  A480
court may make such an order on several grounds relating to inappropriate conduct
of an individual  while serving as the director of a company.  An order of probation481 482
will have the result that, for a period of no more than five years,  this person may483
serve as a director only to the extent allowed by the order,  for example only for a484
private company or a company of which this person is the sole shareholder.485
Although an order of probation is thus not an absolute disqualification for appointment
as a director but only to the extent stipulated in the order, the wording of section
138(1)(b) implies that any such order renders the individual completely ineligible for
appointment as a business rescue practitioner.
The grounds for an order of probation are the following:
(i) Failure to vote against a resolution taken in contravention of statutory liquidity
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and solvency requirements  at a meeting  where he was present.486 487 488
(ii) Acting in a manner that is materially inconsistent with the duties of a director.489
It is unclear whether the fact that the provision does not refer to an actual breach
of a director’s duties means that even inappropriate behaviour that does not quite
amount to a contravention of the statutory duties of a director  could also490
constitute grounds for the order of probation.491
(iii) Acting in an oppressive or prejudicial manner against a shareholder or director
as described in section 163(1), or supporting a decision of the company to act
in this way,  if the court is satisfied that placing the person under probation is492
justified when considering the circumstances and conduct of the company or
close corporation, and the conduct of the director in respect of the entity’s
management, business and property at the time.  493
(iv) If, within any period of ten years after the date on which this section of the
Companies Act of 2008 came into operation,  the person was a director of more494
than one company or managing member of more than one close corporation,
irrespective of whether he held these positions concurrently, sequentially or at
unrelated times, and, while he held these positions, two or more of these entities
did not pay all its creditors in full or meet all of its obligations, unless this was in
terms of a business rescue plan (but only if the business rescue proceedings were
started by a board resolution)  or in terms of a compromise.  The court may495 496
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place a person under probation for this reason only if it is satisfied that the failure
of the company or close corporation to meet its obligations was wholly or partly due
to the way in which the company or close corporation was managed and the
declaration is justified, having regard to the circumstances of this matter and
person’s conduct at the time.497
The application for a probation order may be brought by a company, a
shareholder, director, company secretary or prescribed officer of that company, a
registered trade union or other representative of employees of the company,  or by498
the Commission or Takeover Regulation Panel.  The application must be brought499
while the person who is to be placed under probation is still a director of the company
or was a director within the 24 months immediately preceding the application.  500
 
3.7.1.2.3 Not disqualified from acting as director
A person may also not be appointed as a company’s business rescue practitioner if
he would be disqualified from acting as a director of the company in terms of section
69(8).  This means that he must not be an unrehabilitated insolvent, not be501
prohibited in terms of any public regulation to be a director of the company, not have
been removed from an office of trust on the grounds of misconduct involving
dishonesty within the last five years, and not have been convicted and sentenced to
imprisonment without the option of a fine, or a fine exceeding the prescribed amount,
for theft, fraud, forgery, perjury or an offence involving fraud, misrepresentation or
dishonesty, or in connection with the promotion, formation or management of a
company or a contravention of the Companies Act of 2008 and a number of specified
other Acts.  The last-mentioned disqualification also ends five years after502
completion of the sentence.  503
SOUTH AFRICA-103-
 In terms of s 162 of the Companies Act of 2008 or s 47 of the Close Corporations Act of 1984.504
 In terms of s 162(6)(a) if the order is based on the grounds set out in s 162(5)(a) or (b).505
 In terms of s 162(6)(b) if the order is based on the grounds contained in s 165(5)(c)-(f).506
 The grounds for a delinquency order are listed in s 162(5). 507
 See Loubser “Insolvency Practitioners” at 131-134 regarding this qualification in Australia and the508
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law drafted by the UNCITRAL W orking Group V (Insolvency Law).
 See Chapter 4, part 2.7.1.2.4.509
Furthermore, in terms of this requirement a person would be disqualified from
being appointed as a business rescue practitioner if a court order has been issued
prohibiting him from acting as a director of any company or declaring him to be
delinquent.  Unlike an order of probation, an order of delinquency is either504
unconditional and effective for the lifetime of the person  or subject to any conditions505
deemed appropriate by the court and effective for a period of at least seven years.506
The grounds for a declaration of delinquency therefore relate to more serious
offences, such as acting as a director while ineligible or disqualified or in
contravention of an order of probation, grossly abusing the position of director, or
intentionally or through gross negligence causing harm to the company.  507
It is unfortunate that this requirement has been linked to the disqualification of
directors rather than directly listing an adapted version of these grounds for
disqualification as they would apply to business rescue practitioners. As a result, the
grounds listed in section 69(8), which have clearly not been drafted to apply to juristic
persons because section 69(7) excludes them from being appointed as directors,
have quite inappropriately now become applicable to juristic persons that may be
appointed as business rescue practitioners. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the
conditions to which an order of delinquency may be made subject by the court will
also apply to acting as business rescue practitioner or whether this is a blanket
disqualification for the duration of the order. 
 
3.7.1.2.4 No compromising relationship with company
The next requirement, which essentially means that the person must be independent from
the company and that there should be no conflict of interests, is found in most juris-
dictions,  even ones like Germany in which the profession of rescue practitioner is not508
strictly regulated.  This is clearly of great importance and one of the measures to prevent509
an abuse of the procedure, particularly where the directors may appoint the practitioner.
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However, the drafters of the Companies Act of 2008 have once again, in an effort
to cover every possibility instead of stating the general rule, succeeded in phrasing
a fairly simple principle in such a convoluted and complicated manner that it has
resulted in a vague and unclear requirement that will create a substantial degree of
uncertainty until a court has pronounced on its exact meaning. 
Section 138(1)(d) namely provides that a person may be appointed as the
business rescue practitioner of a company only if he has no “other  relationship with510
the company” that “would lead a reasonable and informed third party to conclude that
the integrity, impartiality or objectivity of that person is compromised by that
relationship”. The meaning of an individual’s “relationship” with a juristic person is
explained in section 2(1)(b) as the direct or indirect control, as determined in section
2(2), of the juristic person by the individual. The control of a company by an individual
is defined as the ability of the individual, together with any related person, to exercise
or control the exercise of a majority of the voting rights of shareholders, or the right
to appoint or elect, or control the appointment or election of directors of the company
who control the majority of votes on the board.  511
This definition of “relationship” is extremely limited and essentially excludes only a
majority or influential shareholder from being appointed as the company’s business
rescue practitioner.  One has to wonder whether the drafters had possibly forgotten512
about their definition in the Act and had intended the word to have a wider meaning, as
it normally has in this context,  to include the company’s external auditors, legal513
advisors, bankers and major creditors in the list of persons who may not be appointed.
This is the result that the requirement should have achieved, but does not. Once again,
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in the absence of a detailed report or explanatory document, one would have to guess
what the drafters’ intentions were. Judging by the fact that both a conflict of interests and
a lack of independence of the practitioner constitute grounds for his removal by the
court,  it seems probable that they intended to formulate a wider disqualification than514
the application of the definition of a relationship to this requirement would allow. 
One of the major concerns raised by the business turnaround industry in respect
of this requirement is that it is unclear whether a practitioner who assisted the
company in the development of a pre-packaged rescue plan  would be disqualified515
from appointment as the company’s business rescue practitioner.  If so, he will also516
be disqualified from appointment as part of the company’s management and as
advisor to the company or practitioner.  It would be absurd to exclude the person517
who has taken the preliminary steps and knows more about the company’s financial
situation and business than anybody else. Furthermore, he would probably already
have been involved in negotiations with major creditors who would be more inclined
to support the rescue attempt if he were appointed as the business rescue
practitioner. He clearly is the obvious choice to complete the process, but it all
depends on the meaning of the word “relationship” and also on whether a reasonable
and informed third party would regard him as a person who is not independent. 
The absence of any reference to independence from creditors is a major concern
since it is equally important that a business rescue practitioner should not act merely
in the interests of a particular creditor or group of creditors. 
 
3.7.1.2.5 Not related to person with compromising relationship
This requirement is linked to the previous one in that a person who is related to a
person who has such a compromising relationship will also be disqualified from
appointment as the company’s business rescue practitioner.  The effect of this518
requirement will depend on whether the word “relationship” is to be given its defined
meaning or not, and it is therefore impossible to evaluate.
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3.7.1.3 Vacation of or removal from office
In terms of section 139(3), if a practitioner dies, resigns or is removed from office, the
directors or the creditor who nominated that practitioner must appoint a new one.
Although the Act does not contain any provision specifically allowing a practitioner to
resign, it must be assumed that, since provision is made for the appointment of a
practitioner to replace one who has resigned, a practitioner has the right to resign
from office, apparently also at any time and for any reason.  This unlimited right to520
resign is perhaps not in the best interests of a company whose continued existence
is hanging in the balance and where continuity and consistency are required to bring
much-needed stability. It will now be left to the Regulatory Board to draft a code of
conduct providing guidelines on when it will be appropriate or compulsory for a
practitioner to resign.
A business rescue practitioner can be removed from office only by an order of
court, in terms of either section 130(1)(b)  or section 139. If the practitioner is521
removed in terms of section 139, the directors or the creditor who nominated the
practitioner who has been removed must appoint a new one.  522
The court may remove any practitioner in terms of section 139 on application by
an affected person or on its own initiative, on any of the following six grounds
stipulated in section 139(2). In spite of the fact that some of these grounds refer to
inappropriate behaviour on the part of a business rescue practitioner, the court has
not been given the authority to declare such a person unfit or ineligible for
appointment as a business rescue practitioner in future, unlike section 373 of the
Companies Act of 1973 which allows the court to remove a liquidator from office and
simultaneously declare him incapable for life or a specific period of being appointed
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as a liquidator. I regard this as a regrettable oversight since it will now be left to the
Regulatory Board to suspend or withdraw his accreditation. Whether such action will
be taken will depend on whether the matter is brought to the Board’s attention and
will also take some time before it is dealt with.  In the interim such an individual will523
still be eligible for appointment.
The problems that would be caused by the appointment of a partnership or
juristic person as business rescue practitioner are also prominent here. Apart from
the fact that many of these grounds would be difficult to apply to a juristic person, the
question is whether the removal of a business rescue practitioner would entail
removing the juristic person, or merely an order that the nomination of the responsible
individual who was guilty of inappropriate behaviour or actions should be recalled by
the juristic person.
3.7.1.3.1 Incompetence or failure to perform his duties  524
Once again, the question must be asked why competence or the ability to perform the
functions and duties required by the circumstances of the specific case is not also
one of the requirements for appointment as practitioner.  Another question is: whose525
incompetence is relevant here, that of the juristic person or partnership, or the
designated individual?
3.7.1.3.2 Failure to perform his functions with the proper degree of care526
In terms of section 140(3)(b), during the business rescue proceedings the business
rescue practitioner has all the duties, responsibilities and liabilities of a director
contained in sections 75 to 77. He will also be liable for a breach of any of these
duties in the same way as a director, but may not otherwise be held liable for any act
or omission in good faith in the exercise of his functions and powers as business
rescue practitioner, unless the act or omission amounted to gross negligence.527
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Sections 75 to 77 represent the legislature’s attempts to (partly) codify the common-
law fiduciary duties and duty of care and skill of directors, and contain most of the basic
principles of these duties. Directors are prohibited from approving or entering into
contracts in which they or a related person has a personal financial interest, without the
required disclosure and approval,  and from using their position or information528
obtained as director to gain a personal advantage or to knowingly cause harm to the
company or its subsidiary.  Section 76(3) provides that a director must exercise his529
powers and functions “in good faith and for a proper purpose”,  “in the best interests530
of the company”,  and “with the degree of care, skill and diligence that may reasonably531
be expected” from a person with the same knowledge, skill and experience and carrying
out the same functions in the company as the particular director.  Section 77 deals532
mainly with the liability of a director  to the company for a breach of any of his duties533
stipulated above, and specifically states that this liability will be in accordance with the
principles of the common law relating to a breach of fiduciary duties  or delict.534 535
However, the section also provides that a director may be held liable for any loss or
damages sustained by the company as a result of a number of specific actions by a
director.  One of the stipulated grounds for liability  is if the director knowingly536 537
acquiesced in the company carrying on its business in contravention of section 22(1)
that prohibits both reckless or fraudulent trading by a company and trading under
insolvent circumstances. Considering the fact that a company must be imminently
insolvent or unable to pay its debts to qualify for the commencement of business rescue
proceedings,  it is difficult to see how any practitioner will be able to avoid contravening538
the prohibition against insolvent trading, particularly in the early stages of the process.
It would have been of great assistance if here, as well, we had the benefit of a document
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explaining the reasoning behind the provision, since it would then have been possible
to ascertain whether the drafters realised that they were burdening the rescue
practitioner with a duty that was impossible not to breach.  539
Even more confusing is the fact that only a breach of his duty to act with the
required degree of care is mentioned as grounds for the removal from office of a rescue
practitioner. It is abundantly clear that the duties described in sections 75 to 77 and
which are explicitly made applicable to the practitioner refer to both fiduciary duties and
the duty of care and skill. It is difficult to believe that the drafters intended that a breach
of his fiduciary duties by a practitioner would not constitute grounds for removal,
especially in view of the element of fraudulent abuse of his position that is found in many
of these duties. However, unless it is assumed that the drafters intended to include both
groups of duties in the word “care”, although making a clear distinction between them
in the statutory provisions regulating these duties, or that they believed that a breach of
any fiduciary duties were covered by the grounds of a conflict of interest,  a practitioner540
may not be removed from office because of a breach of any of his fiduciary duties. 
3.7.1.3.3  Engaging in illegal acts or conduct541
Since this conduct is not required to be in connection with the performance of his
duties as a practitioner, he may theoretically be removed for failing to stop at a stop
sign or exceeding the speed limit. It is also not required that he should have been
found guilty in a court of law, and the question arises what degree of proof, if any, of
this conduct is required. I believe that a strong argument could be advanced for
striking this requirement on the grounds of vagueness.
3.7.1.3.4 No longer meeting the requirements contained in s 138(1)542
All the uncertainties regarding the proper meaning and interpretation of section
138(1) will once again arise here.  Furthermore, the fact that this constitutes543
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separate grounds for removal also emphasises that a practitioner may be removed
from office for failing to meet a requirement that is not stipulated in section 138 and,
strictly speaking, is not a requirement for appointment. 
3.7.1.3.5  Conflict of interest or lack of independence544
This provision seems to indicate that the drafters of the Act intended to require that a
person must be independent and without any possible conflict of interests to qualify for
appointment as a business rescue practitioner. It would have been a good idea to use
the same wording to phrase the requirement for appointment in section 138(1)(d).  545
3.7.1.3.6 Incapacity and inability to perform his duties
The court may also remove a business rescue practitioner from office if the
practitioner becomes incapacitated and unable to perform his functions, and it is
unlikely that he will regain this capacity within a reasonable time.  546
There is no indication as to what could be regarded as a reasonable time, neither
does the provision contain any guidance on who should be managing the business
rescue proceedings during this time. It is unthinkable that a company should be left
without a capable and functioning practitioner for an indeterminate period during
business rescue proceedings, and this would probably prove to be catastrophic for
the rescue attempt. The regulatory body will also have to fill this gap by including in
their regulations or code of conduct an obligation on a practitioner to resign if he is
likely to be incapacitated for more than a few days. 
3.7.2 Powers and duties of directors
According to the Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Bill, 2008 that
accompanied the Companies Bill, 2008  the new business rescue proceedings are547
“largely self-administered by the company” within the constraints set out in the Act
and under the independent supervision of the business rescue practitioner.  The548
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 Section 140(1)(b).553
implication of this statement is that directors are not automatically removed from
office by the commencement of business rescue proceedings but in fact retain some
of their managing powers and duties. This is also reflected in the definition of
business rescue, which refers to the “temporary supervision of the company, and of549
the management” of the company’s affairs, business and property.550
The intention thus seems to be that the supervisor will not take over the
management of the company completely but that the directors of the company will
continue to fulfil their management functions, albeit under the supervision of the
practitioner. This view is also confirmed by section 137(2)(a), which provides that each
director “must continue to exercise the functions of director, subject to the authority of
the [business rescue] practitioner”. However, the use of the word “authority” rather than
“supervision” is the first indication that more than mere supervision by the practitioner
is envisaged, since this means that they derive their powers from the practitioner and
may perform only those management functions that the business rescue practitioner has
expressly authorised them to do. 
Indeed, several provisions dealing with the respective powers of the practitioner and
directors convey the message that the business rescue practitioner takes over full
responsibility for the management of the company while directors are not allowed to do
more than follow his orders. The first of these provisions is found in section 140(1)(a),
which states that during a company’s business rescue proceedings, the practitioner “has
full management control of the company in substitution for its board and pre-existing
management”.  However, the practitioner may delegate any of his powers or functions to551
a person who was  part of the board or pre-existing management.  The practitioner may552 553
obviously not delegate any of his powers connected to the rescue of the company, such
as the drafting and implementation of the rescue plan, and the only functions that could be
delegated would thus be the functions relating to the management of the company. This
implies that the directors do not automatically retain any management powers, but have
only the powers specifically delegated to them by the business rescue practitioner.
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 W ith the exception of his liability for loss or damages sustained by the company because the director555
acted in the name of the company while knowing that he lacked the necessary authority (s 77(3)(a)),
knowingly acquiesced in the company’s business being carried on for fraudulent purposes or while
insolvent, in contravention of s 22(1) (s 77(3)(b)), or was party to an act or omission of the company
despite knowing that it was calculated to defraud a creditor, employee or shareholder or for another
fraudulent purpose (s 77(3)(c)). He also remains bound by the provisions of s 75 regarding disclosure
of personal financial interests (s 137(2)(c)). 
 Section 137(2)(d).556
 Section 140(3)(b). See part 3.7.1.3.2 above for a discussion of these duties and particularly the557
inevitable breach by the practitioner of the duty not to trade in insolvent circumstances.
 Section 137(5)(a).558
This view is supported by section 137(2)(b), which imposes a duty on each
director to exercise any management function in the company in accordance with the
express instructions or direction of the business rescue practitioner in so far as it is
reasonable to do so. Directors are also instructed to cooperate with and assist the
business rescue practitioner by delivering books and records of the company to him
and by providing him, within five business days after the beginning of business
rescue proceedings, with a statement of the company’s affairs containing at least the
prescribed information.  Furthermore, a director is relieved from most of his554
statutory duties and liability for breach of any of these duties  as long as he acts555
according to the express instructions and directions of the practitioner.  Clearly,556
therefore, a director should not act without specific instructions from the business
rescue practitioner since he would otherwise risk personal liability for damages
suffered by the company as a result of his actions. 
The practitioner, on the other hand, “has the responsibilities, duties and liabilities
of a director of the company, as set out in sections 75 to 77”.  This goes much557
further than merely supervising the directors in the exercise of their functions, and
implies that the supervisor takes over all their responsibilities and duties.
Another important clue is found in the power given to a business rescue
practitioner to apply to court for the removal from office of a director on one of two
specified grounds. The first is that the director has failed to comply with a requirement
of Chapter 6 of the Companies Act of 2008.  The second one applies where the558
director has by any act or omission impeded or is impeding the practitioner in the
performance of his powers and duties as practitioner (including the development and
implementation of a business rescue plan), as well as, quite significantly, if the
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 Section 141(2)(c)(ii). There is only a rather puzzling instruction that he must direct management to561
rectify the matter, just as in the case of finding evidence of voidable transactions or failure by a director
to perform any material obligation (s 141(2)(c)(i)). It is unclear what is meant by “rectify” (without
reference to any specific powers such as the power to apply to court for dispositions to be set aside)
and whether “management” here includes the directors. It is even more incomprehensible why
management, whose members are almost certainly the ones who were responsible for these actions,
should be chosen to rectify them, rather than being placed under an obligation to assist the practitioner
in rectifying these matters, for example by providing all relevant information. By contrast, the judicial
manager has specific powers to apply to court for the setting aside of voidable and undue preferences:
s 436 of the Companies Act of 1973. I suspect that the answer, at least as regards the provision on
“voidable transactions”, is to be found in the fact that the main drafter of the Act is not familiar with
South African law and is thus unaware of the special meaning attached to the words “voidable
transactions”. The reference in s 141(2)(c)(i) is probably to transactions that are voidable because they
do not comply with requirements of the Act such as approval by shareholders etcetera.
 In terms of s 162.562
 In terms of s 140(1)(c), which does not stipulate any specific grounds for the removal from office.563
Such a person will be an employee of the company, and the apparent contradiction between this
provision and s 136(1)(a), which compels the company to continue employing all its employees after
business rescue proceedings have started, not to mention the resulting unequal treatment of and unfair
discrimination against employees who were part of the company’s pre-existing management, brings
the validity of this provision into question. 
 Title 11, United States Code. 564
director has impeded the management of the company by  the business rescue559
practitioner.  Strangely enough, although the practitioner is instructed to forward to560
the relevant prosecuting authority any evidence of reckless trading, fraud or other
contravention of any law relating to the company before business rescue proceedings
began, he may not rely on any of these as grounds for an application to remove a
director.  The practitioner is also not included in the list of persons who may apply561
for an order declaring a director delinquent or under probation.  562
The practitioner has the right to remove from office any other person who was
part of the pre-existing management of the company, without having to approach the
court.  Since this is usually part of the management duties of the directors, it serves563
as one more reason to believe that the practitioner effectively replaces the board of
directors as the managing organ of the company during business rescue
proceedings. 
I believe that the contradictory provisions in the Companies Act of 2008 on the
division of powers between the business rescue practitioner and the board of directors
are the result of an attempt by the drafters of the legislation to incorporate the principle
of the debtor in possession of the Chapter 11 reorganisation procedure contained in the
United States Bankruptcy Code.  This principle is a distinguishing feature of the564
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 A trustee is appointed only if so ordered by the court after notice and a hearing, and on stipulated565
grounds mainly relating to fraud, dishonesty, incompetence or gross mismanagement of the company’s
affairs by the current management: s 1104(a).
 Section 1101(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.566
 Section 1107(a) of the Bankruptcy Code only excludes a small number of rights and duties: the right567
to compensation and the duty to file certain documents and statements and to investigate the affairs
of the debtor in terms of s 1106(a)(2)-(4). The court may also prescribe limitations or conditions.
 Treister et al Fundamentals at 393.568
 South African Company Law for the 21  Century: Guidelines for Corporate Reform (May 2004) at 45,569 st
available at <http://www.thedti.gov.za/ccrd/companies/Guidelines04.pdf> accessed on 3 March 2009.
 In s 433, and including the duties for which directors are normally responsible, such as to keep570
accounting records, prepare financial statements and convene annual general meetings and other
meetings of members.
Chapter 11 procedure and means that, except in those cases where a trustee is
appointed (which is the exception rather than the rule),  the debtor is left in control of565
his or its business and affairs  with all the rights and powers of a trustee.  The566 567
directors and management of the company will therefore remain in control of the
company’s usual business although the debtor in possession is conceptually regarded
as an entity separate from the debtor company. The shareholders of the company also
retain their usual powers and role.  568
Their intention to consider the American procedure when designing a new South
African business rescue regime was specifically expressed in the policy document
issued by the Department of Trade and Industry in 2004.  However, in the American569
procedure the appointment of a person to supervise or oversee the reorganisation is
rare and not part of the usual course of events. If a trustee is appointed by the court,
management loses its right to manage the company and this power is vested in the
trustee. One would therefore find either a debtor in possession or a trustee in a
particular case, but not both, as is being attempted in the provisions of the Companies
Act of 2008. The fact that a business rescue practitioner must be appointed in all
instances thus excludes the possibility of allowing the board to retain its management
powers, and it should be clarified in the Companies Act of 2008 that the business rescue
practitioner is in charge of the company during business rescue proceedings. 
The Companies Act of 2008 does not stipulate who is responsible for those
management duties that are not related to the business rescue proceedings, such as
convening the annual general meeting, since it does not contain anything similar to
the detailed list of duties of a judicial manager set out in the Companies Act of
1973.  As a result of the uncertainty over whether the practitioner takes over all570
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 Although the word “management” is used elsewhere to denote persons other than the directors, for573
example in s 140(1)(c)(i) on the removal of such persons from office, it appears to include both
directors and other members of management here, as it is unlikely that the practitioner will be required
to consult other persons involved in the management of the company, but not the directors.
Consistency in terminology is, once again, shown not to be a strength of this Act.
 Section 150(1).574
 Since only the creditors and shareholders whose rights will be affected have the right to vote on the575
rescue plan, the question here is whether the words “affected persons” refer to persons who will be
affected by the plan or the legally defined group of affected persons (s 128(1)(a)) who form a
substantially larger group. 
 Prescribed in s 150(2)(a).576
management functions, it is also unclear whether these routine tasks also form part
of his duties.
3.8 The business rescue plan
One of the major innovations of the new rescue proceedings is the requirement that
a rescue plan must be drawn up to show how the rescue of the company will be
achieved. As pointed out before, the lack of a requirement that a proper rescue plan
must be prepared and approved has been identified as one of the reasons why
judicial management has rarely led to a successful rescue.571
3.8.1 Power to submit a business rescue plan 
The business rescue practitioner is responsible for the development and
implementation of a business rescue plan if approved in terms of the Act.  However,572
although he has to prepare the plan, he must consult the creditors, other affected
persons and the management  of the company before doing so.573 574
3.8.2 Prescribed contents of a rescue plan
Section 150(2) prescribes that a rescue plan must contain all the information reasonably
required to assist affected persons  in deciding whether they should accept or reject575
the plan. The rescue plan must furthermore be divided into three parts:
 
3.8.2.1 Part A – Background576
This part must contain at least the following:
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 W hen used as an adjective, the word is defined by s 1 to mean significant in the circumstances to577
a degree that is “of consequence in determining the matter”, or “might reasonably affect a person’s
judgement”. The last-mentioned meaning is clearly not applicable here, and it must be assumed to
mean that only important assets must be listed. There is no indication what the test is to establish
whether an asset is important: is it purely based on its value or on its importance to the company’s
business? There is also no explanation why some assets should be excluded. Unless, of course, the
drafters forgot that they had defined this word in the Act, and merely intended to indicate the opposite
of immaterial assets, for which the correct term in our law is corporeal assets. It is impossible to answer
these questions with any certainty, because of the regrettable lack of a proper explanatory document.
 The practitioner must convene a first meeting of creditors within ten days after being appointed to578
inform them whether he believes that the company has a reasonable prospect of being rescued, and
where creditors may prove their claims: s 147(1). It is at this meeting that creditors decide whether to
appoint a committee of creditors to represent their interests as set out in s 149. 
 Section 98A(1) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936.579
(i) A complete list of all the material  assets of the company, indicating which577
assets were held as security by creditors at the start of business rescue
proceedings. Strangely enough, the Act does not specifically require a valuation
of these assets, but it must be assumed that a valuation should be included since
it would otherwise be impossible to judge the company’s chances of survival.
(ii) A complete list of creditors of the company when proceedings began, as well as
an indication which creditors qualify in terms of insolvency law as secured,
statutory preferent or concurrent creditors and which ones have proved their
claims.  The reference to the laws of insolvency raises some doubts about the578
exact position of employees who are owed money relating to their employment
before the start of business rescue proceedings. These employees are classified
as preferred unsecured creditors for the purposes of Chapter 6 by section 144(2),
without any limitation as to the amount or employment period of the claim.
However, in terms of the Insolvency Act, claims relating to employment prior to
insolvency only enjoy preference for a specific period and up to a specific
amount.  579
(iii) The dividend that creditors in each class will probably receive should the
company be liquidated. To avoid claims from creditors that they have been
misled, practitioners would have to be very careful in their estimates since there
may be a number of factors that cannot be predicted with any degree of accuracy
and that may influence these figures, such as whether purchasers for all the
assets will be found and whether all creditors have proved their claims. The
calculation of this probable dividend (and other projections and estimates
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 See, for example, s 137, which refers to shareholders in its heading, but to issued securities in580
subsection (1); s 152(3)(c), which refers to approval by holders of securities, while s 152(6)(b) refers
to approval by shareholders in terms of subsection (3)(c): see further part 3.8.4 below. 
 As defined in s 1 of the Companies Act of 2008 with reference to s 1 of the Securities Services Act581
36 of 2004.
 See Loubser “Shareholders” at 379-390 where it is pointed out that shareholders play virtually no582
role in business rescue proceedings nor are their interests given much attention, and consequently it
does not make sense to require this list.
 Sections 143(1) and (6).583
 This situation may be changed as a result of draft regulation 135(1), which requires that the basic584
remuneration of the practitioner in terms of s 143(1) must be determined at the time of appointment by
the board or the court, subject to the maximum amounts stipulated in the regulations. Some agreement
on this fee will thus have to be in place before the appointment. The agreement on additional
remuneration is not included here and will be in a second agreement since it must be proposed by the
practitioner, that is, after his appointment.
required by the Act) will in all probability require the services of an expert such
as an accountant or auditor, thereby adding to the costs of what is increasingly
developing into a very expensive procedure.
(iv) A complete list of holders of issued securities of the company. As a result of the
inconsistent use of the word “securities” sometimes to denote only
shareholders,  and not all holders of securities  which would include, for580 581
example, the holders of derivative instruments, bonds and debentures, it is
unclear who should be included in this list. Whatever the answer to that question
may be, it is obvious that this list will in some cases contain thousands, if not
millions of names. The costs and time involved in preparing this list will be
substantial, while it is difficult to find any real purpose of requiring a list with each
person’s name, especially if their rights will not be affected by the plan, as would
usually be the case with shareholders. Surely a summary indicating the numbers
of persons holding each type of share or security would have been more than
sufficient, if at all necessary.  582
(v) A copy of the written agreement concerning the business rescue practitioner’s
remuneration. The practitioner is entitled to charge fees and expenses in
accordance with a tariff that the Minister may prescribe by regulation,  but this583
is presumably not what this item is about since no agreement, whether oral or
written, is required.  The requirement refers to the agreement that a practitioner584
may propose to the company for the payment of additional remuneration if he
succeeds in having a rescue plan approved at all, or within a particular time, or
achieves any specified result or results relating to the business rescue
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 In terms of s 147(3), a decision taken at any meeting of creditors, except for the meeting held in586
terms of s 151 to vote on the rescue plan, must be supported by the holders of a simple majority of
independent creditors’ voting interests to be valid. An independent creditor is one who is not related
(as defined in s 2(1)) to the company, a director or the practitioner: s 128(1)(g). 
 Creditors’ voting interests must be determined according to s 143(4)-(6): see my comments on these587
provisions in fn 343.
 The Act does not specify by whom the meeting should be called, but it will presumably be by the588
practitioner.
 Section 143(3).589
 Section 143(3) does not require that the two meetings must be held on the same day, and this590
means that if they are not, a person whose meeting happened first and who waited for the second
meeting to establish whether they would also approve the agreement may be close to expiry of his ten
days before he knows that an application to court is required to annul the agreement. Therefore, it
would have been preferable if the period of ten days always started after the second meeting. 
 Section 143(4).591
 Section 143(4)(b) uses the words “egregiously unreasonable” which appear to set the test very high.592
The remuneration should surely not be so much that it is repugnant, gross or repulsive before it can
be set aside! Interestingly enough, the official Afrikaans translation of the Act uses the far milder and,
I submit, more appropriate words “uiters onredelik”.
proceedings.  The agreement becomes final and binding only if approved by585
the majority in value of secured and unsecured independent  creditors586 587
present and voting at a meeting called for this purpose,  as well as by the588
majority of shareholders who are entitled to share in the residual value of the
company on winding up, present and voting at a meeting called for this
purpose.  Even after its approval, a creditor or shareholder who voted against589
the agreement may apply to court within ten business days after the date of
voting  for an order setting aside the agreement.  The grounds for setting590 591
aside the agreement are that it is not just and equitable or that the remuneration
in terms of his agreement is unreasonably excessive  in relation to the592
company’s financial circumstances. Our courts will, it is hoped, use their powers
to set aside such an agreement on the grounds of its not being just and
equitable, to prevent the obvious possibilities of abuse by practitioners who
attempt to increase their remuneration by demanding extra payment for simply
fulfilling the functions and duties that they were appointed to fulfil. I regard this
provision as highly undesirable and as constituting obvious possibilities for
abuse. 
(vi) A statement whether the plan includes any proposal made informally by a
creditor of the company. The right to participate informally in the business rescue
proceedings by making proposals for a business rescue plan to the practitioner
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 Section 145(2).594
 Section 150(1).595
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 The Oxford Study Dictionary at 4 explains “accede” as “to agree to what is proposed”. In the official597
Afrikaans version of s 154(1) of the Act, “accede” has also been translated as “aanvaar”. 
 See part 3.8.4 below on the approval of the plan.598
is specifically given to every creditor.  This obviously refers to proposals that593
must be made before or while the plan is being drafted, since a creditor may also
propose an amended or alternative plan if the original one is rejected by the
creditors.  The reason for this requirement is rather obscure since the594
practitioner is specifically instructed by the Act to consult the creditors before he
prepares a business rescue plan and it must be expected that they will make
several proposals.  595
 
3.8.2.2 Part B – Proposals596
This part of the plan explains all the proposed measures to assist the company in
overcoming its problems and managing its debts. It must therefore contain at least
the following information:
(i) The nature and duration of any moratorium for which the plan provides. This will
provide additional breathing space for the company to recover financially and will
make the plan more attractive to creditors than one providing for a partial
discharge of debts. If the sale of the business is envisaged, such a moratorium
will obviously not be required. 
(ii) The extent to which the company will be released from payment of its debts, or
debts will be converted to equity in the company or another company. In terms
of section 154(1), a rescue plan may provide that if it is implemented according
to its terms and conditions, a creditor who acceded to the discharge of the whole
or part of a debt owing to him will lose the right to enforce that debt or part of it.
The use of the word “acceded” is problematic since its more usual meaning is
that of agreement or consent.  However, even if a creditor votes against597
approval of the plan, he will still be bound if it is approved by the required
majority.  It would have been preferable to state simply that a plan may provide598
for the discharge or partial discharge of a debt on condition that it is implemented
SOUTH AFRICA-120-
 A rather strange choice of words which could simply mean an indication of how the company’s599
business will be run to return it to financial health, or whether the company will play a role in the rescue
of the business, that is, whether the company will continue to exist or only the business. Presumably
the first-mentioned interpretation is meant since there is no other item requiring details of the
company’s future plans for the business. 
 Section 136(2); see part 3.6.2 above.600
according to its terms and conditions. It is unnecessary to state that a creditor will
lose his right to enforce such a debt, since section 154(2) already provides that
a creditor may not enforce a debt owed by the company before business rescue
proceedings began, except to the extent provided for in the business rescue plan
that has been approved and implemented. It is also slightly worrying that there
is no stipulation that all creditors of the same class should be treated equally.
Strictly speaking, a rescue plan could thus differentiate between creditors as to
which part or percentage of each creditor’s claim would be discharged, although
it must probably be assumed that, in spite of the absence of any such provision
in the Act, each class of creditors must be treated equally. This is one more
principle that the courts would have to enunciate. 
(iii) The “ongoing role  of the company, and the treatment of any existing599
agreements”. Since the practitioner has been given the power to cancel or
suspend agreements wholly or partially during business rescue proceedings,
without any reference to this being subject to approval by the creditors,  it must600
be assumed that the requirement refers to the treatment of contracts after
approval of the plan. 
(iv) The “property of the company that is to be available to pay creditors’ claims” in
terms of the plan. This provision should probably be interpreted to mean that the
assets that will be used to pay creditors must be listed, rather than assets that are
merely available and could possibly be used. This provision does not, however,
cover the possibility of claims being paid by future earnings.
(v) The order of preference in which creditors will be paid from the proceeds of the
company’s property if the plan is adopted. The lack of any indication here of a
specific order of preference that must be followed in the payment of creditors
may create the impression that the practitioner is free to draft a plan that
provides for any order of payments which he believes the creditors may approve.
This is most probably not true, and although the order of preference in terms of
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 Section 135 stipulates that after payment of the remuneration and costs of the practitioner and costs601
of the business rescue proceedings, any remuneration or other employment-related payments that
became due to employees during the proceedings will be regarded as post-commencement financing
and have preference over all other claims for post-commencement financing, even secured ones. All
these claims will have preference over all unsecured claims.
 Section 144(2) classifies all employment-related claims of employees dating from before the start602
of rescue proceedings as preferred unsecured claims, without any limit to the amount or period, for the
purposes of Chapter 6: see part 3.8.2.1 above.
 On this aspect, judicial management is better regulated because s 434(3) of the Companies Act of603
1973 specifies that creditors’ claims should be paid mutatis mutandis in accordance with the law
relating to insolvency as if these claim were claims against an insolvent estate.
 Sections 146(d) and 152(3)(c).604
insolvency law must be explained in Part A of the plan, it is also unlikely to be the
order that must be followed for payments in terms of the rescue plan, because
the provisions respectively dealing with post-commencement finance  and the601
rights of employees  effect substantial changes to the law in this respect.602
Therefore, it must be assumed that the business rescue plan will have to provide
for payments in the order of preference created by the last-mentioned provisions,
even though they do not specifically refer to the rescue plan.  This is603
unfortunate, as major creditors often agree to consolidate a company’s debts by
paying minor, and usually concurrent debtors first. I submit that this provision
could be a major obstacle to a successful rescue and should be removed.
(vi) A comparison between the benefits for creditors if the plan is adopted and the
benefits they would receive if the company were to be placed in liquidation. For
creditors this is obviously the crucial point since they are unlikely to approve a
plan that will leave them worse off than liquidation would. However, this
comparison will be based on a substantial amount of speculation and
assumptions, and practitioners should be allowed to include only information that
they regard as necessary and fairly reliable. It is also partly a duplication of the
information required in Part A (iii) of the plan.
(vii) The “effect that the business rescue plan will have on the holders of each class
of the company’s issued securities”. This is another example of the drafters’
loosely using the word “securities” when they are in fact referring to shares. It is
obvious that the effect on the different classes of shareholders must be indicated
in the plan, as those shareholders whose rights will be affected also have to
approve the business rescue plan by majority vote.  The holders of some other604
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 Section 128(1)(b)(iii): see part 3.1 above. 606
securities, such as debentures, are creditors, and their claims must be treated
as such. The intention could surely not have been to give them a double vote:
once as a creditor and again as holder of securities. Proof that the drafters
intended to include only shareholders is also found in section 10(2)(f) that refers
to the rights of shareholders  to approve a rescue plan in terms of sections605
146(d) and 152(3)(c). 
It is significant that, although the definition of business rescue  very specifically606
refers to a better return for the company’s shareholders as an acceptable outcome
of the rescue plan, it is not required here or in any other provisions prescribing the
minimum contents of the plan that an indication should be given of the benefits the
plan would have for shareholders, let alone a comparison between the benefits of a
plan and liquidation for them. It is obvious that liquidation would almost never benefit
shareholders in any way, while a successful rescue would always do so. The
reference to a better return for shareholders in the definition of business rescue is
therefore essentially meaningless because there is no attempt to accommodate this
possibility in the provisions, and this part of the definition should be deleted since it
is superfluous and misleading. 
3.8.2.3 Part C – Assumptions and Conditions
This part of the plan must contain at least the following:
(i) Any conditions that must be satisfied before the rescue plan can come into
operation and be fully implemented. No further details are provided, and a rescue
plan could presumably be made subject to any condition, for example that the
company obtains the necessary financing. 
(ii) An explanation of the plan’s effect, if any, on the number of employees and their
conditions and terms of employment. In probably the majority of business rescue
cases, some retrenchments to limit the running costs of the company are
unavoidable: some jobs have to be sacrificed to retain others. Although this is
clearly foreseen in this provision, there is no attempt to assist the practitioner in
the process. If a business rescue practitioner wants to retrench employees or
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 Act 66 of 1995. In terms of s 136(1)(b) of the Companies Act of 2008, any retrenchment of employees607
is subject to the Labour Relations Act of 1995 and other applicable employment-related legislation.
 Section 144(3)(d) specifically gives every trade union representing employees, and every employee608
who is not so represented, the right to be consulted by the practitioner during the development of the
rescue plan and to be given the opportunity to review and comment on the plan; while s 148 gives them
the right to form an employees’ committee to represent their interests. These provisions will ensure that
employees are not treated unfairly. 
 See Loubser “Corporate Rescue and Labour Legislation” at 64-67.609
 See part 3.9 below on the termination of business rescue proceedings.610
 Section 150(3).611
change their conditions of service, he has to follow the full procedure prescribed
by the Labour Relations Act  that a solvent and healthy company has to follow607
– even if these retrenchments are in terms of the rescue plan. Although I am not
arguing for the same situation as in liquidation, I believe that at least if the
retrenchments are part of a rescue plan, some attempt should have been made
to facilitate unavoidable retrenchments.  Just as in the case of judicial608
management, liquidation now remains the easier option if retrenchments are
inevitable.  609
(iii) The circumstances under which the rescue plan will end. The need for this
provision is not immediately obvious since the Act prescribes the specific
circumstances in which the proceedings will end and the procedure that must be
followed.  If it was envisaged that the rescue plan may alter those provisions610
and stipulate its own conditions for termination, it should have been made clear
in the relevant provisions. The intention of the drafters may have been to allow
the plan to specify the requirements that must be satisfied or the targets reached
before a practitioner may file a notice of substantial implementation of the plan
or notice of termination. 
(iv) A projected balance sheet and statement of income and expenses for the next
three years based on the assumption that the plan is adopted. The projected
balance sheet and statement “must include a notice of any material assumptions
on which the projections are based” and “may include alternative projections based
on varying assumptions and contingencies”.  To fulfil this requirement the611
practitioner will obviously have to employ the services of an accountant, which will
add to the costs of the proceedings. It will also require a substantial amount of
guesswork since there could be many unpredictable factors that would influence the
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 This is also the view expressed by Burdette “Business Rescue Model (Part 2)” at 439 and 441 who614
states that the content of the plan “should be left as open-ended as possible”. The UNCITRAL
Legislative Guide at 215 (par 20) also recommends that the minimum information should be specified,
focussing on the key objectives and procedures for implementation of the plan, rather than requiring
income and expenditure of the company. This requirement was clearly not drafted
with any consideration of the possible provision in a rescue plan for the immediate
sale of the business and liquidation of the company. 
The very specific information on the future of the company that is required under
this item is reminiscent of two requirements that have both proved to be a serious
impediment to rescue procedures: firstly, it shows a definite resemblance to the
independent and very costly report on a company’s affairs that was initially required
when applying for an administration order in England and that was identified as one of
the reasons why administration was not used extensively before this requirement was
removed by legislation.  Secondly, it also reminds one of the heavy burden of proof on612
an applicant for judicial management who must provide evidence that the company will
probably become a successful concern and be able to pay its debts if placed under
judicial management. The practitioner is now required to provide enough detailed
information to prove that the company will probably make a certain amount of profit.
The last-mentioned requirement is symptomatic of the general weakness of the
prescribed contents of the plan, which is to focus on small, sometimes irrelevant and
sometimes unreliable detail, rather than on the holistic view. There is, for example,
no requirement that the reasons for the company’s failure should be explained, and
how these problems will be addressed, nor whether financing for the company’s
continued operation has been or can be obtained. There is also no provision for pre-
packaged rescue plans in spite of their increasing importance as evidenced by
developments in England in particular.613
Depending on the specific requirements regarding training and qualifications, the
business rescue practitioner will, it is hoped, be an experienced and properly qualified
professional who will know what information to provide to convince creditors that they
should approve the rescue plan. The Act should have strived for requiring only the
really important minimum information, leaving the rest up to the good sense,
experience and knowledge of the rescue practitioner.  In time, a fairly standard form614
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a wide range of detailed information.
 Section 150(4).615
 Although the Act states that the company must publish the business rescue plan, draft regulation616
134(7) provides that the business rescue practitioner must publish the proposed plan by delivering a
notice of the availability of the plan to every affected person, by displaying a copy of this notice at the
company’s registered offices and principal business place, on its website (if any), on SENS if it is a
registered company, and by providing a copy of the plan free of charge to any affected person who
requests it.
 Section 150(5).617
 Section 147(1). It could make a difference whether this decision is or must be taken at a meeting,618
since s 147(3) stipulates that any decision taken at a meeting must be supported by the majority in
value of independent creditors. Section 150(5) refers merely to the majority of creditors, which could
be interpreted to mean that all creditors’ votes will be taken into account if no meeting is held.
 In England the administrator is required to publish the plan as soon as possible but not more than619
eight weeks after his appointment: see Chapter 3, part 2.8.3. Although this is only one week more than
the period allowed for the business rescue practitioner, the fact is that in many administrations pre-
packs are used and the plan is thus virtually already in place before the administrator is appointed. 
of agreement will in any event develop once practitioners acquire more experience
in drafting these plans, to contain all the information creditors and other persons who
may vote on the plan seek. 
3.8.2.4 Certificate
The business rescue plan must conclude with a certificate by the business rescue
practitioner in which he states that any actual information provided in the plan
appears to be accurate, complete and up to date, and that the projections are
estimates made in good faith and based on the factual information and assumptions
contained in the statement.615
3.8.3 Approval of the plan 
3.8.3.1 Publication of the plan 
The business rescue plan must be published by the company  within 25 business616
days after the date of the appointment of the business rescue practitioner unless
additional time is allowed by the court on application by the company, or the holders
of the majority of creditors’ voting rights consent to a longer period.  There is no617
mention of a meeting being held for this purpose, but it could possibly be decided at
the first meeting of creditors that must be held within ten business days after the
appointment of the practitioner.  618
The period of 25 days seems quite short,  especially in a case involving a large619
company, unless the directors consulted the practitioner beforehand and the plan was
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 In terms of s 131(1), they may do so until a rescue resolution has formally been taken by the board.620
 See par 3.7.1.2.4 above.621
 Section 151(1).622
 As defined in s 128(1)(j) read with s 145(4)-(6).623
 Section 152(3)(c)(ii).624
 Section 152(1)(a), for example, provides that at this meeting, the practitioner must introduce the plan625
for consideration by the creditors and, if applicable, by “the shareholders”. 
 Section 151(2).626
drafted before business rescue proceedings formally commenced (the so-called pre-
packaged plans or pre-packs). However, this course of action is fraught with danger
because any prior consultations or other action by the board of directors exposes the
company to the risk that the employees or their trade unions could take the initiative
(and thereby also control over the process) away from them by applying to court for a
business rescue order.  In addition to that, practitioners are still not sure whether any620
prior involvement in the preparations for rescue proceedings would make them
unsuitable for appointment as business rescue practitioner for the company because of
a lack of independence.621
 
 3.8.3.2 Meeting of creditors and shareholders
Within ten business days after publication of the business rescue plan, the business
rescue practitioner must convene and preside over a meeting of the company’s
creditors and “any other holders of a voting interest” to consider the rescue plan and
vote on its approval.  Since only a creditor can have a voting interest,  it is unclear622 623
who the other holders of a voting interest could be. Shareholders whose rights will be
affected are referred to as having voting rights.  However, judging from other624
provisions in respect of the meeting, it must be a reference to shareholders with
voting rights because only one meeting is convened for creditors and shareholders
with voting rights, where creditors get the first opportunity to vote and then
shareholders who have voting rights.  625
The practitioner must deliver a notice of the meeting to all affected persons at
least five business days before it is due to take place, setting out the date, time and
place of the meeting, the agenda and a summary of the rights of affected persons to
participate in and vote at the meeting.  Once again, the question needs to be asked626
why each and every affected person should be notified in person even though in most
cases many of them, particularly the shareholders, will not even be allowed to attend,
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 Section 152(1)(a). This seems to imply that creditors and shareholders vote at the same meeting627
– an impression that is further strengthened by s 152(3)(c)(i), which provides that the practitioner must
immediately hold (not call) a meeting of shareholders whose rights will be affected, if the creditors
approve the plan. 
 The first occasion at which he has to report on his opinion regarding the prospect of rescuing the628
company is to creditors at their first meeting which has to take place within ten days after his
appointment: s 147(1)(a)(i).
 As he is compelled to do in terms of s 141(2)(a): see part 3.9 below on termination of the business629
rescue proceedings.
 According to the definition of “rescuing the company” in s 128(1)(h): see part 3.1 above.630
 See s 430(c)(vi) of the Companies Act of 1973 and part 2.5.1 above.631
let alone vote at the meeting because their rights will not be directly affected by the
plan. 
At this meeting the business rescue practitioner must introduce the plan for
consideration by the creditors and, if applicable, by the shareholders.  He must also627
inform the meeting whether he continues  to believe that there is a reasonable628
prospect that the company can be rescued. This provision assumes that the
practitioner had expressed a positive view on the company’s prospects of being
rescued when reporting to the first meeting of creditors, and that, if he did not hold
that view, he would have terminated the procedure and applied for an order placing
the company in liquidation.  However, the Act is silent on what the practitioner629
should do if, in spite of his negative views on the company’s future, the creditors vote
in favour of continuing the rescue proceedings at their first meeting because they do
not agree with his view. It must be remembered that in terms of the Act, a better
return for creditors (or shareholders) is also regarded as rescuing the company and
the creditors may have reason to believe that rescue proceedings will achieve that.630
Terminating the rescue attempt at such an early stage and against the wishes of the
majority of creditors seems inappropriate and overhasty, but may be inevitable
because of the failure of the legislature to provide for this contingency. Although a
provisional judicial manager is also required to include his opinion on the prospects
of the company becoming a successful concern in his report to creditors, the
important difference is that it is intended only to advise the creditors and eventually
the court.  The final decision whether to continue the judicial management of the631
company still rests with the court at that stage, because the court has to decide on
the return day whether to issue a final judicial management order. Furthermore, the
duty to apply to court for an order terminating judicial management if he believes that
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 See s 433(l) of the Companies Act of 1973 and part 2.9 above.632
 Section 144(3)(e) of the Companies Act of 2008.633
 In terms of s 144(3)(c).634
 No provision has been made here or elsewhere for shareholders who have voting rights in respect635
of the plan, to propose amendments.
 Section 152(1)(d).636
 A simple majority in value of secured and unsecured independent creditors: ss 145(4) and 147(3).637
 Section 152(1)(e).638
 Section 152(2).639
 Section 152(3)(b).640
it will not succeed rests only on the final judicial manager, and therefore arises at a
much later stage in the process.  632
Employees have been given the right to be present at, and make submissions to this
meeting before a vote is taken on the plan, but this right must be exercised through their
trade union(s), except for employees who are not represented by a trade union, who may
personally exercise their rights.  In an apparent contradiction of this provision, section633
152(1)(c) requires that an opportunity to address the meeting must be provided to the
“representatives” of the employees. This could be interpreted as a reference to the
committee of employees’ representatives that may be formed,  or to the trade unions and634
representatives of employees who do not belong to a trade union. If the last-mentioned
interpretation is correct, it could lead to a long and chaotic meeting where numerous people
may insist on exercising their right to address the meeting. Here again, inconsistent and
careless phrasing of the provisions have led to uncertainty and lack of clarity. 
The practitioner must allow a discussion of the plan and, if any creditors with voting
interests  propose and second amendments to the plan, or propose that the practitioner635
should adjourn the meeting to revise the plan, conduct a vote on such motions.  636
3.8.3.3 Approval by creditors
Unless an adjournment has been approved by the required majority of creditors,637
the practitioner must then call for a vote by the creditors for the preliminary approval
of the proposed plan, as amended in terms of any approved motion.  If the business638
rescue plan is supported by creditors holding more than 75 per cent in value of all the
creditors who voted, and at least 50 per cent in value of independent creditors, if any,
who voted,  and no rights of shareholders of any class are altered, this constitutes639
the final adoption of the plan.640
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 A secured creditor may vote on the full amount of his claim only in the election of a trustee or when641
his security is affected: Bertelsmann et al Mars at 381-382. 
 See Chapter 3, part 2.8.3. In Germany as well, secured creditors may only vote if their secured642
rights will be affected, and then they vote in a separate group: see Chapter 4, part 2.8.3.3. In his
proposals for a new South African corporate rescue procedure and based on a comparative study of
the law of the United States, Australia, France and Germany, Smits “Corporate Administration” at 104
recommended essentially the same provisions, namely that only unsecured creditors would be able
to vote on a rescue plan and that secured creditors could not be forced to give up their security or
reduce their claims without their consent. 
 As allowed by s 150(2)(c)(i) as Part C of the rescue plan: see part 3.8.2.3 above. 643
Although an approval rate of 75 per cent is higher than the norm, it is probably
preferable since secured creditors have a vote for the full amount of their respective
claims and not only on the unsecured part. This differs from the principles of South
African insolvency law where secured creditors are usually given a vote based only
on the value of the unsecured part of their claims.  The position in company641
administration under English law is also the more conventional one: a majority of
creditors in value present and voting must approve the plan, but the votes of secured
creditors are limited to the unsecured parts of their claims. However, secured
creditors are protected in that the right of a secured creditor to enforce his security
may not be affected by the administrator’s proposals unless the secured creditor
specifically consents thereto.  This solution appears to be far more preferable since642
it is undesirable to interfere with the rights of a secured creditor without his consent,
but also unfair to allow him to vote on a plan to which he will not be bound. Even if
secured creditors are bound (which is not absolutely clear from the current provisions
of the Act), there would be no reason for them to vote in favour of a plan that
postpones payment of their secured claims or converts it into equity or releases the
company from payment of the debt or part of it. The company’s major creditors will
in most cases hold security for their claims and will therefore almost always be in a
position to prevent approval of the rescue plan to the detriment of unsecured creditors
who will probably be much worse off in a liquidation of the company.
The proviso in section 152(3)(b) that the approval is subject to any conditions on
which the plan is contingent is nonsensical. The Act does not provide for conditional
approval by the creditors, and if this is a reference to the conditions that must be
satisfied before the plan may come into operation,  the fact is that these conditions643
are part of the plan itself and thus also subject to the approval. It is only after the plan
SOUTH AFRICA-130-
 Section 152(3) again uses the words “holders of the company’s securities” although almost certainly644
intended to refer to shareholders only. The holders of debentures, for example, would have votes as
creditors, and it is unlikely that the drafters intended them to have double votes as creditors and as
holders of securities. 
 In terms of s 137(1), no alteration in the classification or status of any issued securities of the645
company, except by way of a transfer in the ordinary course of business, is allowed during business
rescue proceedings, unless authorised by the court or contained in an approved business rescue plan.
 Section 152(3)(c)(i).646
 Section 152(3)(c)(ii)(aa). The same meaningless proviso regarding the satisfaction of any conditions647
on which the plan is contingent, which is found in the provision dealing with approval by creditors, is
also present here: see the discussion of s 152(3)(b) above.
 See part 3.8.5 below.648
 Once again s 152(4) refers to the holder of the company’s securities, although obviously meaning649
its shareholders.
has been approved that these conditions, if any, must be fulfilled. Therefore it is not
the approval, but the implementation of the approved plan that is contingent on
fulfilment of the conditions.
3.8.3.4 Approval by shareholders
If the rights of any shareholders  are altered by the plan, the approval by creditors644
is only a preliminary approval, and the rescue plan must also be approved by the
class or classes of shareholders whose rights will be altered.  The practitioner must645
immediately hold a meeting of the holders of these shares and call for a vote to
approve the adoption of the proposed rescue plan.  The plan will have been finally646
adopted if the majority of the votes that are exercised at this meeting are in favour of
adopting the plan.647
If either the creditors or affected shareholders reject the rescue plan, it must be
dealt with as stipulated in section 153.  648
 
3.8.4 Effects of approval of the business rescue plan
Approval of the rescue plan binds the company, every one of its creditors and each
shareholder to the plan, irrespective of whether such a person voted for or against
the plan, or even attended the meeting where the plan was considered or, in the case
of a creditor, had proved his claim against the company.  A creditor is consequently649
prevented from escaping the effects of the plan on his claim by not taking part in the
procedure, and once a rescue plan has been approved and implemented, any
creditor to whom the company owed a debt immediately before business rescue
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 Section 154(2). As explained earlier (in part 3.8.2.2), s 154(1), in what can only be described as650
legislative overkill, provides that a creditor may not enforce payment of that part of his claim that has
been discharged in terms of an approved and implemented plan. 
 Section 152(5) again refers to conditions on which the business rescue plan is contingent although651
it is obviously the implementation of the plan that would be subject to such conditions. 
 Section 152(6)(a). The provisions of ss 38 and 40, dealing with the rights of the board to issue652
authorised shares and determine the issue price, are specifically excluded.
 Section 152(6)(b). The subsection also specifically overrides the provisions of ss 16, 36 and 37 that653
regulate the amendment of the Memorandum, the authorisation for shares in the Memorandum and
the determination of rights, preferences, limitations and other terms on which shares may be issued.
 In terms of s 39.654
 Section 152(7).655
proceedings started may enforce payment of the debt only to the extent provided for
in the rescue plan.  Although section 152(4) provides that every creditor will be650
bound by the adopted business rescue plan, it is unclear to what extent the rights of
secured creditors may be altered. It is difficult to believe that a rescue plan could
reduce the amount of a secured claim or place any restriction on the enforcement of
this security without the specific consent of the relevant creditor. Again, the question
then has to be asked whether secured creditors have full voting powers on a plan to
which they are not bound in spite of this being patently unfair.
The company, under the direction of the business rescue practitioner, must take
all the necessary steps to fulfil any conditions to which implementation of the plan
may be subject, and to implement the plan itself.  The reference to the company651
taking the necessary steps is essentially meaningless, since the business rescue
practitioner needs neither the cooperation nor the approval of the directors or the
shareholders to implement the plan. In so far as it may be necessary to implement
an adopted plan, then, if done in accordance with the plan, the practitioner is
specifically empowered to issue authorised shares and determine the consideration
to be paid therefor.  If the shareholders have approved a business rescue plan that652
provides for the alteration of their rights, the practitioner may also amend the
company’s Memorandum of Incorporation to authorise the issue of shares not
previously authorised, and to determine the preferences, rights, limitations and other
terms of such shares.  The pre-emptive right to any new issue of shares that an653
existing shareholder in a private company may have  is excluded in respect of654
shares issued in terms of a business rescue plan unless provided otherwise by the
plan.  Furthermore, the provisions of sections 112 and 115 which require approval655
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 Sections 112(1)(a) and 115(1)(a)(ii). Section 118(3) also excludes the provisions in respect of656
affected transactions if these transactions are in terms of an approved business rescue plan. 
 As is the case in Germany: see Chapter 3, part 2.8.1. 657
 See part 3.8.5 below on a court’s power to do so.658
 Section 152(8).659
 See part 3.8.2.3 above.660
 Section 153(1)(a)(i).661
 Contrary to s 151(1) where it also included shareholders: see part 3.8.3.2 above.662
by a special resolution of the shareholders for a disposal of all or the greater part of
the assets or undertaking of a company, or to implement an amalgamation or merger
or scheme of arrangement, have also been excluded if the disposal is in terms of or
“contemplated in” an adopted business rescue plan.656
The authority given to the business rescue practitioner to issue shares in terms
of the plan at least ensures that shareholders will not be able to obstruct the
implementation of a plan by refusing to amend the Memorandum or to allow an
increase in the number of authorised shares,  but also protects their interests by657
requiring their approval of a plan providing for the authorisation and issue of
additional shares which will inevitably dilute their shareholdings. The effectiveness
of this protection will, however, depend on how readily the courts will be prepared to
set aside their rejection of such a plan.658
When the business rescue plan has been substantially implemented, the business
rescue practitioner must file a notice to that effect.  The Act gives no indication of what659
would or should be regarded as substantial implementation, and it would therefore be
advisable for creditors to stipulate in the plan at what stage it will be regarded as
substantially implemented, in order to prevent the business rescue practitioner from
abandoning the process before it is completed or nearly completed.  660
3.8.5 Effects of rejection of the business rescue plan 
3.8.5.1 Powers of the rescue practitioner
3.8.5.1.1 Preparation of a revised rescue plan
If the plan is rejected by the creditors or, where applicable, by the shareholders, the
business rescue practitioner has two options, the first of which is to “seek a vote of
approval from the holders of voting interests to prepare and publish a revised plan”.661
In this instance, the reference to the holders of voting interests is apparently
intended to include only the creditors,  because the second option specifically662
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 In s 153(1)(a)(ii).663
 Section 153(3)(a)(i).664
 Section 153(3)(a)(ii).665
 In terms of s 132(3).666
 Section 141(2). See part 3.9 below on the termination of business rescue proceedings.667
 Since the responsibility for development, approval and implementation rests squarely on the668
shoulders of the rescue practitioner (s 140(1)(d)), the application will obviously be brought by the
practitioner and on his authority, albeit in the name of the company.
distinguishes between the votes of the holders of voting interests and those of
shareholders.  This seems to indicate that the practitioner only needs the consent663
of the creditors to prepare a new plan, even if the plan was rejected by the
shareholders. The result of this provision will be that if the creditors vote in favour of
the original plan and refuse to approve the development of a new plan, which is
almost guaranteed to happen in most of these cases, the practitioner will have to use
the second option in respect of the rejection by the shareholders. 
If the business rescue practitioner is authorised by the meeting of creditors to
prepare and publish a revised plan, the meeting must be concluded immediately after
the vote of approval has been given.  The practitioner then has ten business days664
in which to prepare and publish a new or revised plan, and the new plan must again
be put through the process prescribed by the Act for publication and consideration of
a business rescue plan.  665
There is no limit on the number of times the meeting of creditors may authorise the
practitioner to prepare a revised or new plan, and the court or Commission, as the case
may be, to which the practitioner must deliver a monthly report if the proceedings have
not ended within three months after being started,  does not seem to have the666
authority to terminate the proceedings mero motu. However, it must be assumed that
the creditors will not allow the process to continue indefinitely, while the practitioner is
also under a duty to take the prescribed steps to terminate the business rescue
proceedings if there are no reasonable prospects that the company will be rescued.667
3.8.5.1.2 Application to court to set aside the votes 
The second option available to a practitioner if the rescue plan is rejected is to inform
the meeting that “the company”  will apply to court to have the result of the vote by the668
holders of voting interests (the creditors, in other words) or the shareholders, as the
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 Section 153(1)(a)(ii).669
 Section 153(2).670
case may be, set aside on the grounds that the decision was inappropriate.  Although669
it is not stated specifically that the application to court will seek to have the votes
rejecting the plan set aside, it may be assumed that this is the intention. There are no
guidelines on the circumstances in which rejection of the plan will be regarded as
inappropriate, and it will be interesting to see how our courts interpret this provision. In
most cases these applications would probably be in respect of a rejection of the plan by
shareholders, and the question is whether the shareholders’ rejection of a plan that was
approved by the creditors would automatically be regarded as inappropriate. This would
obviously be undesirable because shareholders will lose the little power they have been
given to influence the outcome of the business rescue proceedings. 
If an application to court is to be made, the meeting must be adjourned for five
business days, unless the application to court is made during that time, or until the
court has disposed of the application.  This provision is anything but clear, but670
seems to require that the application to court must be brought within five business
days. If it is not, the next meeting must take place after the five-day period, but if it is,
then the meeting is adjourned until the court has ruled on the matter. Apart from the
fact that five days are almost certainly not enough to prepare the documents for the
application and file them with the court, the practitioner will presumably have to inform
every affected person who is entitled to attend the meeting that it will not take place
within five days. It would have been much simpler and more cost-effective to provide
that the practitioner must file the application to court within a reasonable time,
whether stipulated or not, and that he must call a meeting within a stipulated period
after the court has ruled on the application or if he decides to abandon the
application. 
There is furthermore no indication of the purpose of the meeting: if the court
grants the order sought, the plan would presumably be regarded as approved
because the votes of the group who rejected it will be nullified. No further voting or
other steps are required, and the plan may be implemented. A simple notification to
affected persons would surely have been sufficient. If the court dismisses the
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 Section 153(1)(b), which sets out the powers of affected persons (see part 3.8.5.2 below),671
specifically provides that these options apply if the practitioner takes no action. In this case he has,
although unsuccessfully. Furthermore, s 153(4) specifically provides that in the case of an acquisition
of voting rights by others (discussed in part 3.8.5.2.3 below), voting must again take place and all the
options in s 153 become available again, while in this instance the Act is silent on this matter. 
 Section 153(1)(b)(i)(aa).672
 Again, the drafters probably only intended to include shareholders, and not, for example, debenture673
holders who would have the substantially stronger rights afforded to creditors. 
 Section 146(e)(i).674
application, it is not clear whether all the other options become available again,  or671
whether the practitioner must merely call for another vote. If none of these apply, the
rescue proceedings must be terminated and there is again no need for anything more
than a notification to affected persons.
3.8.5.2 Powers of affected persons
3.8.5.2.1 Demanding a revised plan from the practitioner 
The Act offers three possible courses of action if the business rescue practitioner fails
to use either of the above options. Firstly, any affected person present at the meeting
may put forward a proposal requiring the business rescue practitioner to prepare and
publish a revised plan. Once again, this proposal only needs approval by the creditors
(“the holders of voting interests”).  672
The right given to “each holder of any issued security of the company”  to673
propose the development of an alternative plan in accordance with section 153  is674
far more limited than would appear at first sight. Firstly, only an affected person who
is present at the meeting may make such a proposal. Since only those shareholders
whose rights will be directly affected by the plan may attend the meeting, it is
misleading to phrase this provision as if each shareholder would be entitled to make
such a proposal. Secondly, the right to propose an alternative plan is limited to
exactly that, in other words, to propose an alternative plan. It remains the sole right
of creditors to vote on the proposal. If the creditors have voted in favour of the original
plan, they will simply reject the proposal for an alternative plan put forward by a
shareholder, so that in reality this provision is meaningless and provides only the
illusion that shareholders can influence the rescue plan in any way.
Contrary to the almost powerless situation of shareholders, including those
whose rights may be directly affected by the plan, trade unions and unrepresented
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 Section 144(3)(e).675
 Section 153(3)(a).676
 Section 153(1)(b)(i)(bb).677
 Section 153(2). 678
employees have specifically been given the right to be present at the meeting.675
They will therefore always be in a position to propose an alternative plan, in addition
to any rights they may have as creditors of the company.
The same provisions apply as in the case of the practitioner being the one who
requested the drafting of a revised plan, which means that he has ten business days
in which to prepare and publish the new plan and this plan must be taken through the
whole prescribed process for approval again.  Here as well, no limit has been set676
on the number of times that such a proposal for the drafting of a new plan may be
approved.
 
3.8.5.2.2 Application to court to set aside the votes 
The second possible course of action for affected persons if the practitioner fails to take
any action after the plan has been rejected, but again restricted to those who were
present at the meeting, is to apply to court for an order setting aside the result of the
vote of either the creditors or shareholders on the grounds that it was inappropriate.677
Theoretically speaking, a shareholder whose rights will be directly affected by the plan
and who was thus present at the meeting could rely on this provision to apply to court
for the approval of the plan by the creditors to be set aside. There is nothing in the
provision itself which excludes this possibility, but such an application is unlikely to
succeed. The fact that every trade union and unrepresented employee also have this
right could prove to be much more dangerous. Any rescue plan could be delayed and
even ruined by trade unions and employees if they are not properly consulted and their
cooperation and approval secured before the plan is finalised. In effect, all employees,
even those who are not creditors of the company, have been given the right, albeit
indirectly, to veto or approve a business rescue plan.
The provisions applicable in the case where the practitioner brings the application
to court also apply here. The affected person who intends applying to court must
inform the meeting, and the practitioner must adjourn the meeting for five business
days or until the court has ruled on the application.  In this case the period of five678
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 See part 3.8.5.1.2 above.679
 Section 153(1)(b)(ii).680
 The words “voting rights” are used to denote the rights of holders of the company’s securities to vote681
on any matter: s 1. 
 Although the section refers to the holders of the company’s “securities”, this is patently incorrect682
since many of them would be creditors whose rights to participation are regulated in section 145. 
business days is even more unreasonable and all the problems raised above
regarding this provision also arise.679
3.8.5.2.3 Acquisition of voting interests 
The third option is open to all affected persons, not only to those who were present
at the meeting. If the practitioner does not take any action he is allowed to take after
the business rescue plan has been rejected, any affected person or persons acting
together “may make a binding offer to purchase the voting interests” of any persons
who opposed the adoption of the plan.  680
Several serious questions and doubts are raised by this provision. The first
question that needs to be answered is whether the reference to the acquisition of
“voting interests” means that only the votes of dissenting creditors may be acquired,
not the votes of shareholders, or whether in this particular case, the voting rights of
shareholders are included in “voting interests”. The words “voting interest” are defined
in s 128(1)(j) as being the votes to which creditors are entitled on the basis of their
claims against the company as determined in terms of s 145(4) to (6).  On the face681
of it this means that the votes of shareholders whose rights will be affected are not
included in this option. However, one cannot be certain that this was the intention
since section 151(1) refers to “creditors and any other holders of a voting interest”
who must be called to the meeting to consider the proposed rescue plan. The answer
is found in section 146(e)(ii), which deals with the rights of the company’s
shareholders  to participate in the business rescue proceedings. This subsection682
states that each of them is entitled to make “an offer to acquire the interests of any
or all of the creditors or other holders of the company’s securities” in terms of section
153. The voting rights of shareholders who oppose the plan may thus also be
acquired, but since these rights are attached to the shares, it will in fact be the shares
that will be acquired and not merely their voting rights. This makes the rest of this
provision discussed below even more ominous.
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The word “binding” seems to imply that the offer, once made, cannot be retracted
or changed, although it is far from clear why this should be the case. An explanatory
memorandum or report by the drafters to explain the reason behind this condition
would, once again, have been of invaluable help. 
Then follows an even more curious condition: the payment offered to purchase
the voting interests must be equal to the independently and expertly determined, fair
and reasonable estimate of what the holder of the voting interests would receive if the
company were to be liquidated. The task of obtaining this valuation is specifically
given to the practitioner.  The valuation is subject to review, reappraisal and683
revaluation by the court on application by the holder of the voting interest or the
person acquiring it.684
This provision can best be described as alarming. The question needs to be asked
why the offeror is not allowed to offer more than the liquidation value of the voting
interest to make the offer more attractive to the offeree. The liquidation value of a
concurrent creditor’s claim, for example, would be close to nil and a share in a company
unable to pay its debts would definitely be worthless on liquidation. Such a creditor or
shareholder would almost certainly rather attempt to have an amended plan prepared
than virtually donating his votes to another person, since there would be no advantage
for him in such a transaction. This inexplicable condition now raises the fear that the
words “binding offer” referred to above do not apply to the offeror only, but in fact also
bind the offeree to the offer. The right of the offeree to apply to court for a review of the
valuation would be explained by this interpretation, as he would otherwise simply refuse
the offer. It is to be hoped that this is not the intended result of the provision, since the
possibilities for abuse and exploitation are endless, but it is almost impossible to say with
any certainty what this provision is supposed to achieve.
If such an offer is made, the practitioner must adjourn the meeting for no more
than five business days during which period he must amend the plan to reflect the
results of the offer.  It is not clear what is meant by “the results” of the offer,685
because all the provisions of sections 152 and 153 will apply afresh at the next
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meeting.  This means that the plan must be published and voted on as was done686
previously, although obviously the balance of votes will be different as a result of the
acquisition of votes by some affected persons. It is therefore misleading to refer to
the results of the offer, as these results will become obvious only after voting has
taken place. I would suggest that the provision should merely require the amended
plan to reflect details of the offer, the number of votes that have been acquired and
by whom. If the plan is rejected again, all the options available in case of rejection as
discussed here  become available once more.  687 688
3.8.5.3 No action taken by either the practitioner or affected persons 
 If no decision is taken that a revised plan must be prepared, no application is made
to court for the setting aside of opposing votes, either at the initiative of the
practitioner or an affected person, and no offer for the acquisition of voting interests
is made, the business rescue practitioner must without delay file a notice of
termination of the business rescue proceedings with the Commission.  689
3.9 Termination of business rescue proceedings 
In terms of section 132(2), business rescue proceedings are terminated in one of three
ways: by an order of court, by the filing of a notice of termination by the business rescue
practitioner, or by the rejection or substantial implementation of a business rescue plan.
Although the wording of section 132(2)(a) creates the impression that the court order
can either set aside the order or resolution that initiated the proceedings, or convert the
proceedings to liquidation proceedings, this is incorrect and misleading. As will appear
from the discussion below, an order placing the company in liquidation is always
combined with an order setting aside the rescue proceedings. There is no provision for
converting these proceedings into liquidation. 
No provision has been made for the automatic or compulsory termination of
business rescue proceedings after a specified period, but the legislature clearly intended
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and expected the proceedings to take little more, or maybe even less, than three months
in total. As a result, section 132(3) provides that if the proceedings have not ended
within three months after commencement, or within a longer period allowed by the court
on application by the practitioner, the practitioner must write a report on the progress of
the business rescue proceedings and update it on a monthly basis until the rescue
proceedings have ended.  This report, as well as the monthly updates, must be690
delivered  to each affected person and, if the proceedings have been the subject of a691
court order, to the court as well.  If the last-mentioned condition does not apply, the692
report and updates must be delivered to the Commission.693
The period of three months is fairly unrealistic and would be quite insufficient in
most cases, which will result in either a substantial administrative burden for the
practitioner, with added costs for the company as a result of this duty, or the costs of
applying to court for an extension in order to avoid having to prepare and deliver the
monthly updates. A period of 12 to 18 months would have been far more realistic to
allow sufficient time for amendments to the rescue plan that may be necessary, as
well as for proper implementation of the plan.  This provision also creates the risk694
that the business rescue practitioner will prematurely end his participation in the
implementation of the plan to avoid the substantial administrative burden. 
The need for stipulating a period at all must also be questioned, since termination
never takes place automatically but requires a prescribed action under prescribed
circumstances. Unless and until these circumstances are present, it serves no real
purpose to attempt to accelerate the procedure. Both the creditors  and the695
employees  are entitled to form committees to represent their interests and they696
would surely be able to monitor the actions of the practitioner to establish whether he
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is making progress and taking the appropriate action to terminate or finalise the
proceedings when required.
 
3.9.1 Termination by order of court
3.9.1.1 Rescue proceedings started by a board resolution
The first instance where a court may terminate these business rescue proceedings
is when an application is made by an affected person for the business rescue
resolution of the board of directors to be set aside.  The court may set aside the697
resolution on any of the stipulated grounds  and, where appropriate, may also make698
an order placing the company under liquidation.  699
As was explained before, it also appears to be possible for a court to terminate
business rescue proceedings that were commenced by a board resolution if an
application for the replacement of the business rescue practitioner has been made
and not for the setting aside of the resolution to commence business rescue
proceedings.  If so, an affected person who considers applying for the replacement700
of the business rescue practitioner would have to carefully consider the unintended
consequences that the application may have. 
Company directors who started business rescue proceedings by a resolution of
the board are not themselves authorised to terminate these proceedings. Only the
business rescue practitioner may, and indeed must, apply to court for termination of
these rescue proceedings and placing the company in liquidation if, after investigating
the company’s affairs, business, property and financial situation,  or at any time701
during the business rescue proceedings, he comes to the conclusion that there is no
reasonable prospect for the company to be rescued.  The court, the company and702
all affected persons must be informed of this situation, presumably before applying
to court, although this is not specifically stated by the applicable provision.703
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For some unknown reason, the drafters of the Act deemed it necessary to restate
the power of the court to order the liquidation of a company if a reasonable prospect
of rescuing the company no longer exists. In spite of section 141(2)(a)(ii) clearly
conferring this power and creating a duty on the practitioner to apply for such an
order, section 81(1)(b), which deals with the liquidation of solvent companies,
provides that a court may order a solvent company to be wound up if the practitioner
has applied for liquidation in terms of section 141(2)(a) on the grounds that there is
no reasonable prospect of the company being rescued. Apart from being completely
unnecessary, section 81(1)(b) also creates substantial confusion, as it is difficult to
believe that a company with no reasonable prospects of being rescued could still be
solvent. The next logical question raised by this inexplicable provision is whether, and
if so, why the power to liquidate insolvent companies is conferred on the courts by
section 141(2)(a), but not to liquidate solvent ones, although it contains no
requirement that the company must be insolvent.
The business rescue practitioner may not be appointed as the liquidator of the
company if the company is liquidated when the business rescue ends.704
3.9.1.2 Rescue proceedings started or confirmed by an order of court 
Unless a business rescue plan has been rejected, or adopted and implemented,705
business rescue proceedings that were commenced by an order of court  can be706
terminated only by an order of court.  707
Just as in the case of business rescue proceedings started by a board resolution,
the business rescue practitioner must apply to court for an order discontinuing the
proceedings and placing the company in liquidation if, after investigating the
company’s affairs, business, property and financial situation,  or at any time during708
the business rescue proceedings, he comes to the conclusion that there is no
reasonable prospect for the company to be rescued.  The impression created by709
section 132(2)(a) that setting aside the business rescue order or converting the
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proceedings to a winding up are alternatives is not correct since in all instances
where a court may order liquidation, the Act clearly states that the business rescue
proceedings must first be terminated or discontinued.
The practitioner must also apply for an order terminating business rescue
proceedings that were started or confirmed by an order of court,  if at any time he710
comes to the conclusion that reasonable grounds to believe that the company is
financially distressed no longer exist.  711
3.9.2 Termination by filing a notice
A business rescue practitioner may also terminate business rescue proceedings by
simply filing a notice to that effect with the Companies and Intellectual Property
Commission.  There are two instances in which a practitioner may file such a notice.712
The first one is where the business rescue proceedings were initiated by a
resolution of the board of directors and the practitioner concludes that there no longer
are reasonable grounds to believe that the company is financially distressed.  Since713
the Act is silent on what will or should happen after such a notice has been filed, it
must be assumed that the company will return to its pre-business rescue situation
without any further formalities.
The second possibility applies to all business rescue proceedings if a business
rescue plan has been rejected by the creditors or shareholders, where applicable, and
none of the possible actions provided by section 153(1) have been taken by either the
business rescue practitioner or any affected person. In such a case the practitioner must
promptly file a notice of termination of the business rescue proceedings with the
Commission.  However, section 132(2)(c)(i) also provides for this possibility by stating714
that rejection of the plan and failure by any affected person to use the options provided
by section 153 will terminate business rescue proceedings. These two provisions not
only regulate exactly the same situation, but contradict each other: according to section
132(2)(b), the business rescue proceedings are terminated by the filing of the notice of
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termination, while in terms of section 132(2)(c)(i), they are terminated by the mere
inaction of the affected persons.
The situation is further complicated unnecessarily by section 81(1)(c)(i), which
provides for the liquidation of a (solvent) company by the court on application by one
or more of the company’s creditors. The grounds stipulated in this subsection for the
order are that business rescue proceedings have been terminated in terms of section
132(2)(b) or (c)(i), which refer to the above two instances where a practitioner may
file a notice of termination, and it appears to the court that it is just and equitable in
the circumstances for the company to be wound up.
It is understandable that provision should be made for the liquidation of a
company if the business rescue plan has been rejected and nobody has taken any
steps to resolve the deadlock. The company is most probably already insolvent
and/or unable to pay its debts or will soon be, and allowing the creditors to have it
liquidated without the need to prove any of the usual grounds for insolvent liquidation
provides a quick and effective solution to the problem. The reference in section
81(1)(c)(i) to section 132(2)(c)(i) is thus correct. What is not clear, however, is why
the termination of business rescue proceedings because the company is no longer
in financial distress should also expose the company to the risk of being liquidated
on the application of creditors. The additional requirement that it must appear just and
equitable to the court for the company to be wound up may act as some safeguard,
but considering the historical approach of the courts in favouring creditors, it is
uncertain to what extent a company will be protected. The reference to section
132(2)(b) is thus not only unnecessary but could result in unfair and quite possibly
unintended consequences for the company.
 
3.9.3 Termination as a result of rejection or implementation of a business
rescue plan
Although the rejection of a rescue plan and failure by any affected person to extend
the proceedings in terms of any of the options provided by section 153 is stated as
one of the ways in which business rescue proceedings are terminated,  this is not715
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correct in terms of other provisions of the Act. As explained above,  the mere716
rejection and inaction by affected persons do not terminate the proceedings. They are
terminated by the notice of termination of business rescue proceedings that must be
filed by the practitioner.  This possibility is already covered by the provisions of717
section 132(2)(b).  718
However, the second possibility mentioned in this subsection does terminate
business rescue proceedings. This is when a business rescue plan has been adopted
as prescribed by the Act,  and the practitioner has filed a notice of substantial719
implementation of the plan.  There is no indication of what would objectively be720
regarded as substantial implementation, neither is there any provision for some form
of control over this decision by the practitioner. The sole decision on whether the
rescue plan has been substantially implemented thus lies with the business rescue
practitioner. It would have been preferable to require full implementation or at least
that the plan must specify the test for substantial implementation. 
3.10 Evaluation of business rescue proceedings
The new business rescue proceedings presented the legislature with an opportunity
to design a rescue procedure that would avoid all the pitfalls and weaknesses that
had been identified not only in judicial management, but also in comparable
procedures such as administration in England. It is clear that this is an attempt to
move away from judicial management, but in the process many new problems and
uncertainties have been created. Suggestions and recommendations to rectify at
least some of them are made in Chapter 5.
The possibility for a company board to commence a formal rescue procedure by
simply filing a resolution to that effect and without having to obtain a court order is
completely new to South Africa and a major improvement as it will save considerable
time and costs. Another improvement is that the required circumstances in which
such a resolution may be taken are not as onerous as those for judicial management:
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the test throughout is one of a reasonable belief or reasonable likelihood, rather than
a probability. The board can also appoint a business rescue practitioner in whom they
have confidence and are not compelled to accept one nominated by creditors as
would be the case in proceedings commenced by an order of court as well as
currently in judicial management. 
However, there are many unclear provisions and a lot of unnecessary
administrative duties, such as notification to all affected persons of every
development. The preference rights given to employees may also present problems
and it remains to be seen whether company boards will embrace the new procedure
or choose other options, such as informal arrangements or even liquidation, exactly
as they have done before.
Creating a successful and acceptable business rescue procedure in a creditor-
friendly system, which South Africa most certainly is, is always difficult  and this has721
been proved by our history with judicial management. It is therefore regrettable that the
drafters of the provisions regulating the new rescue proceedings did not exercise more
care in constructing the new procedure to avoid introducing principles and provisions
that are completely foreign and indeed in conflict with our established common law.
Frisby  argues convincingly that an insolvency system arises out of existing722
cultural conditions and attitudes, and how debt and debt forgiveness is viewed in a
specific country. It should reflect the legal, historical, political and cultural context of
the country that has developed it. In so far as business rescue proceedings also deal
with unpaid debts and discharge of debts, the same principles apply here and the
danger exists that the business rescue proceedings, in spite of the legislature’s best
intentions, will not find acceptance because of the many new and foreign principles
introduced. The new procedure has many positive aspects, but these may be
overshadowed by the negative ones unless they are rectified in time.
 
4 COMPROMISE WITH CREDITORS  
4.1 Introduction 
Section 311 of the Companies Act of 1973 provides for a compromise or arrangement
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between a company and its creditors or members or any class of them. Although this
section does not apply only in instances of insolvency or financial difficulties, it is
often used as a way to rescue a company in financial distress by reaching a
compromise with creditors and, where necessary, with members of the company.723
The procedure entails an application to the High Court by the company, a
creditor, a member, the (provisional) liquidator if the company is being wound up or
the (provisional) judicial manager if the company is under judicial management, for
an order directing that a meeting of the creditors or members (or class of creditors or
members) of the company be summoned to consider a proposed compromise.  724
If the court grants the order, a notice summoning the meeting must be sent to the
creditors or members concerned, accompanied by a statement explaining the effect of
the compromise, stating all relevant information regarding the value of debentures
concerned in any arrangement and stating any material interests of directors of the
company, whether as directors, members or creditors of the company and the effect
thereon of the compromise if it differs from the effect on similar interests of other
persons.  These are the only prescribed contents for the proposal of a compromise or725
arrangement, leaving a substantial degree of freedom to the persons making the
proposal to design a proposal according to the relevant circumstances. Generally
speaking, the proposal must contain sufficient information to enable those persons
entitled to vote on it to exercise informed votes, taking into consideration their alternative
options, but this information will vary according to the circumstances of each case and
the availability of information.  The notice summoning the meeting must also be726
advertised and if the statement is not included, the advertisement must indicate where
and how copies may be obtained by creditors.727
If the compromise is agreed to by a majority in number and three-fourths in value of
the creditors or class of creditors, or a majority representing three-fourths of the votes
exercisable by the members or class of members, present and voting in person or by
proxy at the meeting convened for this purpose,  the applicant must approach the court728
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again to sanction the compromise. The court has a discretion whether to sanction the
compromise, even if the required majority has voted in its favour,  but once the compro-729
mise has been sanctioned by the court, it will be binding on all creditors or class of
creditors (or members) and also on the company or, if applicable, the liquidator or judicial
manager.  A compromise or arrangement in respect of a company that is being wound730
up may also provide for the discharge of the winding-up order,  which is one of the ways731
in which a section 311 compromise can be used to rescue a company in distress. 
The advantages of this compromise procedure are that it may be used outside of any
formal insolvency procedure, thus avoiding the stigma of insolvency, and that the
unanimous agreement of all the creditors or members concerned is not required to make
it binding on them all, although they are adequately protected by the requirement of
sanctioning by the court. Even dissenting creditors or members are thus bound to the
compromise if the required majority have voted in its favour and the court has given its
approval. Another advantage, at least from the perspective of the board, is that the current
management of the company is not displaced but remains in control of the company. 
The disadvantages are that it is a costly and onerous process because of the
involvement of the High Court  and, unless it takes place while the company is in732
liquidation or under judicial management, there is no moratorium in place to protect
the company against enforcement actions by creditors or even an application for
winding up, until the compromise is approved by the court. As a result of the strictly
prescribed procedure and the involvement of the court on two occasions, the period
of the company’s vulnerability could last several weeks. 
4.2 Compromise between a company and its creditors under the
Companies Act of 2008 
A new compromise procedure has now been created by section 155(2) of the
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Companies Act of 2008, which provides that the board of a company or the liquidator
of a company being wound up may propose an arrangement or a compromise of the
company’s financial obligations to all its creditors or to all the members of any class of
its creditors. Although section 155(2) refers to both a compromise and an arrangement,
the drafters of these provisions do not seem to have appreciated the fact that there is
a difference between a compromise and an arrangement.  The word “arrangement”733
appears to have been regarded as merely an alternative term for a compromise. This
impression is reinforced by the fact that the headings to both this part of Chapter 6 and
section 155 itself refer only to a compromise, and the word “arrangement” is used only
in section 155(2) and again in section 155(9), the very last subsection in this part of the
Act, which refers to the liability of a surety of the company and does not in any way
regulate the compromise or arrangement itself. This discussion will therefore follow the
wording of the legislation and also refer only to a compromise. 
A major difference between the current section 311 compromise and the new
compromise procedure is that the current compromise with creditors and members
has been split into two completely separate procedures in the Companies Act of
2008. Provision is made in section 114 of the Act for a scheme of arrangement
between a company that is not in liquidation or business rescue, and the holders of
its securities or any class of them. This section is found in Chapter 5 dealing with
fundamental transactions, takeovers and offers, while the new procedure for a
compromise between a company and its creditors is found in Chapter 6, following
immediately after the provisions regulating business rescue proceedings.  The last-734
mentioned procedure is thus clearly intended as an alternative to business rescue
proceedings and is therefore comparable to the procedure of company voluntary
arrangements in England.  735
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By excluding the participation of shareholders from this new procedure, any part of
the proposal that requires the consent of shareholders will have to be obtained by a
separate process, either by using the procedure of a scheme of arrangement with
shareholders (which will not be possible if the company is in liquidation),  or by calling736
a general meeting and obtaining the required consent as prescribed by the Act. Although
section 155 specifically provides for the possibility of a proposal that debt will be
converted to equity, the drafters do not seem to have foreseen the possibility that the
cooperation or approval of shareholders may be required in some cases.737
Another important difference is that the new compromise procedure requires only
one application to court, namely to approve the compromise once the proposal has
been adopted by the required majority of creditors.  It will therefore no longer be738
necessary to seek the court’s permission to arrange the meeting where the proposed
compromise will be discussed and voted on. This may render the procedure slightly
less expensive than the one required by section 311 of the Companies Act of 1973.
Although there are some similarities between the new compromise procedure and
company voluntary arrangements in England, it does not appear as if the drafters of the
South African legislation took note of the more than 20 years of experience gained in
England with company voluntary administrations. The South African procedure does not
provide for a moratorium against enforcement actions by creditors in the period between
the delivery of a proposal and its approval by the court, even though the lack of a
moratorium was identified as a major weakness in company voluntary administrations
and subsequently rectified by amending legislation.  The requirement that a proposal739
approved by the affected creditors should be sanctioned by the court to make it binding
is also not found in company voluntary arrangements and is probably a remnant from
the section 311 procedure. The additional costs resulting from this requirement will
contribute to making the procedure too costly for small companies and seem
unnecessary considering the high percentage of votes required for approval by
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creditors.  However, the compromise with creditors has one advantage over company740
voluntary arrangements, namely that the board of directors are in charge of the whole
procedure and not an outsider  whose fees and expenses invariably add to the costs741
of the procedure.
4.3 Entities to which a compromise applies 
In terms of section 155(1) of the Companies Act of 2008, the compromise provisions
apply to any company, irrespective of whether the company is financially distressed  or742
not, unless the company is engaged in business rescue proceedings in terms of Chapter
6. Companies engaged in business rescue proceedings are excluded for the obvious
reason that any compromise reached during this procedure must be part of the business
rescue plan which, as indicated below, is very similar in form as prescribed by the Act.743
Although not specifically stated here, it can be deduced from other subsections that the
compromise procedure is available to a company that is in liquidation.
The specific provision that a company need not already be in financial distress
to make use of this procedure must be taken to indicate an intention on the part of the
legislature to provide a solution which can be used by companies before their
financial difficulties have reached the point of actual financial distress. This is
probably an acknowledgement of the fact that the existing section 311 compromise
has been used more extensively and successfully as a corporate rescue measure
than judicial management has. Unfortunately, however, as will be shown in the
discussion below, it is questionable whether this new compromise procedure will
prove to be a popular successor to the section 311 compromise. 
4.4 Prescribed contents of a proposal
The prescribed minimum contents that a compromise proposal must contain are
almost identical to those for a business rescue plan. This means that almost all the
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problematic, ambiguous and baffling provisions identified in respect of the prescribed
contents of a business rescue plan are repeated here. It also causes a number of
unnecessary complications to a procedure that should ideally be straightforward,
informal and flexible. 
The proposal for a compromise must contain all information reasonably required to
assist creditors in deciding whether or not to accept or reject the proposal.  The proposal744
must also be divided into three parts similar to those prescribed for a rescue plan:
4.4.1 Part A - Background 
In terms of section 155(3)(a), this part must contain at least the following information:
(i) A “complete list of all the material assets of the company” and “an indication as
to which assets are held as security by creditors” on the date of the proposal.745
As was mentioned in the discussion of this item in a rescue plan, it is unclear
whether the word “material” refers to important or valuable assets only, without
any indication of what the threshold value should be, or whether it was intended
to include only corporeal assets. Once again, although no valuation of these
assets is required, it must be assumed that a valuation should be included.  746
(ii) A complete list of the creditors of the company as on the date of the proposal and
an indication which creditors would qualify as secured, statutory preferent and
concurrent in terms of insolvency law. It must also indicate which creditors have
proved their claims.  By all appearances this provision, also found in the747
requirements for a business rescue plan, was simply repeated without giving any
thought to the different circumstances prevailing in a compromise. If the company
is not in liquidation, there would not as yet have been any meetings of creditors
or proof of claims at this stage, and it is thus unclear whether in such a case all
claims must automatically be regarded as proven, or creditors should be required
to prove or confirm their claims by some process, or whether this part of the
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 See Chapter 3, part 3.5.4 regarding the CVA procedure in England where every creditor who has748
notice of the meeting is entitled to vote according to the amount of his debt, subject to the right of the
chairman of the meeting to accept or reject a claim (Insolvency Rule 1.17). No formal proof of claims
is required.
 Section 155(3)(a)(iii).749
 Section 155(2).750
 Per Didcott J in Ensor NO v South Pine Properties (Pty) Ltd 1978 (2) SA 755 (N) at 761 explaining751
why it could not be an absolute requirement that a company should in all cases supply this information
in a proposed compromise in terms of s 311, since it would often be too soon to predict the outcome
of a winding up with much confidence, even if the company is already in provisional liquidation.
 Section 155(3)(a)(iv).752
 See part 3.8.2.1 above.753
 “Holders of securities” in this instance is logically taken to mean only shareholders.754
provision must simply be ignored.  It seems an unnecessary complication of the748
procedure, apart from the fact that, if creditors have to prove their claims by
some prior process, they will be alerted to the company’s financial difficulties
before the compromise is ready for their consideration. Since the company need
not necessarily be in liquidation or financial distress to enter into a compromise,
the reference to rules of insolvency seems inappropriate and unnecessary. 
(iii) The probable dividend that creditors would receive in their specific classes if the
company were placed in liquidation.  Since a compromise may also be proposed749
by the liquidator of a company that is already in liquidation,  the wording of this750
provision has clearly not been given any serious thought. A fairly small change in
the wording would cover both possibilities. The estimated dividend will obviously be
more accurate in the case of a company that is already in liquidation. Although only
the probable dividend has to be provided, the possibility that it may be impossible
to do so, particularly if the company is not yet in liquidation, has obviously not been
considered. This is unfortunate, and may lead to “rash prophesies, misleading
creditors by their unwarranted optimism or pessimism, or stand in the way of an
unduly high proportion of proposals.”  751
(iv) A complete list of the holders of the securities issued by the company, and the
effect, if any, that the proposal would have on them.  Apart from being extremely752
impractical and costly, as was pointed out in the discussion of the business rescue
plan,  this provision is even more unnecessary and meaningless than in a rescue753
plan. In most cases a compromise would not affect the shareholders  at all, as it754
usually provides for a moratorium on payments, partial discharge of claims and
other purely creditor-related issues. In those cases where shareholders will be
SOUTH AFRICA-154-
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 See part 4.5 below.756
 See part 4.4.3 below.757
 Section 155(3)(a)(v).758
 Section 145(1)(d).759
affected, for example where shares will be issued to creditors in payment of their
claims, this has to be specifically set out in Part B of the proposal.  The755
shareholders are not involved in the compromise: they do not vote on it, even if their
rights are affected, and it is not binding on them after approval by the creditors and
confirmation by the court.  Should their approval or cooperation be required for756
any part of the compromise, this will have to be stipulated as a condition for the
proposal to come into operation or be implemented, which has to be set out in Part
C of the proposal.757
(v) “[W]hether the proposal includes a proposal made informally by a creditor of the
company”.  This is another example of the mindless repetition of a requirement758
for the business rescue plan. Whereas the right to participate in the business
rescue proceedings informally by making proposals for a business rescue plan to
the practitioner is specifically given to every creditor,  there is no such provision759
in relation to a compromise. It is difficult to imagine any situation where a creditor
will make a proposal for a compromise, but even in the unlikely event that this
should happen, there does not seem to be any good reason why this should be
specifically mentioned in the proposal. If the proposal is acceptable to the required
majority of creditors, it surely makes no difference who the originator of the proposal
was, and may merely cause other creditors to be suspicious about a proposal that
is inherently sound. 
The general impression of Part A is that there is again a tendency by the drafters
to over-regulate, to include provisions without any discernible reason and to complicate
unnecessarily what could and should have been a procedure designed to assist
companies in coming to a quick and cost-effective solution to their financial difficulties.
4.4.2 Part B - Proposals
In terms of section 155(3)(b), Part B must include at least the following:
(i) The “nature and duration of any proposed debt moratorium”. This is one of the
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 The board may take a resolution to issue authorised shares without having to obtain the approval760
of shareholders (s 38(1)), unless the shares are issued to a current or future director or prescribed
officer of the company, to a person related to the company, a director or prescribed officer of the
company, or to a nominee of any of these persons, in which case approval by special resolution of the
shareholders is required (s 41(1)). This approval is also required if shares will be issued that carry
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identified as one of its major weaknesses, since they are not bound by the plan and their refusal to give
their consent where required could undermine the process: see Chapter 4, part 2.8.1. In England, by
contrast, provision is made for the approval of a company voluntary arrangement by creditors and
members, irrespective of whether the rights of members will be directly affected, and members are
bound by any voluntary arrangement approved by creditors: see Chapter 3, part 3.5.4. 
 Section 114(1).761
 Section 115(2)(a).762
important ways in which a compromise can assist in giving a company some time
to overcome its difficulties. In most cases, however, this would probably have to
be combined with at least a partial discharge of debts. 
(ii) The “extent to which the company is to be released from the payment of its
debts, and the extent to which any debt is proposed to be converted to equity in
the company, or another company”. In most compromises at least one of these
two measures will be found but since this compromise, unlike the section 311
compromise of the Companies Act of 1973, does not provide for the possible
inclusion of shareholders in the process, any proposal for the conversion of debt
to equity will have to be made subject to the condition that the requirements for
the issue of these shares can be fulfilled.  It is regrettable that the drafters of760
this provision, when deciding to exclude shareholders from the procedure, did not
consider the difficulties it may present if shareholders are not bound. The
scheme of arrangement with shareholders created in section 114 is not
applicable to a company in liquidation.  Since the scheme of arrangement with761
shareholders also requires approval by a special resolution,  there does not762
appear to be any advantage in following this procedure, even if it were possible,
to obtain the necessary approval of shareholders in cases where it is required for
a compromise to become effective. 
(iii) The “treatment of contracts and [the] ongoing role of the company”. The reason for
the first part of this item is impossible to explain. Firstly, it is unclear why contracts
should be separated from other liabilities of the company. If the company is unable
to effect payment or any other performance in full, the compromise offer should
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surely include some provision such as the partial discharge or moratorium in
respect of this obligation just like any other liability. If the company is in liquidation,
the compromise will almost certainly provide for the discharge of the winding-up
order if the compromise is approved. In such a case, the company will continue to
be bound to perform in terms of uncompleted contracts except to the extent that the
compromise specifically provides for a moratorium or a discharge of part of the
payment or performance by the company. Neither the liquidator nor, after discharge
of the winding-up order, the directors, have the right to cancel or suspend any
contracts, and the company will be liable for damages for breach of contract if it
does. If the company is not in liquidation, the same principles apply. It would
therefore be extremely shortsighted not to include the liabilities or obligations under
uncompleted contracts in any proposal for a discharge or moratorium.
The requirement that the ongoing role of the company must be explained,
presumably applies to a company that is in liquidation and whether it intends applying
for a discharge of the winding-up order, although this is not specifically allowed as is
presently done by section 311(4) of the Companies Act of 1973. It is unclear what
could be intended in the case of a company that is not in liquidation and probably
enters into a compromise in order to continue trading. The future of the company will
surely become clear from the important part of the proposal dealing with obligations
to the creditors and how these will be met. 
(iv) The property of the company that will be made available for the payment of
creditors’ claims. Considering the fact that the compromise will usually contain
a proposal for the payment of a specified portion or percentage of each claim, it
seems unnecessary to list specific assets that will be used. Furthermore, the
proposal may be to pay from future income of the company. If specific assets are
indicated, the question arises whether the company could be forced to use
additional assets that were not listed, if the proceeds of the assets chosen for this
purpose prove not to be sufficient.
(v) The “order of preference in which the proceeds of property of the company will
be applied to pay creditors if the proposal is adopted”. Since the proposal must
already contain details of any debt moratorium, as well as what part of each
claim will be paid, this seems an unnecessary duplication. 
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 Section 155(3)(c)(i).763
 Section 112(2)(a). The provisions of the Act in this regard are not excluded by ss 112(1) and764
115(1)(a)(ii) as in the case of a business rescue plan.
 Section 155(3)(c)(ii) uses the word “plan”, clearly illustrating that the drafters simply carried over this765
provision from those regulating the contents of the business rescue plan without much thought going
into whether it was appropriate or not.
(vi) The benefits (for creditors) of adopting the proposal as opposed to the benefits
that creditors would receive if the company were placed in liquidation. As pointed
out before, however, the company may already be in liquidation, and the wording
should reflect this possibility. 
 
4.4.3 Part C - Assumptions and conditions
In terms of section 155(3)(c), Part C must include at least the following:
(i) A statement of any conditions that must be satisfied for the proposal to come into
operation and be fully implemented.  This is where any approval of763
shareholders, if required, for the issue of authorised shares or for the sale of their
shares would have to be stipulated. Should the proposal provide for a sale by the
company of all or the greater part of its assets or undertaking, the approval of
shareholders by a special resolution will also be required and will have to be
mentioned here.  The question could of course be asked whether creditors will764
approve a compromise if it is subject to conditions that may not be fulfilled. The
board would probably have to ensure that these conditions will be fulfilled before
approaching the creditors with their proposals.
(ii) Any effect that the plan  may have on the number of employees, as well as on765
their terms and conditions of employment. The reason for this requirement is
almost impossible to establish. It is difficult to see how a compromise or
agreement between the company and its creditors would be able to influence the
number of employees or alter their terms and conditions of employment. Any
retrenchments or transfer of employment contracts resulting from a sale of the
business or its assets will be determined by the provisions of labour legislation,
and most certainly not by the compromise. Furthermore, no compromise could
have any direct effect on the terms or conditions of employment of employees,
since negotiations and agreement to any such amendments would also have to
be conducted in terms of labour legislation. This provision is not only completely
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 See part 3.8.2.3 above.767
 Section155(5).768
unnecessary but also displays a lack of any real consideration of or attention to
the effect that a compromise could possibly have on employees.
(iii) A “projected balance sheet for the company ... and a statement of income and
expenses for the [next] three years, prepared on the assumption that the
proposal is accepted”. Both these documents “must include a notice of any
significant assumptions on which the projections are based” and “may include
alternative projections based on varying assumptions and contingencies”.  In766
the absence of a proper explanatory report, this requirement seems to be
completely unnecessary and all the objections raised in respect of this
requirement for a business rescue plan  apply with even more force in this767
instance. Apart from the guesswork and expenses required to compile these
documents, the inevitable question is why creditors should be interested in these
fairly unreliable figures, for a period of three years in the future, when they agree
to accept a reduced or late payment of their claims which, once paid, would
terminate their relationship with the company. 
4.4.4 Certificate
A proposal for a compromise “must conclude with a certificate by an authorised
director or prescribed officer of the company stating that any ... factual information
provided [in the proposal] appears to be accurate, complete, and up to date, [while]
projections provided are estimates made in good faith on the basis of factual
information and assumptions as set out in the statement”.  In the case of a company768
that is being wound up, it must be assumed that the liquidator will be the appropriate
person to sign the certificate, although it is not mentioned in this provision.
 
4.5 Procedure
4.5.1 Notice of proposal
A copy of the proposal and notice of a meeting to consider the proposal must be
delivered by the liquidator or board of directors proposing the arrangement or
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 Although it is more usual to include only creditors whose names and addresses are known (as in769
s 147(2) in respect of business rescue proceedings), s 155(2) specifically uses the word “or” and it must
be assumed that it will be the duty of the person making the proposal to trace a creditor of whom only
the name or address is known; unless, of course, this is merely a negligent drafting error.
 Section 155(2).770
 Section 155(6).771
 This inference is supported by s 145(4)(a), which applies to the whole of Chapter 6 of the Act (in772
terms of s 128(1)(j)) and in terms of which secured and unsecured creditors have voting rights based
on the full value of their claim. 
 Section 155(7) provides that the court may take into consideration the number of creditors “of any773
affected class” who voted in favour of the proposal.
compromise, to every creditor of the company or every member of the relevant class
of creditors whose name or  address is known to, or can reasonably be obtained by,769
the company and to the Commission.  There is no indication of how long before the770
meeting this notice should be delivered, and it remains to be seen whether some
courts will refuse to sanction the proposal because creditors were not given sufficient
prior notice. 
 
4.5.2 Adoption of the proposal 
A proposal will have been validly adopted by the creditors of the company or the
members of the relevant class of creditors, if it is approved by a majority in number,
representing at least 75 per cent in value of the creditors or class of creditors, present
and voting in person or by proxy at the meeting called for that purpose.771
No distinction is made here between secured, preferent and concurrent creditors.
This means that all creditors have the right to vote on the full value of their claims,
including the secured parts of their claims.  However, it is not clear whether this772
means that the rights of secured and preferent creditors may also be amended by a
general compromise applicable to all creditors. Since section 155(2) provides for a
proposal to all the creditors of the company, it must be assumed that it is indeed
possible. This raises the question whether voting must take place separately in each
class of creditors where secured and unsecured creditors are involved. There is
nothing in the relevant provisions that indicates such a requirement, because the
references to meetings of a class of creditors appear to refer to instances where the
proposal is made only to a class of creditors and not to all creditors.  This is a most773
unsatisfactory situation since it is an accepted principle that the rights of secured
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 See Chapter 3, part 3.8 regarding the situation in England where secured creditors are expressly774
excluded from voting with other creditors on a company voluntary arrangement, but their rights may
only be affected by the company voluntary arrangement if they consent individually. 
 Section 155(7)(a).775
 See part 4.5.4 below.776
 Section 155(7)(b).777
 Section 155(7)(b)(i).778
 Section 155(7)(b)(ii).779
creditors may not be amended without their specific consent.  On the other hand,774
it is also patently unfair that a creditor whose claim is largely secured should be able
to vote on the full amount of this claim, and not only on the unsecured part, for a
substantial discharge of all unsecured claims. 
4.5.3 Approval by the court
If the proposal has been adopted by the creditors as required by section 155(6), the
company may apply to the High Court for an order approving the proposal.  The use775
of the word “may” in this provision is misleading since, judging by the stipulated effects
of sanctioning by the court,  the proposal will not be binding on the creditors or class776
of creditors, as the case may be, in spite of their formal approval by the meeting of
creditors, unless and until the proposal has been sanctioned by the court. The company
must therefore apply to court and it is unclear why the provision does not set it out as
a requirement that the company must apply to court to bind the creditors concerned. 
The court has a discretion whether to sanction the compromise contained in the
adopted proposal.  The court may do so if it considers it just and equitable, having777
regard to, firstly, “the number of creditors of any affected class of creditors, who were
present or represented at the meeting, and who voted in favour of the proposal”.778
Since no provision is made for voting by creditors in their different classes, it is
unclear whether the requirement of considering the number of creditors in an affected
class refers to those instances where only one class of creditors will be affected, or
whether this fairly vague provision should be interpreted to mean that separate voting
must take place if more than one class of creditors is involved. 
The second factor to be taken into account by the court applies only to a
compromise in respect of a company being wound up. In such a case, the court must
also consider the report of the Master which is required by the provisions regulating
the liquidation of companies.  This provision refers to the report that the Master may779
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 In terms of s 346(4)(b) of the Companies Act of 1973, which will, in terms of item 9 of Schedule 5780
to the Companies Act of 2008, continue to apply to insolvent liquidations after the last-mentioned Act
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 See Meskin et al Henochsberg at 603-605 and the cases referred to there; Blackman et al Companies781
Act at 12–18 -12–30; and generally, Delport “Section 311”; Delport “Insolvente Maatskappye”.
 See Chapter 3, part 3.5.5.782
file with the court after being notified of the application for liquidation, in which any
facts of which he has become aware and which may justify the postponement of the
hearing or dismissal of the application by the court are disclosed.  Exactly what it780
is that the court should look for in this report that would render the proposal just and
equitable (or not), remains a mystery. 
It is regrettable that the legislature found it necessary to retain the requirement of
approval by the court, as it will not only add unnecessary costs and time to the
procedure, but will almost certainly lead to complications as courts attach differing
interpretations to the very vague requirement of just and equitable. The history of the
complications and problems caused in the section 311 procedure as a result of courts
differing in their interpretation of what the procedure entailed and required is well known
and could now repeat itself.  Since the court is no longer approached before a meeting781
is held, the directors or liquidator will find out whether the proposals are acceptable to
the court only after the relevant meeting for approval has been held and substantial
costs have been incurred. It will also be too late to amend the proposals to make them
acceptable to the court. The whole process would have to be started afresh while, as
already stated, the company is not protected by any moratorium against enforcement
action by creditors who are now fully aware of the company’s financial difficulties. 
It is not clear why the sanction of the court should be required to make an
agreement reached between a substantial majority of affected creditors and the
company, binding on the parties. The publicity caused by the application will also be
detrimental to the reputation and creditworthiness of the company, and what could have
been an informal, inexpensive and fast out-of-court settlement between the company
and its creditors, or some of them, has now been turned into an onerous and
cumbersome procedure which will probably be inaccessible to smaller companies. 
The legislature would have been well advised to follow the example of the English
legislation in respect of company voluntary arrangements, where the court becomes
involved only if the approval by creditors is challenged on one of the specified grounds.782
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 Section 155(8)(b) read with ss 24 and 25.784
 The use of the word “of” is slightly misleading, since it could also mean a surety who guaranteed785
payment by a debtor to the company. The word “for”, as presently used in s 311(3) of the Companies
Act of 1973, would have made the meaning clearer. 
 Section 155(9).786
 4.5.4 Effects of approval
If the compromise is sanctioned by the court, the company must file a copy of the
order with the Commission within five business days.  A copy of the order must also783
be attached to each copy of the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation that is kept
at the company’s registered office or at another location where the company’s
records are kept if not at its registered office.  Although it is the contents of the784
compromise that are of importance, these requirements refer to a copy of the order
sanctioning the compromise that must be filed and attached to the Memorandum of
Incorporation. It is unlikely that the compromise will be included in the order, and in
most cases it will be referred to as an annexure to the order. It would have been
preferable for these provisions to have made it clear that both a copy of the
compromise and of the sanctioning order are included. 
Section 155(8)(c) repeats this mistake by providing that the order of court
sanctioning a compromise is final and binding on all the company’s creditors or all
members of the relevant class of creditors, as the case may be, from the date on
which the copy of the order is filed. In reality it is the compromise that is binding after
sanctioning by the court, and not the order itself, which is meaningless without
reference to the compromise. Although the meaning of the provision is clear, that
does not detract from the fact that the wording is patently incorrect.
The liability of any person who is a surety of  the company is not affected by a785
compromise approved and sanctioned in terms of section 155.786
 
4.6 Evaluation of compromise in the Companies Act of 2008 
Whatever the intention behind the drafting of the new compromise provisions may have
been – whether to merely simplify the existing procedure in terms of section 311 of the
Companies Act of 1973, or to create a new and more informal procedure as an
alternative to the formal business rescue proceedings – the final result is not impressive.
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The new provisions perpetuate the weaknesses of section 311 by failing to
provide for any moratorium and continuing to require involvement by the court.
Instead of creating an improvement on the current procedure, the new compromise
achieves the opposite by an almost mindless copying of most of the requirements for
a business rescue plan, without any clear basis for setting these detailed
requirements. The very specific and detailed information required will almost certainly
make the procedure costly. On the other hand, important information such as whether
the compromise is (or is even allowed to be) made subject to the condition that an
existing provisional winding-up order will be discharged, or how and when the
procedure will end, the circumstances that make it necessary to enter into a
compromise or the real advantages for creditors, is not required. In spite of having
the company voluntary arrangement in England as an example of what is necessary
and what should be avoided in the provisions regulating such a procedure, the
drafters seemingly chose not to make use of this opportunity. 
It is unlikely that the new compromise will be as popular as its predecessor,
particularly since its contents are so strictly prescribed that it will not be as adaptable
or flexible as the section 311 compromise. The many uncertainties, particularly those
pertaining to the rights of secured creditors, and the exclusion of shareholders, will
also prevent the compromise from finding general acceptance. We are effectively left
worse off than before because we now have two procedures, one for effecting a
scheme of arrangement with creditors, and another for a compromise with
shareholders, which are both deficient. The compromise with creditors is not quite an
out-of-court procedure as it should ideally have been, and excludes shareholders
whose cooperation may be essential in some cases, while the scheme of
arrangement with shareholders excludes creditors but does not require approval by
the court except on application by a person who voted against it.  The last-787
mentioned option is what should have been provided in the procedure for a
compromise with creditors since it would have granted an adequate remedy for any
creditor who felt aggrieved by the majority decision of the other creditors. 
 This was the date on which the Insolvency Act 1985 (c 65) was to have been fully brought into force1
by the Insolvency Act 1985 (Commencement No 5) Order 1986 (SI 1986/1924). However, the
Insolvency Act 1986 replaced the Insolvency Act 1985 before the latter fully came into effect. The
Insolvency Act 1986 consolidated most of the provisions of the Insolvency Act 1985 with the provisions
relating to corporate insolvency contained in the Companies Act 1985, giving effect to the
recommendation of the Cork Report that there should be a consolidated Act regulating both individual
and corporate insolvency: Fletcher Insolvency at 19-21. However, as Fletcher points out (at 22), the
traditional distinction between corporate insolvency law and personal insolvency law remains.
 The history and terms of reference of this Committee are discussed in detail in Fletcher Insolvency2
at 16-19. 
 Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice Cmnd 8558 (1982), hereafter3
referred to as the Cork Report as it is commonly known. 
 Paragraph 496.4
 The appointment of a receiver or receiver and manager is a remedy available to a company’s5
debenture holder or mortgagee whose loan is secured by either a fixed charge over specific assets of
the company or by floating charge over fluctuating assets such as goodwill and cash: Fletcher
Insolvency at 417-419; Palmer par 14.101ff. In an effort to clarify the many obscurities in this area of
the law, s 29(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986 also created a special category of receiver, the
administrative receiver, defined in the Act as a receiver or manager of all (or substantially all) the
property of a company who is appointed by or on behalf of the holders of any debentures of the
company secured by a floating charge. Receivers who did not fall under this definition were largely
unaffected by the Insolvency Act 1986 but had far less powers than administrative receivers. However,
see footnotes 17 and 64 below for the effects of the Enterprise Act 2002 (c 40) on the power to appoint
administrative receivers.
CHAPTER 3
ENGLAND
1 INTRODUCTION
The Insolvency Act 1986 (c 45) presently regulating insolvency law in England came
into effect on 29 December 1986.  This Act was the result of an in-depth investigation1
into insolvency law that began in 1977 with the appointment of a committee to
undertake a complete review of insolvency law, including corporate insolvency law.2
The Insolvency Law Review Committee under the chairmanship of Sir Kenneth Cork
submitted its report containing recommendations for many radical changes in English
insolvency law to Parliament in 1982.  3
The Cork Report expressed the opinion that in many cases insolvent companies
that could have been rescued had been forced into liquidation because no proper rescue
procedure was available to them,  particularly where such companies had no floating4
charges and the appointment of a receiver and manager was thus not an option.  In the5
Cork Report one of the main objects of their proposals that the Committee identified was
to encourage the continuation and disposal of a debtor’s business as a going concern,
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 Paragraph 1980(2) of the Cork Report.6
 Paragraph 499 stated that although these proposals were primarily designed for corporate debtors, the7
intention was not to limit the procedure to companies. The Insolvency Act 1986, however, only refers to a
“company” in the sections dealing with administration: see the discussion under part 2.2. below.
 Paragraph 497.8
 Fletcher Insolvency at 515; Palmer par 14.004.9
 Fletcher Insolvency at 22; Palmer par 14.004. Statistics for the period 1996 to 2002 indicate that10
liquidation was used in the vast majority of corporate insolvency cases and administration was used
the least: Parry “Administrative Receivership and Administration” at 148-149. 
 Fletcher Insolvency at 515; Palmer par 14.003. Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 341 point out11
that although many commentators were pessimistic about administration’s chances of being effective before
the administration procedure was brought into force, many administration orders were actually made every
year from the time the Insolvency Act 1986 came into operation in December 1986. 
 In terms of the original Rule 2.2 of the Insolvency Rules 1986 (SI 1986/1925), and preferably prepared by12
a qualified insolvency practitioner. Although such a report was not compulsory, the original Rule 2.3(6)
required an explanation should a report not be available. In Re Newport County Association Football Club
Ltd [1987] 3 BCC 635 Harman J stressed the importance of such a report and the influence it had on the
court’s decision whether to grant an administration order or not, while in Re W F Fearman Ltd [1988] 4 BCC
139 the application was denied because of the absence of an independent report. The reports became so
elaborate and thus expensive that on 17 January 1994 the Chancery Division issued the Practice Note
(Administration order applications: content of independent reports) [1994] 1 W LR 160; [1994] BCC 35) in
which it was stressed that it was important not to allow high costs to frustrate the primary aim of
administration orders, namely the rescue and rehabilitation of insolvent companies. The Practice Note
therefore stated that the content of the independent report should not be unnecessarily elaborate and
detailed but should be a concise assessment of the company’s situation and its future prospects. It went on
to state that in straightforward cases a report may even be unnecessary and that in all cases
as well as the preservation of at least some of the jobs in such a business.  The report6
therefore proposed the introduction of a new procedure to assist companies7
experiencing financial difficulties by the appointment of an administrator who would have
the wide powers normally conferred upon a receiver and manager appointed under a
floating charge.  These powers would have to include the power to carry on the business8
of the company and to borrow funds for that purpose. 
This recommendation resulted in the introduction of a new formal rescue
procedure, the administration order procedure regulated by Part II of the Insolvency
Act 1986, into English law.
Although administration was used successfully in a limited number of cases,  it9
did not achieve its intended purpose of providing a practical and widely-used
company rescue procedure that would be appropriate in the various circumstances
where intervention was needed.  This was partly due to the fact that administration10
was a new and unfamiliar procedure and thus regarded with some scepticism  but11
also because the procedure itself had certain weaknesses, such as the requirement
of a detailed independent (and costly) report on the company’s affairs that had to
accompany an application for administration  and the very fact that an application12
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“disproportionate investigation and expense” should be avoided. See also Palmer par 14.006 where this
problem is confirmed. However, Frisby “Rescue Regime” at 259 avers that the costs of the report as a
deterrent to administration have been overrated, since it has become common practice for floating charge
holders to commission a so-called “Independent Business Review” by an insolvency practitioner when a
borrower shows signs of financial difficulties; the costs would thus already have been incurred by the time
an application for administration was made. 
 Goode Corporate Insolvency Law at 323 refers to this as a “major impediment” not only because it13
made the procedure expensive but also because it took too long to appoint an administrator, making
it unsuitable for cases where it was necessary for someone urgently to take control of the assets. 
 Parry “Administrative Receivership and Administration” at 146; Fletcher Insolvency at 516; Grier and14
Floyd Corporate Recovery at 6. This is also one of the main criticisms against judicial management:
see Chapter 2, part 2.1. 
 The Executive Agency of the Department of Trade and Industry (now the Department for Business,15
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform) is responsible for the administration of insolvency law in England
(and W ales). A full explanation of the purpose and role of the Insolvency Service can be found on its
website at <http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/aboutus/aboutusmenu.htm> accessed on 17 February 2010.
 Insolvency Service Productivity and Enterprise: Insolvency – A Second Chance Cm 5234 (July16
2001). In an earlier Consultative Document (Company Voluntary Arrangements and Administration
Orders) published in 1993, the Insolvency Service identified five reasons for the failure of administration
to become widely used, namely time and costs, secured creditors’ right of veto, administrator’s power
to remove directors, obligatory report on directors’ conduct and concern by unsecured creditors that
they are being ignored: Grier and Floyd Corporate Recovery at 213. 
 The rectification of some weaknesses in the administration procedure itself, particularly the high costs17
involved, was only part of the reason for the reforms. Interestingly enough, the reforms were also necessary
to limit the power of the holders of floating charges to appoint receivers – the very procedure on which
administration had been based – because the appointment of an administrative receiver (see fn 5 above)
precluded a company from being placed in administration and thus became a major inhibiting factor
preventing administration from becoming the popular and successful corporate rescue regime that the
government had hoped for: Parry “Administrative Receivership and Administration” at 145-147. In the first
12 years, the number of administrative receiverships per year far outnumbered that of administration orders,
with an average of 172 administration orders per year in the first ten years (the highest number reached was
211 in 1990 compared to 4,318 administrative receiverships in the same year), only marginally increasing
to 440 in 1999 and 438 in 2000: Palmer par 14.004. Receiverships totalled 1,618 and 1,595 respectively in
those years: Parry “Administration Orders” at 59. There was also a general perception that secured creditors,
more specifically the banks, too easily put troubled companies into receivership, to the detriment of
unsecured creditors and enterprise in general: Finch “Corporate Rescue” at 527. See further fn 65 below
on the effect of the reforms on administrative receivership. 
 Section 248(1) of the Enterprise Act 2002 substituted Part II of the Insolvency Act 1986 for a new Part II.18
Section 8 in the new Part II provides that Schedule B1 which was inserted into the Insolvency Act 1986 by
s 248(2) of the Enterprise Act 2002, shall regulate administration orders. However, the previous provisions
to court was the only way to have an administrator appointed.  The administration13
order procedure was thus criticised for being cumbersome and expensive, the latter
in particular making it unsuitable for small to medium-sized companies.  14
In July 2001, the Insolvency Service  published a White Paper  setting out the15 16
need for some reforms to the administration procedure.  This was followed by the17
Enterprise Act 2002 (c 40), which, with effect from 15 September 2003, substantially
replaced those provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986 regulating the administration
procedure. Administration is now regulated by the provisions contained in Schedule
B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 as inserted by the Enterprise Act 2002.  Although18
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regulating administration orders (including the original version of Part 2 of the Insolvency Rules 1986) still
apply to petitions for administration orders presented to court before 15 September 2003 (the date on which
the Enterprise Act 2002 came into effect) as well as some entities to which the new procedure does not
apply. These provisions will thus be referred to as the “original” provisions where it is necessary to refer to
them. References to the Insolvency Rules must be taken to refer to the Insolvency Rules 1986 as amended
by the Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2003 (SI 2003/1730) and several other subsequent statutory
instruments, unless otherwise stated. 
 Lightman and Moss Administrators par 1-017; Palmer par 14.008.19
 Paragraph 400ff.20
 In par 366ff.21
 Paragraph 430.22
 Containing ss 1-7, which replaced ss 20-26 of the Insolvency Act 1985.23
 Rutstein “Corporate Failure” at 72 based this view on the fact that a voluntary arrangement allows24
a company to propose what is essentially a commercial deal to its creditors to pay them later or less
or both. 
 Fletcher Insolvency at 516; Palmer par 14.403; Broc “Company Voluntary Arrangements” at 177. 25
some of the more radical recommendations contained in the White Paper had to be
abandoned after strong opposition from some sectors, the Enterprise Act 2002
effectively relaunched the administration procedure.  19
The Cork Report further drew attention to the lack of a procedure whereby a
company could effect an out-of-court, formal and binding composition with its
creditors, and the fact that the available procedures, particularly the court-sanctioned
arrangement between a company and its creditors, were lengthy, involved and
costly.  The Committee could see no reason why a procedure similar to the one it20
proposed for an individual insolvent debtor to enter into a voluntary arrangement with
his creditors,  should not be available to companies as well. The Committee believed21
that the speed and simplicity of such a procedure, as well as the fact that there was
no obligation to go to court, would prove to be of great value to small companies in
particular.  The result of this recommendation was the new company voluntary22
arrangement procedure regulated by Part I of the Insolvency Act 1986.  23
Once again, although on paper it appeared to be an attractive proposition,  the new24
procedure did not prove to be as popular as had been hoped or anticipated, not even
during the severe recession in the British economy between 1989 and 1993 when there
was a sharp increase in the number of company failures. Statistically, company voluntary
arrangements were shown to be even less attractive in practice than administration.25
This could be ascribed primarily to one reason: there was no provision in the Act for a
moratorium to prevent creditors from enforcing their claims while the proposal was still
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 Broc “Company Voluntary Arrangements” at 183; Fletcher Insolvency at 517; Palmer par 14.404;26
Sealy and Milman Insolvency Legislation at 19; Grier and Floyd Corporate Recovery at 155. 
 Stevens “Report for England” at 203.27
 Apparently some practitioners suggested that a petition for administration should be filed in such a case28
to create the automatic moratorium under s 10 of the original provisions and the hearing then be postponed
until after the creditors had met to consider the voluntary arrangement proposal. If the proposal was adopted,
the court could then be requested to dismiss the application: Grier and Floyd Corporate Recovery at 156.
This would obviously have amounted to an abuse of the process, a view shared by Sealy and Milman
Insolvency Legislation (2004) at 20 that labelled such a petition “probably ... improper” and “unwise”. 
 Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 191.29
 Sections 1 and 2 and Schedules 1 and 2. These provisions were based on proposals contained in30
a Consultative Document issued by the Insolvency Service in April 1995 entitled Revised Proposals
for a New Company Voluntary Arrangement Procedure: Fletcher Insolvency at 480. After the Labour
Government came into power in 1997 a decisive policy of promoting a rescue culture was followed,
resulting in a Consultation Document: A Review of Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction
Mechanisms in September 1999. See further parts 3.1 and 3.6 below.
 Sealy and Milman Insolvency Legislation at 19. See part 3.6.1 below on renewed efforts to increase31
the use of company voluntary arrangements by extending the option of a moratorium to all companies.
 Regular updates on the progress made in the modernisation and consolidation project are posted32
on the official Insolvency Service website at <http://www.insolvency.gov.uk>.
being prepared and considered.  In most cases, a voluntary arrangement was thus26
combined with an administration order that supplied the required moratorium, but this
inevitably increased the costs of the procedure.  Particularly in the case of smaller27
companies, this was not a viable option because the full process of administration was
too expensive and onerous in relation to the problems that needed to be solved.  Even28
in those cases where a company considered being placed in administration with the
ultimate purpose of entering into a company voluntary arrangement, the banks often
prevented this by using their power as debenture holders to appoint an administrative
receiver – a procedure they obviously preferred.  In reaction to these deficiencies in the29
company voluntary arrangement procedure, the Insolvency Act 2000 (c 39) that came
into force on 1 January 2003 included several provisions  aimed at removing some of30
the obstacles that prevented voluntary arrangement from becoming an acceptable
alternative to administration, particularly for smaller companies.
Another factor contributing to the limited use of company voluntary arrangements
still remains, however, namely the fact that secured and preferential creditors cannot
be bound without their individual consent.31
The Insolvency Service is currently undertaking a major project aimed at
modernising and consolidating insolvency legislation.  The purpose of this project32
is to modernise terminology, remove unnecessary costs particularly in respect of
publication of notices, provide flexibility of communication by allowing delivery of
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 SI 2009/642.33
 Rule 5 of the Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2009.34
 SI 2010/18 made on 6 January 2010.35
 Both the Order and the draft Insolvency (Amendment) Rules are available on the Insolvency Service36
website at <http://www.insolvency.gov.uk> accessed on 22 January 2010.
 By article 3(1) of the Order.37
 See Chapter 2, part 3.5.2.6. 38
 By article 4 of the Order.39
notices by email and the use of websites for notices to creditors, and to consolidate
much of the secondary legislation relating to insolvency.
The first step in this project was the amendment of the Insolvency Rules 1986
by the Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2009  with effect from 6 April 2009. In terms33
of the new Rules, notices must be advertised in the Gazette but any further
advertising of the notices is left in the discretion of the relevant insolvency
practitioner. Furthermore, the word “forthwith” wherever it appeared in the Rules, has
been replaced with the words “as soon as reasonably practicable”.  34
The second stage of the project will be completed with the coming into force (probably
on 6 April 2010) of the Legislative Reform (Insolvency) (Miscellaneous Provisions) Order
2010  and the draft Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2010.  The first important change35 36
affecting company voluntary arrangements and administrations which the Legislative
Reform (Insolvency) (Miscellaneous Provisions) Order 2010 will make to the Insolvency Act
1986, is the introduction  of section 246A (“Remote attendance at meetings”), which will37
allow a person to attend meetings in any corporate insolvency proceedings by using any
form of technology permitting such a person to be heard and to vote at the meeting without
having to physically attend the meeting. Another amendment will be the introduction of
section 246B (“Use of websites”) that will allow an office-holder in corporate insolvency
proceedings to use a website to send documents and information during the proceedings.
It is regrettable that the drafters of the regulations in terms of the South African Companies
Act of 2008 did not take cognisance of the last-mentioned development, and still insist on
delivery of the many prescribed notices during business rescue proceedings by way of
email, registered post or fax to each person individually.38
A new section 436B will also be inserted  into the Insolvency Act 1986 to make39
it clear that any reference to documents “in writing” will include the electronic form.
Finally, all requirements in the Insolvency Act 1986 that a document must be sworn
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 Article 5 of the Order.40
 Some of the intended amendments are referred to in the discussion of the applicable Rules in this Chapter.41
 In Rule 1.24(4).42
 For example in Rule 1.32.43
 For example in Rule 1.9(2).44
 See Chapter 1, part 4 on the problems created by the many different sources of insolvency legislation45
in England.
 The document is entitled Draft Modernisation Rules Nov09 and is available at <http://www.insolvency.gov46
.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/consolidation/updateNov09.htm> accessed on 22 January 2010. Also
see part 3.6.1 below on another project of the Insolvency Service to encourage the use of company voluntary
arrangements by extending the moratorium option to all companies.
 Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 inserted by the Enterprise Act 2002. As the provisions are47
now contained in a Schedule to the Insolvency Act 1986 rather than in the main body of the Act, they
are referred to as “paragraphs” and not “sections”. 
 Paragraph 1(2)(a) of Schedule B1. 48
to by affidavit will be replaced with a requirement that the document must be verified
by a statement of truth.40
The draft Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2010 will harmonise the Insolvency
Rules 1986 with the amendments effected by the draft Order, and will modernise the
Rules by making numerous amendments to eliminate unnecessary Rules and clarify
any uncertainties.  Examples include the replacement of the word “immediately” with41
“as soon as reasonably practicable”,  replacing “affidavit” with “witness statement”42 43
and the amendment of some requirements that notices must be sent to all the
relevant persons of which the insolvency practitioner is aware, to all those of whose
claim and address he is aware.   44
The final phase of the project to modernise and consolidate insolvency legislation
will be to consolidate the Insolvency Rules by the publication of a completely new set of
Insolvency Rules together with several smaller insolvency statutory instruments.  A draft45
version of the consolidated Rules has been made available by the Insolvency Service to
illustrate the end result of what they hope to achieve with this consolidation.46
2 ADMINISTRATION
2.1 Definition and purpose
For purposes of the Insolvency Act 1986, an administrator of a company is defined
in paragraph 1  as a person appointed under Schedule B1 of the Act to manage the47
affairs, business and property of the company. A company is thus “in administration”
while the appointment of an administrator is in force  but does not cease to be so48
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 Paragraph 1(2)(d) of Schedule B1.49
 In part 2.4.2.50
 Paragraph 111 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 was amended by the Insolvency Act 198651
(Amendment) Regulations 2005 (SI 2005/879) to clarify the situation even further. Paragraph 111(1A) was
inserted containing a provision interpreting any reference to a “company” in Schedule B1 to mean (a) a
company within the meaning of s 735(1) of the Companies Act 1985; (b) a company incorporated in another
EEA State; or (c) a company not incorporated in an EEA State but having its centre of main interests (COMI)
in a member State other than Denmark. Although par 111(1A)(a) has not been amended to reflect this
change, the reference to s 735(1) should now be read as a reference to ss 1(1) and 1171 of the Companies
Act 2006 (c 46) which replaced s 735(1) from 1 October 2009: Fletcher Insolvency at 482 and 656. In terms
of s 1(1), any company formed and registered under the Companies Act 2006 or the Companies Act 1985
(c 6) would be included, as well as any company registered under the former Companies Acts and
recognised as an existing company under the Companies Act of 1985. The former Companies Acts are
listed in s 1171 and include the Companies Acts dating from the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856. The
inclusion in par 111(1A) of companies in the EEA or having their COMI in a member state was a result of
EC Council Regulation No 1346/2000 [2000] OJ L160/1 as amended, to ensure the application of uniform
rules on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement in the member states of the EU. 
 Footnote 7.52
 Paragraph 499. The administration procedure was eventually also made applicable to partnerships53
by par 6(1) of the Insolvent Partnerships Order 1994 (SI 2421 of 1994) with the relevant provisions
modified as set out in Schedule 2 to the Order, as amended by the Insolvent Partnerships
(Amendment) Order 2005 (SI2005/1516). The Limited Liability Partnership Regulations 2001 (SI
2001/1090) and subsequently the Limited Liability Partnerships (Amendment) Regulations 2005 (SI
2005/1989) also made administration, with the necessary modifications, applicable to limited liability
partnerships as from 6 April 2001. Partnerships will not be discussed here, since there are important
because of the vacation of his office by an administrator as a result of death,
resignation or otherwise or if the administrator is removed from office.  49
Administration must have one of three purposes stipulated in the Act and these
are discussed below  as part of the requirements that must be met for the50
appointment of an administrator.
2.2 Entities to which administration applies
Although contained in the Insolvency Act 1986 that regulates both individual and
corporate insolvency, the wording of the provisions dealing with administration makes it
clear that this procedure is available to companies only.  Section 8 states that Schedule51
B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 provides for “the administration of companies” and
Schedule B1 throughout refers only to companies. This is in spite of the fact that, as was
mentioned above,  the proposals for administration in the Cork Report did not limit the52
procedure to companies, although the proposals were primarily designed for corporate
debtors. The Cork Report specifically mentioned that the appointment of an administrator
could be “advantageous where a substantial business [was] being carried on by a sole
trader or in partnership”.  The size of the business, rather than its form, seemed to be53
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basic differences between the South African and English law regulating partnerships.
 Stevens “Report for England” at 228. 54
 Fletcher Insolvency at 12-15 and 22.55
 Cilliers, Benade et al Corporate Law par 2.03.56
 See Chapter 1, part 3; Chapter 2, part 3.2.57
 Section 249(1) of the Enterprise Act 2002. These are companies established and governed by the58
following statutes which provide their own special administration regimes: the W ater Industry Act 1991
(c 56); the Railways Act 1993 (c 43); the Channel Tunnel Rail Link Act 1996 (c 61); the Transport Act
2000 (c 38); the Greater London Authority Act 1999 (c 29) and the Building Societies Act 1986 (c 53).
 Paragraph 7. This does not apply to the appointment of replacement or additional administrators in59
terms of pars 90-97 and 100-103, respectively, of Schedule B1.
 Paragraph 8(1). This is subject to the power of the liquidator of a company in terms of par 38 to apply to60
court for administration of the company, discussed in part 2.3.2 below. In the case of a voluntary winding up,
certain holders of a floating charge may also apply for administration (par 8(3), read with pars 14 and 37).
 Paragraph 9(2), subject to specific exemptions not relevant to this discussion (par 9(3)).61
 Paragraph 9(1).62
 Paragraph 1(2)(b) of Schedule B1.63
the determining factor in the proposals of the Cork Committee. However, English
insolvency law has historically developed into two very distinct and substantially different
branches: corporate insolvency and individual insolvency law, and this distinction will not
be changed easily.  The existence of separate processes (such as winding up) for54
insolvent companies, although now contained in one consolidated Insolvency Act, thus
remains a distinctive feature not only of English company law but also of the company
law of other countries that closely followed England in their company law.  South Africa55
is one of these countries,  and although in more recent times there has been some56
divergence, the basic principles are still similar. This aspect should be kept in mind when
considering the development in South African law of a consolidated Insolvency Act that
would apply both to individuals and corporations.57
Six types of (mainly utility) companies are specifically excluded from the provisions
regulating the administration procedure.  An administrator may furthermore not be58
appointed for a company that is already in administration,  in liquidation,  effects or59 60
carries out contracts of insurance  or is subject to a liability for a deposit accepted in61
accordance with the Banking Act 1979 but is not an authorised deposit taker.62
2.3 Power to initiate administration 
The administration procedure commences with the appointment of an administrator
for the particular company.  There are now three ways in which a person may be63
appointed as administrator of a company: by an administration order of the court
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 Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.64
 Schedule B1. Special provisions for the appointment of an administrator by the holder of a floating65
charge over the whole or substantially the whole of the company’s property were necessitated by the
fact that the administrative receivership procedure, to which these creditors had access before, has
been abolished (with only a few very specific exceptions) by s 72A of the Enterprise Act 2002. Although
this procedure had also sometimes resulted in the rescue of a company, its main object remained to
protect the interests of one creditor – the holder of the floating charge: Parry “Administrative
Receivership and Administration” at 152-153. This specific type of secured creditor is unknown in South
African law and his power to appoint an administrator will therefore not be included in further
discussions. This decision is vindicated by Stevens “Report for England” at 228, who believes the
power of the floating charge holder to appoint an administrator to be the result of an historical accident
and doubts whether any other system of law would want to adopt this procedure. 
 Of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.66
 In part 1.67
 Paragraph 14.034.68
 This is also the view held by Fletcher Insolvency at 536. An informal unanimous assent by all the69
shareholders will also be acceptable (Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 372), but will obviously be
possible only in the case of smaller companies with relatively few shareholders. According to Lightman and
Moss Administrators par 5-047, an ordinary resolution taken at a meeting or a written resolution signed by
all shareholders is required. However, considering that an extraordinary general meeting will have to be
called at short notice, this will require consent by 95 per cent of the shareholders.
 The decision by the South African legislature to grant the power to appoint a business rescue70
practitioner only to the board of directors seems sensible and practical in the light of this comment: see
Chapter 2, part 3.3.1.
 No formal resolution at a board meeting is required, on condition that the majority are in favour of the71
decision: par 105 of Schedule B1; Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 372. 
under paragraph 10,  by the holder of a floating charge under paragraph 14  or by64 65
the company or its directors under paragraph 22.  66
2.3.1 Appointment by the company or its directors
The power to appoint an administrator without having to obtain an order of court is given
both to a company and the directors of a company by paragraph 22 of Schedule B1 to
the Insolvency Act 1986. This constitutes a major amendment to the original provisions
regulating administration in the Insolvency Act 1986 which, in all instances, required an
order of court to appoint an administrator. As explained above,  these reforms to the67
administration procedure were made in an effort to render administration more popular
and effective by reducing the costs and simplifying the process.
In my view, Palmer  is correct in pointing out that unless the articles allow the68
directors to take the decision in the name of the company, an appointment by the
company will require a resolution taken at the company’s general meeting.  The inevitable69
effects of the publicity resulting from such a meeting and the time and costs involved will
be seriously detrimental to a rescue attempt and this route is therefore unlikely to be used
very often.  In most cases the directors will therefore take such a decision.  70 71
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 Paragraph 23 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. Palmer par 14.036 refers to the necessity of72
measures to prevent “serial filings” by directors who merely want to use the moratorium without any real
intention to continue the process to its intended conclusion. It is noticeable that there is no such limitation
on how often a board may appoint a business rescue practitioner in the new South African proceedings. 
 Discussed in part 3 below.73
 Paragraph 24 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.74
 Of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.75
 Of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.76
 In terms of ss 117 and 251 of the Insolvency Act 1986 and s 1156 of the Companies Act 2006,77
jurisdiction vests in the court that has jurisdiction to wind up the company, ie the High Court and, in the
case of a company whose paid-up share capital does not exceed £120,000, in the county courts.
 Although the relevant provision does not specify this, Pennington Corporate Insolvency at 336 submits78
that the same reasoning would apply as in cases dealing with applications for winding up where it was held
that an application in the name of the company could be presented only if a resolution to this effect had been
taken by the general meeting or if the articles contained an express delegation of power to the board to apply
in the name of the company. This is confirmed by Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 352-353
referring to the case of Smith v Duke of Manchester (1883) 24 Ch D 611.
 In Re Equiticorp International Plc [1989] BCLC 597; 5 BCC 599 it was held that all the directors must apply79
or the application must be by virtue of a board resolution which would be binding on all directors. The
decision was on the original provisions which did not make this clear. The current par 12(b) of Schedule B1
to the Insolvency Act 1986 also merely refers to the power of “the directors” to apply for administration, but
par 105 now contains a provision that a reference in Schedule B1 to something done by the directors of a
company includes the same act done by a majority of the directors. This need not even be pursuant to a
formal resolution but can also be decided informally: Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 352. 
To offset the obvious risks of abuse of the process as a result of the relative
ease with which it can be initiated, an administrator may not be appointed in terms
of paragraph 22 within a period of twelve months starting on the day on which the
appointment of a previous administrator of the company ceased, if the previous
appointment had been made under this paragraph or in terms of an administration
order on application by the company or its directors.  A similar restriction regarding72
the appointment of an administrator and the period applies from the date on which
a moratorium under Schedule A1  to the Insolvency Act 1986 ends without a73
voluntary arrangement being in place or where it has ended prematurely.74
2.3.2 Appointment by order of court
An administration order is defined in paragraph 10  as “an order appointing a person75
as the administrator of a company”. In terms of paragraph 12  the application to76
court  for an administration order may be made by the company in terms of a77
resolution taken at a general meeting,  by the directors of the company,  by one or78 79
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 If the creditor’s claim is disputed, the court will not make an administration order on the basis of that80
claim unless there are special circumstances: Palmer par 14.026.
 No minimum amount is required for the debt on which the application is based, and both contingent81
and prospective creditors are expressly included by par 12(4) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act
1986. Since it would in most cases be very difficult for a creditor to prove the company’s actual inability
to pay its debts, a creditor will have to rely on deemed inability based on a statutory demand that
remains unpaid; in effect it means that the claim of the creditor will have to be for at least £750: see
further part 2.4.1 below. 
 Section 87A of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (c 43) applies under specified circumstances where82
a fine was imposed on a company. 
 Discussed in Chapter 2, part 2.3.83
 This was also true of the original s 9(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986, which expressly authorised both84
the company and the directors to apply for an administration order. 
 Paragraph 501 of the Cork Report.85
 In s 214. In terms of this section any person who is or has been a director or shadow director of a86
company that is being wound up may on the application of the liquidator be declared liable by the court
to make such contribution to the company’s assets as the court thinks proper. This section only applies
if the company has gone into insolvent liquidation and if, at some time before the liquidation, while he
was a director or shadow director, the person knew or ought to have known that there was no
reasonable prospect of the company avoiding going into insolvent liquidation and omitted to take every
reasonable and practicable step to minim ise the potential loss to the company’s creditors. For
determining the last-mentioned requirement, the general knowledge, skill and experience of the specific
director as well as that which can reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the same functions
in a company are taken into account: s 214(4). The test is therefore both objective and subjective:
Sealy and Milman Insolvency Legislation at 231. In South Africa, whereas s 424 of the Companies Act
of 1973 contains a similar provision for personal liability for debts of the company based on reckless
or fraudulent trading, the equivalent s 77(3)(b) of the Companies Act of 2008 provides only for the
directors’ liability to the company (not to creditors) for actual loss, damages or costs sustained by the
company as a result of insolvent trading, which is prohibited by s 22(1)(b). Section 218(2), however,
provides that any person who contravenes any provision of this Act is liable to any person who suffered
any loss or damage as a result of the contravention. 
 Chapter 44 of the Report. The Committee felt that it was necessary to create a liability for wrongful87
trading because the previous Act only provided for liability based on fraudulent trading which required
proof of intention and was thus rarely successful (par 1776). Liability for fraudulent trading is now
regulated by s 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
more creditors  of the company,  by the designated officer exercising the power80 81
conferred by section 87A of the Magistrates’ Court Act  or a combination of these82
persons. By making it clear that both the company itself and the directors may apply,
any uncertainty regarding the power of directors to apply without authorisation by a
general meeting, as experienced in South African law with regard to applications for
judicial management or liquidation,  has been avoided.  83 84
The Cork Committee felt very strongly that the directors of a company should
have an unfettered right to apply for an administration order.  This should be seen85
in the light of their potential liability for wrongful trading, a new concept that was also
introduced into the Insolvency Act 1986  on the recommendation of the Cork86
Report.  Placing the company in administration would be one of the obvious ways87
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 Palmer par 14.014 believes that if the company was not placed in administration directors should be88
required to show that they at least considered the possibility of administration as a way to minimise the
loss to creditors. If the courts consistently follow this approach when deciding on a director’s personal
liability for wrongful trading, this will “generate an important incentive for directors to consider
administration” or other options, such as a voluntary arrangement, before an insolvent liquidation
becomes inevitable. Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 341 declare that administration should
be considered as one of the normal measures to be taken by directors in an effort to minimise loss to
the company’s creditors and should provide directors who have done so with at least a partial defence
to a claim of wrongful trading. 
 In Chapter 45 of the Report.89
 See part 2.7.1.2 below. Also see Chapter 2, parts 3.7.1.2.2 and 3.7.1.2.3 on similar provisions in the90
Companies Act of 2008 which do not, however, provide for any order directly disqualifying the individual
from acting as a business rescue practitioner, but only from acting as a director. 
 See part 2.3.1 above.91
 Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 342. Although a similar prohibition against out-of-court92
commencement of business rescue proceedings is found in the South African Companies Act of 2008,
neither the company nor the directors may apply to court for a business rescue order: see Chapter 2,
part 3.5.1.
 Paragraph 38(1) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.93
 W ith the approval of the court in a winding up by the court, without any approval required in a94
voluntary winding up: Schedule 4, par 5 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
 Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 339-340.95
to avoid liability for wrongful trading.  Another measure that resulted from88
recommendations contained in the Cork Report  and that should encourage89
directors to take all possible steps to rescue their company, is the Company Directors
Disqualification Act 1986 (c 46) in terms of which the director of a company that has
become insolvent can be disqualified from acting as an insolvency practitioner or
director.90
Although the directors of a company will obviously prefer to use the faster and
easier procedure for an out-of-court appointment of an administrator, an application
to court is the only way in which the company may be placed in administration after
a petition for winding up the company has been presented to court but not yet
disposed of.  The power of a company or its directors to apply to court for an91
administration order therefore still has a definite and important role.  92
An application for an administration order in respect of a company that is in
liquidation may only be made by the company’s liquidator.  Although it would be93
unusual for such an application to be made, it could be appropriate if a liquidator
wants to continue trading and obtain new business for the company in the interests
of the creditors: the power of a liquidator to carry on the business of a company  is94
limited to what may be necessary for its beneficial winding up, and does not include
seeking new business.  If the administration order is granted, any winding-up order95
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 Paragraph 38(2)(a) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.96
 Paragraph 12(5) read with s 7(4)(b). See part 3.5.3 below regarding the supervisor.97
 This was also the case under the original provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986. The proposal98
contained in par 500 of the Cork Report that an individual shareholder (or director) should have the
right to apply to court for leave to make an application for the appointment of an administrator if the
assets of the company are in jeopardy was never implemented. 
 Paragraphs 11(a) and 27(2)(a) respectively of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. 99
 Rule 2.4(1) of the Insolvency Rules.100
 Rule 2.4(2)(a) to (c) of the Insolvency Rules. The required affidavit will be replaced by a witness101
statement once the Draft Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2010 referred to in part 1 above come into effect.
 Under par 22 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.102
 Or, where no prior notice is required, the notice of appointment must contain this statement: see part103
2.5.1 below.
in respect of the company must be discharged by the court.  The supervisor of a96
company voluntary arrangement in respect of the company may also apply for an
administration order.  97
In contrast to judicial management and the new business rescue procedures in
South Africa, there are no circumstances under which one or more individual
members or shareholders of a company may apply for an administration order.  98
2.4 Requirements for administration 
2.4.1 Inability to pay debts
The first requirement for the appointment of an administrator, whether by an order
of court or by the company or its directors, is that the company is or is likely to
become unable to pay its debts.  99
In the case of an application for an administration order, the applicant must state
in his application that he believes the company to be, or likely to become, unable to
pay its debts.  The affidavit supporting the application must contain a statement of100
the financial position of the company in which the applicant specifies, to the best of
his knowledge, the assets and liabilities of the company and details of any security
known or believed to be held by creditors, as well as details of any insolvency
proceedings in relation to the company of which the applicant is aware and any other
information which the applicant believes will assist the court in making its decision.101
Where the appointment of an administrator is to be made by the company or its
directors without the intervention of the court,  the statutory declaration accompanying102
the notice of intention to appoint an administrator that is filed with the court, must contain
a specific declaration that the company is or is likely to become unable to pay its debts.103
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 Chapter 2, part 2.4.1. In respect of an application for business rescue proceedings, see Chapter 2,104
part 3.4.2 where two very problematic alternatives for “financial distress” which could be regarded as
deeming provisions are discussed. Again, no real deeming provisions have been introduced as
grounds for the commencement of business rescue proceedings.  
 The last-mentioned test is referred to as the cash flow or commercial insolvency test where the105
courts will look at the factual situation, that is, whether the company is actually not paying its
(undisputed) debts as they fall due: Goode Corporate Insolvency Law at 87 and 95-101. A company
that is still solvent but cannot pay its debts because of a cash-flow problem thus qualifies for
administration: Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 361.
 Section 123(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986; Fletcher Insolvency at 660; Goode Corporate Insolvency106
Law at 88 and 101-109.
 Corporate Insolvency Law at 88.107
 Corporate Insolvency at 338.108
By contrast with the uncertainty on the same issue in the case of judicial
management,  paragraph 111(1) of Schedule B1 provides that the phrase “unable104
to pay its debts” in this Schedule has the same meaning as in section 123 of the
Insolvency Act 1986 where the phrase is defined for the purposes of an application
for the winding up of a company. Section 123(1) of the Act provides that a company
is deemed to be unable to pay its debts if it fails to pay or secure a debt of at least
£750 within three weeks after delivery of a written demand at its registered offices,
or if execution on a judgement in favour of a creditor of the company is returned
unsatisfied or if it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the company is unable
to pay its debts as they fall due.105
Apart from the above circumstances, a company is also deemed to be unable
to pay its debts if it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the value of the
company’s assets is less than the amount of its liabilities (including prospective and
contingent liabilities) – also referred to as balance-sheet deficiency.  This ground106
is important in a company rescue attempt because it allows an application for an
administration order to be presented while the company is still able to pay its debts
as they fall due but its contingent and prospective liabilities are such that at some
stage the company’s assets will clearly be exhausted before all creditors have been
paid. Goode  points out that in most cases it would be clear that the company’s107
assets are insufficient to meet all its liabilities, but in marginal cases this test would
require some measure of judgment to estimate the amount that a purchaser would
be prepared to pay for a particular asset or assets. 
There is no provision explaining the circumstances under which a company will
be regarded as likely to become unable to pay its debts. According to Pennington,108
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 [2002] EW HC 2815 (Ch); [2003] BPIR 324.109
 Discussed in part 2.4.2 below.110
 It may thus increase the possibility of achieving the main object of administration which is to rescue111
the company as a going concern: see part 2.4.2 below.
 Chapter 2, part 2.4.1. The equivalent provision in the Companies Act of 2008 is a major112
improvement in this respect because the company’s future insolvency, albeit subject to a limited period,
constitutes grounds for commencement of business rescue proceedings: see Chapter 2, part 3.4.1.1.
 Finch “Corporate Rescue” at 548 argues that in reality administrators will aim to satisfy the banks113
rather than achieve a rescue because the banks are potential sources of future work for insolvency
practitioners and the providers of funding without which no rescue will be possible. As a result,
administrations will become more like receiverships in that they will primarily serve the interests of the
major creditors. Frisby “Rescue Regime” at 262 believes that the duty imposed on administrators may
encourage insolvency practitioners to move out of their alleged “institutional inertia” that has perhaps
prevented corporate rescue from flourishing. Creditors may enforce this duty by means of par 74 of
Schedule B1 (discussed in part 2.7.2 below). 
it would be necessary to prove a continuing deterioration in the company’s financial
situation which will result in the company’s insolvency in the not too distant future. In
Re COLT Telecom Group Plc (No 2)  it was held that the court had to be satisfied109
that it was more probable than not that the company would become unable to pay its
debts, and not merely that there was a real prospect of this happening. In
comparison to the wording used for the second requirement,  it seems that a slightly110
heavier burden of proof applies to this requirement in that the court must be satisfied
on a balance of probabilities that insolvency will occur. In spite of this, the
requirement still allows the appointment of an administrator before a company is
already commercially or factually insolvent and probably beyond rescue  – another111
major point of criticism raised against judicial management where actual and present
inability of the company to pay its debts must be proved to obtain the order.112
2.4.2 Achieving the purpose of administration  
The second requirement for administration, irrespective of the procedure by which
the administrator is appointed, is derived from paragraph 3 of Schedule B1 to the
Insolvency Act 1986, which imposes a duty on the administrator to perform his
functions with the objective of achieving the purpose of administration as stipulated
in this paragraph, subject to the interests of the company’s creditors as a whole.113
Paragraph 11(b) repeats this requirement by stipulating, as the second condition
for making an administration order, that the court must be satisfied that the
administration order is reasonably likely to achieve the purpose of administration. The
affidavit filed in support of an application for an administration order will therefore
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 In terms of Rule 2.4(2)(e) of the Insolvency Rules, which requires any information which “will assist114
the court in deciding whether to make such an order”. The statement by the administrator (Form 2.2B)
consenting to his appointment must also state that in his opinion it is reasonably likely that the purpose
of administration will be achieved.
 Paragraph 29(3)(b) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.115
 Palmer par 14.034.116
 The last-mentioned meaning was eventually accepted by the courts as the correct one: Sealy and117
Milman Insolvency Legislation at 43; Pennington Corporate Insolvency at 342; and Farrar’s Company
Law at 688. The observation by Vinelott J in preferring the test of “a real prospect”, that a too strict
burden of proof would “stultify the Act and achieve no useful purpose”, is of particular relevance in the
context of judicial management where this is exactly what has happened: Re Primlaks (UK) Ltd [1989]
BCLC 734; (1989) 5 BCC 710.
 Chapter 2, part 2.4.3. The equivalent requirement for business rescue proceedings is far less118
onerous and also closer to the one for administration: see Chapter 2, part 3.4.1.2.
 [2008] BCC 761.119
have to contain enough information to satisfy the court on this requirement.  Where114
an administrator is appointed by the company or its directors, the prescribed
administrator’s statement that must accompany the notice of appointment contains
a statement that in the opinion of the administrator the purpose of administration is
reasonably likely to be achieved.  This unfortunately adds to the costs of the out-of-115
court procedure since a thorough and detailed investigation of the company’s affairs
is necessary before the administrator is able to form such an opinion.  116
The use of the phrase “reasonably likely to achieve” in the new provisions is
intended to resolve the judicial controversy that arose in regard to the burden of proof
required for an administration order under the original provisions. The original section
8(1)(b) contained a requirement that the court had to consider the making of the
administration order as “likely to achieve” one or more of the stipulated purposes. In
some judgments this was interpreted to mean “on a balance of probabilities” or “more
likely than not”, while in others it was held to require the lesser burden of proof of
“reasonably likely” or merely “a real prospect”.  Although the new wording still117
requires more than the mere possibility that administration will achieve its intended
purpose, the requirement is not as onerous as the heavy burden of proof that an
applicant for judicial management has to discharge in proving a reasonable
probability that it will be successful.  In Auto Management Services Ltd v Oracle118
Fleet UK Ltd  the Chancery Division once again explained that the court did not119
have to be satisfied that on a balance of probabilities the purpose would be achieved,
but only that there was a reasonable prospect.
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 The purposes as set out in the original s 8(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986 were (i) the survival of the120
company and the whole or any part of its undertaking as a going concern, (ii) the approval of a
voluntary arrangement under the Act, (iii) the sanctioning of a compromise or arrangement under s 425
of the Companies Act 1985 (now s 895 of the Companies Act 2006) and (iv) a more advantageous
realisation of the company’s assets than would be effected on a winding up. The Cork Committee
recommended another purpose – carrying on business for the public interest (par 498) – but this was
never included in the Act.
 Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.121
 Paragraph 111(1) of Schedule B1 provides that any reference in this Schedule to the purpose of122
administration means an objective specified in par 3. It is submitted that whenever there is a reference
to the “purpose” of administration, all or any of the three stated objectives are thus included. Under the
original s 8(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986 the specific purpose or purposes for which it was made had
to be disclosed in the administration order. 
 Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 345.123
 Paragraph 3(1)(a).124
 Chapter 2, part 2.4.3.125
 Stevens “Report for England” at 206 refers to this change as “regrettable”. Sealy and Milman126
Insolvency Legislation at 504 holds a contrary view, namely that the insistence on a rescue of the
company and not just its business could make it easier for an administrator to conclude that this
objective is not reasonably practicable and to pursue the second statutory objective (a better result for
creditors, discussed in part 2.4.2.2 below). 
By contrast with the original provisions which contained four purposes of an
administration order that were placed on an equal footing and from which one or
more had to be selected by the applicant,  paragraph 3(1)  sets out three120 121
objectives in a clear hierarchy, although all under the heading to paragraph 3:
“Purpose of administration”.  The choice of which purpose to pursue rests solely122
with the administrator and it is unlikely that a court would interfere with his decision
unless it can be proved that the decision was made in bad faith or irrationally.  123
2.4.2.1 Rescue of the company as going concern
The first and main objective of administration that an administrator must pursue is to
rescue the company as a going concern.  From the wording it is clear that the124
survival of the company entity is envisaged, and not just the business or part of it.
The criticism levelled against judicial management because it does not provide for
the rescue of a company’s business or a viable part of its business only, but requires
a rescue of the corporate entity as well,  would thus also apply here and the change125
has in fact been criticised.  However, it is important to note that although statistics126
in England indicated that it was more usual for the business of a company to be
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 Statistics released by the R3 Association of Business Recovery Professionals in their report for the period127
January 2002 to June 2003 Corporate Insolvency in the UK – 12  Survey indicated that in 59 per cent ofth
rescue procedures the entire business of the company was saved through a sale as a going concern.
 Lightman and Moss Administrators par 5-012 (fn 18) refers to the fact that the government was not128
prepared to amend the provision to focus on the rescue of the underlying business rather than the company,
in spite of intensive lobbying by the Association of Business Recovery Professionals and others. 
 Parry Corporate Rescue at 38.129
 Parry “Administrative Receivership and Administration” at 163. Goode Corporate Insolvency Law130
at 335-336 puts it somewhat differently: confirming that the phrase “as a going concern” was added
at a later stage to make the government’s policy clear, he interprets it to mean that it was not the empty
shell of the company that should be rescued but the company with at least a substantial part of its
business intact.
 Paragraph 60 of Schedule B1 and Schedule 1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.131
 Section 434(1) of the Companies Act of 1973. The Companies Act of 2008 has widened this power132
by authorising the company (not the business rescue practitioner) to dispose of company assets in the
ordinary course of its business, or in a bona fide transaction with the prior approval of the business
rescue practitioner, or as part of an approved business rescue plan (s 134(1)(a)). A disposal of all or
the greater part of the company’s assets will also not require the approval of the shareholders if it is
done in terms of a business rescue plan: s 112(1)(a).  
 Frisby “Rescue Regime” at 264-265 draws attention to the importance of the use of the word “thinks” that133
emphasises the administrator’s subjective and thus almost unassailable opinion in this regard, possibly even
irrespective of whether he has reasonable grounds for this belief. Palmer par 14.021 also expresses the
opinion that the use of such “inexact” expressions as “thinks” and “reasonably practicable” is likely to become
grounds for future challenges of an administrator’s choice of an alternative objective. 
saved than the company itself,  the wording of this provision was deliberate.  It127 128
was argued that there would be little incentive for directors to initiate a rescue by way
of administration if the rescue of the business and not the company itself was the
objective, and the purpose of the Act would thus be defeated.  However, the129
addition of the words “as a going concern” was intended to make it clear that it is the
business that is of value and should be saved where possible, even if it means
stripping the company to an empty shell.  This is made possible by the power of the130
administrator, among other things, to sell or otherwise dispose of the property of the
company.  A judicial manager, on the other hand, is specifically prohibited from131
selling or otherwise disposing of any of the company’s assets without the leave of the
court unless it is in the ordinary course of the company’s business.  132
2.4.2.2 Better result for creditors
Contrary to the situation in judicial management, the rescue of the company is not
the only objective that the administrator is allowed to pursue. If the administrator
thinks  either that it is not reasonably practicable to rescue the company as a going133
concern or that the second objective of administration would achieve a better result
for the company’s creditors as a whole, he may perform his functions with that
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 Paragraphs 3(1)(b) and 3(3)(a) and (b). According to Goode Corporate Insolvency Law at 327, the134
vast majority of administrations have in practice achieved this purpose. 
 Gower at 848; Palmer par 14.021, who regards it as significant that there is no reference to the135
interests of shareholders or employees. According to Parry “Administrative Receivership and
Administration” at 162, this provision also ensures that an administrator will not be obliged to attempt
a rescue of a company that is beyond salvage. 
 Chapter 2, part 2.4.3. However, see Chapter 2, part 3.1 regarding the inclusion of a better return for136
creditors (and shareholders!) as a secondary purpose in the definition of “business rescue” in s
128(1)(b) of the Companies Act of 2008.  
 Pennington Corporate Insolvency at 306-307.137
 Of the three objectives listed under the purpose of administration in par 3(1) of Schedule B1 to the138
Insolvency Act 1986.
 The administrator would, however, require the approval of a creditors’ meeting should he decide to139
pursue another objective after his proposals have already been approved: see part 2.8.3 below. 
 Kotzé v Tulryk Bpk en Andere 1977 (3) SA 118 (T) referred to in Chapter 2, part 2.4.3.140
second objective, namely to achieve a better result for the company’s creditors than
would be likely if the company were wound up without first being in administration.134
There can be no doubt that this provision firmly places the interests of creditors first,
even before those of employees or shareholders who would benefit more from a
rescue of the company itself, in that a rescue of the corporate entity need not be
pursued if it would be to the detriment of the creditors.  By contrast, the South135
African courts have emphatically rejected a better result for creditors as a ground for
judicial management.  136
Under the original administration provisions, the viable part of a company’s business
had in practice often been transferred to a new company, and the court was then
approached for a termination of the administration order, replacing it with a liquidation
order to realise any remaining assets and pay outstanding debts. In many cases the
application for an administration order therefore provided for the rescue of the company
or the more advantageous eventual winding up of the company as alternative
objectives.  As neither the administration application nor the statement of the proposed137
administrator now requires an indication of the specific objective  that will be pursued138
during administration, the administrator may under the new provisions apparently decide
to pursue the second objective even though this was not originally intended, if at any
stage during the administration he comes to the conclusion that the second objective
would be the better or more practicable option.  This would address another problem139
encountered in judicial management where the courts have refused to issue even a
provisional judicial management order to enable a judicial manager to ascertain whether
the company could be successfully rescued.140
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 Paragraph 3(4) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency141
at 345 (fn 6) refers to this duty to creditors as “window-dressing” to appease ordinary creditors and
wonders quite what practical effect it will have.
 Discussed in part 2.8.2 below.142
 Paragraph 49(2)(b) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.143
 Paragraph 26(1) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. This will give the holder of the floating144
charge an opportunity to appoint an administrator of his choice, but will not allow him to block
administration as before: Parry “Administrative Receiverships and Administration” at 161. Rule 2.20(2)
of the Insolvency Rules also requires notice to the company if the directors are making the
appointment, to the supervisor of a voluntary arrangement under Part 1 of the Insolvency Act 1986, any
sheriff known to be executing a legal process against the company and any person known to have
distrained against the company or its property. 
 Paragraph 26(3) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 and Form 2.8B.145
 Rule 2.22 of the Insolvency Rules. An ordinary resolution by the company (or an informal unanimous146
consent) seems to be all that is required: Sealy and Milman Insolvency Legislation at 516. W here the
directors intend making the appointment, the use of the word “decision” rather than the more formal
“resolution” indicates that they need not even hold a formal meeting: par 105 of Schedule B1 and Sealy
and Milman Insolvency Legislation at 516 and 563. 
2.4.2.3 Distribution to secured or preferential creditors
The third and last objective listed under the purpose of administration is that of realising
property in order to make a distribution to one or more secured or preferential creditors.
This objective may, however, only be pursued by the administrator if he thinks that it is not
reasonably practicable to achieve either of the other two objectives and he does not
unnecessarily harm the interests of the company’s creditors.  This objective can be seen141
as part of the trade-off to compensate creditors holding a floating charge over the
company’s assets for depriving them of their traditional remedy of appointing a receiver or
administrative receiver. However, the pursuit of this objective is more regulated than the
others since, where applicable, the administrator is required to explain in his administration
proposals  why he believes that the other objectives cannot be achieved.  142 143
2.5 Procedure to commence administration
2.5.1 By the company or its directors
A person who intends appointing an administrator under paragraph 22 must give at least
five business days’ prior written notice to any person entitled to appoint an administrative
receiver of the company and to any holder of a floating charge who is or may be entitled
to appoint an administrator under paragraph 14.  This notice of intention to appoint has144
to identify the proposed administrator and be in the prescribed form.  A copy of the145
company’s resolution to appoint an administrator or a record of the decision of the directors
to make such an appointment must accompany the notice.  If there are no such persons146
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 Rule 2.25 of the Insolvency Rules.147
 Paragraph 27(1) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. If there are no persons to whom notice148
has to be given, no such notice is filed with the court either.
 Discussed in part 2.4.1 above. 149
 These refer to the restrictions on the appointment of an administrator within 12 months after the150
previous appointment of an administrator or an arrangement under Schedule A1 (discussed in part
2.3.1 above) and those in terms of par 25 discussed below in this part.
 Paragraph 27(2) and (3) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 requires that this declaration151
must accompany the copy of the notice filed with the court, but it actually forms part of the notice itself
as prescribed in Form 2.8B. In terms of Rule 2.21 of the Insolvency Rules this statutory declaration may
not be made more than five business days before the notice is filed with the court.
 Paragraph 1(2)(b) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 provides that a company enters152
administration when the appointment of an administrator takes effect. Paragraph 31, in turn, provides
that the appointment of an administrator under par 22 takes effect when the requirements of par 29
are satisfied.
 Paragraph 29 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. Form 2.9B is prescribed if a notice of153
intention to appoint has been issued, and Form 2.10B if it has not because there are no persons
entitled to notice in terms of the relevant provisions. Apart from the administrator’s statement discussed
below, the other prescribed documents are a statement on their division of functions if more than one
administrator is to be appointed (in terms of par 100(2)) and the written consent of all the persons to
whom notice of the intention to appoint was given if the notice of appointment is filed less than the
prescribed five business days afterwards: Rule 2.23 of the Insolvency Rules. 
 Unless each person who was notified consents in writing to the making of the appointment: par154
28(1)(b) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. 
 Paragraph 28(2) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.155
 On Form 2.8B and made not more than five business days before filing with the court: Rule 2.21 of156
the Insolvency Rules. 
entitled to prior notice, the notice of appointment (discussed below) will include the
statements and declarations prescribed for the notice of intention to appoint and will be
accompanied by a copy of the company’s resolution or record of the directors’ decision.147
A copy of the notice of intention to appoint and its accompanying document must
also be filed with the court as soon as is reasonably practicable.  The prescribed148
notice contains a mandatory statutory declaration to be made by or on behalf of the
person who proposes to make the appointment in which it is declared that the
company is or is likely to become unable to pay its debts,  that, so far as the person149
making the statement is able to ascertain, the appointment is not prevented by
paragraphs 23 to 25  and that the company is not in liquidation.  150 151
The actual appointment of an administrator, which also signals the official commence-
ment of administration,  is done by filing the prescribed notice of appointment and other152
prescribed documents with the court  at least five business days after the required written153
notice of intention to appoint has been given  but not more than ten business days after154
a copy of this notice was filed with the court.  The notice of appointment must include a155
statutory declaration  by or on behalf of the person making the appointment stating that156
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 Paragraph 29(2) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. It is an offence to make a false157
statement under this provision without reasonably believing it to be true (par 29(7)).
 Paragraph 29(3) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 read with Rule 2.3(5) of the Insolvency158
Rules. The purpose of administration is discussed in part 2.4.2 below.
 Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.159
 Of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.160
 Paragraph 32 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.161
 Paragraph 46 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 and Rule 2.27(2) of the Insolvency Rules,162
discussed in part 2.5.2 below. He also has to gazette the notice of his appointment and advertise it in
any other manner he deems fit: Rule 2.27(1).
 In Re Blights Builders Ltd [2006] EW HC 3549(Ch); [2007] BCC 712 the uncertainty as to exactly at163
what point this is, was resolved when it was held that a petition for winding up is presented when it is
delivered to the court for issue, and not later when it is actually issued by the court. See Chapter 2, part
3.5.1.1 where a similar uncertainty in respect of the new rescue proceedings in South African law has
been created because of unclear wording. 
 This is contrary to the position in an application for an administration order where it is merely164
required that the administrative receiver and the person who appointed him, or the petitioner for winding
up (and the provisional liquidator if one has been appointed), as the case may be, should be notified
of the application (discussed in part 2.5.2 below). As explained in part 2.3.2 below, an administrator
may not be appointed for a company already in (final) liquidation, except by virtue of an order of court
he is entitled to make an appointment under paragraph 22 and that the appointment is in
accordance with Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986, and further confirming the
accuracy, as far as he is able to ascertain, of the statements and information contained in
the declaration filed with the notice of intention to appoint.  The administrator, who must157
be identified in the notice of appointment, has to provide an accompanying statement in
which he consents to his appointment, provides details of any prior professional
relationship he has had with this company and expresses his opinion that the purpose of
administration is reasonably likely to be achieved.  Paragraph 29(4)  makes it clear that158 159
the administrator is entitled to rely on information supplied by directors of the company for
his statement, unless he has reason to doubt the accuracy of this information. 
As soon as is reasonably practicable after the notice of appointment and other
prescribed documents have been filed in accordance with paragraph 29  the person160
appointing the administrator must notify him and the same persons who had to be
notified of the intention to appoint an administrator. Failure to do so without a
reasonable excuse constitutes a criminal offence.  The administrator then has to161
notify the company, its creditors and the registrar of companies of his appointment,
in the same manner as required after an administration order has been issued.162
Paragraph 25 of Schedule B1 prohibits the appointment of an administrator under
paragraph 22 if an administrative receiver of the company is in office or if a petition for the
winding up of the company has been presented  and not yet disposed of.  For obvious163 164
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on the application of the liquidator. 
 Rules 2.2(1), 2.3 and 2.4 of the Insolvency Rules. The form prescribed for the application is Form165
2.1B. The prescribed contents of both the application and the affidavit (soon to be replaced by a
witness statement as explained above) are discussed in part 2.4 above.  
 Rule 2.2(2) of the Insolvency Rules.166
 Rule 2.2(3) of the Insolvency Rules.167
 Rule 2.3(5) of the Insolvency Rules. 168
 Discussed in part 1 and fn 12 above.169
 Lightman and Moss Administrators par 5-017.170
 Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 357.171
reasons it also prohibits the appointment of an administrator if an application for an
administration order has been made and not yet disposed of.
2.5.2 By order of court
2.5.2.1 Application and supporting documents
The application for an administration order must be in the prescribed form and
accompanied by an affidavit containing the prescribed information.  The Rules are165
very specific about the persons who must make the affidavit supporting the
application in each case. If the application is to be made by the company or by the
directors, the affidavit must be made by one of the directors or the secretary of the
company.  If the application is to be made by creditors, they must authorise one166
person (who need not be one of them) to make the affidavit on their behalf.  167
The application must also be accompanied by a written statement by each of the
persons proposed to be appointed as administrator. It must contain each candidate’s
consent to the appointment, details of any prior professional relationship with the
company and his opinion that it is reasonably likely that the purpose of administration will
be achieved.  The last requirement was inserted to avoid the problem experienced168
under the original provisions where it became accepted practice to file a statement of the
company’s affairs prepared by another insolvency practitioner (because of the
requirement of a report prepared by an independent person), adding to the costs and
time spent on an administration application.  It is, however, still required that the169
proposed administrator should be objective in his assessment of the situation.  The170
courts largely rely on the evidence supplied by the prospective administrator and his
statement should contain enough information to show why other options are not
appropriate and how the administration process will be funded and managed.  171
ENGLAND-188-
 Rule 2.5 of the Insolvency Rules.172
 Paragraph 12(3) of Schedule B1.173
 Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 347 (fn 1) refers to the prevention of a “knee-jerk”174
reaction to pressure from creditors by applying for administration merely to buy time. 
 See part 2.6.1 below.175
 These are stipulated as business days by the draft Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2010. 176
 Paragraph 12(2) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986, read with Rule 2.8(1) of the Insolvency177
Rules. 
 Paragraph 12(2) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 and Rule 2.6 of the Insolvency Rules.178
Also on the list prescribed by par 12(2) and Rule 2.6 are any administrative receiver who has been
appointed, the person who appointed him and any person who is entitled to appoint an administrative
receiver. As the power to appoint an administrative receiver is now severely limited by the Insolvency
Act 1986 to only a few very special cases (mostly where administration is not applicable), they are not
important to this discussion. 
 The Cork Report (in par 502) specifically recommended that “an application for the appointment of an179
administrator should not be advertised”. This is understandable when one takes into account the serious and
damaging consequences that prior notification would probably have on the company’s ability to continue
doing business. Unfortunately, the drafters of South Africa’s business rescue provisions in the Companies
Act of 2008 do not seem to have considered this at all: see Chapter 2, part 3.5.2.1.    
The application and all supporting documents must be filed with the court which
will then determine a date for the hearing.  An application for administration may not172
be withdrawn without the permission of the court after it has been presented.  This173
is intended to discourage frivolous applications or abuse of the process  to obtain174
the advantage of the interim moratorium that operates from the presentation of the
petition to court.  175
2.5.2.2 Notification of application
The applicant must give notice of the application as soon as is reasonably practicable
after filing the application but not less than five days  before the date of the hearing.176 177
The detailed and very specific list of parties to whom notice should be given does not
include the general body of creditors nor does it include employees, but is restricted to
the company itself (if it is not the applicant), the person proposed as administrator, the
petitioner in any pending petition for winding up of the company (and the provisional
liquidator, if any), any supervisor of a voluntary arrangement under Part I of the
Insolvency Act 1986 and any person who, being the holder of a qualifying floating charge
in respect of a company’s property, is or may be entitled to appoint an administrator of
the company in terms of paragraph 14 of Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986.  178
As a result of the very limited notification required by the Act,  it is possible that179
a creditor who is unaware of the pending administration application may apply for
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 Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 351.180
 Parry Corporate Rescue at 34-35.181
 See Chapter 2, part 3.5.2.1.182
 Of the Insolvency Rules 1986.183
 The other persons on the list are an administrative receiver (if one has been appointed), any person184
who has presented a petition for the winding up of the company, the person proposed for appointment
as administrator, any holder of a floating charge who qualifies in terms of par 14 of Schedule B1 to
appoint an administrator and any supervisor of a voluntary arrangement under part I of the Insolvency
Act 1986 (discussed in part 3 below). 
 Rule 2.12(1)(k) of the Insolvency Rules.185
 Rule 2.9(1)(g) of the Insolvency Rules. 186
 Re Chelmsford City Football Club (1980) Ltd [1991] BCC 133; Sealy and Milman Insolvency187
Legislation at 45 and 721. The court did, however, allow members to appear in Re Farnborough-
winding up of the company after an application for administration has been
presented. In such a case the court will hear the administration application first so as
not to damage the company while this petition is pending, and will lean towards
granting the administration order if it has a chance of succeeding, especially as it will
become clear very early on in the administration process whether it should be
allowed to continue.180
Although this will only be allowed in very exceptional circumstances, the courts
have on occasion granted an administration order without any prior notice being
given, for example to avoid a run on a bank that was the subject of the administration
order.  In view of the comprehensive notification required by the provisions181
regulating business rescue proceedings in the Companies Act of 2008 it seems
unlikely that any South African court will believe itself to have a similar discretion,
even if it is clear that irreparable damage will be caused by the compulsory notices.182
2.5.2.3 Persons who may participate in the hearing
Rule 2.12(1)  contains a limited list of persons who may appear or be represented183
at the hearing, including the applicant, the company and one or more of the
directors.  Persons who are not included in this list – such as members and some184
secured and all unsecured creditors – may appear or be represented only with the
permission of the court if they appear to have an interest justifying their
appearance.  Under the previous, identically-worded provision,  members were185 186
not regarded as automatically having such an interest, particularly if the company
was already in, or on the verge of, insolvency, in spite of having a real interest in a
successful rescue of the company.  However, Bailey and Groves  state that it is187 188
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Aircraft.com Ltd [2002] EW HC 1224 (Ch); [2002] 2 BCLC 641. 
 Corporate Insolvency at 362, also citing Re Farnborough-Aircraft.com Ltd [2002] EW HC 1224 (Ch);188
[2002] 2 BCLC 641 as an example. 
 Paragraph 13(3) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.189
 Paragraph 13(1)(a), (b), (c), (d) and (f) respectively of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.190
 Sealy and Milman Insolvency Legislation at 48; Grier and Floyd Corporate Recovery at 24-25 and191
cases mentioned there; Parry Corporate Rescue at 42.
 Referred to in fn 12 above.192
 Sealy and Milman Insolvency Legislation at 717.193
 However, the courts in South Africa emphatically rejected the use of a provisional judicial194
management order to determine whether judicial management was appropriate: Chapter 2, part 2.5.1.
 Section 131(4)(b): see Chapter 2, part 3.5.2.5.195
normally fairly easy to convince the court to hear an interested party and an applicant
would have serious problems trying to convince the court that an interested creditor
should not be heard.
2.5.2.4 Powers of the court
Apart from granting the administration order or dismissing the application, the court
may also adjourn the hearing, make an interim order (that may restrict the exercise
of a power of the company or directors and may confer a discretion on the court or
a person qualified to act as an insolvency practitioner)  or make any other order189
which the court thinks appropriate.  The court does not have the power to appoint190
an interim administrator but may appoint an insolvency practitioner to take control of
and manage the company’s property if necessary.  However, in the Practice Note191
issued in January 1994  it was mentioned that in suitable cases the court could192
appoint an administrator but require him to report back to court within a short period
so that the court could decide whether to allow the administration to continue or
terminate it.  There is thus no provision for a provisional administration order as in193
the case of judicial management where such an order is obligatory.  No provision194
exists in the Companies Act of 2008 for a provisional order in respect of the new
business rescue proceedings, and the power of the court to make “any further
necessary and appropriate order” only applies if the application for business rescue
proceedings is dismissed.  It will therefore not include the power to make a195
provisional order either. 
The court is furthermore given the express power to treat an administration
application as a winding-up petition and make any order it has the power to make when
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 Paragraph 13(1)(e) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 which had no predecessor in the196
legislation before the Enterprise Act of 2002. Section 125(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986 provides that
on hearing a winding-up petition, the court may dismiss it, adjourn the hearing, make an interim order
or make any other order that it thinks fit, thereby giving the court the widest possible discretion. The
court used its power under par 13(1)(e) to issue a winding-up order in Re Ci4net.com Inc [2004] EW HC
1941 (Ch); [2005] BCC 277.
 Re Brooke Marine Ltd [1988] BCLC 546; Sealy and Milman Insolvency Legislation at 150-151. This197
rule is also discussed in part 2.9 dealing with the termination of administration.
 Paragraph 510 of the Cork Report recommended that the court should have jurisdiction to appoint198
an administrator if appropriate, even if there was no specific application for such an appointment. 
 Paragraph 1 of Schedule B1 states that for the purposes of the Insolvency Act 1986 an administrator199
of a company means a person “appointed under this Schedule”. The same principle applied to the
original provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986, although they did not contain a provision similar to par
1: Sealy and Milman Insolvency Legislation at 45. 
 Section 427(3) of the Companies Act of 1973 discussed in Chapter 2, part 2.4.5.200
 Such an application may, for example, be brought by an intervening creditor or the provisional201
judicial manager: Chapter 2, part 2.5.2. 
 See Chapter 2, parts 3.5.2.4 and 3.5.2.5 respectively.202
 Rule 2.14 of the Insolvency Rules.203
hearing a petition for winding up, obviously including an order for winding up.  This is196
an exception to the general rule that a winding-up order may be made only after a
petition for winding up has been presented under section 124 of the Insolvency Act
1986.  However, in spite of a recommendation in the Cork Report  that the converse197 198
should also be made possible, this has not happened: the court may not issue an
administration order when hearing a winding-up petition because the Insolvency Act
1986 makes it clear that an administrator may be appointed only under its Schedule
B1.  This is the exact opposite of the situation in judicial management where the court199
is granted the express power to issue a judicial management order where an application
for winding up is before the court.  On the other hand, South African courts are not200
authorised under the Companies Act of 1973 to issue a winding-up order when hearing
an application for judicial management, unless a proper application for the winding up
of the company is before the court.  The Companies Act of 2008 now allows a court201
to order, under appropriate circumstances, the commencement of business rescue
proceedings when hearing an application for winding up of the company and, conversely,
to order the liquidation of the company when an application for the commencement of
business rescue proceedings is before the court.   202
If an administration order is made by the court, the applicant must notify the
person appointed as administrator as soon as reasonably practicable by sending him
a sealed copy of the order.  The administrator is responsible for sending a notice203
of his appointment to the company, all its creditors (or at least those whose claims
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 Paragraph 46 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.204
 Rule 2.27 of the Insolvency Rules. 205
 Paragraph 13(2).206
 See Chapter 2, part 3.5.2.6.207
 In terms of Rule 7.47. Aggrieved persons include the company, the administrator and a creditor who208
can prove that the order is oppressive in respect of himself: Palmer par 14.029. 
 This moratorium lasted until the order was granted or the application dismissed. In the former case209
the moratorium was extended in terms of s 11.
 See part 2.6.2 below.210
 Administrators par 2-040.211
 The administrator has not been given any specific power to repudiate a contract but should this be212
necessary to promote the purpose of administration, it would be advisable to apply to court for
directions in terms of par 63: Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 398. Sections 238 and 239
of the Insolvency Act 1986, on the other hand, provide for applications to court by the administrator to
set aside transactions at an undervalue and (undue) preferences respectively. 
and addresses appear on the list he must obtain from the company) and the registrar
of companies.  The administrator is also required to advertise his appointment in204
the Gazette and may advertise it in any other way as he thinks fit.  205
Administration officially commences at the time stipulated in the order of court
appointing the administrator or, if no such time is specified, when the order for the
appointment of the administrator is made.  This is in sharp contrast to the rather206
confusing situation regarding the commencement of business rescue proceedings
in terms of the Companies Act of 2008.207
An appeal against an administration order may be lodged by any party aggrieved
at the making of the order.  208
2.6 The moratorium
Whereas the original section 10 of the Insolvency Act 1986 provided for an automatic
moratorium on most legal processes that commenced or continued against the
company as soon as an administration order was presented to the court,  the209
moratorium on insolvency proceedings and other legal processes against the
company now only commences once the company is in administration, that is, from
the moment when an administrator is appointed.  Lightman and Moss  express210 211
the opinion that although it is convenient to describe it as a moratorium, the breathing
space that the company is allowed is not an authorisation to the company to
postpone the payment of its debts  but merely a limited immunity against212
enforcement of some legal rights. It would appear as though the drafters of the
provisions regulating the new business rescue proceedings in South Africa have
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 See Chapter 2, part 3.6 and Chapter 4, part 2.6. 213
 In terms of par 27(1) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.214
 Paragraph 44 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.215
 Paragraph 44(5) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. There is another notable difference in216
that, during the interim moratorium, the permission of the court is not required for the appointment of,
or carrying out of his functions by, an administrative receiver or the appointment of an administrator
in terms of par 14 of Schedule B1: par 44(7). Although the appointment of administrative receivers has
been virtually abolished by s 72A of the Insolvency Act 1986 as inserted by the Enterprise Act 2002,
this applies only to floating charges created after its enactment, and administrative receivers will still
be around for a long time.
 Insolvency Legislation at 517 and 528.217
 Corporate Insolvency at 361-362.218
confused these two issues by allowing a company to suspend existing contracts or
some provisions thereof, which could effectively be used as a moratorium on the
payment of debts.  213
2.6.1 Interim moratorium 
The fact that the moratorium commences only on the granting of an administration order
or the appointment of an administrator would, in the period immediately after the first
steps towards administration have been taken, leave the company vulnerable to actions
by creditors hoping to enforce their claims before the moratorium takes effect. To fill this
gap, provision is made for an interim moratorium in the period between the making of an
application for administration and the granting or dismissal of an administration order, as
well as between filing an intention to appoint an administrator with the court  and the214
moment the actual appointment takes effect or the specified period of ten business days
expires without any appointment being made.  The scope of the interim moratorium is215
almost exactly the same as that of the final one, because the provisions of paragraphs
42 and 43 (except for references to the consent of the administrator) are made
applicable to the interim moratorium.  As Sealy and Milman  correctly point out, no216 217
interim moratorium will come into effect if there are no persons to whom notice of the
intention to appoint an administrator must be given, because no notice of intention to
appoint an administrator is filed with the court in such a case. The effect of this omission
is that the company will be left vulnerable while the documents for appointment of an
administrator are being prepared. 
In his discussion of the moratorium under the original provisions, Pennington218
pointed out that there was no moratorium on the actions of directors of a company
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 Pennington Corporate Insolvency at 362 stated that the court apparently had no authority to prevent219
directors from exercising their normal powers unless it would amount to a breach of fiduciary or other
duties.
 Of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.220
 Paragraph 13 of Schedule B1 discussed in part 2.5.2 above. 221
 In terms of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (c 46): see part 2.7.1.3 below.222
 Chapter 2, part 2.5.1. The Companies Act of 2008 makes no provision for an interim moratorium223
before the commencement of business rescue proceedings, in spite of requiring wide notification of
an intended application for a business rescue order, thereby leaving a company completely exposed
to actions by creditors and directors: see Chapter 2, part 3.6.1.1.  
 Of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. The two very specific exceptions concern state224
authorities acting in the public interest and are not relevant to this discussion.
 In spite of this, however, one of the powers of an administrator as contained in Schedule 1 to the225
Insolvency Act 1986 is to present a petition for the winding up of the company (par 21). In such a case
the administrator will simultaneously have to apply to court in terms of par 79 for his appointment to
be terminated. 
until the administration order was issued because the directors remained in office in
the period between the filing of the first documents and the time when the
appointment of an administrator takes effect. Directors were thus free to exercise
their powers, including the power to dispose of company property by selling, leasing,
mortgaging or charging it and they could also continue to draw on the company’s
bank account.  Although paragraph 13(3)(a)  now authorises the court to make an219 220
order restricting the exercise of a power of the directors of a company, this is still only
possible when the application for administration is heard and if the application is not
immediately granted or dismissed.  The weakness that was identified in the original221
provisions has therefore continued to exist in the amended procedure. However, the
possibility of being reported to the Secretary of State and consequently being
disqualified from acting as an insolvency practitioner or being involved in the
promotion, formation or management of a company without the permission of the
court,  should act as a strong deterrent from taking any improper actions. The222
situation is only marginally better in the case of judicial management where all the
property of the company is automatically vested in the Master of the High Court as
soon as a provisional judicial management order is issued.  223
2.6.2 Final moratorium
In terms of paragraph 42,  there is an absolute moratorium on the winding up of the224
company while in administration, whether by way of a company resolution or order
of court.  By contrast, the position under the new business rescue proceedings in225
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 See Chapter 2, part 3.6.1.2.226
 In terms of a decision of the Court of Appeal (although on the previous provisions) this also applies227
to criminal proceedings against the company: see Environment Agency v Clark (Administrator of
Rhondda Waste Disposal Ltd) [2000] BCC 653 (CA).
 Paragraph 43 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.228
 [1992] Ch. 505; [1990] BCC 859. See Fletcher Insolvency at 544-546; Farrar’s Company Law at229
691-694; Palmer par 14.045 and Sealy and Milman Insolvency Legislation at 53-54 for a discussion
of the moratorium and in particular this decision. Although this case and many other authorities
mentioned in the discussions deal with the moratorium under the original provisions, the basic
principles still apply.
 This aspect was again emphasised by the Court of Appeal in Innovate Logistics Ltd v Sunberry230
Properties Ltd [2008] EW CA Civ 1321; [2009] BCC 164 where permission was refused because the
intended proceedings would prejudice the achievement of the purpose of the administration by resulting
in a lower realisation of the company’s estate. See Frisby “Pre-packs” at 1-4 where this judgment is
discussed in detail. 
 This does not follow automatically, however; each case must be considered individually, including231
the behaviour of the applicant, and whether the application is opposed by the administrator: Bailey and
Groves Corporate Insolvency at 381-382.
South Africa is far from clear because winding up is not specifically mentioned in the
provisions regulating the moratorium. It must be assumed that an application to court
for the winding up of the company is possible with the consent of the business rescue
practitioner or the court.  226
The moratorium on other legal processes prohibits, except with the consent of
the administrator or the permission of the court, any steps to enforce security over
the company’s property, repossess goods under a hire-purchase agreement,
exercise a landlord’s right of forfeiture and any other legal process against the
company  or its property while the company is in administration.  The moratorium227 228
is thus automatic and wide and in force for the duration of administration but, with the
exception of any process to wind up the company, it is not absolute, since both the
administrator and the court have the power to allow a specific legal process against
the company to be instituted or continued.
In Re Atlantic Computer Systems Plc  the Court of Appeal set out the principles229
which should be applied in deciding whether to grant leave to an applicant to exercise
existing proprietary rights (including security rights). Among these is the duty of the court
to balance the interests of the applicant with those of other creditors where giving leave
would hinder the achievement of the administration’s purpose.  In general, administration230
should not be conducted for the benefit of unsecured creditors at the expense of secured
creditors or owners/lessors, unless this is unavoidable, and leave should normally be
granted if a lessor or secured creditor will suffer significant loss if leave is refused.  A court231
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 Paragraph 43(7) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.232
 Paragraph 100 of Schedule B1.233
 Paragraph 2 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. As explained in part 2.3 above, the third234
possibility of appointment by the holder of a floating charge is not relevant for our purposes, as South
African law does not recognise this special type of company creditor.
 Paragraph 6 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.235
 All the professional bodies concerned publish guides to professional conduct and ethics that explain236
the principles to be considered when deciding whether to accept an appointment or not: Sealy and
Milman Insolvency Legislation at 426. 
 In Form 2.2B: Statement of proposed administrator, as prescribed by Rule 2(23)(2)(a) of the237
Insolvency Rules.
 But the court may be persuaded to appoint a specific candidate if creditors overwhelmingly support238
his appointment rather than the other: Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 364. Otherwise each
nominee’s knowledge of the company’s affairs and the amount of investigative work he has already
done are some of the factors the court will take into consideration. However, according to Milman
“Overview” at 2, referring to the decision in The Oracle (North West) Ltd v Pinnacle Financial Services
(UK) Ltd [2008] EW HC 1920 (Ch); [2009] BCC 159, the court will usually choose the person nominated
by the leading creditors rather than the one nominated by the company. 
may grant permission for a process to be instituted or continued against the company
subject to a condition or a requirement.  These principles should also guide an232
administrator in deciding whether to allow a legal process. 
2.7 Managing the procedure
2.7.1 The administrator
2.7.1.1 Appointment
It has already become clear from the discussions above that an outsider (the
administrator or administrators, as more than one may be appointed) is appointed to
manage the company’s affairs during administration.  The administrator is appointed233
either by the court as part of the administration order or by the company or its
directors.  Only a person who is qualified to act as an insolvency practitioner in relation234
to the company may be appointed.  The phrase “in relation to the company” refers to235
a possible prior professional relationship with the company which would disqualify an
insolvency practitioner from appointment for that particular company. The Act does not
describe the circumstances under which this would be the case,  but details of any236
such prior relationship must be disclosed.237
Where an administration order is made by the court and different administrators are
nominated by the company and another party respectively, the court has a discretion
whom to appoint without having to give preference to the nominee of any particular party,
such as the company or the creditors.238
ENGLAND-197-
 Paragraphs 758–774.239
 Paragraph 732.240
 Although at the time there were no statutory requirements regarding the qualifications or experience241
of persons appointed in any insolvency proceedings (eg liquidators, receivers etc), the courts would
only appoint solicitors or registered accountants with several years of experience in their profession,
as liquidators: Pennington Corporate Insolvency at 4. 
 In terms of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, a person may be disqualified by an order242
of court for a specified period from being an insolvency practitioner or director or in any way taking part in
the promotion, formation or management of a company without the permission of the court (s 1(1)). The
order may be based on the person’s conviction of an indictable offence (s 2), persistent breaches of
company legislation (s 3), fraud or fraudulent trading of a company that has been wound up (s 4), summary
conviction of contravention of company legislation (s 5) or unfitness (s 6).
 Section 390(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986.243
 Section 389(1).244
 See Chapter 2, part 3.7.1.2.245
 Section 390(1) excludes “a person who is not an individual”, and corporate bodies are thus246
disqualified. This provision is preferable to the one in South Africa which allows the appointment of a
juristic person or partnership as a business rescue practitioner, thereby creating innumerable problems:
see Chapter 2, part 3.7.1.2.
 2.7.1.2 Qualifications
The strictly regulated system of appointment and supervision of insolvency
practitioners is an important feature of current English insolvency law. These
requirements were introduced as a result of proposals put forward by the Cork
Report  which stressed that the success of any insolvency system depended largely239
on those who administered it: if they did not have the respect and confidence of the
courts, the creditors, the debtors and the general public, the insolvency system would
fall into disrepute and disuse.  The Cork Report thus recommended that some240
minimum professional qualification as well as control was required to ensure a high
standard of competence and integrity and to prevent abuse.241
A person is disqualified from acting as insolvency practitioner if at the time he is an
undischarged bankrupt, or disqualified from being an insolvency practitioner or a director
of a company,  is a mental patient or lacks capacity.  Acting as an insolvency242 243
practitioner without being qualified to do so is an offence for which the offender can be
imprisoned or fined or both.  Unfortunately, no such provision is found in the South244
African Companies Act of 2008 and the only sanction seems to be the possible
withdrawal of the accreditation of such a person by the regulatory authority.245
In terms of section 390 of the Insolvency Act 1986, only an individual  who has246
been authorised to act as an insolvency practitioner is qualified so to act. Section
390(2) prescribes the two ways in which a person may be authorised to act as an
insolvency practitioner, namely by virtue of membership of a recognised professional
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 Section 390(2)(a). In terms of s 391(3), persons who are not members of a recognised professional body247
but who are subject to its rules in the practice of the profession in question may also be authorised.
 In terms of s 390(2)(b).248
 Section 391.249
 These recognised professional bodies are the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants; the250
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and W ales; the Institute of Chartered Accountants in
Ireland; the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Scotland; the Law Society; the Law Society of
Scotland, and the Insolvency Practitioners Association: Insolvency Practitioners (Recognised
Professional Bodies) Order 1986 (SI 1986/1764).
 Section 390(2)(a).251
 Insolvency Legislation at 428.252
body and permitted to act as such by its rules  or, alternatively, in terms of an247
authorisation by a competent authority.248
2.7.1.2.1 Membership of a recognised professional body
As far as the first option is concerned, the Secretary of State has the power to issue
or revoke an order recognising a professional body for this purpose. However, only
a professional body that regulates the practice of a profession and maintains and
enforces rules ensuring that members who act as insolvency practitioners are fit and
proper persons and meet acceptable requirements in education, practical training
and experience, may be recognised.  At present there are seven such recognised249
bodies of which all but one represent either the legal profession or accountants.250
Mere membership of a recognised professional body does not, however,
automatically qualify the relevant member to act as an insolvency practitioner. The
member must also be permitted to act as an insolvency practitioner in terms of the rules
of his professional body.  This part of the provision allows a recognised professional body251
to set minimum requirements and standards for its members with regard to qualifications,
training and experience before allowing them to act as insolvency practitioners. 
Sealy and Milman  point out that although the Secretary of State does not have252
the power to exercise direct control over the way a recognised professional body
conducts its affairs, his power to revoke his authorisation from such a body allows
him to ensure adherence to acceptable standards and control of members. 
2.7.1.2.2 Authorisation by the Secretary of State 
The second option is available for individuals who are not members of one of the
recognised professional bodies. Such individuals may on application be authorised by the
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 The Secretary of State is the competent authority unless he has designated another body or person253
for cases of a certain type (s 392(2)). No such designation has as yet been made: Sealy and Milman
Insolvency Legislation at 429. 
 In terms of s 393(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986. The period was reduced from the previous period254
of three years by the Provision of Services (Insolvency Practitioners) Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/3081).
 Stipulated in s 393(2).255
 Section 393(3A). Regulation 8A was inserted into the Insolvency Practitioners Regulations 2005 (SI256
2005/524) to stipulate the requirements for further authorisation of an insolvency practitioner in respect
of education, practical training and experience. 
 Section 393(4). In such a case no automatic authorisation is granted in terms of s 393(3A) and if257
already granted, is withdrawn: s 393(6).
 Finch “Insolvency Practitioners” at 336.258
 Finch “Insolvency Practitioners” at 342.259
 Statutory Instrument 2005/524.260
 In regulation 6(a) to (f). Briefly stated, they are whether the applicant has been convicted of an261
offence involving fraud or dishonesty, has contravened any provision of insolvency legislation, has
engaged in deceitful, unfair or improper behaviour (whether unlawful or not) in his profession or
Secretary of State to act as insolvency practitioners.  Section 393 of the Insolvency Act253
1986 provides that authorisation may be granted to an applicant who appears to be a fit
and proper person to act as an insolvency practitioner and who meets the prescribed
requirements with respect to education, practical training and experience. This
authorisation is given for one year  but must be automatically renewed by the competent254
authority unless it appears to the authority that the practitioner no longer complies with the
requirements  of being a fit and proper person to act as an insolvency practitioner and255
those regarding education, practical training and expertise.  The authorisation may be256
withdrawn earlier if the holder appears no longer to be a fit and proper person or fails to
comply with any applicable provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986.  257
To ensure that the same standards of competence will be maintained by all the
various authorising professional bodies and the Secretary of State, all applicants
have since 1990 been required to pass a centrally organised examination set by the
Joint Insolvency Examining Board.  258
In spite of the strict controls already in place, many insolvency practitioners in
England were not complying with their statutory duties and the system was thus
regarded as being inadequate.  As a result, the Insolvency Practitioners Regulations259
2005  which came into effect on 1 April 2005, inter alia replaced the previous260
regulations relating to the grant and refusal of authorisation by the Secretary of State.
The new regulations provide a list of six specific issues that must be included in the
matters to be taken into account in deciding whether any applicant is a fit and proper
person to act as an insolvency practitioner.  Consideration of these issues is clearly261
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employment, has failed to make full disclosure of a conflict of interest when acting as insolvency
practitioner, whether he had adequate systems of control and accounting in place in any insolvency
practice he carried on and whether his insolvency practice is or will be carried on with independence,
integrity and appropriate professional skills.
 Regulation 7(1)-(6). To summarise: the applicant must have held office as insolvency practitioner262
(or in certain other prescribed capacities) in at least 30 cases during the immediately preceding ten
years, or acquired at least 2000 hours of insolvency work (at least 1400 hours thereof in the
immediately preceding two years). In the last-mentioned instance, the applicant must also either have
acted in one of the prescribed offices in at least five cases in the preceding five years or acquired so-
called “higher insolvency work experience” (as defined) of at least 1000 hours, or in specified
combinations of numbers of cases and hours. 
 Regulation 8(2).263
 Regulation 8(2). Activities regarded as continuing professional development include attendance at264
courses, seminars or conferences (or viewing a recording thereof), giving lectures, reading books or
periodical publications and writing for publication, all of these obviously on insolvency law or insolvency
practitioners (reg 8(3)). Practitioners authorised by the Secretary of State are required to keep records
of these activities (reg 9) and must also submit annual reports to him containing details of such
activities as well as of cases in which they acted as insolvency practitioners in the period covered by
the report (reg 11). 
 Corporate Insolvency at 202-203.265
intended to ensure that only those applicants who will conduct their practices as
insolvency practitioners with honesty, integrity, fairness and the appropriate professional
skills will be authorised. The regulations also contain specific requirements to ascertain
whether an applicant who has never previously been authorised to act as insolvency
practitioner meets the requirements with respect to education, practical training and
experience as prescribed by section 393(2)(b). Apart from having to have passed the
Joint Insolvency Examination Board examination referred to above, the applicant must
also have acquired the necessary experience as set out in provisions detailing the
prescribed minimum number of cases or hours of insolvency work in a specific period of
time.  Although contained in a separate provision, the same requirements in respect262
of previous experience that are set for first-time applicants are made applicable to
applicants who have previously been authorised to act as insolvency practitioners.  In263
addition, these applicants are also required to have completed a specified minimum
number of hours of continuing professional development.  264
In an evaluation of the present system of regulation of insolvency practitioners,
Finch  states that using several recognised professional bodies as well as the265
Secretary of State (through the Insolvency Service) to execute this regulation has the
advantage of a wide regulation of all the activities of insolvency practitioners, such
as their conduct as accountants and lawyers, as well as their activities as insolvency
practitioners. Although a single regulator could perhaps lead to more consistency and
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 Of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.266
 In terms of par 87 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. He may only do so on the grounds267
of ill-health, intention to cease practising as insolvency practitioner, conflict of interest, change in
personal circumstances making it impossible or impracticable to discharge his duties or, if on grounds
other than these specified ones, with permission of the court: Rule 2.119 of the Insolvency Rules.
 In terms of par 88 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.268
 Paragraph 89 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. The Secretary of State may withdraw his269
authorisation on the grounds that the authorised person is no longer a fit and proper person, has failed
to comply with his statutory duties or has furnished the Secretary of State with false, misleading or
inaccurate information (s 393(4)). A professional body will follow its own rules in deciding whether to
withdraw its authority in respect of a particular member. 
 Paragraphs 93 and 94 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. The consent of every holder of270
a qualifying floating charge (ie who is authorised in terms of par 14 to appoint an administrator for the
company) is required, but if this consent is withheld, the court may give the required permission. 
 Chapter 2, part 2.7.1. Unfortunately, although the profession of business rescue practitioner is now271
regulated in terms of the Companies Act of 2008, the Act provides for the removal of the practitioner
only by an order of court: Chapter 2, part 3.7.1.3.
transparency, and provide a single body to which the public could address
complaints, the existing system was still preferable because of the dual scrutiny to
which it subjected most insolvency practitioners.
2.7.1.3 Vacation of or removal from office
The Insolvency Act 1986 provides for various situations that may cause the administrator
of a company to cease holding office before the administration procedure ends and that
will result in the administrator having to be replaced. Paragraph 90  contains four of266
these reasons: if the administrator dies, resigns,  is removed by order of court  or267 268
vacates his office because he is no longer qualified to act as an insolvency practitioner
in relation to the company.  In addition, where an administrator was appointed by the269
company or its directors, the person who made the appointment is also entitled to
remove and replace the administrator.  This ensures that an administrator who is failing270
to fulfil his duties properly can be removed without the expense and delay which would
inevitably result if the court had to be approached for the removal of an administrator. It
should also remove one of the possible obstacles to implementation of formal corporate
rescue measures, namely the fear of directors of an ailing company that they may be
handing over the management of the company to someone who is not capable of
rescuing the company but can only be removed at great expense and with great difficulty.
This fear is certainly justified in South Africa where the current Companies Act of 1973
provides neither for any qualifications, experience nor training for judicial managers, nor
a procedure or grounds to remove a judicial manager.  271
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 Paragraph 97. This is subject to the conditions that there is no holder of a qualifying floating charge272
and that the new administrator’s written consent to act is presented to the meeting before the
replacement is made. 
 In terms of par 91 the creditors’ committee, the company, its directors, one or more creditors or a273
remaining co-administrator is authorised to make the application. However, if the administrator was
appointed by administration order, only the creditors’ committee may apply unless there is no such
committee or the court is satisfied that the committee is not taking reasonable steps to appoint a
replacement or the court is satisfied by another reason for the application. 
 Paragraph 95 allows the court to replace an administrator only if the person entitled to replace him274
is not taking reasonable steps to do so or there is another acceptable reason for the court to make the
replacement. 
 In terms of par 74, discussed below.275
 Paragraph 74(4)(d).276
 In terms of par 75 discussed below.277
 Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 391.278
 The original provision (s 27) used the more familiar “unfairly prejudicial to the interests” and it is279
unclear whether a difference in meaning was intended, as the new provision could require proof of
An important power is given to the creditors’ meeting in that they are also
allowed to replace the administrator in those cases where the company or its
directors appointed him.  This is another safeguard to prevent abuse of the272
procedure by the directors or members of a company appointing an insolvency
practitioner who will act according to their wishes and to the detriment of the
creditors. The risk, however, is that this may deter the directors from putting the
company into administration, as they have no guarantee that the administrator
appointed by them will not be removed and replaced by the creditors. 
The power of the court to remove an administrator is limited by allowing only a few
specified persons to apply for such an order  and, in those cases where the273
administrator was not appointed by an administration order, also limiting the
circumstances under which the court may replace the administrator.  However, an274
application to court by a creditor or member challenging the administrator’s conduct275
may also lead to his removal from office.  The Act does not specify the grounds on276
which an administrator should be removed by the court but if the administrator has been
guilty of misfeasance  the courts will probably remove him because it is one of the277
mainstays of the insolvency legislation that only those who are ethically and educationally
qualified should be allowed to act as insolvency practitioners.  278
To counterbalance the powers of the administrator, paragraphs 74 and 75
respectively provide for a challenge to and examination of the administrator’s conduct
in respect of the company. In terms of paragraph 74, a creditor or member may apply
to court for relief on the grounds that the administrator has unfairly harmed  the279
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actual harm rather than mere potential harm: Palmer par 14.073; Sealy and Milman Insolvency
Legislation at 545. 
 Finch “Corporate Rescue” at 548 raises this possibility and suggests that it would result in reducing the280
effectiveness of the rescue because the process would become highly contested and thus slowed down.
 Frisby “Rescue Regime” at 264-265. Palmer par 14.075 is of the opinion that, unless the applicant has281
a strong case, the court would rather adopt a “wait and see” attitude, relying on the potential liability of an
administrator for wrongdoing because it would be detrimental to the process if an administrator’s
commercial judgment could be too easily questioned. However, Finch “Corporate Rescue” at 555 warns that
this attitude could change if the courts lost confidence in the way administrators and others operated during
the process. Milman “Overview” at 3 refers to the refusal of the court to make an order under par 74 in Re
Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) [2008] EWHC 2869 (Ch); [2009] BCC 632 as
an indication that the approach taken by the courts still points towards non-intervention. 
 Now ss 895-899 of the Companies Act 2006.282
 Paragraph 75(3). As agent of the company (par 69) the administrator is in a fiduciary position as regards283
the company: Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 388. Finch Corporate Insolvency at 444 (fn 365)
notes that there has not been any case law to date in respect of administrators being sued for breach of duty
but expects this to change as administrations take over from administrative receiverships.
 Palmer par 14.077.284
interests of the applicant or proposes to do so or is not performing his functions as
quickly or efficiently as is reasonably practicable. Although this power may
conceivably be abused by some creditors for tactical reasons,  the more general280
view seems to be that the courts would be slow to interfere with the professional and
commercial judgment of insolvency practitioners.  A director is not authorised to281
bring the application in his capacity as such. The court has a wide discretion
regarding the relief it may grant and may in particular regulate the administrator’s
exercise of his functions or order that his appointment will cease to have effect,
subject to the condition that the court may not make an order that will prevent or
impede a voluntary arrangement or compromise with members and creditors
sanctioned under section 425 of the Companies Act 1985.  282
Paragraph 75 provides for an examination of the conduct of an administrator or
past administrator (or someone who purports or purported to be one) on the
application of a creditor, member, liquidator or administrator of a company or the
official receiver. Such an application must be based on an allegation that the
administrator has misapplied or retained or become accountable for any money or
other property of the company, has breached a fiduciary or other duty to the
company, or has been guilty of misfeasance.  It is important to note that this action283
is based on the misconduct of the administrator towards the company and not
against the applicant.  If any of these grounds are established, the court may order284
the administrator to repay or restore money or other property to the company, pay
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 See Chapter 2, part 3.7.1.3.2. 285
 Paragraph 59(1). Some specific powers are listed in Schedule 1 to the Act, such as the power to continue286
the company’s business and raise or borrow money, but are not limited to them (par 59(2)). As a result of
the very extensive powers given to the administrator, it should only in very special circumstances be
necessary to make use of par 63 to apply to court for directions in connection with his functions. 
 This of course means that their usual statutory and common law duties, including fiduciary duties, will still287
apply. See Sealy and Milman Insolvency Legislation at 57 and 539; Farrar’s Company Law at 689. 
 Paragraph 64(2) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.288
 Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 393; Fletcher Insolvency at 549; Palmer par 14.053.289
 See Chapter 2, part 3.7.2. 290
interest or pay compensation, but may not terminate his appointment under this
paragraph. A successful action thus benefits the company in the first place and any
creditor who succeeds in his action will derive only an indirect benefit. 
In my view these provisions are preferable to those found in the Companies Act of
2008 which simply make the business rescue practitioner subject to the same duties as
a director: a business rescue practitioner operates under completely different
circumstances and with objectives different from those of a director, rendering several
of a director’s duties inappropriate.  285
2.7.2 Powers and duties of directors
The administrator is given extremely wide powers by the Act in that he has all the
powers that may be necessary or expedient to manage the affairs, business and
property of the company.  This, however, does not mean that the directors are286
automatically removed from office when the company is in administration: both the
board of directors and the members in general meeting retain their powers as organs
of the company,  but their powers are severely restricted by paragraph 64(1), which287
forbids a company or any of its officers from exercising a management power without
the consent of the administrator. For the purposes of this provision, a management
power is defined as any power, irrespective of whether it is conferred by legislation
or an instrument, that could interfere with the exercise of the administrator’s
powers.  The management powers of the directors are thus effectively suspended288
for the duration of administration although they remain liable to perform their statutory
duties such as the proper filing of annual returns and holding of annual meetings.289
In the absence of clear provisions on this aspect in the South African business
rescue proceedings, and since the directors seem to lose only their management
powers, the position must be assumed to be the same as in England.290
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 Paragraph 61 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.291
 Fletcher Insolvency at 549.292
 Section 7(3) of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (c 46). In terms of s 6(2)(b) of this293
Act a company is automatically regarded as having become insolvent by the mere fact that an
administration order has been made in relation to it. 
 Sections 1 and 6 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.294
 In terms of ss 6 and 7 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 295
 In terms of a new s 1A of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 inserted by the296
Insolvency Act 2000 (c 39).
 Insolvency (2002) at 516. The law in this book was as at December 2001.297
The administrator is also very specifically authorised to remove any director of
the company and to appoint a person as director, whether or not to fill a vacancy.291
In making these decisions the administrator will be led by the needs of the company
“and the best way in which to achieve the purpose of administration”.  292
The administrator is furthermore one of the office-holders who are compelled to
submit a report to the Secretary of State if they find that the conduct of a director or
past director of a company that has become insolvent makes him unfit to be
concerned in the management of a company.  This report could result in the293
director being disqualified from acting as an insolvency practitioner or, unless he has
the permission of the court, taking part in the formation, promotion or management
of a company for a period of between two and fifteen years.  Disqualification is294
achieved by an order of court on application by the Secretary of State  or the295
acceptance by the Secretary of State of a disqualification undertaking by a person
who meets the requirements for a disqualification order.  296
In his discussion of the (then merely proposed) amendments, Fletcher297
expressed some doubts as to whether they would really solve the problem of under-
utilisation of administration since the main problem lay in the “inbuilt aversion” of
directors to relinquish their power to an independent official who furthermore had the
power to dismiss them. He saw the answer in more compelling inducement for
directors to take action at an early stage when rescue is still a realistic possibility, in
particular by not requiring administrators to report on directors’ conduct if
administration results in the survival of the company. Conversely, in those cases
where a company was liquidated, the failure of its directors to take timely and
genuine steps to initiate administration could be taken as an indication of unfitness
to be involved in the management of a company. He also suggested that the power
of an administrator to remove a director should be made subject to approval by the
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 Fletcher Insolvency (2002) at 518.298
 Discussed above. See Fletcher Insolvency at 869-884 for a full discussion of the provisions of the Act.299
 Insolvency at 522-523. This is in the later (2009) edition in which he again confirms his original view300
(at 516-517) that the relaxation of some procedural aspects alone would not have solved the problem
of under-usage because of the reluctance of directors to relinquish their power to an administrator. 
 See Fletcher Insolvency at 857. 301
 Fletcher Insolvency at 523.302
 Prescribed by par 49 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 and Rule 2.33 of the Insolvency303
Rules. The proposals must be attached to the prescribed Form 2.17B. 
court, thereby affording the affected director an opportunity to challenge the
administrator’s reasons for removing him.  298
Although none of these proposals have found their way into the new provisions
regulating administration, Fletcher points to the role that section 214 of the Insolvency Act
1986 and sections 6 and 7 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986  can299
play in discouraging directors from allowing a company to “decline into a state of
insolvency” without taking any active steps to at least attempt to rescue it.  In terms of300
section 214(1), the directors of a company which has gone into insolvent liquidation may
incur personal liability for wrongful trading through an order of court issued on application
by the liquidator of the company and ordering a director to make such a contribution to
the company’s assets as the court deems appropriate.  However, section 214(3)301
provides a statutory defence to any director who can satisfy the court that he took every
reasonable and practicable step he should have taken, to minimise the potential loss to
creditors of the company as soon as he had actual or constructive knowledge that the
company had no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation. If the courts
emphasise administration and company voluntary arrangements as such reasonable and
practicable steps which could result in a director being saved from personal liability, it
would encourage directors to consider these measures at an early stage when it may still
be possible to rescue the company. The courts and the Insolvency Service should also
apply the same considerations when exercising their powers in respect of the
disqualification of directors under the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.302
2.8 The rescue plan
2.8.1 Power to submit a statement of proposals
The most important duty of the administrator is to prepare a statement setting out his
proposals for achieving the purpose of administration.  The administrator is also the303
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 Goode Corporate Insolvency Law at 382.304
 See Chapter 2, part 3.8.1.305
 To obtain this information, the administrator may in terms of pars 47-48 of Schedule B1 to the306
Insolvency Act 1986 require a statement of the affairs of the company from any relevant person who
will then be compelled to supply it. 
 Rule 2.33(2)(m). In terms of the draft Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2010 a new paragraph (2C)307
will be added to Rule 2.33(2) requiring additional information if it is proposed that the company will
move into a company voluntary arrangement.
 Paragraph 49(2)(b) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.308
 Discussed in part 3 below.309
 In terms of s 425 of the Companies Act 1985 (now ss 895-899 of the Companies Act 2006) and very310
similar to the South African scheme of arrangement in terms of s 311 of the Companies Act 1973. 
only person who may submit a rescue plan. Although he is not obliged to do so, it
would be advisable for the administrator to consult the major creditors on any
proposals involving “significant action” such as a sale of substantial assets of the
company or a compromise.  By contrast, the business rescue practitioner in South304
Africa is specifically ordered by section 150(1) of the Companies Act of 2008 to
consult the creditors, other affected persons and the management of the company
before preparing a business rescue plan.  This seems to be a more realistic305
approach since no plan can succeed without the support of the major creditors, while
the management of the company may have the experience and expert knowledge
required to compile a feasible plan for the rescue of the company.   
2.8.2 Contents of the statement of proposals
Apart from the prescribed formal information (details of company, administrator,
directors, etcetera) that it must contain, the statement must explain the circumstances
that led to the appointment of the administrator, the company’s financial position  and,306
most importantly, how the administrator intends achieving the purpose of administration
and how it should end.  If he is of the opinion that the objective of a rescue of the307
company as a going concern or a better result for the company’s creditors cannot be
achieved, he has to explain the reasons for this belief.  308
Paragraph 49(3) specifically permits the proposals for achieving the purpose of
administration to include a proposal for a voluntary arrangement under part I of the
Insolvency Act 1986  or a court-sanctioned compromise or arrangement with309
creditors or members.  Again, this is in clear contrast to the rather confusing310
position in South Africa where the applicant for a judicial management order must
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 Section 311(1) of the Companies Act of 1973.311
 Section 155(1): see Chapter 2, part 4.3.312
 Rule 2.33(2)(o) of the Insolvency Rules. 313
 In Chapter 2, part 3.4 two South African cases are mentioned where the courts refused to grant a314
judicial management order because the companies would not have had access to adequate capital.
 See Chapter 2, part 3.8.2.315
 Joint Insolvency Committee Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 (E and W) with effect from 1316
January 2009 available at <http://www.sra.org.uk/documents/solicitors/accreditation/insolvency-
practitioners-statement-16.pdf> accessed on 8 February 2010. The rules contained in the Statement
have been adopted by all the regulatory bodies of insolvency practitioners and a departure from these
standards could lead to disciplinary action being taken against an insolvency practitioner by his
regulatory authority.
 According to Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 347 (fn 5), administration is increasingly317
being used to effect pre-packed sales of businesses which are arranged some time before the (usually
out-of-court) appointment of an administrator and then completed on the day of or soon after the
appointment. 
prove a reasonable probability that the company will be able to pay all its debts in full
in spite of the fact that a judicial manager is one of the persons authorised to apply
to court for an order summoning a meeting of creditors to approve a compromise.311
On the other hand, the Companies Act of 2008 has now created a strict division
between business rescue proceedings and a compromise with creditors by excluding
a company engaged in business rescue proceedings from the procedure for a
compromise between a company and its creditors.312
The further requirement that the statement must include details on how the
company has been managed and financed since the administrator’s appointment,
and will continue to be managed and financed if his proposals are approved  is313
important because it is generally agreed that the availability of working capital is
essential for a successful rescue.  In spite of listing detailed information that must314
be included in a business rescue plan, the South African Companies Act of 2008
does not require the plan to explain the future or current financing of the company
or how it will be managed.315
Another important set of requirements regarding the information to be disclosed was
recently added in respect of so-called “pre-packaged sales” (or “pre-packs”).  For316
purposes of these requirements a pre-pack is defined as an arrangement under which
the sale of all or part of a company’s business or assets is negotiated with a purchaser
before an administrator is appointed and the administrator effects this sale immediately
or shortly after his appointment.  In several cases the courts have held that an317
administrator has the power to sell assets without prior approval of the court or creditors
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 See Re T&D Industries Plc [2000] 1 W LR 646; [2000] 1 All ER 333; Re Transbus International Ltd318
(In Liquidation) [2004] EW HC 932 (Ch), [2004] 2 All ER 911; DKLL Solicitors v HM Revenue &
Customs [2007] EW HC 2067 (Ch); [2007] BCC 908.
 Frisby “Pre-packs” at 3. Finch Corporate Insolvency at 456 refers to estimates that between 35.5319
per cent and 50 (or even 80) per cent of sales of businesses during an administration were done by
way of pre-packs. 
 R3-Association of Business Recovery Professionals Press Briefing: the use of ‘pre-pack’320
administrations 22 January 2009 available at <https://www.r3.org.uk/newsandpress/> accessed on 17
March 2009. Hyde and W hite “Pre-pack administrations” at 135 mention the preservation of goodwill
as a major advantage of pre-packs because of the swift and seamless transfer to a purchaser, thereby
improving returns to creditors. See Finch Corporate Insolvency at 456-457 for a discussion of the
potential advantages of pre-packs, including a substantial saving in costs, but also (at 460-463) the
disadvantages and potential for abuse. Parry Corporate Rescue at 16-17 notes that although pre-packs
do not appear anywhere in the insolvency legislation, which may create the impression that they are
illegitimate, pre-packaged sales are often used for sound commercial reasons and should be accepted
as fulfilling a need, on condition that the administrator observes his duties and acts according to the
hierarchy of objectives contained in the Insolvency Act 1986.   
 These are generally referred to as “phoenix” pre-packs: Frisby “Pre-packs” at 1; Hyde and W hite321
“Pre-pack administrations” at 137.
 In a 2007 study, it was found that the most common omission in the reports of administrators was322
the identity of the purchaser: Finch Corporate Insolvency at 463. It is hard to believe that this was
merely coincidence rather than an effort by administrators to conceal the fact that these were sales to
management. 
 Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 par 9. In a detailed discussion of pre-packs in administration323
in Kayley Vending Limited, Re Insolvency Act 1986 [2009] EW HC 904 (Ch); [2009] BCC 578 it was
held that the court must be alert to obvious abuses of the pre-pack when exercising its discretion to
if justified by the circumstances of the case and in genuine furtherance of the purpose
of administration.  A pre-packaged sale of the company’s business has been accepted318
by the courts as a legitimate purpose of administration and administration orders are
often granted by the courts where such a pre-pack sale is given as one of the purposes
of the administration.  Although pre-packaged sales can have many benefits, such as319
preserving more jobs, providing a better return for creditors and preserving the value of
the business,  concurrent creditors will not be informed about the sale before it takes320
place and will not have the opportunity to consider whether it will be to their advantage.
As a result, these creditors are often suspicious as to whether the sale was in their best
interests, particularly in the 59 per cent of cases where the business is sold back to
connected parties, such as directors of the company.  Statement of Insolvency Practice321
16 was therefore developed to address these concerns of creditors by requiring the
administrator to disclose all the details regarding a pre-packaged sale, including his pre-
administration involvement, efforts to consult with major creditors, details of assets
involved, consideration, terms of payment, identity of the purchaser,  names of directors322
or previous directors connected to the purchaser and a detailed explanation and
justification of his decision.323
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make an administration order, and should refuse the order if it appeared to be inappropriate even if it
is not being opposed.
 See part 2.5.2 above.324
 See part 2.8.3 below.325
 Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 par 11.326
 Paragraph 49(5) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.327
 Paragraph 49(4) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. In terms of par 49(6), the administrator328
need not notify every member individually but may simply publish a notice that he will furnish any
member who applies in writing, with a copy of the statement of proposals. Rule 2.33(7) and (7A) leaves
the manner in which the notice will be published entirely in his discretion. This is in stark contrast to the
costly and unnecessary notifications that must be sent to all the members of a company in business
rescue proceedings even if they have no right to attend or vote at the meeting convened for approval
of the rescue plan: see Chapter 2, part 3.8.3.1. 
 Paragraph 51 of Schedule B1. Rule 2.34(1) also requires that the administrator gazette details of329
the meeting as soon as practicable after the invitation to creditors has been sent, and in terms of Rule
2.34(1A), he may also advertise this information in any other manner he thinks fit. 
 Goode Corporate Insolvency Law at 330-332.330
 But see Finch Corporate Insolvency at 379-380, who disagrees with this view and believes that331
shareholders clearly have an interest if there is a possibility that the company may survive. 
This information should preferably be provided with the first notification of
administration to creditors.  However, if no initial meeting of creditors is to be held324 325
and it is impracticable to provide the information in the first notification, the
information must be provided in the proposals of the administrator which he should
send out as soon as possible after his appointment.  326
 
2.8.3 Approval of the plan
Within eight weeks after his appointment  the administrator must send a copy of his327
statement of proposals to the Registrar of Companies and to every known creditor
and member of the company.  Each copy of the statement sent to a creditor must328
be accompanied by an invitation to an initial creditors’ meeting that must take place
within ten weeks after the date on which the company entered administration.329
There is no provision for approval or veto of the proposals by members because the
approach is that although a rescue of the company is the ideal outcome, the
emphasis is on a rescue of the business rather than keeping a damaged and
essentially unrecoverable company alive.  The argument seems to be that since a330
liquidation of the company is the most probable outcome of the process and the
company is already insolvent or nearly so, the shares in the company no longer have
any real value and therefore shareholders do not have any residual interest in the
company or its fate.  In spite of the many references to shareholders in various331
provisions regulating business rescue proceedings in South Africa, the position is
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 See Chapter 2, part 3.8.3.2. See also generally Loubser “Shareholders”.332
 Paragraph 52(1).333
 Paragraph 52(2); Palmer par 14.062.334
 Paragraph 53(1) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.335
 Rule 2.38(4). A secured creditor only has a vote for the unsecured balance of his claim (Rule336
2.40(1)) but is protected by par 73(1) and (2) which prohibits any proposal that would affect his right
to enforce his security unless he specifically consents to such a proposal.
 Paragraph 54 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. This implies that the administrator may337
make insubstantial deviations from the approved plan of action although it may not always be easy to
distinguish between substantial and insubstantial changes: Pennington Corporate Insolvency at 388;
Sealy and Milman Insolvency Legislation at 536 and 542. The court may also authorise the
administrator to deviate from the approved proposals if necessary as a result of a subsequent change
in circumstances or misunderstanding about the proposals: par 68(3)(c) and (d).
 Paragraph 57 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.338
 Paragraph 53(2) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.339
essentially the same since shareholders have no vote unless their rights will be
affected directly by the business rescue plan.  332
If the administrator thinks that the company has enough assets to pay all its
creditors in full, or not even enough assets to make any distribution to unsecured
creditors, or that administration will achieve neither a rescue of the company nor a
better return for creditors, the statement of proposals must contain a statement to
this effect.  In such a case the administrator need not convene a creditors’ meeting333
as it would not serve any purpose and be a waste of money. However, creditors
holding at least 10 per cent of the company’s debts may requisition a meeting for
which they will have to bear the costs.  334
The administrator’s proposals are considered by the creditors at their meeting
and may be approved without modifications or with amendments to which the
administrator has consented.  To approve the proposals, a majority in value of335
creditors present and voting at the meeting must vote in favour of the proposals.336
The Insolvency Act 1986 makes provision for the procedure to be followed by the
administrator to summon a creditors’ meeting for the purpose of obtaining the
creditors’ approval should he want to substantially amend his original proposals after
they have been approved.  At a creditors’ meeting the creditors may establish a337
creditors’ committee to protect their interests through regular communication with the
administrator.  338
The administrator is required to report the result of this meeting to the court, the
registrar of companies and such other persons as may be prescribed.339
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 Paragraph 68(1) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. Paragraph 65 now expressly grants340
him the power to make a distribution to preferent and secured creditors without the permission of the
court. 
 In terms of pars 74 and 75 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 discussed in part 2.7.2 above.341
 Paragraph 55 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.342
 Palmer par 14.080 confirms that these wide powers enable a court to react in a flexible way if the343
creditors refuse to approve the administrator’s proposals, but believes that unless strong evidence
exists that the purpose of administration could still be achieved by, for example, the appointment of a
new or additional administrator, a court would be more likely to make an order for the transition to
winding up. Sealy and Milman Insolvency Legislation at 537 do not, however, seem to share this view:
they merely state that, despite the wide wording of par 55(2)(e) authorising the court to make any order
it thinks appropriate, the court’s powers are limited and they could not impose on the creditors any
proposals to which they have not agreed.
 Paragraph 76(1) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. The original sections of the Act did not344
provide for automatic termination or for a specified period for administration, but the custom developed
to grant it for only three months, which was generally regarded as too short. The original version of this
clause in the Enterprise Act 2002 also limited the period to three months, but was changed because
it would have caused inconvenience and unnecessary costs as a result of repeated applications for
extensions: Palmer par 14.099.25. This is another aspect of which the drafters of the Companies Act
of 2008 should have taken notice before deciding on the obviously insufficient period of three months
2.8.4 Effects of approval of the plan
Once the proposals have been approved, the administrator has to act in terms of
these proposals.  There are various mechanisms to ensure that the administrator340
fulfils his functions according to the approved proposals, such as the power given to
creditors and members to challenge his conduct and actions in court  and the341
authority of the creditors’ committee to obtain information from the administrator. 
2.8.5 Effects of rejection of the plan
If the administrator reports to the court that the meeting of creditors has refused to
approve his proposals or a revision of his proposals, the court may order that his
appointment will cease from a specified date, thereby effectively terminating the
administration, or make any order it regards as appropriate.  The power of the court342
to make any other appropriate order could be interpreted to mean that the court could
approve those proposals despite their rejection by the creditors.  343
2.9 Termination of administration
2.9.1 Automatic termination
The appointment of an administrator and, consequently, the administration of a
company are automatically terminated one year after the appointment became
effective.  According to the Insolvency Service,  this period was decided on after344 345
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for completion of business rescue proceedings: see Chapter 2, part 3.9.
 Item 11, “Frequently Asked Questions about the Enterprise Act: Company” available at <http://www345
.insolvency.gov.uk/faq/faqeactc.htm#11> accessed on 14 February 2010.
 Paragraph 4 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. Frisby “Rescue Regime” at 268 believes346
that this provision renders the imposition of a time limit of one year unnecessary and unwise, since a
rescue attempt of the whole company as a going concern should not be hastily undertaken for fear of
running out of time. Sealy and Milman Insolvency Legislation at 505, on the other hand, remark that
this provision may be too vague to establish a positive legal duty that can be enforced, although par
74(2) provides a remedy by allowing a creditor or member to apply to court claiming that the
administrator is not performing his functions as quickly or efficiently as reasonably practicable. 
 Paragraph 76(2). However, the debts of those unsecured creditors who did not respond to the347
invitation to give or withhold their consent must be disregarded in the calculation of the total unsecured
debts: par 78 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. 
 Lightman and Moss Administrators par 2-040.348
 Keay and W alton Insolvency Law at 95. The same could probably be said of business rescue349
proceedings since the procedure is expected to be completed within an even shorter period of three
months and comes to an end when the business rescue practitioner is able to file a notice of
substantial implementation of the rescue plan: see Chapter 2, part 3.9.3. 
 Paragraph 79(1) and (2) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.350
consultation with a wide range of interested parties but may be amended in future if
shown by experience to be necessary. 
The administrator is also instructed to perform his functions “as quickly and
efficiently as is reasonably practicable”.  He may, however, apply to court to extend346
his term of office for a specified period or it may be extended for up to six months by
consent of all the secured creditors and of unsecured creditors holding more than 50
per cent of the unsecured debts of the company.  The reason for the fairly short347
period of administration is that, unlike judicial management, administration is not
seen as an end in itself, but a facilitative procedure to give the company some
protection while it devises a solution to its problems, such as a voluntary
arrangement or compromise with its creditors or even its liquidation.  In essence,348
therefore, administration is a temporary measure that grants the company a period
of relief during which the foundations for its actual rescue are laid, rather than being
the rescue measure itself.  349
2.9.2 By order of court
The administrator of a company may apply to court for his appointment to cease
before it expires automatically. He is compelled to do so if it appears to him that the
purpose of administration cannot be achieved, or he thinks that the company should
not have entered administration in the first place or if he is required to make such an
application by a meeting of the company’s creditors.  350
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 Pennington Corporate Insolvency at 355 and 356.351
 Re Brooke Marine Ltd [1988] BCLC 546. In Lancefield v Lancefield [2002] BPIR 1108, however, it352
was held that a court may in an appropriate case and under exceptional circumstances issue a
winding-up order mero motu. See also Sealy and Milman Insolvency Legislation at 62; Pennington
Corporate Insolvency at 401-402. In those cases where par 83 applies (discussed in part 2.9.3 below),
the problem will be solved by the company moving into a voluntary liquidation.
 Schedule 1, par 21.353
 An example of such a case is found in Re Brooke Marine Ltd [1988] BCLC 546.354
 Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 427. The writers believe that the court has the authority355
to issue a winding-up order in terms of the “catch-all” provision in par 79(4)(d) authorising the court to
make any order “it thinks appropriate” when the administrator applies for his appointment to be
terminated. In Re J Smith Haulage Ltd [2007] BCC 135 where a petition for the winding up of the
company had been suspended by the administration order, the court used this power to order winding
up the company to take effect immediately after term ination of the administration. However, Rule
2.114(4) refers specifically to an application by an administrator in terms of par 79 for an order ending
administration, in conjunction with a winding-up petition under s 124 for an order to wind up the
company, which clearly requires a petition for the winding-up order.   
 Section 140(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986.356
 Paragraph 79(3) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.357
 Paragraph 81 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.358
Most applications for discharge under the original provisions were made because
the purpose or purposes of the administration order could not be achieved or the
creditors refused to approve the administrator’s proposals.  Although winding up the351
company often appeared to be an unavoidable result, the courts did not (and still do
not) have any specific power to order the winding up of a company on an application
for the discharge of an administration order: as a general rule a winding up order may
only be made on a petition lodged in terms of section 124 of the Insolvency Act
1986.  An administrator has specifically been given the power to apply for the352
winding up of the company  but if he fails to do so the courts may, where353
necessary, direct the administrator to exercise this statutory power.  However, if it354
is necessary for the company to move into a compulsory liquidation in order to deal
with the claims of creditors, the administrator will usually present a petition for
winding up rather than depend on the court to make the required order.  The court355
may appoint the administrator as liquidator of the company if a winding up order is
made immediately after the discharge of an administration order.356
Where the administrator was appointed by order of court, he is also compelled
to apply to court if he thinks that the purpose of administration has been sufficiently
achieved before the period of one year has expired.357
The Act also provides for the termination of administration on application by a
creditor in those cases where the appointment was made for an improper motive.358
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 Paragraph 14.099.28.359
 Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 428 states that if administration is found to be in the best360
interests of the creditors, the court is unlikely to order rescission of the administration order, but may
make an order replacing the administrator.
 Paragraph 80 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. Although par 80(4) requires that a copy361
of this notice must be sent to every creditor of whose claim and address he is aware, the administrator
is regarded as having complied with this provision if he merely gazettes within five business days after
filing, a notice undertaking to provide a copy to any creditor: Rule 2.113(6). This Rule also allows any
further advertising of the notice which he may regard as necessary.
 As only the administrator, and not a former administrator has this power, it must be done before his362
appointment automatically expires after one year: Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 430.
 Paragraph 83 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 which contains detailed provisions on the363
procedure that has to be followed.
 Palmer par 14.099.31.364
 In terms of par 84(1) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.365
Although the provision does not explain what would be regarded as an improper
motive, nor within what period such an application should be made, Palmer359
believes that the court’s discretion is sufficiently wide to allow an administration to
continue if it is in the best interests of the company and its creditors.  360
2.9.3 By filing of a notice
In those cases where the administrator was appointed by the company or its directors,
he may file a prescribed notice with the court and the registrar of companies if he thinks
that the purpose of administration has been sufficiently achieved. This will terminate his
appointment from the date of proper filing of the notice.361
The administrator  may furthermore turn the administration into a creditors’362
voluntary winding up if he believes that the total amount payable to all secured
creditors has been paid or set aside and a distribution will be made to unsecured
creditors. The procedure he has to follow is to file a notice with the registrar of
companies and the court that paragraph 83  applies, and send a copy of this notice363
to every known creditor. On registration of this notice by the registrar of companies,
the appointment of the administrator ceases and the company is wound up as if a
resolution for voluntary winding up was passed on that day. The creditors may
appoint a liquidator of their choice but it would obviously save time and costs if they
choose the administrator.364
If the abovementioned procedure is not applicable because there are no assets
to permit a distribution to creditors, the administrator can effect the dissolution of the
company by sending a notice to that effect to the registrar of companies.  He must365
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 Paragraph 84(5). In practice this procedure is also used where all available assets have been366
distributed by the administrator. Although this is not strictly in accordance with the wording of par 84,
the Insolvency Service has given its approval to the wide interpretation of this provision and the courts
have also applied it: Palmer par 14.099.33; Sealy and Milman Insolvency Legislation at 553. 
 Paragraph 84(6).367
 This was mentioned in Sealy and Milman Insolvency Legislation (2004) at 40 but was not repeated368
in later editions. Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 340 also refers to judicial management as
a similar rehabilitation procedure and comments that it proved to be unsuitable as a result of the
extensive involvement of the court. Palmer par 14.002 merely states that administration is comparable
to procedures that are available under foreign insolvency law systems but specifically mentions Chapter
11 of the US Bankruptcy Reform Act (11 USC) as one possible model, albeit without its foremost
characteristic – the debtor in possession system where the directors remain in control of the company.
 Fletcher Insolvency at 515 refers to a “sustained vote of ‘no confidence’”.369
 Finch “Corporate Rescue” at 557. Frisby “Rescue Regime” at 262 concluded that the new regime370
did not provide administrators with any new apparatus to achieve a rescue. 
 Several commentators have remarked that the reforms will succeed only if approached in a positive371
manner by creditors (particularly the banks), insolvency practitioners and judges: Finch “Corporate
Rescue” at 528. At least as far the judges are concerned, Finch has since reached the conclusion that
“they are sympathetic to the development of administration as a streamlined tool of rescue” and will
not easily interfere with the business judgments of the administrator: Corporate Insolvency at 452. 
also as soon as possible thereafter file a copy of the notice with the court and send
it to every known creditor.  Three months after receipt and registration of this notice366
by the registrar the company is deemed to be dissolved.  This procedure may be367
used irrespective of the manner in which the company was placed in administration.
2.10 Evaluation of administration
The introduction of the process of administration was greeted with a certain degree
of scepticism in England while some commentators also drew attention to its
similarities with judicial management in South Africa and the fact that the last-
mentioned was not generally regarded as being a very effective rescue procedure.368
That scepticism seemed to be well-founded when the procedure failed to achieve
general acceptance and popularity and the number of administration orders remained
more or less static.  The amendments effected by the Enterprise Act 2002 have369
undoubtedly removed certain weaknesses, some of which administration shared with
judicial management. The remaining similarities as well as the differences between
these two procedures are therefore important for the development of South African
law in this area. 
Although some doubts were initially expressed by commentators on the ability
of administration to become more effective in spite of the reforms effected by the
Enterprise Act 2002  others believed that it was at least a possibility.  Indications370 371
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 Statistics show that the out-of-court procedure for the appointment of an administrator was an372
immediate success after the Enterprise Act 2002 came into effect. In the period of 2003-2004 this
procedure was used in 65.5 per cent of companies entering administration: Finch Corporate Insolvency
at 393. 
 Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 385.373
 Corporate Insolvency at 402.374
 Finch Corporate Insolvency at 403.375
 Finch Corporate Insolvency at 404.376
 Corporate Rescue at 24-25. She believes that the increase in administrations could also be partly377
ascribed to its use as an alternative liquidation procedure.
 This is also true of the new business rescue proceedings in South Africa, except for the – in my view378
misguided – decision to make it applicable to close corporations as well: see Chapter 2, part 3.2.
are that the power given to directors to directly appoint an administrator without
involvement by the courts, has resulted in administration becoming a user-friendly
and affordable way of rescuing a company.  The automatic moratorium that allows372
the administrator to prepare proposals for the creditors without the pressure of
threatening enforcement actions, and to continue running the business while the
creditors consider these proposals, is also a major advantage of administration.373
However, Finch still expresses many reservations about administration and
particularly its attraction for banks as the major creditors.  The legal uncertainties374
for major creditors created by, among other things, the duty of the administrator to
act in the best interests of all the creditors may result in banks using various methods
of security for their claims, leading to a fragmentation of the secured assets.  The375
general uncertainty of banks about their role in the rescue of companies may
eventually cause the banks to lose patience with troubled companies and opt for
direct enforcement action at an early stage rather than attempting a rescue.  Parry376
also points out that the increase in the number of administrations may “superficially”
be regarded as an indication of its “resounding success”, but in actual terms it is
more expensive, complex and slower that administrative receivership, and creditors
are not in a significantly better position than before the changes effected by the
Enterprise Act 2002.  377
 The most important similarity between administration and judicial management
is the fact that both apply to companies only.  This has not been changed by the378
new provisions and, it is submitted, supports the view that it is undesirable (if not
impossible) to design a rescue procedure that would be equally suitable for large
companies and small businesses. Furthermore, just like judicial management,
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 Parry “Administrative Receivership and Administration” at 172. The introduction of a similar379
procedure for the commencement of business rescue proceedings was probably influenced by
administration: see Chapter 2, part 3.3.1.
 See Chapter 2, part 3.5.2.1.380
 See Chapter 2, part 3.1 on the inclusion of this purpose in the definition of business rescue381
proceedings.
administration could formerly also be initiated only by an order of court. The
introduction of a less formal procedure for the company and its directors to
commence administration is therefore of particular importance to South Africa to
establish whether it has had the intended result of encouraging directors to act at an
early stage when a rescue of the company is still possible.  379
Even in those cases where an administrator is appointed by an order of court,
it is not required (or even allowed) that a provisional administrator should first be
appointed. This has the advantage that if all the requirements for the appointment of
an administrator are met, the court has to be approached only once and the costs of
a second court appearance, as required for a final judicial management order, are
saved. In South Africa, the procedure for the commencement of business rescue
proceedings by an order of court now also includes only one approach to the court,
but has had the unfortunate result that the interests of affected persons are protected
by a requirement of prior notification to all of them which will undoubtedly have
serious detrimental consequences for the company.    380
Whereas the original provisions on administration provided for the alternative
objective of a more advantageous realisation of the company’s assets than on
winding up, on an equal footing with a rescue of the company, it is interesting to note
that in the amended provisions the rescue of the company as a going concern is now
very firmly positioned as the first and primary objective of administration. Achieving
a better result for creditors may only be the objective if the administrator believes that
administration is not practicable or would not achieve a better result for the
company’s creditors. In this respect administration has moved closer to judicial
management. It is important, however, that advantage to creditors in a subsequent
winding up of the company is acceptable as the purpose of administration and
constitutes a vast difference from judicial management.  381
Another important difference between administration and judicial management
is that the company is protected by a moratorium from the moment that the first steps
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 Part 2.6 above.382
 See Chapter 2, part 3.6.383
 Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 387.384
 Sealy and Milman Insolvency Legislation at 421 point out that the introduction of professional385
standards for insolvency practitioners has, for example, made it possible to allow them to perform
certain functions without the consent of the court, thereby saving time and costs.
 See Chapter 2, part 2.7.1.2.386
 See Chapter 2, part 3.7.1.2.387
 Part 2.7.2 above.388
are taken to place the company in administration.  Furthermore both the interim and382
final moratoria come into effect automatically. In judicial management the moratorium
has to be specifically applied for and ordered by the court. This means that a judicial
management order could conceivably be granted without a moratorium, either
because it was not included in the application as a result of an oversight by the
applicant, or because a court may decide not to grant it. This would undoubtedly
make any rescue attempt extremely difficult, if not impossible. Although this problem
has now been addressed by the provisions regulating business rescue proceedings
through the introduction of an automatic moratorium, the unclear wording of these
provisions has created new problems.383
Both in administration and judicial management an outsider is appointed to take
control of the company and the rescue process. This is cited as one of the
disadvantages of administration as creditors may generally feel uncomfortable about
such an outsider running the business and also having the power to remove the
directors.   However, there is a vast difference between the stringent requirements384
set for appointment as an administrator and the practically non-existent ones for a
judicial manager. It is clear that the success of administration depends largely on the
expertise and irreproachable conduct of the insolvency practitioner  to the same385
extent that judicial management has probably often failed because of a lack of it.386
The intended regulation of the profession of business rescue practitioner by the
Companies Act of 2008 in South Africa is thus a welcome innovation although a
number of problems are foreseen in the application of these provisions.387
Apart from the control exercised over an administrator by his professional body
or the Secretary of State, the actions of a particular administrator may be challenged
in court by a creditor or member of the company.  This may even result in his388
removal from office. By contrast with all the above measures designed to control and
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 Chapter 2, part 2.7.1.3. 389
 Chapter 2, part 2.7.1.3.390
 See Chapter 2, part 3.7.1.3.391
 Chapter 2, part 3.7.1.2.1.392
 Part 2.8 above.393
 Chapter 2, part 3.8.394
 See part 2.9.3 above.395
 Chapter 2, part 2.9.396
supervise the actions of an administrator and remove him from office if necessary,
there is no express provision in the Companies Act 1973 for the removal of a judicial
manager on any grounds, and a degree of uncertainty regarding the inherent power
of the court to do so remains.  Furthermore, only the Master, the final judicial389
manager himself or a duly authorised representative of the creditors may apply to
court for a variation of the judicial management order which does not include removal
from office of the judicial manager.  A business rescue practitioner in South Africa390
may be removed from office by an order of court on application by any affected
person or on the court’s own initiative on a (possibly too) wide array of grounds.391
However, there seems to be little else an affected person can do to control the
actions of a particular practitioner except to have him removed by an order of court
or possibly reporting him to the intended regulating authority.392
Whereas a judicial manager is more or less left to his own devices during the
rescue attempt, an administrator has to prepare definite proposals for achieving the
purpose of administration and obtain the creditors’ approval. Once his proposals
have been approved, he is obliged to acts in terms thereof.  The business rescue393
practitioner is now under a similar duty to draft a business rescue plan for approval
by (mainly) the creditors.394
Administration automatically terminates after one year and, in those cases where
the administrator has been appointed by the company or directors, may be
terminated even sooner and without intervention by the court, if the purpose has
been achieved.  Whereas judicial management lasts for an indefinite period and395
can be terminated only by an application to court,  the provisions regulating396
business rescue proceedings fall somewhere between the two possibilities: it is
supposed to last only three months but does not end automatically after this period.
Depending on how the proceedings were commenced and why they are being
terminated, an application to court or the filing of a notice by the practitioner is
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 See Chapter 2, part 3.9.397
 Insolvency at 605-607.398
 This procedure is often referred to by the abbreviated term “CVA”.399
 Although contingent and prospective creditors are not expressly included here whereas in other400
sections of the Insolvency Act 1986 they are (eg, par 12(4), which defines creditors for the purposes
of an application for an administration order to include contingent and prospective creditors), the
question whether they are included has been settled by the courts to the effect that such creditors are
indeed included: Doorbar v Alltime Securities Ltd [1996] 1 W LR 456; [1995] BCC 1149; Re Cancol Ltd
[1996] 1 All ER 37; [1995] BCC 1133; Re Sweatfield Ltd [1997] BCC 744. However, there is nothing
to prevent a scheme of arrangement from containing terms excluding future or contingent creditors
from its operation: Sealy and Milman Insolvency Legislation at 21-22. 
required to terminate the business rescue proceedings.  In keeping with most of the397
provisions regulating business rescue proceedings, the provisions determining the
procedure for termination of the proceedings are noticeably more complicated and
unclear than those applicable to administration and could have benefited quite
substantially from following the examples found in the Insolvency Act 1986.
In spite of all the attempts at improving, adapting and modernising administration,
some doubts about its potential success remain. Fletcher mentions two major problems
that England has to overcome in attempting to develop a rescue culture and a successful
company rescue regime.  These are, first, the characteristic feature of English398
insolvency law of bias towards the protection of (particularly secured) creditors’ interests
resulting in a conflict with the aims of a rescue culture. The second problem is the “deep-
seated mistrust of the concept of ‘debtor-in-possession’” which allows the existing
management to retain their management powers during a rescue attempt. As a result
of the uncertainty of their position and combined with the risks of personal liability,
directors tend to postpone the decision to commence administration until the only
possible outcome is the distribution of the company’s assets to its creditors. His
conclusion is that a true rescue culture will remain an “elusive quest” and beyond the
reach of English insolvency law while it remains in its present form. This is probably
equally true of South African law.
3 COMPANY VOLUNTARY ARRANGEMENTS399
3.1 Definition and purpose
Section 1(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986 provides for a proposal that is made to a
company and to its creditors  for a voluntary arrangement between the company400
and its creditors within the framework provided by Part I of the Act. A proposal is
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 Section 1(2). See part 3.7.1 below for a discussion of the qualifications required for appointment as401
nominee (and supervisor).
 Described by Goode Corporate Insolvency Law at 26 as an agreement by the company’s creditors402
to accept, either in one sum or by instalments, an amount less than the amount due to them, without
involving a transfer of assets or change in the structure of the company or rights of its members. It is
essential, however, that the company must make a payment of money or other consideration: a
proposal providing for a nil dividend to unsecured creditors, for example, would not qualify as a
composition but as a scheme of arrangement: Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 197.
 A scheme of arrangement involves an element of give and take and includes a wide array of403
schemes such as conversion of debt into equity or secured into unsecured debt and vice versa and
subordination of debt: Goode Corporate Insolvency Law at 26. It involves something less than the
release or discharge of the company’s debts, eg a moratorium, which would not qualify as a
composition but would be acceptable as a scheme of arrangement: Sealy and Milman Insolvency
Legislation at 22. It may also involve a third party who will supply financing or other benefits: Bailey and
Groves Corporate Insolvency at 199. This scheme of arrangement must not be confused with the
scheme of arrangement in terms of ss 895-899 of the Companies Act 2006 (previously s 425 of the
Companies Act 1985) that requires approval by the court and closely resembles the scheme of
arrangement in South African law in terms of s 311 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (discussed in
Chapter 2, part 4.1).
 Picarda Receivers, Managers and Administrators at 581; Grier and Floyd Corporate Recovery at 155.404
 Broc “Company Voluntary Arrangements” at 179-180; Sealy and Milman Insolvency Legislation at405
35; Goode Corporate Insolvency Law at 388. This was confirmed by the judgment of the Court of
Appeal in Re NT Gallagher and Son Ltd [2002] EW CA Civ 404; [2002] 1 W LR 2380.
 By inserting s 1A into the Insolvency Act 1986, which provides that Schedule 1A will determine which406
companies are eligible for the moratorium, the procedure for obtaining, and effects of such a
moratorium, and the procedure for the approval and implementation of a voluntary arrangement where
a moratorium is or has been in force. The procedure and requirements for obtaining the moratorium
are discussed in part 3.6 below.
 Consequently, there are two sets of provisions in the Insolvency Act and two sets of Rules in the407
Insolvency Rules for company voluntary arrangements, being one each for arrangements with and
defined in the Act as being one which provides for a person (the so-called nominee),
who must be qualified to act as an insolvency practitioner or authorised to act as
nominee, to act either as trustee or otherwise to supervise the implementation of the
voluntary arrangement.401
A voluntary arrangement can be in the form of either a composition in
satisfaction of a company’s debts  or a scheme of arrangement  of its affairs.402 403 404
It is generally accepted that a voluntary arrangement created in terms of the relevant
statutory provisions is thereafter governed by contractual principles, which means
that a court cannot give orders for the amendment of a company voluntary
arrangement after it has been concluded.405
The Insolvency Act 2000 introduced a new Schedule 1A into the Insolvency Act
1986 in terms of which a company voluntary arrangement can be combined with a
moratorium in certain cases.  However, the original company voluntary arrangement406
without moratorium continues to exist for companies that do not qualify for the
moratorium procedure.  It is also used by companies that are eligible but prefer to407
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those without a moratorium, respectively. However, except for those specifically dealing with the
moratorium itself (discussed in part 3.6 below), the provisions and Rules are essentially the same,
particularly those regarding the consideration and implementation of the voluntary arrangement: Palmer
par 14.449. Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 194 (fn 12) remarks that the Insolvency Rules
Committee seems to have lost enthusiasm for the totally unnecessary task of maintaining two separate
sets of provisions by simply making many of the Rules for a CVA without moratorium applicable to the
CVA with moratorium by direct reference to the former. The provisions regulating the CVA with a
moratorium will therefore only be referred to where they differ from the standard ones. 
 Palmer par 14.406.408
 Section 1(4) also includes companies incorporated in an EEA State other than the UK or a company409
not so incorporated but having its centre of main interests in a member State other than Denmark.
These will not be considered, as they are not relevant to this discussion. 
 These would be companies formed and registered under s 1(1) of the Companies Act 2006 (c 46)410
(previously s 735(1) of the Companies Act 1985) or the former Companies Acts excepting the Joint
Stock Companies Acts, the Companies Act 1862 and the Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908: see
fn 51 above. Voluntary arrangements based on company voluntary arrangements were also made
available to partnerships by the Insolvent Partnerships Order 1994 (SI 1994/2421), as amended by the
Insolvent Partnerships (Amendment) Order 2005 (SI2005/1516), and to limited liability partnerships by
the Limited Liability Partnership Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/1090) as amended by the Limited Liability
Partnerships (Amendment) Regulations 2005 (SI 2005/1989). Partnerships will not be discussed here,
since there are important basic differences between the South African and English law regulating
partnerships. In terms of s 90A of the Building Societies Act 1986 (c 53), the company voluntary
arrangement procedure may also be used by building societies.
 Section 1(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986.411
 Section 1(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986. Such companies are excluded from the procedure involving412
a moratorium: see part 3.6 below.
avoid the inevitable publicity that accompanies the moratorium because it could result
in destabilising the company’s business to such an extent that it cannot survive.408
3.2 Entities to which a company voluntary arrangement applies
Company voluntary arrangements, as the name implies, apply to companies as
defined for this purpose in section 1(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986. This means that
it applies primarily  to companies within the meaning of the Companies Act 2006.409 410
3.3 Power to initiate a company voluntary arrangement
A proposal for a composition in satisfaction of the company’s debts or for a scheme
of arrangement of its affairs (both referred to in the Act as a voluntary arrangement)
may be made to a company and its creditors by the directors of the company on
condition that the company is not in administration or being wound up.  If the411
company is in administration or being wound up the administrator and the liquidator
respectively have the power to make such a proposal.  Neither the members nor412
the creditors of a company may propose a voluntary arrangement.
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 Fletcher Insolvency at 483-484; Grier and Floyd Corporate Recovery at 9; Pennington Corporate413
Insolvency at 409; Goode Corporate Insolvency Law at 387. It is, however, clearly assumed to be in
financial distress: Rule1.6(1) authorises the nominee to ask the directors to provide him with further
and better particulars of the circumstances and reasons why the company is insolvent or threatened
with insolvency. 
 Sealy and Milman Insolvency Legislation at 20.414
 Fletcher Insolvency at 483-484 explains that a company voluntary arrangement can therefore be415
used “in an attempt to avoid a threatened, or predictable, insolvency before it actually occurs”. 
 Section 2 of the Insolvency Act 1986 prescribes the procedure where the nominee is another416
person. This part of the procedure is omitted if the nominee is the liquidator or administrator.
3.4 Requirements for a company voluntary arrangement 
There are no specific requirements for a company to be eligible for a voluntary
arrangement – it need not be insolvent, unable to pay its debts or likely to become
so as defined by the statutory definitions.  If the company is already in liquidation413
or administration, it would of course have had to comply with the requirements for
those procedures and will thus in most cases be insolvent or likely to become
insolvent or unable to pay its debts.
Although it is not specifically required that the company must be insolvent or
likely to become so as defined by statute,  it is unlikely that the directors of a414
company will propose a voluntary arrangement if the company is not in some sort of
financial distress, and even more unlikely that creditors will accept their proposal,
since it usually provides for late payment or only partial payment of the company’s
debts. The absence of formal requirements regarding insolvency does have the
advantage that directors are able to act as soon as the first signs of serious financial
problems appear,  particularly in the case of smaller companies where it is now415
possible to do so without exposing the company to the risk of creditors making a run
on the company to obtain payment before a voluntary arrangement comes into effect.
3.5 Procedure for a company voluntary arrangement
If a company is in administration or liquidation, the administrator or liquidator will
normally appoint himself as nominee, and the procedure prescribed by the Act
therefore differs according to whether the nominee is the liquidator (or administrator)
or another person.416
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 See part 3.8 below for a discussion of the contents of the proposal.417
 Rule 1.4 of the Insolvency Rules 1986.418
 Rule 1.5 of the Insolvency Rules 1986. After amendment by the Insolvency (Amendment) Rules419
2010, the statement of affairs will have to be delivered at the same time as the proposal, and verified
by a statement of truth by at least one director.
 It will be assumed for the purposes of this discussion that the proposal has been made by the420
directors when the nominee is not the administrator or liquidator of the company, although there is
nothing to prevent an administrator or liquidator from designating another person as nominee. 
 Fletcher Insolvency at 487; Palmer par 14.415; Sealy and Milman Insolvency Legislation at 21. 421
 Section 3(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986. The reason behind this is that an administrator or liquidator422
is always an insolvency practitioner and may thus be assumed to have already made a professional
judgment on the viability and terms of his proposal: Fletcher Insolvency at 487.
 See part 3.5.3 below.423
3.5.1 Notice of proposal
The directors must give written notice of their proposal to the intended nominee by
delivering the notice, accompanied by a copy of the proposal,  to the nominee417
himself or a person authorised to accept delivery on his behalf. If he agrees to act,
the nominee must endorse the date on which he receives the notice on a copy
thereof and immediately return this endorsed copy to the directors.418
The directors must also within seven days after delivery of the proposal deliver
to the nominee a statement of the company’s affairs, certified as correct by at least
two directors (or one director and the company secretary) in which the prescribed
information regarding the company’s assets, liabilities, secured, unsecured,
preferential and connected creditors is disclosed, as well as the names, addresses
and respective shareholdings of the company’s members, and any other information
required in writing by the nominee.419
If the nominee is not the liquidator or administrator of the company, the
directors  will in practice consult the intended nominee beforehand and he would420
usually assist in drawing up the proposal.  The prescribed procedure up to the point421
where meetings of the company’s members and creditors are held to consider the
proposal is thus to a large extent a mere formality.
If the liquidator or administrator is the nominee, this part of the procedure is
omitted  and he immediately proceeds to summon the required meetings.  From422 423
that point onwards the procedure is the same for both situations.  
3.5.2 Report by nominee
Within 28 days (or a longer period allowed by the court) after the recorded date of
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 Section 2(2)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1986 as amended by Schedule 2 to the Insolvency Act 2000.424
 Section 2(2)(b) of the Insolvency Act 1986. In terms of Rule 1.9(1) of the Insolvency Rules of 1986,425
the meetings must be held in the period between 14 and 28 days after the filing of the report in court.
 W hich may be amended by the directors with the written consent of the nominee until just before426
this point: Rule 1.3(3) of the Insolvency Rules. 
 Rule 1.7(1) of the Insolvency Rules. 427
 Rule 1.7(2) of the Insolvency Rules 1986. There is no provision prohibiting the company’s directors from428
seeking out another nominee for a second opinion: Sealy and Milman Insolvency Legislation at 24.
 Rule 1.7(3) of the Insolvency Rules 1986.429
 Section 3(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986; Palmer par 14.414.430
 Rule 1.7(4) of the Insolvency Rules 1986.431
 In terms of s 6A of the Insolvency Act 1986 it is a criminal offence for an officer of the company to432
make any false representation or fraudulently do or omit to do anything for the purpose of obtaining the
approval of members or creditors to a proposal for a voluntary arrangement.
receiving notice of the proposal for a voluntary arrangement, the nominee must
submit a report to the court in which he expresses his opinion on whether the
proposed voluntary arrangement has a reasonable prospect of being approved and
implemented and whether meetings of the company and its creditors should be
summoned to consider the proposal.  If he believes that these meetings should be424
summoned, he must also indicate when and where he proposes that they should be
held.  A copy of the proposal  and a copy or summary of the company’s statement425 426
of affairs must accompany the nominee’s report.427
If the nominee expresses the opinion that the directors’ proposal has a
reasonable prospect of being approved and implemented and that meetings of the
company and its creditors should be summoned, he must attach his comments on
the proposal to his report to court. If he believes otherwise, he must give reasons for
his opinion.  The date on which the nominee’s report is filed in court must be428
endorsed on the report and any director, member or creditor of the company is
entitled to inspect the file at all reasonable times on a business day.  The court429
does not play an active role in this regard, but merely an administrative one, as it
does not give any order for meetings to be held. In spite of this, the nominee is not
allowed to convene the meetings before he has filed his report.  The nominee must430
also send a copy of his report and any comments to the company.431
Although he need not personally verify every minute detail, the nominee may not
merely accept the information supplied in the proposal and statement of affairs
without query, especially not if there is reason to doubt whether the information
supplied by the directors is complete or truthful.  In such a case he is expected to432
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 Picarda Receivers, Managers and Administrators at 588 in his discussion of the judgment in Re a Debtor433
(No 140 IO of 1995) [1996] 2 BCLC 429. Although this case dealt with an individual voluntary arrangement,
Picarda submits that the same principles would apply to a company voluntary arrangement.
 Rule 1.6 of the Insolvency Rules 1986.434
 Section 2(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986 as amended by par 3 of Schedule 2 to the Insolvency Act 2000.435
 Insolvency Legislation at 25.436
 Section 3(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986.437
take at least reasonable steps to satisfy himself on three aspects in particular: 
(a) that the company’s substantially real financial situation is represented to the creditors;
(b) that the proposal has a real prospect of being implemented in the way it is
presented to the creditors’ meeting; and 
(c) that the information he has does not indicate an unavoidable prospective
unfairness in his functions.  433
The nominee may also request further information from the directors if he cannot
properly prepare his report on the information that he already has.  This would434
include more information on the circumstances of and reasons for the company’s
insolvency or threatened insolvency and particulars of previous proposals for a
voluntary arrangement.
If the nominee fails to submit his report or has died (presumably before
submitting the report), the directors may apply to court for the appointment of another
person to replace the nominee. The directors or the nominee may also bring such an
application if it is impracticable or inappropriate for the nominee to continue acting
as such.  As Sealy and Milman  point out, there does not seem to be any reason435 436
why the procedure could not simply be aborted under these circumstances without
approaching the court, because no creditor would as yet have been approached or
even be aware of the intended proposal. However, they believe that the consent of
the nominee would be required, as ethical rules might prevent a colleague from
replacing him against his wishes. If this consent is refused, the court would have to
become involved. 
3.5.3 Meetings of creditors and members
If the report of the nominee states that meetings of the company and its creditors
should be held, they must be summoned by the nominee for the date, time and place
as specified in the report.  Where the nominee is the liquidator or administrator he437
ENGLAND-228-
 Section 3(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986.438
 Rule 1.13 of the Insolvency Rules. The reference to seven days will be amended to clarify that it439
means “business days” once the amendments to the Rules come into operation in 2010.
 Rules 1.9(2) and 1.11(1) respectively of the Insolvency Rules.440
 Rules 1.9(3) and 1.11(2) respectively of the Insolvency Rules.441
 Insolvency Rule 1.16.442
 Insolvency Rules Part 1, Chapter 5 (Rules 1.13-1.21).443
 This differs from the more usual requirement of just 75 per cent voting in favour of a resolution.444
However, Rule 1.19(1) will be replaced by Rule 1.19(2) of the draft Insolvency (Amendment) Rules
2010 which stipulates “three-quarters or more (in value)”.
 Insolvency Rule 1.19. Rule 1.17(3) allows a creditor whose claim is for an unliquidated amount or445
a debt whose value is not ascertained, to vote but for this purpose his vote is valued at £1 unless the
chairman agrees to put a higher value on it. The creditor’s acceptance of this value is not necessary:
Palmer par 14.422. 
 Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 272 state that it is unclear why importance is attached446
to notice of the meeting having been sent. Strictly speaking, the vote of a creditor who did not receive
notice but somehow learns of the meeting, attends and votes against the proposal, should then not be
decides on the date and place of the meetings.  The meeting of creditors must438
always be held before that of the members, and if not held on the same day, the
members’ meeting must take place within seven days after the meeting of creditors.
If the meetings for the company’s members and creditors are held on the same date,
they must be held in the same place and then the convenience of the creditors is the
deciding factor when choosing a venue for the meetings.  It is not required that439
separate meetings must be held for the different classes of creditors. 
The meetings are summoned by sending a notice to every known creditor and
member of the company at least 14 days before the meeting.  The notice must contain440
an explanation of the requisite majority votes of creditors required for approval and be
accompanied by copies of the proposal, the statement of affairs and, where applicable,
the nominee’s comments on the proposal.  Notice must also be given to directors and441
other officers of the company whose presence is required, but they may be excluded
from attendance at a meeting, even if they have been notified.  442
3.5.4 Approval of company voluntary arrangement
The procedure to be followed at these meetings is prescribed in detail, including the
voting rights of creditors and members.  For the voluntary arrangement to be443
binding, it must be approved (with or without modifications) by a majority of creditors
in excess  of three-quarters in value (excluding secured or unproved claims) of444
creditors present in person or by proxy and voting.  However, if more than half in445
value of the creditors to whom notice of the meeting was sent,  whose votes are not446
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taken into consideration, but they believe that the courts will in such a case deem the creditor to have
been given notice. 
 Insolvency Rule 1.19(3) stipulates which votes are to be left out of account, such as those in respect447
of secured claims (because secured creditors are not bound unless they consent: see part 3.8 below)
or where written notice of the claim was not given at or before the meeting.
 Defined in s 249 as a director or shadow director, or associate of such persons or associate of the448
company. Section 435 of the Insolvency Act contains a complete list of who will be regarded as an
associate, and includes the husband, wife or civil partner of an individual or a relative of one of them,
a partner, employer or employee of the individual or a person who controls a company. 
 Insolvency Rule 1.19(4).449
 Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 271.450
 Insolvency Rule 1.20.451
 Previously stated in s 5(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986. This section has now been amended by the452
Insolvency Act 2000 to reflect the new situation.
 Section 4A(3) and (4). In spite of this provision, a voluntary arrangement takes effect from the date453
of the creditors’ meeting, although this could be up to seven days before the meeting of members is
being held (s 5(2)(a)). 
 Section 4A(6).454
to be left out of account  and who are not, to the best of the chairman’s belief,447
connected with the company,  vote against approval of the proposal, the resolution448
approving the proposal is invalid.  This double requirement is intended to prevent449
minority creditors being forced into an arrangement by majority creditors who are
closely connected to the company.  450
As far as approval by members is concerned, more than half in value of the
votes (determined by the number of voting rights conferred by the articles of
association) of members present in person or by proxy and voting is required.  451
However, an important amendment was made to the Act by the introduction of
section 4A by the Insolvency Act 2000. Although section 4A(2)(a) repeats the general
principle that a decision regarding the approval of a voluntary arrangement has effect
if taken by the meetings of both the creditors and the members,  section 4A(2)(b)452
provides an alternative by stating that such a decision will also have effect if taken
by the creditors’ meeting only. If a different decision than the one taken by creditors
is taken by the members, a member of the company may within 28 days after the
later of the two decisions was taken apply to court for relief.  The court may order453
that the decision taken by the members, and not the one taken by the creditors,
should have effect or make any other order it deems fit.  454
It is clearly almost entirely up to the creditors of a company whether a voluntary
arrangement will be implemented or not, irrespective of the wishes of the members,
as it seems unlikely that a court would readily interfere with the decision taken in this
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 See Chapter 2, part 4.2. Although no similar procedure exists in Germany, the exclusion of455
members from the insolvency plan, which can also contain a compromise, has led to a situation where
shareholders can undermine the plan by withholding their consent which also has to be obtained in a
separate process: see Chapter 4, part 2.8.1. 
 Section 4(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986.456
 Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 278. 457
 Section 5(2)(b) as substituted by the Insolvency Act 2000. Previously, only persons who had458
received notice of the meeting were bound.
 Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 192 allege that creditors are sometimes deliberately459
omitted from the statement of affairs.
 Insolvency at 497.460
regard by the creditors. In effect the members of a company have been left
powerless in spite of the very obvious interest they have in rescuing the company
although their rights may not be affected by a voluntary arrangement. This once
again illustrates the point that although a company rescue can benefit various
interested parties, the emphasis here remains on the best interests of the creditors.
However, the inclusion of members in the process, although subject to severe
limitations on their rights, ensures that the arrangement will be binding on them,
which is a substantial advantage compared to the new compromise procedure
created by the Companies Act of 2008 in South Africa, where shareholders are not
involved and their consent, if necessary, will have to be obtained in a separate
process.  455
One of the modifications expressly allowed by the Insolvency Act 1986 is a
decision to replace the nominee by another person on whom the relevant functions
are then conferred to supervise the execution of the voluntary arrangement.456
Although the nominee is usually appointed as supervisor, major creditors sometimes
approve an arrangement subject to the condition that their choice of supervisor is
appointed.457
3.5.5 Effects of approval
If the proposal for a voluntary arrangement is approved in terms of section 4A of the
Act it binds every person who was entitled to vote at the meeting (irrespective of
whether he was present or represented at the meeting) or who would have been
entitled to vote if he had notice of the meeting.  Thus even a creditor (or member)458
who did not receive notice of the meeting would be bound.  Fletcher  explains that459 460
this change in the law was effected to prevent creditors that escaped being bound
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 Section 6 is discussed below in this part.461
 “Company Voluntary Arrangements” at 181.462
 Now ss 895-899 of the Companies Act 2006.463
 Inserted into the Insolvency Act 1986 by the Insolvency Act 2000.464
 Unless the arrangement ends prematurely. Section 6, discussed in the next paragraph, also465
provides a right to challenge the arrangement or its approval in court. 
 Section 7(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986.466
 Discussed in part 3.5.5 below.467
 Section 1(2); Sealy and Milman Insolvency Legislation at 22. 468
 Section 5(3). Alternatively, the court may give such directions regarding the administration or469
winding up as it thinks appropriate for facilitating the implementation of the voluntary arrangement. 
 The chairman of each meeting, and not the nominee/supervisor, has to report the outcome of the470
meeting to the court and prescribed persons: s 4(6) of the Insolvency Act 1986. In terms of Rule 1.24
of the Insolvency Rules 1986, the report must be filed in court within four days after the meeting and
immediately after that, sent to every person who was notified of the meeting.
from undermining an otherwise acceptable voluntary arrangement, and although he
acknowledges that this is “a suppression of a customary principle of natural justice”,
he refers to the remedy provided by section 6 of the Insolvency Act to challenge a
decision taken at the meeting.  Broc  makes a valid point when she submits that461 462
under the previous dispensation a voluntary arrangement was weakened by the
existence of creditors who were not bound by it, thereby putting the procedure at a
disadvantage compared to the more expensive and cumbersome scheme of
arrangement under section 425 of the Companies Act 1985.  However, these463
creditors are now accorded special protection by section 5(2A),  which makes the464
company liable for payment to such persons of any amount payable under the
arrangement but not yet paid when the arrangement comes to an end.465
If a voluntary arrangement takes effect in terms of section 4A, the nominee or
other person who has been given the task of executing the voluntary arrangement
in terms of the approval is now referred to as the supervisor of the voluntary
arrangement.  In most cases the nominee appointed in the proposal also continues466
to act as the supervisor  who administers the voluntary arrangement after it has467
been approved, and the Act seems to assume that this will be so in its description of
the nominee.  If the company is being wound up or an administration order is in468
force, the court may stay all proceedings in the winding up or discharge the
administration order  once a period of 28 days has expired after the approval of the469
meetings has been reported to the court  – the period within which the decisions of470
the meetings may be challenged in court by a person entitled to vote at one of the
meetings, or by the nominee, the liquidator or administrator. 
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 Section 6. A person who was not notified of the meeting must apply to court within 28 days from the471
day on which he first became aware that the meeting had taken place. 
 Section 6(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986. The court does not have the power to make its own472
amendments or make a proposal for consideration by the meetings: Sealy and Milman Insolvency
Legislation at 32. However, the writers (at 34) refer to the decision in Re FMS Financial Management
Services Ltd (1989) 5 BCC 191 that a certain group should be treated as creditors and included in the
voluntary arrangement already agreed to by other creditors, although this resulted in the other creditors
getting a substantially smaller dividend. 
 Although the Act places no limitation on persons that may apply, an applicant will presumably have473
to show some interest in the matter: Sealy and Milman Insolvency Legislation at 34. 
 Section 7(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986.474
 Section 7(4)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1986.475
 Section 7(4)(b) of the Insolvency Act 1986.476
 Broc “Company Voluntary Arrangements” at 182-183. 477
 W ith the exception of s 233 of the Insolvency Act, which prohibits a supplier of gas, electricity, water478
or communications services from making the giving of any further supplies subject to the condition that
The grounds on which the application to court may be made are that the
arrangement unfairly prejudices the interests of a member or creditor or that there
has been some material irregularity in relation to either of the two meetings.  The471
court may revoke or suspend any approval given at one or both of the meetings and
may give directions for further meetings to be summoned to consider a revised
proposal put forward by the same person who made the original one.  472
The supervisor has to act in terms of the approved voluntary arrangement and
the Rules issued in terms of the Insolvency Act 1986 but the court has also been
given almost unlimited powers to oversee his conduct. Any creditor or other person473
dissatisfied by any act, omission or decision of the supervisor may apply to court for
an order to reverse or modify such act or decision or to give directions to the
supervisor or make any other order the court considers appropriate.  The supervisor474
may also apply to court for directions in relation to any matter arising under the
voluntary arrangement  and may apply for the winding up of the company or an475
administration order.  The decisions of the courts in cases involving company476
voluntary arrangements have thus far proved to be supportive and helpful in finding
practical solutions to contentious questions, thereby avoiding delays and
unnecessary litigation that could have undermined this rescue procedure.   477
3.6 The moratorium
As was mentioned before, the company voluntary arrangement procedure did not
originally make any provision for a moratorium.  As a result the procedure was mainly478
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payment must first be made for supplies given to the company before the date on which a voluntary
arrangement (or other insolvency processes) came into effect. 
 By way of the Insolvency Act 2000 with effect from 1 January 2003.479
 Paragraph 3 of Schedule A1.480
 Section 382(3)-(6) of the Companies Act 2006.481
 Corporate Insolvency at 491. She agrees with the view expressed by Fletcher that the chief reason482
seemed to be “the desire to channel all rescue proceedings involving larger companies through the
new, streamlined administration procedure” (fn 59).   
 Available on the Insolvency Service website at <http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/index.htm> accessed483
on 22 January 2010.  
used in combination with administration, which defeated the purpose of creating an
inexpensive procedure as envisaged by the Cork Report. An attempt has now been
made to rectify this problem, although only in respect of certain companies, by the
introduction of section 1A of and Schedule A1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.  479
3.6.1 Eligibility for moratorium
Section 1A states that the directors of an eligible company may take steps as
prescribed in Schedule A1 to obtain a moratorium when they intend to make a
proposal for a voluntary arrangement. An eligible company is defined as a company
that satisfies at least two of the three requirements for being a small company as
specified in section 382(3) of the Companies Act 2006 in the year ending with the
date of filing of the documents for obtaining the moratorium or in the immediately
preceding financial year.  The three requirements for a small company are that its480
annual turnover may not exceed £6.5 million, its balance sheet total may not be more
than £3.26 million and the number of employees may not exceed 50.  481
Finch remarks that companies meeting these requirements are “very small
companies indeed” and endorses the view that there is no good reason for restricting the
moratorium to small companies instead of making it available to all companies.  This is482
obviously a widely-held view, and the Insolvency Service is consequently considering the
extension of the moratorium to all companies. A discussion document entitled Encouraging
Company Rescue - a consultation, was issued by the Insolvency Service in June 2009.483
Comments were invited on two proposals for extending the moratorium in company
voluntary arrangements: Proposal A was to extend the current moratorium of Schedule A1
to the Insolvency Act 1986 to medium and large-sized companies as well, thereby allowing
all companies to benefit from this option, while Proposal B was to create an additional new
procedure for a court-sanctioned moratorium of up to three months which would be
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 Ministerial Statement Insolvency Service Consultation on Encouraging Company Rescue available484
at <http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/index.htm> accessed on 22 January 2010.
 Such as insurance companies, banks, companies operating in the financial market and other485
institutions protected by the Banking Act 1987: par 2(2) of Schedule A1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.
 Such as a company in administration or liquidation or where a provisional liquidator or administrative486
receiver has been appointed or a voluntary arrangement is already in effect: par 4(1). 
 Paragraph 4(1)(f) of Schedule A1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.487
 Paragraph 6(1) of Schedule A1.488
 Paragraph 6(2)(b) of Schedule A1. The directors have to supply the nominee with the information489
he needs to meet this requirement: par 6(1)(c). 
available to all companies. The majority of the respondents expressed support for the new
proposals and the Insolvency Service will now develop more detailed proposals.  484
Certain specific types of companies are excluded  as well as companies that485
already are in some insolvency or rescue procedure.  To prevent directors from486
abusing the procedure, there is a further exclusion of any company that was in
administration in the immediately preceding twelve months, or that had a moratorium
in force at any time in the preceding twelve months where no voluntary arrangement
had been in force when the moratorium ended or the voluntary arrangement ended
prematurely.487
3.6.2 Procedure
The procedure for obtaining the moratorium and subsequent consideration and
implementation of a voluntary arrangement is very similar to that described above for
a voluntary arrangement without a moratorium. The directors are required to furnish
the nominee with a written statement of the terms of the proposed voluntary
arrangement and prescribed information on the company’s assets, debts and
liabilities and any other information required by the nominee to form a professional
opinion on the prospects of the voluntary arrangement.  488
An important difference is that the nominee does not submit his report on the
directors’ proposals to the court but to the directors. This report must state whether, in
the opinion of the nominee, “the proposed voluntary arrangement has a reasonable
prospect of being approved and implemented, the company is likely to have sufficient
funds available to it during the proposed moratorium to enable it to carry on its business,
and meetings of the company and its creditors should be summoned”.  489
If the nominee’s report is favourable, the directors may then file with the court the
document setting out the terms of the proposed voluntary arrangement, the nominee’s
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 Paragraph 7 of Schedule A1.490
 Brown Corporate Rescue at 663; Palmer par 14.444.491
 “Insolvency Bill” at 63.492
 Corporate Insolvency at 501-502.493
 Corporate Rescue at 663-664.494
 This point was in fact raised by respondents to the proposals of the Insolvency Service in this495
regard. It was pointed out that the perceived risk to a nominee when expressing an opinion on the
viability of a company voluntary arrangement was already proving to be one of the main obstacles to
a wider use of the Schedule A1 moratorium and would therefore have to be addressed if the proposals
for a wider application of the moratorium were adopted: The Insolvency Service Encouraging Company
Rescue Summary of Responses (Nov 2009) par 17.  
 Paragraph 8(1) of Schedule A1. 496
 In terms of Rule 5 of the Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2009 (SI 2009/642), the word “forthwith”497
was replaced with the words “as soon as reasonably practicable” wherever it appeared in the
Insolvency Rules 1986.
statement and his consent to act, a statement of the company’s affairs and a statement
that the company is eligible for a moratorium.  The professional opinion of the nominee490
is the deciding factor as to whether a company is able to obtain a moratorium, and the
nominee thus has the responsibility to prevent abuse or exploitation of the procedure by
the directors of a company that is doomed to fail.  This aspect was criticised by491
Steiner  on the grounds that it was not clear whether the nominee was merely required492
to exercise professional judgment or whether he was required to approach the major
creditors, which could be fatal because the creditors would then have due warning of the
intended moratorium. It is submitted that the last-mentioned interpretation is unlikely to
have been the intention of the legislation and, as a result, there is a considerable
responsibility resting on the shoulders of the nominee. Finch  refers to the “difficult” role493
of the nominee in this respect because he has to rely heavily on the information supplied
to him by the directors and does not have the time or the power to personally conduct
a thorough investigation of the company’s affairs. She agrees with Brown  that if too494
much reliance is placed on the nominee acting as a “filter” for unviable cases, it will
inevitably lead to a procedure that was intended to be fast and inexpensive becoming
“prohibitively expensive and slow” since the nominee will try to protect himself by a “due
diligence” investigation resulting in increased costs and delays. If, as discussed above,
the moratorium is extended to medium and large companies as well, this will become an
even greater problem for nominees since the affairs of the company will be even more
complicated and difficult to assess.       495
The moratorium comes into force when the above documents are filed with the
court.  The nominee must “as soon as reasonably practicable”  advertise the496 497
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 Rule 1.40(2). Before its amendment by the Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2009 which apply to all498
company voluntary arrangements commencing on or after 6 April 2009, the Rule required that the
notice should also be published in a newspaper. This is one example of the modernisation and
consolidation project of the Insolvency Service referred to in part 1 above to, among other things,
remove unnecessary costs in the administration of insolvency processes.      
 See part 3.5.3 above.499
 Paragraph 12(1) of Schedule A1.500
 Paragraphs 9 and 10 provide for notification of the beginning and end of the moratorium, pars 16501
and 17 ensure that anyone doing business with the company will be informed of the moratorium and
par 18 regulates disposals and payments by the company. The nominee is also specifically instructed
to monitor the company’s affairs during a moratorium to ensure that the proposed arrangement still has
a reasonable prospect of being approved and implemented and that the company is likely to have
sufficient funds available to continue carrying on its business until the moratorium comes to an end:
par 24(1) of Schedule A1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.
 Paragraph 40 of Schedule A1. See further part 3.6.4 below.502
coming into force of the moratorium in the Gazette, but may exercise his own
discretion as to whether any further publication is necessary and if so, what form it
will take.  As a result of this notice, the financial problems of the company will498
become known to its creditors at an earlier stage than in the case of a CVA without
a moratorium, where creditors are informed about the proposed arrangement for the
first time when they are called to the meeting to consider the proposal.  499
3.6.3 Effect of moratorium
The moratorium is wide in its application and forbids any steps to enforce security
over the company’s property as well as any other proceedings, execution or other
legal process against the company or its property, without the leave of the court.
During the period that the moratorium is in force, no petition for the winding up of the
company or for an administration order may be presented, no meeting of the
company may be held without the consent of the nominee or the court, no resolution
may be passed or order made for the winding up of the company and no
administrative receiver may be appointed.500
The activities of the company are strictly controlled and monitored during the
period of the moratorium and even limited in some aspects to avoid any possible
abuse.  Any creditor or member of the company may furthermore apply to court for501
an appropriate order that could include ending the moratorium, on the grounds that
the directors are or have been managing the company’s affairs, business and
property in an unfairly prejudicial way to the interests of its creditors or members in
general or some part of them.  Officers of the company are held accountable for502
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 Paragraph 41 of Schedule A1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. These acts include removing or503
concealing company property worth more than £500 and concealing, destroying or falsifying company
documents or book entries or disposing, pledging or pawning property of the company obtained on
credit and not yet paid for. 
 Paragraph 14.444.504
 Paragraph 14.406. This view is shared by Fletcher Insolvency at 481, who believes that if there is505
no danger of disruption of the procedure by a non-assenting creditor, the benefits of the original
procedure – simplicity and the avoidance of excessive publicity – may outweigh those of the new
procedure.
 In terms of par 24 of Schedule A1.506
 In terms of par 27 of Schedule A1.507
 Steiner “Insolvency Bill” at 64.508
their actions not only during the moratorium but also during the twelve months
immediately preceding the moratorium: any officer (including a shadow director) who
during this period did one of a list of prohibited things or knew about others doing
some specified ones is regarded as having committed an offence and liable to
imprisonment and/or a fine.503
The process is so heavily regulated that Palmer  describes it as “exacting” but504
concedes that the threshold requirements in particular have to prevent exploitation
of the procedure by directors who may use the moratorium as a delaying tactic when
the company in reality has no chance of survival. However, as a result of these
onerous requirements as opposed to the relative simplicity of the original procedure
and the possibility of avoiding too much publicity during a financially sensitive period,
some companies that do qualify for the moratorium choose the original and riskier
voluntary arrangement over the new procedure.505
This illustrates the dilemma associated with any rescue procedure that, in an
effort to make it fairly simple and not too expensive, is informal and unregulated and
thus open to abuse. As a result there has to be considerable supervision that
inevitably raises the costs of the procedure and renders the procedure too difficult
and demanding to become widely used or popular. There is also a fear that
nominees may insist on even closer supervision than intended by the legislation
because of the heavy responsibility they bear during the moratorium to monitor the
company’s activities closely  and the possibility of being held personally liable for506
losses suffered by the company as a result of their acts, omissions or decisions.507
This will again have the result that the costs of the moratorium will be higher than
intended.  508
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 In terms of par 29 the nominee must summon meetings of the company and every known creditor509
of the company.
 Paragraph 8(2) of Schedule A1. The strict limitation on the duration of the moratorium is one of the510
measures intended to prevent abuse of the procedure: Palmer par 14.404.
 Paragraph 32.511
 Paragraph 25 of Schedule A1.512
 Paragraph 26 of Schedule A1.513
 Section 122(1)(fa) of the Insolvency Act 1986.514
 Rule 1.42(1). In terms of a new Rule 1.42(1A) to be introduced by the draft Insolvency (Amendment)515
Rules 2010 the notice will, apart from the standard contents (to be prescribed by a new Rule 12A.32),
also have to state the nature of the company’s business, that the moratorium has come to an end and
the date on which it ended.
3.6.4 Termination of moratorium
A moratorium ends on the day on which the meetings of creditors and members
summoned to approve or reject the proposed voluntary arrangement  take place (or509
the later of the two if held on different days), or 28 days after coming into force,
whichever is the first.  This period may be extended by a meeting of creditors or510
members if they decide to adjourn their meeting, but the extended period may not
exceed a period of two months after the first meeting was held.511
The moratorium will come to a premature end if the nominee withdraws his
consent to act, which he is compelled to do if at any time he comes to the conclusion
that the proposed voluntary arrangement no longer has a reasonable prospect of
being approved or implemented, or the company will not have sufficient funds to
continue its business, or the company was not eligible for the moratorium in the first
place or the directors fail to provide him with any information he needs to monitor the
company’s affairs during the moratorium.512
The moratorium may also be terminated by an order of court on the application
of a creditor, director or member of the company or any other person affected by it
if they are dissatisfied with any action taken or omitted by the nominee.  A513
moratorium that comes to an end without any voluntary arrangement having been
approved constitutes one of the specific grounds on which a company may be wound
up by the court.  The nominee must gazette a notice of the moratorium coming to514
its end as soon as reasonably practicable after it has ended, and may further
advertise the notice as he thinks is appropriate.515
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 Inserted by the Insolvency Act 2000.516
 Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 201.517
 Section 389A(2) and (6).518
 Section 389A(5).519
 Section 389A(7).520
3.7 Managing the procedure 
3.7.1 Nominee and supervisor
The appointment of the nominee and supervisor takes place as explained above and
is an integral part of the voluntary arrangement procedure. Before the enactment of
the Insolvency Act 2000, the Insolvency Act 1986 provided that both the nominee
and supervisor must be qualified insolvency practitioners meeting the same
requirements as an administrator. However, as part of the effort to reduce the costs
associated with the voluntary administration procedure, this is no longer required. It
is now also possible for a person who is not authorised to act as an insolvency
practitioner to act as nominee or supervisor of a voluntary arrangement, provided that
he is authorised to act as such in terms of section 389A of the Insolvency Act
1986.  The intention behind this amendment was to enable individuals with516
business rescue experience rather than accountants, to assist small companies in
particular and prevent them from entering insolvency.  517
A person may be authorised to act as nominee or supervisor of a voluntary
arrangement if he is a member (and/or subject to the rules) of a body recognised for
this purpose by the Secretary of State and has given security for the proper
performance of his functions.  A body may be recognised for this purpose if it518
maintains and enforces rules to ensure that its members are fit and proper persons
to act as nominees or supervisors and meet acceptable requirements regarding
education, practical training and experience.  However, to date no such bodies519
have been recognised.
The recognition of a body may be revoked by the Secretary of State if it appears
to him that it no longer complies with the requirements.  No provision has been520
made for direct authorisation by the Secretary of State to act as nominee or
supervisor as in the case of insolvency practitioners. 
A person is disqualified from acting as nominee or supervisor if at the time he is
an undischarged bankrupt, subject to a disqualification order or disqualification
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 Section 389A(3).521
 Section 389(1) read with s 389A(3).522
 Rule 1.23(1) of the Insolvency Rules.523
 Rule 1.26(1) of the Insolvency Rules.524
 Sealy and Milman Insolvency Legislation at 22. The writers believe that it would have been525
preferable for the supervisor to have been given specific statutory powers and authority because it
would have avoided uncertainty regarding the extent to which the terms of the voluntary arrangement
may override the articles of the company in granting authority to the supervisor. 
 Grier and Floyd Corporate Recovery at 10. Rutstein “Corporate Failure” at 72 refers to the fact that526
directors are often reluctant to hand over management of their companies to insolvency practitioners
because insolvency practitioners are regarded as “financial undertakers” rather than rescuers. 
 In terms of s 6(2) of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 a company is automatically527
regarded as “becoming insolvent” when it enters administration.
undertaking in terms of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, is a mental
patient or lacks capacity.  Acting as a nominee or supervisor without proper521
authorisation is an offence for which the offender can be imprisoned or fined or
both.522
3.7.2 Powers and duties of directors 
The supervisor of a voluntary arrangement takes possession and control of only
those assets that are included in the arrangement and must deal with them according
to the terms as agreed in the voluntary arrangement.  This could mean carrying on523
the business of the company, realising assets or otherwise administering or disposing
of company funds.  524
The supervisor does not have the powers given to an administrator and the
management of the company therefore remains in the hands of the directors. The
supervisor has only those powers given to him in terms of the voluntary arrangement
or flowing from his appointment as administrator or liquidator.  The fact that525
management is not replaced may be an advantage from the point of view of the
directors and may encourage them to put forward proposals at an early stage that will
satisfy the creditors without having to subject themselves to the level of control that
an administrator will exercise if the company enters administration.  526
In the past, some directors might also have preferred to make use of the voluntary
arrangement procedure rather than administration because, unlike an administrator,
the nominee or supervisor of a voluntary arrangement was not compelled to report a
director to the Secretary of State where the director’s conduct as director of a company
that had become insolvent,  made him unfit to be concerned in the management of527
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 Sections 6 and 7 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.528
 Section 1(1) of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. The stipulated period may be529
anything from two to 15 years. Sealy and Milman Insolvency Legislation at 37 believe that the absence
of the duty to report any such offence could have been one of the attractions of company voluntary
arrangements for directors. 
 Introduced by the Insolvency Act 2000.530
 Paragraph 40(2) of Schedule A1.531
 Paragraph 40(3)-(4) of Schedule A1.532
 Paragraph 40(5) of Schedule A1.533
 Rule 1.3(1) of the Insolvency Rules.534
a company.  This was an important issue to consider because such a report may528
result in the disqualification, for a specified period, of such director from being a director
of a company or in any way taking part in or being involved with the promotion,
formation or management of a company without the leave of the court, or from acting
as an insolvency practitioner.  However, section 7A of the Insolvency Act 1986  now529 530
provides for an almost similar duty on the supervisor or nominee to report to the
Secretary of State any past or present officer of the company who appears to have
been guilty of any offence in connection with the moratorium or voluntary arrangement,
for which he is criminally liable. 
The limitation on the powers of the supervisor does not mean that the directors
have a completely free hand in managing the company during the voluntary
arrangement. Specifically in those cases where a moratorium is or was effected, a
creditor or member of the company may challenge any act or omission of the directors
in court. Such an application may be made on the grounds that the company’s affairs,
business and property are being or have been managed in a way that is unfairly
prejudicial to the interests of the creditors or members generally or any part of them,
or that any actual or proposed act or omission of the directors would be prejudicial to
them.  The application may be brought during or after the moratorium and the court531
may make any order it deems fit.  Such an order may in particular regulate the way532
in which the directors manage the company during the remainder of the moratorium,
order them to call a meeting of creditors or terminate the moratorium.  533
3.8 The proposal
In the proposal it must be explained why a voluntary arrangement is desirable as well
as why the creditors would be willing to agree to such an arrangement.  Other534
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 Rule 1.3(2) of the Insolvency Rules 1986. The draft Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2010 will also535
add a general par (2)(r) requiring that the proposal must disclose any other information that is regarded
as appropriate to ensure that the members and creditors are able to reach an informed decision on the
proposal.
 Rule 1.3(2)(h), (o) and (p) of the Insolvency Rules 1986.536
 Palmer par 14.412. Fletcher Insolvency at 496 refers to the fact that although the basic requirement537
remains the acceptance of the proposal by creditors and members, s 4A(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986
(discussed in part 3.5.4 above) enables a proposal to take effect with the approval of only the creditors.
 Fletcher Insolvency at 485; Palmer par 14.412.538
 “Company Voluntary Arrangements” at 180.539
prescribed information that must be contained in the proposal includes details of the
company’s assets with the estimated value of each asset and the extent to which any
asset is subject to security in favour of creditors, an indication which particular assets
are to be excluded from the voluntary arrangement, particulars of property which is not
part of the assets of the company but will be included in the arrangement, liabilities of
the company and how it is intended to deal with the various types of claims, how the
business of the company is to be conducted during the course of the arrangement and
what further credit facilities are to be arranged for the company.  The proposed535
duration of the arrangement and proposed dates on which distributions to creditors will
be made, as well as the estimated amounts of such payments, must also be disclosed.
Details of the person proposed as supervisor of the voluntary arrangement, payment
of his remuneration and expenses and his functions must also be included.536
Although the Rules are quite specific about the formal matters that must be dealt
with in the proposal, section 1 of the Insolvency Act 1986 contains almost no
prescriptions regarding the terms and substance of the proposal for a voluntary
arrangement except to state that the proposal must be for a composition in
satisfaction of the company’s debts or a scheme of arrangement of its affairs. As a
result there is considerable flexibility regarding the type of arrangement and the terms
that may be proposed, subject only to the question whether they will be acceptable
to the required majority of creditors.  Examples of the terms that an arrangement537
could validly contain include a term that unsecured creditors are to receive a different
payment from what they would have received in a liquidation, or that smaller claims
are to be paid before large ones or even that non-preferential, unsecured creditors
will receive no payment.  Broc  also suggests the company voluntary arrangement538 539
as an appropriate way to sell company assets or the business as a going concern,
or to facilitate the reorganisation of a company, which would be followed by an
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 Sealy and Milman in Insolvency Legislation (2004) at 20 suggested that, where administration and540
a voluntary arrangement were combined, it would be more practical to obtain the administration order
first, after which the administrator himself could act as nominee and supervisor of the scheme. 
 Part 2.8.2 above.541
 Goode Corporate Insolvency Law at 403-404. If there is no express provision preventing creditors542
from enforcing their claims while the company is still in the process of complying or has already
complied with its obligations in terms of the scheme of arrangement, the court may, depending on the
terms of the arrangement, imply such a provision: Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 198.
 Section 4(3) and (4).543
 Finch Corporate Insolvency at 490.544
 Insolvency at 484.545
 Fletcher Insolvency at 503.546
 In parts 3.6.4 and 3.7.2.547
administration order to exit from the reorganisation.  As mentioned above,  a540 541
company voluntary arrangement may also follow an administration order as the
means to accomplish the purpose of administration. The proposal should therefore
include as much information as possible to assist (and persuade) creditors in making
their decision whether to accept the proposal. Provision should also be made for a
moratorium that would prevent any creditor bound by the arrangement from instituting
an action to pursue his claim outside the arrangement.  542
Secured and preferential creditors are expressly protected by the Act  in that543
no proposal affecting their rights may be approved without the consent of each such
affected creditor.  However, the fact remains that their rights may be modified with544
their concurrence, and the overall policy in this regard is referred to by Fletcher as
one of “laissez-faire”.545
There is no provision in the Act for variation of the arrangement after it has been
approved, and so the terms of the arrangement should preferably include an express
power of variation or modification. If it does not, an amendment to address unexpected
problems would be possible only if all interested parties agreed to it or an application was
made to court, the last-mentioned resulting in added costs and other complications.546
3.9 Termination of voluntary arrangement
A voluntary arrangement that has not been terminated prematurely in one of the
ways described above  is completed once the supervisor has fully implemented the547
proposal as approved by the meetings. Within 28 days after its final completion the
supervisor must send a notice to all the members and creditors of the company
bound by the voluntary arrangement to the effect that it has been fully implemented.
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 Rule 1.29(1)-(2) of the Insolvency Rules.548
 Rule 1.29(3) of the Insolvency Rules.549
 Lightman and Moss Administrators par 2-017.550
 Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 193.551
 See part 3.6.1.552
 Broc “Company Voluntary Arrangements” at 188; Steiner “Insolvency Bill” at 62.553
 “Corporate Failure” at 74.554
This notice must be accompanied by a report of the supervisor setting out all receipts
and payments made by him in terms of the arrangement and explaining any
differences between the actual implementation of the voluntary arrangement and the
proposal as originally approved.  Within the same period, a copy of the notice and548
report must also be sent to the registrar of companies and the court.  No other549
formalities are required to terminate the voluntary arrangement officially. 
3.10 Evaluation of company voluntary arrangements
Before the introduction of the moratorium for smaller companies in a voluntary
arrangement by the Insolvency Act 2000, the procedure was not popular in spite of
having all the characteristics that many commentators regard as the most important
for a successful rescue procedure: it is easy and relatively inexpensive to commence,
the creditors have control over the way in which the rescue will be effected, the
procedure is fairly informal and involvement by the courts is limited. The new
provisions that should have popularised voluntary arrangements, particularly for
smaller companies that had the most to benefit from these amendments,
unfortunately do not seem to have had much of an impact.  This is probably as a550
result of the amendments made to the administration procedure by the Enterprise Act
2002 which came into effect on 15 September 2003, a mere nine months after the
introduction of the moratorium, and which made administration more accessible.551
For medium-sized and large companies, administration will remain the better option
as long as they cannot make use of the moratorium although, as indicated above, there
is now a real possibility of its extension to all companies.  This possibility was foreseen552
at the initial introduction of the moratorium by commentators who believed that,
depending on how effective and popular it turned out to be, it might eventually be
widened to include bigger companies.  As Rutstein  points out, however, it must be553 554
remembered that even after the amendments company voluntary arrangements are not
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 Milman “Opinion” at 2 refers to a “sneaking suspicion” that the moratorium will not be widely used555
because it is over-regulated and because of the reforms to the administration procedure. This is
confirmed by the statistics quoted by Broc “Impact” at 105 of the number of annual company voluntary
arrangements from 1992 to 2005 indicating only a moderate impact of the moratorium and also by
Sealy and Milman Insolvency Legislation at 23. However, in a discussion of the official insolvency
statistics for the period from October 2008 to September 2009, Milman “Overview” at 2 points out that
company voluntary arrangements had increased by about 16 per cent in this period, and ascribes it to
the media prominence given to company voluntary arrangements of large retail chains in England.  
 Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 202.556
 See Chapter 2, part 4.6.557
 Bailey and Groves Corporate Insolvency at 202.558
free from criticism: they are often seen as a stalling tactic delaying the inevitable failure
of the company and could be a means by which incompetent or dishonest management
keep themselves in office. On the other hand, the exacting but unavoidable regulation
of the moratorium procedure, which is designed to prevent abuse, may discourage
eligible companies from using it; preferring, instead, to enter administration by way of the
new and fairly simple process.  555
In favour of the company voluntary arrangement it must be said, however, that
it is extremely flexible, that it is less costly than other insolvency procedures, and that
it may be structured to avoid capital gains tax  and may effect the rescue of a small556
company without its having to enter an insolvency procedure such as administration
or liquidation with the resulting damage to its reputation. None of these advantages
are visible in the newly created compromise with creditors introduced into South
African law by the Companies Act of 2008,  and with the added disadvantage that557
no moratorium is available during this procedure, I see very little reason to believe
that it will be successful in the rescue of any South African company, big or small.
Some of the disadvantages of company voluntary arrangements are that there
is no provision for detrimental transactions to be set aside and claims for wrongful
trading or malfeasance may not be made against directors or other officers.  558
4 CONCLUSION 
Apart from the historical link between the corporate laws of England and South Africa,
there are definite and clear similarities between the corporate rescue procedures as well.
These similarities have become even more as a result of the new procedures introduced
into South African law by the Companies Act of 2008 and include the fact that both
administration and business rescue proceedings may be commenced without
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 See part 3.5.5 above.559
approaching the court, that both apply primarily to companies and were thus designed
with companies in mind, and that both involve the appointment of an outsider to take
over the management of the company during the rescue process. 
The new compromise procedure introduced by the Companies Act of 2008 differs
from the company voluntary arrangement in several respects, but the experience in
England with the CVA procedure should provide South Africa with an indication of where
problems may be expected. Unfortunately, the South African drafters do not seem to
have heeded these potential problems, as appears from the absence of a moratorium
in the South African procedure, although this has proved to be the single most
problematic aspect of company voluntary arrangements. In addition, the South African
provisions are extremely formalistic and prescriptive with regard to the contents of the
proposal, requiring detailed information that often seems completely unnecessary. The
requirement in South Africa that a court must approve the proposal after its adoption by
the required majority of creditors is also an unnecessary feature since a compromise or
arrangement is contractual in nature and the role of the court should have been limited,
as in England, to instances where serious objections are raised against the approved
proposal on grounds of unfair prejudice or irregularities.  559
In spite of the South African Department of Trade and Industry’s original intention
to look at the American Chapter 11 procedure, it is clear that the culture and attitudes
which influence our corporate insolvency law are far closer to those prevailing in
England than in America.
Perhaps the most important lesson that South Africa can learn from England is that
corporate rescue is not a static area of law which, once established, can be left
unchanged for decades as happened in the case of judicial management. It needs to be
streamlined, adapted and modernised all the time to keep up with the ever-changing
circumstances under which it operates. If the South African legislation regulating judicial
management had been subjected to regular assessment, evaluation and improvement,
it would not have been necessary to replace judicial management with completely new
proceedings that will require some time for practitioners and company directors to
familiarise themselves with all their intricacies and implications before those practitioners
and directors will be prepared to make use of them.
 In keeping with the German legislative tradition of referring to statutes and codes by their1
abbreviations, the abbreviated form of the name is normally used when referring to the
Insolvenzordnung: Flessner “Germany” at 313. The abbreviation will be used throughout this Chapter
when referring to the Insolvenzordnung, and all references to sections or provisions or “the Code” will
be to the Insolvenzordnung unless specifically stated otherwise. 
 BGBl. I S 2866.2
 Reichgesetzblatt (RGBl. S 351). In English this is usually referred to as the Bankruptcy Act: Remmert3
“Introduction” at 427.
 Composition Act (RGBl. I S 321). This statute was enacted during the Nazi regime and therefore,4
rather than promoting reorganisation of all potentially successful businesses, it reflected the national-
socialist views on public welfare and reserved this benefit for “deserving” and “respectable” businesses.
Debtors who had become insolvent through “dishonesty, price cutting or imprudence” were not allowed
to use this procedure: Schiessl “Comparative Analysis” at 237-238; also Flessner Sanierung at 17. 
 Collective Enforcement Act; Gesetzblatt der DDR (Gbl. I 32, 285).5
 Flessner “Germany” at 313.6
 According to Ehlers “Statutory Corporate Rescue” at 155, it was no mere coincidence that this was7
also the year in which the United States Bankruptcy Code (Title 11, United States Code) was passed
– 1978 marked a new era of insolvency law globally. 
 The Kommission für Insolvenzrecht (Commission for Insolvency Law), which consisted of academics,8
practitioners, insolvency judges, trustees and representatives from trade unions and business: Schiessl
“Comparative Analysis” at 234. 
 Bundesministerium der Justiz Erster Bericht der Kommission für Insolvenzrecht, Köln,1985; Zweiter9
Bericht der Kommission für Insolvenzrecht, Köln, 1986. 
CHAPTER 4
GERMANY
1 INTRODUCTION
The Insolvenzordnung (InsO)  or Insolvency Code of 5 October 1994  came into1 2
force on 1 January 1999 and replaced all existing insolvency and business rescue
legislation and proceedings in the old East and West Germany respectively. Up to
that date, the Konkursordnung  of 10 February 1877 and the Vergleichsordnung  of3 4
26 February 1935 had respectively regulated liquidation and composition
proceedings in the old West Germany. In the old East Germany the
Gesamtvollstreckungsordnung  of 1990, enacted as a provisional measure after the5
reunification of Germany, substantially kept the previous insolvency legislation dating
from just after the Second World War, in force in the former East German states.  6
The process of extensive reform to the insolvency law started in West Germany
in 1978  with the appointment of a commission of insolvency experts to make7
recommendations on a fundamental reform of the insolvency law.  The Commission8
delivered its reports in 1985 and 1986  but the proposed new insolvency legislation9
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 Balz and Landfermann Insolvenzgesetze at XXXIV-XXXV; Flessner “Germany” at 314; Schiessl10
“Comparative Analysis” at 259.
 Ehlers “Statutory Corporate Rescue” at 155; Henckel “Einleitung” at 2-3. See also generally Binz and11
Hess Konkurs, which is a publication specifically aimed at proving that a total reform of insolvency law
was unnecessary (see in particular the summary at 45); Gravenbrucher Kreis “Alternativentwurf”, which
proposed minor amendments to the Konkursordnung that they believed would be sufficient. 
 The first was a draft Bill, the Regierungs-Entwurf einer Insolvenzordnung in 1991. After some12
amendments by the Legal Committee of the Lower House of Parliament (Rechtsausschusses des
Deutschen Bundestages, which is more or less the equivalent of the parliamentary portfolio committees
in South Africa), the final draft was accepted in April 1994: Stewart Insolvency Code at 10. 
 See, for example, Grub “Sanierungsfeindlich” at 397, who argued that the new draft legislation would13
make business rescues more difficult; Grub and Rinn “Freifahrschein” at 1587, who concluded that the
legislation was too debtor friendly and would result in more debtors defaulting on their payments. Balz
and Landfermann Insolvenzgesetze at XLII-XLIII give an overview of the objections.
 Flessner “Germany” at 313. Several critics remained opposed to the final version, however, and the14
Gravenbrucher Kreis sent a document to every member of the Bundestag in an attempt to convince
them not to pass the legislation: see “Appell gegen die Verabschiedung”.
 Title 11, United States Code.15
 The Parliamentary Secretary of State declared that consultations with practitioners and economists16
during an information visit to the United States in 1992 had confirmed that the German legislation had
adopted the successful principles of the American Bankruptcy Code but had omitted the problematic
ones: Funke “Stand der Diskussion” at 447. 
 See, however, part 2.7.2.2 regarding the possibility of self-administration.17
 Ehlers “Statutory Corporate Rescue” at 162.18
 Balz “Logik und Grenzen” at 1440. 19
detailed in these reports was greeted with widespread disapproval.  There was also10
substantial support for the retention, with some amendments, of the 1877
legislation,  but after drastic amendments by the Bundestag to the two successive11
ministerial drafts  that had also been heavily criticised,  the new Insolvenzordnung12 13
was enacted in 1994.14
Whereas the recommendations of the Commission had been heavily influenced by
the reorganisation procedure under Chapter 11 of the American Bankruptcy Code,  the15
final version of the InsO differed from the American proceedings in several important
ways.  Two basic principles of the American reorganisation procedure were rejected by16
the German legislature: firstly, the rule of debtor in possession that in most cases allows
the debtor to remain in control of and continue to operate the business,  and secondly,17
the priority and independence that reorganisation in terms of Chapter 11 enjoys.18
According to the German rule, the rescue of a business should not in itself be the
purpose of insolvency proceedings, but should be an option only if it is clear that the
value of the business as a going concern (the continuation value) is higher than its
liquidation value.  However, the introduction of the option of an insolvency plan to19
restructure the debts of the debtor and allow its business to survive was one of the
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 Ehlers “Statutory Corporate Rescue” at 161.20
 See part 2.8.2.1 below on the plan’s required disclosure.21
 See part 2.8.2.2 below.22
 See part 2.8.3.3 below.23
 Kamlah “German Insolvency Act” at 422-423.24
 InsOÄndG 2001 (Insolvency Code Amendment Act) (BGBl. I S 2710), which came into effect on 125
December 2001. 
 Braun Commentary at 61 par 19. See part 2.2.1 below regarding consumer insolvencies.26
 Act for the Simplification of Insolvency Proceedings (BGBl. I S 509). 27
 Henckel “Einleitung” at 19; Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 6.28
 Discussed in part 2.8 below.29
principles taken over from the American system.  Further examples of such principles20
are the requirement that the insolvency plan must disclose all the information that
creditors may need to assess the plan,  as well as the classification of creditors into21
groups according to the similarity of their claims  and the provisions binding dissenting22
minorities of creditors to the plan (the so-called cram down provisions).23
One of the many grounds on which the InsO has been criticised is that it adopted
the American model without taking into account the differences between European
and American culture and practices, particularly the German belief that the American
system is too debtor friendly.24
The InsO has been amended on several occasions since coming into force.
Of these, the two most important amending Acts are the Gesetz zur Änderung der
Insolvenzordnung und anderer Gesetze v 26.10.2001,  which dealt mainly with25
consumer insolvency,  while the Gesetz zur Vereinfachung des Insolvenzverfahrens26
v 13.4.2007,  which came into force on 1 July 2007, addressed the need to improve27
some aspects of the standard (that is, business) insolvency proceedings.28
2 INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS
2.1 Definition and purpose
§ 1 of the InsO defines the insolvency proceedings by reference to their objective,
namely the satisfaction of the debtor’s creditors either by the liquidation of the
debtor’s assets and distribution of the proceeds, or by way of an arrangement
contained in an insolvency plan  intended to keep the enterprise going. The German29
insolvency procedure is therefore a unitary one in that, at least initially, there is no
difference in the procedure, irrespective of whether liquidation or a rescue of the
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 Flessner “Germany” at 314. See part 2.2.2 below.30
 For example, in England where the terms insolvency, winding up, administration and company31
voluntary arrangement indicate the type of debtor and procedure. 
 Balz AMarket Conformity” at 168; Braun Commentary at 71 pars 63-64 and at 72 par 65.32
 See part 3 below. See also Loubser “Business Rescue” at 161-162 for a discussion of the negative impact33
that the close association of judicial management with insolvency probably had on judicial management. 
 Braun Commentary at 58 par 8 and at 71 par 61; Remmert “Introduction” at 427; W immer and34
Ahrens Frankfurter Kommentar at 8.
 Insurance companies and financial institutions are not excluded but in terms of the35
Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz (Insurance Supervision Act) and Gesetz über das Kreditwesen (Credit
Industry Act) respectively, only the regulating authorities are authorised to initiate their insolvency
proceedings: Flessner “Germany” at 317. 
 These are listed in § 11(2)(1) as a general commercial company, limited partnership, professional36
partnership, company under the Civil Code, shipping company or EEIG.
 § 11(3).37
business is envisaged.  This explains why the general term “insolvency proceedings”30
is used for all procedures under the Code rather than any specific terminology
distinguishing between the liquidation and rescue procedures as found in many other
systems.  It is also noteworthy that the purpose of the proceedings is expressly31
stated to be the satisfaction of creditors’ claims, irrespective of whether this happens
by way of liquidation or reorganisation. 
The procedure contains no bias or built-in preference for rescue or liquidation.32
However, as explained later in this Chapter, the close association and equalisation
of business rescue with liquidation has resulted in insolvency practitioners continuing
to favour liquidation, with which they were familiar before the introduction of the new
legislation, over an insolvency plan to rescue the business.  Of course, this33
approach is strengthened by the legislation, which makes it clear that the main
purpose of the insolvency proceedings remains the most advantageous realisation
of the debtor’s assets and satisfaction of creditors’ claims.  34
2.2 Entities to which insolvency proceedings apply
§ 11(1) provides that insolvency proceedings may be instituted in respect of the
assets owned by or the estate of any individual, corporation  or unincorporated35
association. This is amplified by § 11(2), which specifically includes any “company
without legal personality”,  and deceased or joint estates. Even a company or36
unincorporated association that has already been liquidated or dissolved may be the
subject of insolvency proceedings if the assets have not yet been distributed.  37
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 §§ 304-314.38
 Flessner “Germany” at 316.39
 § 304. This section was substantially amended by the InsOÄndG 2001 to exclude all individuals who40
are still pursuing independent economic activities when insolvency intervenes. 
 Braun Commentary at 524.41
 § 12.42
 In terms of § 3 the insolvency court in whose district the debtor has his main business activity has43
jurisdiction. The Local Court (Amtsgericht) has exclusive jurisdiction as insolvency court: § 2; Braun
Commentary at 73 par 72. This is a local court of first instance that also has jurisdiction in other non-
litigation matters such as adoptions, deceased estates and enforcement of judgments. The insolvency
court has at least one judge assisted by an administrative staff of semi-judicial officers (Rechtspfleger):
Flessner “Germany” at 329-330. Appeals from the insolvency court are decided by the Regional Court
(Landgericht) or if so provided, by the Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht) and from there,
although very rarely, to the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof): Flessner “Germany” at 331-332.
 § 13(1).44
 § 14(1). The grounds on which insolvency proceedings may be commenced are discussed in 2.4 below.45
The general application of the Code to all debtors is qualified by the special
simplified provisions for consumers contained in Part Nine of the InsO.  These38
provisions apply to all individuals who do not currently and have not previously
pursued independent economic activities (that is, natural persons without a business
or professional practice owned by them)  as well as to individuals who in the past39
pursued independent economic activities but who have fewer than 20 creditors at the
time of applying for relief and who have no claims arising out of employment
relationships against them.  40
The special insolvency procedure for consumers differs considerably from the
standard procedure, and the two are mutually exclusive. Furthermore, the court determines
the applicable procedure, and the debtor is not allowed any choice in the matter.  41
Government institutions and assets are specifically excluded from insolvency
proceedings in terms of the Code.42
 
2.3 Power to initiate insolvency proceedings 
Insolvency proceedings must be commenced by way of an application to the
insolvency court  made by the debtor or his creditors.  43 44
Any creditor may apply if he has a legal interest in commencing insolvency
proceedings and is able to provide prima facie proof of both his claim and the
necessary grounds for initiating the proceedings.  The requirement of a legal interest45
is intended to prevent malicious, frivolous or vexatious applications by creditors, and
means that it must not be possible for the creditor to obtain payment of his claim by
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 Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 190. This requirement shows a strong similarity to46
the South African requirement of advantage to creditors in applications for sequestration of an
individual’s estate (Bertelsmann et al Mars at 72 and 123), and seems rather misplaced in the context
of a corporate insolvency, not to mention a business rescue procedure. 
 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 123.47
 Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 190 with reference to a decision of the48
Oberlandesgericht Brandenburg ZInsO 2001, 1153-1154. 
 Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 190-191. See part 2.8.2.2 regarding these creditors49
who are normally not involved in the insolvency proceedings or plan.
 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 123.50
 Braun Commentary at 93 par 163 and at 94 par 173; Flessner “Germany” at 318; Oberlandesgericht51
Köln ZInsO 2002, 728 and 730.
 Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 191 referring to two decisions where this was confirmed:52
Amtsgericht Duisburg NZI 2003, 161; Amtsgericht Hamburg ZInsO 2001, 1121. See also Eickmann,
Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 124-125 and Bertram and Gottwald Insolvenzrechtshandbuch
at 220 for confirmation of these and other examples of abuse of the process by creditors. 
 Flessner “Germany” at 318. This is another point on which the German procedure differs from the53
American Chapter 11 reorganisation, as the InsO requires neither a minimum number of creditors nor
a minimum value of their claims to apply for insolvency proceedings to commence: Schiessl
“Comparative Analysis” at 246. 
 Braun Commentary at 93 par 163; Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 123.54
means of another procedure that is faster, simpler or cheaper: insolvency
proceedings must serve the general satisfaction of all the creditors, not just the
applicant who could just as easily use ordinary execution procedures to obtain
payment.  However, this does not mean that the applicant must first exhaust all46
other means of execution to obtain payment: if he can prove one of the grounds for
an insolvency order, it will normally be sufficient.  47
A creditor whose claim is fully secured will not have the required legal interest,48
and neither will a lower-ranking creditor except for the rare instances where it can be
proved that such creditors will receive at least partial payment of their claims.  The49
test here is thus an objective one: no legal interest exists where the commencement
of insolvency proceedings will serve no purpose for a particular creditor.  50
A creditor must also not have ulterior motives that are unrelated to the objectives
of the insolvency proceedings, for example to eliminate a competitor  or to put51
pressure on a still solvent but unwilling debtor to pay his claim or at least part of it.52
Neither the size of the claim nor its ranking plays a role in establishing whether the
creditor has the required interest in insolvency proceedings being commenced,  and53
it is generally accepted that if one of the grounds for insolvency proceedings is
proved to be present, the creditor has such a legal interest except under very special
circumstances.  However, the debtor must be given an opportunity to be heard to54
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 § 14(2); Braun Commentary at 94 par 173.55
 Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 192.56
 The application must be brought on behalf of the company and not in the name of the individual57
director: Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 135.
 § 15(1). However, such an application may be brought only on the grounds of illiquidity or insolvency,58
and not impending illiquidity: see part 2.4 below. This subsection also authorises any partner of an
unincorporated association or partnership to apply for insolvency in respect of its business.
Furthermore, if a company has no managing organ at the time, every member of the company and
every member of the supervisory board have the same right to apply. 
 Blackman et al Companies Act Vol 1 at 4–29; Davies et al Gower pars 7-18 to 7-20; Schmidt59
Gesellschaftsrecht at 806-807; Jäger Aktiengesellschaft at 386.
 Schiessl “Comparative Analysis” at 239 explains that the very short period of three weeks, which makes60
successful negotiations with creditors almost impossible, is the result of the legislature’s being “very
suspicious” of an insolvent debtor attempting to retain some assets at the expense of the creditors.
 §15a(1) of the InsO. §15a was inserted by the Gesetz zur Modernisierung des GmbH-Rechts und61
zur Bekämpfung von Missbräuchen (MoMiG) of 23.10.2008 (BGBl I S 2026) with effect from 1
November 2008. At the same time this Act scrapped the almost identical provisions (to those in §
rebut the evidence of the applicant.  This is a right accorded to the debtor for which55
the consent of the court is not required, but which the debtor is also not compelled
to exercise nor can he be forced to do so.56
Although these measures are aimed at protecting the debtor and preventing an
abuse of insolvency proceedings, they may have the unintended consequence that
a creditor who is a major supplier of the company and launches an application with
the aim of rescuing the company to preserve his market may find his application
being refused by the court because he would be able to obtain payment of his claim
by other means. It is clear that although the procedure is theoretically intended for
both liquidation and business rescue, very little attention has been paid to the actual
aim of business rescue. 
In the case of a corporate debtor, any individual director may apply for insolvency
proceedings on behalf of the company  if he is able to satisfy the court that the57
required grounds for such an application exist.  This provision constitutes an unusual58
exception to the generally accepted rule that boards govern by majority decision and
that single directors do not have any powers to act on behalf of the company unless
specifically authorised.  59
The reason why individual directors have been given the right to initiate insolvency
proceedings is to be found in the concomitant statutory obligation which compels the
board of directors of a company to bring such an application without culpable delay and,
at the latest, within three weeks  after the company becomes insolvent or unable to pay60
its debts.  If the board fails to file such an application, or even causes an unnecessary61
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15a(1)) contained in § 92(2) of the AktienGesetz (AktG) (the Stock Corporation Act regulating public
companies) and § 64(1) of the Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung
(GmbHG) (the Private Limited Companies Act regulating private companies): see Schmidt
Gesellschaftsrecht at 816-818; Bertram and Gottwald Insolvenzrechtshandbuch at 155-158. As the
wording of the new provision is very similar to the previous ones, commentaries and judgments on the
repealed provisions will also apply to the new § 15a(1). 
 In terms of a decision of the Federal High Court of Justice for Civil Matters in the case of the Herstatt62
Bank (BGHZ 75, 96), it will not be regarded as an unnecessary or negligent delay if the three-week
period is used by the managing organ of the company to investigate the possibility of other less drastic
measures to solve the company’s financial problems: see further Baur and Stürner Insolvenzrecht at
388-90; Kühn and Uhlenbruck Konkursordnung at 1995 par IV.
 If there is no management organ in place at the time, every member of a private company (GmbH) and63
every member of the supervisory board of a public company (Aktiengesellschaft) is obliged to bring such an
application, unless they had no knowledge of the illiquidity or insolvency of the company: § 15a(3). 
 In terms of § 15a(4), any person who was compelled to bring an insolvency application in terms of64
this section but failed to do so or to do it in good time may be sentenced to imprisonment of up to three
years or a fine. However, if such a person was merely negligent, the maximum period of imprisonment
is limited to one year: § 15a(5). 
 Schmidt and Lutter Aktiengesetz Band I at 1046-1047. Directors may also be liable in delict to individuals65
who contracted with the company without knowing that it was insolvent: Flessner “Germany” at 357. 
 § 401 AktG and § 84 GmbHG.66
 Müller “Antragsrecht” at 434. 67
 Jäger Aktiengesellschaft at 2207 par 32.68
 Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 198.69
 § 15(2).70
 Commentary at 613 par 2847.71
delay in doing so,  every individual member of the board  has a duty to file the62 63
application to avoid both criminal  and civil personal liability for damages to the64
company.  The three-week period may be used by the board to investigate alternative65
ways of rescuing or reorganising the company  but if it is clear that an insolvency plan66
procedure has the same or even a better chance of success than an out-of-court rescue
attempt, especially where creditors’ interests are at risk, an insolvency application must
be brought immediately.  Furthermore, if it is clear at the outset that there is no real67
possibility of a rescue, the directors may not wait for three weeks before applying but
must do so immediately after becoming aware of the situation.  Another aim of this68
provision is to ensure that a lack of consensus among the directors over the existence
of grounds for an insolvency application will not cause an unnecessary delay in bringing
the application.  If the application is brought by a single director, the court must afford69
other members of the board the opportunity to be heard.  70
Braun  states that the duty to apply for the opening of insolvency proceedings71
is often breached by company boards that are either reluctant to admit that the
company is in trouble or seem unaware of their duty to file for insolvency. Not even
the provision that directors who, in contravention of corporate or insolvency law, and
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 § 26(3); Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 13. See further part 2.5.2 on this aspect.72
 See further Chapter 2, part 3.5.1.2. 73
 The supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) is the second tier of the German two-tier system of corporate74
governance, with the board of directors (Vorstand) being the other: see generally Du Plessis et al
German Corporate Governance at 65ff. 
 Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 199. This is subject to the exceptions stipulated in75
§ 15a(3) discussed above.
 § 16.76
 Flessner “Germany” at 319.77
 Braun Commentary at 61 par 20.78
in culpable breach of their duties fail to apply for insolvency, may be held personally
liable to refund a creditor who advances money to cover the costs of the
proceedings, has had the desired effect of encouraging directors to apply before the
company is hopelessly insolvent.  The South African authorities should take note of72
this observation in light of the obligation that is now placed on company boards to
inform all affected persons if the company is in financial distress but the board has
not resolved to commence business rescue proceedings: if not even the very real risk
of specific criminal and personal liability is sufficient to force directors to act, it is
highly unlikely that South African boards will generally comply with this provision.73
Members of the company, as well as the supervisory board,  whether74
individually or collectively, are not authorised to bring an application for insolvency
proceedings in respect of a company.  Since members have the most to gain by a75
rescue attempt and could have influenced the administrator and creditors to attempt
a rescue, their omission as authorised applicants is regrettable. This is particularly
important in Germany where very few corporate rescues are attempted as a result
of an historical and cultural mistrust of bankrupts. 
2.4 Requirements for opening of insolvency proceedings
In terms of the InsO it is an absolute requirement for the opening of insolvency
proceedings that one of the grounds specified in the Code must exist at the time when
the court decides whether to grant such an application.  In sizeable business76
insolvencies the court usually appoints an expert to establish whether the requirements
are present.  Since these grounds have been defined precisely in the InsO, very little77
room has been left for interpretation or adaptation of the requirements.  Any other78
considerations, such as general political, social, economic and even labour issues, may
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 Braun Commentary at 95 par 176.79
 Schiessl “Comparative Analysis” at 247.80
 See Chapter 2, part 3.2 on this issue.81
 “Zahlungsunfähigkeit”. Although the direct translation of this term is “inability to pay”, most English82
texts use the word “illiquidity” to denote the true nature of the requirement and to distinguish it from the
requirement of factual insolvency that could also result in an inability to pay debts. Schmidt
Gesellschaftsrecht at 322 even uses the German term “Illiquidität” for this requirement.
 § 17(1). W immer and Ahrens Frankfurter Kommentar at 247 declare that the other two grounds for83
an insolvency order are not of fundamental importance when compared to illiquidity because technical
not influence the court’s decision.  This illustrates a major disadvantage of the unitary79
proceedings, as the prevention of job losses is invariably advanced as one of the
reasons for the existence of business rescue procedures, but this obviously plays no part
in the decision to wind up an insolvent company. As the requirements stipulated in the
InsO have to apply to both situations, the discussion below will show that these
requirements are geared almost solely towards insolvency and liquidation.
The strict condition that one of the stipulated grounds must be present is intended
to protect the debtor, the creditors and the shareholders against an abuse of the
insolvency proceedings, but means that relief can be granted by the court under only
very limited circumstances and at a fairly late stage in the deterioration of a company’s
financial situation when the chances of a successful rescue are substantially diminished.
The Insolvency Commission rejected proposals that would have given debtors access
to a rescue procedure at the first signs of financial problems and before insolvency or
illiquidity was imminent. The Commission’s view was that until actual financial distress
occurred, it was preferable for a debtor to negotiate with his creditors outside of formal
court proceedings.  This view is not without merit, as the commencement of formal80
insolvency or rescue proceedings negatively affects the reputation and creditworthiness
of a debtor and could be harmful to the business and therefore debtors would probably
have hesitated to use such a pre-insolvency procedure.  On the other hand, the81
safeguards of formal proceedings, notably a stay of execution, are not present in an out-
of-court rescue attempt, and debtors are therefore exposed to enforcement actions by
creditors of their claims. 
 
2.4.1 Illiquidity82
The first and most usual ground on which insolvency proceedings may be initiated is the
illiquidity of the debtor.  A debtor is deemed to be illiquid if he is unable to pay his debts83
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insolvency (see part 2.4.3 below) can be “calculated away” while imminent illiquidity does not give rise
to a duty to apply (see part 2.4.2 below). 
 § 17(2). 84
 § 17(2).85
 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 148.86
 Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 220.87
 Braun Commentary at 96 par 188.88
 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 153.89
 Braun Commentary at 96 par 185; Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 216.90
 Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 213.91
 Braun Commentary at 96 par 186.See also Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at92
149-151 for further examples of such circumstantial evidence, including non-payment for essential
services such as electricity and rent for the business premises. 
 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 148.93
 Braun Commentary at 96 par 187.94
as and when they become due.  Furthermore, as a rule, a debtor is presumed to be84
unable to pay if he has stopped payment of his debts.  Although this is interpreted to85
mean that it should have become clear to others in the debtor’s business circle that he
does not have the necessary funds to pay a substantial part of his debts,  even non-86
payment of one important debt can indicate that the debtor has ceased payment of his
debts, in spite of payment of some other debts.  The debtor may rebut this presumption87
of inability to pay if the application is brought by a creditor.  As a rule, in practice this will88
be possible only if the debtor was mistaken or misled others about his inability to pay, or
if his unwillingness to pay was mistaken for inability.89
Illiquidity in this respect must be taken to mean a lack of cash or money with
which to pay, whether as cash in hand, credit in a bank account or in the form of
available credit.  Only the debtor’s monetary debts are therefore taken into90
consideration, and not other obligations such as an obligation to deliver an object;
such an obligation becomes relevant only after changing into a claim for damages.91
Illiquidity can also be proved by circumstantial evidence such as when a debtor
closes his business, insists on cash payment on delivery or fails to pay taxes and
social security contributions.  The test is one of liquidity, not solvency, although proof92
of the last-mentioned could, but does not necessarily always indicate illiquidity.  93
In cases where an application based on illiquidity is made by a creditor, the court
has to guard against an abuse of the process by the creditor who may be attempting
to achieve other non-insolvency objectives such as forcing the debtor to pay.  94
Illiquidity was also recognised as a ground for insolvency proceedings under the
previous insolvency legislation, and specific criteria regarding duration, importance
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 Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 212.95
 Begründung RegE Zu §20 und §21: Balz and Landfermann Insolvenzgesetze at 90; W immer and96
Ahrens Frankfurter Kommentar at 234.
 Commentary at 96 pars 182-188. Häsemeyer Insolvenzrecht at 137 also believes that the legislature97
erred in not being more precise in its definition of illiquidity, particularly in respect of the importance and
duration of the inability to pay. 
 See part 2.4.2 below.98
and seriousness of the creditors’ claim were created by the legislation and the
literature to determine the exact circumstances under which illiquidity would be
sufficiently substantial and permanent to constitute the required ground.  However,95
the legislature decided to ignore these criteria in drafting the InsO, and opted for a
legal definition of illiquidity which has been criticised as being insufficient and unclear.
The official drafters defended their decision by pointing out that, firstly, it was
unnecessary to state the obvious fact that a temporary cashflow problem that would
soon be solved did not qualify as illiquidity; secondly, requiring the illiquidity to be
continuous or lasting could be interpreted to mean that the debtor had to cease
payment of his debts over a period of weeks or even months to fulfil this requirement,
thereby defeating the purpose of encouraging applications to be made as soon as
possible; and thirdly, a requirement that the debtor had to be unable to pay a
substantial part of his debts was not only unnecessary in so far as a very small cash
shortfall would obviously not be considered as illiquidity, but could also strengthen
the undesirable tendency to limit the meaning of illiquidity by restricting it to an
inability to pay a specified minimum percentage of total debts – a limitation that the
drafters regarded as excessive and unjustified.  96
Braun  does not agree with these arguments and mentions the following four97
particular problems in this regard:
(i) The duration or size that would distinguish a merely temporary cashflow problem
(or payment bottleneck, as he refers to it) from illiquidity or inability to pay as required
by the InsO has not been defined.
(ii) There is no indication of the specific point in time at which illiquidity should be
present to distinguish it from imminent liquidity, which is an alternative ground for
insolvency proceedings.98
(iii) Failure to pay could be due to the debtor’s being unable or unwilling to pay in
spite of having adequate liquid funds. 
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 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 144-145. See Chapter 2, part 3 where it is99
shown that the Companies Act 2008 has not excluded this danger.
 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 149.100
 Bundesgerichtshof decision of 24.05.2005 (BGHZ 163,134): ZInsO 2005, 807.101
 The courts had previously set the period at one month: Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger102
Kommentar at 146. However, commentators had recommended periods varying from a few days to
three months: W immer and Ahrens Frankfurter Kommentar at 234. 
 Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 217. See also Eickmann, Flessner et al103
Heidelberger Kommentar at 147, who agree with this interpretation.
(iv) Mere factual stopping of payments by a debtor is regarded as evidence of illiquidity
although the debtor may refute the presumption. However, discontinuation of payments
as an indication of illiquidity means more than simple non-payment by a debtor and
should include an obvious inability of the debtor to pay his liabilities when due. 
Not all of these points of criticism can be accepted as valid, however, as there is
sufficient authority to emphasise the fairly obvious fact that a debtor will not be regarded
as unable to pay when, although he has the necessary funds, he is unwilling to pay, or
forgot to do so or believes, rightly or wrongly, that the claim is unfounded.  It is also clear99
from the discussion above that irrespective of the size or number of unpaid claims, the
court will look at the reason for the non-payment. What the court will not take into
consideration is whether the debtor knew the legal consequences that his non-payment
could have or whether he intended to indicate his inability to pay.  100
However, in spite of the legislature’s intentional omission of specific criteria, the
Federal High Court  has now laid down the principle that illiquidity in the judicial101
sense is most probably present when a debtor has been unable to pay 10 per cent
or more of his total due and payable debts for more than three weeks  unless it is102
almost certain that the shortfall will soon be completely or almost completely
eliminated. In cases where the shortfall is less than 10 per cent, illiquidity will be
assumed only if it is already foreseeable that this percentage will in the near future
exceed 10 per cent. As a result of this decision, a cash shortfall of less than 10 per
cent must now be regarded as too small to constitute illiquidity, while one exceeding
10 per cent will create a rebuttable presumption of illiquidity.  103
2.4.2 Imminent illiquidity
An alternative ground on which an insolvency application may be granted is the
imminent or threatening illiquidity of the debtor. However, this ground is available only
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 § 18(1).104
 W immer and Ahrens Frankfurter Kommentar at 243. See Chapter 2, part 3.3.2.3 where ample105
opportunity for abuse has been created by the wide array of persons who may apply on any of the
prescribed grounds for the new rescue proceedings in South Africa. 
 § 18(3). The articles of association may provide that a single director has authority to apply for106
insolvency proceedings but may also require the opposite, namely that all directors, or a minimum
number of directors must apply together: Müller “Zahlungsunfähigkeit” at 459. 
 Bertram and Gottwald Insolvenzrechtshandbuch at 132.107
 Ausschussbericht Zu § 22 Abs 3: Balz and Landfermann Insolvenzgesetze at 92; W immer and108
Ahrens Frankfurter Kommentar at 242. See part 2.3 above regarding the obligation of directors to apply
if one of the other two grounds for insolvency proceedings are present. 
 Braun Commentary at 97 par 192.109
 § 18(2).110
 See Chapter 3, part 2.4.2 on the problems created in England regarding the interpretation of the111
requirement of “likely to achieve”.
 Spliedt “Schulnerberatung” at 41; Müller “Zahlungsunfähigkeit” at 458. 112
in cases where the debtor is the applicant.  Contrary to the original proposal by the104
Insolvency Commission, the legislature specifically decided on this limitation to
prevent creditors from exercising undue pressure on a debtor and hindering any
rescue attempt before actual insolvency sets in.  105
In the case of a company, the application must be brought by all the directors
together unless the applicant is authorised to represent the company.  Therefore, it106
may not be brought by a single director without the necessary authority to act on behalf
of the company. This is the case not only because the legislature intended to prevent
abuse of the new insolvency ground  but also because imminent insolvency does not107
impose an obligation on the directors to apply for insolvency proceedings with the
accompanying risk of personal liability if they fail to do so.  At this stage, the directors108
are still free to attempt an informal or extra-judicial compromise with debtors, but, as
is the case in most systems, the safeguards afforded by statutory liquidation or rescue
procedures are absent while these attempts are underway. Hence there is no stay of
execution, and debts have to be paid when they become due.  109
In terms of the InsO a debtor meets the requirement of imminent insolvency if
it is likely that he will be unable to pay his existing debts when they fall due.  As was110
the case in England before amending legislation brought clarity,  the exact degree111
of probability or possibility required by the term “likely” is unclear. Commentators
generally seem to interpret it as requiring proof that illiquidity is more probable than
not, that is, there has to be more than a 50 per cent probability that it will happen.112
As it is almost impossible to predict future illiquidity with any mathematical precision,
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 Müller “Zahlungsunfähigkeit” at 458.113
 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 156.114
 “Bestehenden”.115
 Bertram and Gottwald Insolvenzrechtshandbuch at 130; Braun Commentary at 97 par 189. Spliedt116
“Schuldnerberatung” at 40 confirms this view and points out that if the business will soon have insufficient
liquid funds, it makes no difference whether it will be due to existing debts or unavoidable future debts.
 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 156; Häsemeyer Insolvenzrecht at 140.117
 Bertram and Gottwald Insolvenzrechtshandbuch at 131; Spliedt “Schuldnerberatung” at 40.118
 Spliedt “Schuldnerberatung” at 41. However, he also believes that if a debtor will be unable to obtain119
the necessary cash within six months by selling some of its assets, it is probably already insolvent.
Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 155 and Bertram and Gottwald
Insolvenzrechtshandbuch at 131 also limit the acceptable period to two years. 
 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 157.120
the general rule is that the further into the future the illiquidity is expected to occur,
the more pronounced the indications of impending illiquidity will have to be.113
The practice is to prepare a projective financial statement covering a specific future
period, showing payments that will be due, in the sequence that they will be payable.114
In spite of the fact that the wording of this subsection clearly refers to existing  debts,115
all debts that may arise in the near future must be included in the calculation of imminent
illiquidity.  These would include expenses that are unavoidable in the running of a116
business such as salaries, taxes, electricity costs and rent.  Temporary cashflow117
problems and minor shortfalls will obviously not constitute this ground. 
The reference to existing debts payable at some future date but without any
limitation as to how far into the future they must be payable has made it difficult to
establish the period over which the imminent illiquidity should be measured. Some
commentators believe that the period must extend until the date on which the last
existing debt is payable, but as this could stretch over several years, with possibly
only one debt payable far later than all the others, this period is regarded as
potentially too long.  The suggested solution to this problem is that the118
management of a company use their financial and liquidity planning to establish
whether there is a threat of future illiquidity, and since the planning period usually
stretches over the next (financial) year, this is also the period that should be used for
determining imminent illiquidity.  The courts are not, however, bound to the period119
chosen by the debtor and may use any other period they deem appropriate.  120
Since none of the previous insolvency legislation contained a similar provision,
imminent insolvency as a ground for the opening of insolvency proceedings was
introduced into German insolvency law for the first time by the InsO. This
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 According to Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 154, it was also intended to121
assist natural persons who may not base an insolvency application on overindebtedness (that is,
insolvency) (see part 2.4.3 below). 
 Braun Commentary at 97 par 190.122
 According to Remmert “Introduction” at 427, 84 per cent of applications for commencement of123
insolvency proceedings under the Konkursordnung were refused because of a lack of sufficient assets
(even to cover the costs). 
 Bertram and Gottwald Insolvenzrechtshandbuch at 128-129.124
 Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 226; Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger125
Kommentar at 154; Bertram and Gottwald Insolvenzrechtshandbuch at 129. 
 Braun Commentary at 61 par 23; Ehlers “Statutory Corporate Rescue” at 173. W immer and Ahrens126
Frankfurter Kommentar at 244 estimate that, at least during the first years after the InsO came into
effect, only in 1 to 2 per cent of these applications had illiquidity not already set in. 
 Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 226.127
 Hamburger Kommentar at 13. 128
development is the Code’s first acknowledgement of the business rescue aspect of
insolvency proceedings, in that it is intended to come to the assistance of a debtor
at an early stage when a rescue or restructuring of his business has a better chance
of succeeding.  This also explains why only the debtor may base an application on121
this ground, apart from the fact that it requires information that mostly only the debtor
would have. It would also be open to abuse if available to creditors.122
The general consensus in Germany is that under the previous legislation most
insolvency proceedings were instituted far too late when there were almost no assets
left,  and the legislature regarded it as one of the major aims of the insolvency law123
reform to solve this problem and to give a business in financial distress the opportunity
to be rescued while enjoying the protection of the insolvency procedure.  However, in124
spite of the legislature’s good intentions in introducing the ground of imminent illiquidity
to enable a debtor to act at an early stage when faced with financial crisis, it has not had
the desired effect and plays almost no role as a ground for the commencement of
insolvency proceedings.  Although many applications are now based on the imminent125
inability of the debtor to pay his debts, it appears that in the vast majority of these cases
the debtor is in fact already insolvent or unable to pay his debts.  Even in those few126
cases where the debtor is not already unable to pay his debts, it is an almost
unavoidable consequence of the application that the debtor becomes illiquid soon
afterwards because banks usually then cancel the debtor’s credit and demand
immediate payment of their claims.127
Schmidt and Ahrendt  point out that both the introduction of imminent illiquidity128
as a ground for an insolvency order and the concomitant potential liability of directors
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 See further parts 2.3 and 2.5.2 regarding this liability.129
 Müller “Zahlungsunfähigkeit” at 461. The writer explains that the perception that insolvency is a sign130
of financial and personal failure first needs to be overcome, and that this will take time but may be
achieved by positive reports of successful rescues taking hold in the minds of the general public. 
 W immer and Ahrens Frankfurter Kommentar at 244 state that a change in legislation and policy is131
not sufficient to change ingrained behaviour automatically. 
 Braun Commentary at 59 pars 10-11.132
 At the report meeting held in terms of § 157: see part 2.5.2 below regarding this meeting.133
 Bertram and Gottwald Insolvenzrechtshandbuch at 130. See part 2.3 above regarding this duty.134
 “Überschuldung”.135
for the costs of the proceedings if they have not applied in good time in breach of
their statutory and other duties  have failed to achieve the aim of putting pressure129
on directors to apply for the commencement of insolvency proceedings before actual
insolvency sets in. This can be ascribed to the view still widely held that insolvency
is a sign of shameful commercial failure, resulting in insolvency applications being
brought too late. In spite of several provisions specifically aimed at encouraging
voluntary and thus early applications, most debtors delay applying for as long as
possible until all resources have been exhausted and the possibility of a rescue is
lost.  There has not yet been the required acceptance of the InsO as a modern130
business rescue statute,  and the anticipated interest of creditors in these131
proceedings has also not materialised. It is only in rare cases, mostly in the case of
large companies, that an insolvent company applies for insolvency proceedings with
the specific intention of achieving a successful corporate rescue.  132
There are also other reasons for the failure of company boards to use imminent
illiquidity to apply for an insolvency order early enough to rescue the company or
business. These include the fact that, contrary to the intentions of the directors, the
creditors may decide against a rescue and in favour of liquidation after the insolvency
order has been granted,  or the fact that the court may find that the company is133
already unable to pay its debts, in which case the directors are criminally liable for
breach of their duty to apply for insolvency.134
2.4.3 Overindebtedness135
The third ground on which an application to initiate insolvency proceedings may be
granted is overindebtedness, which is defined in § 19(2) as the situation that exists if the
assets of the debtor are no longer sufficient to cover its existing liabilities. This is what
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 See Bertelsmann et al Mars at 2.136
 § 19(1).137
 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 159. 138
 Braun Commentary at 99 pars 200-201.139
 However, see the discussion below on the temporary amendment of this provision. 140
 See Landfermann “Insolvency Code” at 36, who expressed relief that it had been om itted, not141
realising that the final version would include this provision.
 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen (BGHZ) 119, 201: NJW  1992, 2891.142
Schmidt Gesellschaftsrecht at 322-323 mentions further cases and expresses serious doubts whether
the legislation will be successful in changing the existing practice.
 Ausschussbericht Zu § 23 Abs 2: Balz and Landfermann Insolvenzgesetze at 93.143
 Ausschussbericht Zu § 23 Abs 2: Balz and Landfermann Insolvenzgesetze at 93. See Müller144
“Überschuldung” at 467-470 for a discussion of the history and the reaction to the inclusion of this sentence.
most legal systems refer to as actual or technical insolvency, as opposed to commercial
insolvency.  However, this ground is available only in those instances where the debtor136
is a legal person  and is specifically intended to prevent companies that often have137
nothing but their limited share capital to pay their debts, from continuing to operate in the
marketplace once their liabilities exceed their assets.  138
To prove that a company is insolvent, an account must be prepared showing all
the assets of the company, including immaterial property such as special expertise,
together with their realisable value, as well as all liabilities.  139
§ 19(2) specifically provides that for the purposes of this provision the valuation of
the debtor’s assets must be done on the basis of a going concern if, in the
circumstances, it seems highly probable that the business will continue to operate.140
This part of the provision was added to the draft legislation by the parliamentary
committee in spite of the government draft expressly excluding it on the grounds that it
was an unnecessary complication of the test for insolvency.  The parliamentary141
committee believed that it was necessary to add this sentence because a practice had
developed that was supported by decisions of the Federal High Court,  to exclude142
overindebtedness as grounds for an insolvency order if the prognosis for survival of the
business was positive, even if the liabilities exceeded the assets at liquidation values.143
The parliamentary committee was of the view that a favourable prognosis for the
business should not automatically exclude insolvency – only a valuation based on this
positive prognosis that resulted in the value of assets exceeding total liabilities should
have that effect. Otherwise it could lead to a company continuing to conduct its business
without the necessary capital, leading to creditors suffering considerable prejudice if the
positive prognosis turned out to be wrong.  144
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 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 161.145
 According to Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 160, the test is whether the146
probability that the business will be continued is more than 50 per cent.
 W immer and Ahrens Frankfurter Kommentar at 246.147
 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 160 describe the test as being whether an148
effective and knowledgeable business manager would decide to continue the business after
considering all the relevant circumstances. 
 Braun Commentary at 98 par 196; Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 232.149
 Braun Commentary at 99 par 199.150
 Bertram and Gottwald Insolvenzrechtshandbuch at 134.151
 Bertram and Gottwald Insolvenzrechtshandbuch at 133-134. 152
A valuation founded on the basis of a going concern will mean that assets will be
valued at their maximum value, as they invariably have a higher value when part of a
going concern rather than when broken up into separate items.  The valuation of the145
company’s assets therefore entails two elements or steps: firstly, a prediction must be
made, based on the company’s current financial situation, whether the continuation of
the business is more likely than not.  This is referred to as a company’s insolvency146
status, as opposed to its insolvency balance.  A prognosis that the business will147
probably be carried on further can be made only if the debtor is determined that it will
continue, even if it requires a sale of the business as a running concern, and if, seen
objectively, it will be possible to continue running the business.  148
The second part of the test is a financial balance sheet calculation where,
depending on the outcome of the first step, assets will be valued as part of either a
continuing business or a liquidation.  The provision does not stipulate the period149
over which the company’s future continuation should be calculated, which allows the
courts to consider the merits of each case according to its own individual
circumstances.  However, many commentators seem to agree that the period150
should be at least one year but should not exceed two years.  Therefore,151
overindebtedness (or insolvency) in the legal sense that constitutes grounds for an
insolvency order can be determined only after both steps have been completed.152
Some commentators believe this test to involve three steps: firstly, a
determination of the company’s insolvency by using liquidation values; secondly, if
the company is already insolvent, ascertaining whether the business is likely to be
continued; and thirdly, if the last-mentioned result is positive, doing a new calculation
based on going concern values which may, or may not, still result in an outcome of
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 W immer and Ahrens Frankfurter Kommentar at 247.153
 Müller “Überschuldung” at 470-471.154
 See part 2.4.1 above.155
 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 142 states that illiquidity almost always occurs156
only after insolvency. 
 See part 2.3 above.157
 Bertram and Gottwald Insolvenzrechtshandbuch at 137. See also Müller “Überschuldung” at 465158
and sources referred to there (in fn 2).
 W immer and Ahrendt Frankfurter Kommentar at 245.159
 W immer and Ahrendt Frankfurter Kommentar at 246.160
 Gesetz zur Umsetzung eines Maßnahmenspakets zur Stabilisierung des Finanzmarktes (FMStG)161
vom 17.10.2008 (BGBl. I S 1982) with effect from 18 October 2008. 
 §§ 6(3) and 7(2).162
insolvency.  Although some commentators firmly believe that it is wrong to begin153
with the prognosis on the future existence of the business, it does not seem to make
any difference to the final result which of the two tests is used. Doing a calculation
based on liquidation values when a company is clearly able to survive is superfluous
and unnecessary and not required by the InsO.154
The intention behind this ground is to encourage the management of a company
to apply for insolvency before the company reaches the stage where it can no longer
pay its debts as they become due.  The Code therefore recognises the fact that a155
company may be technically insolvent but still able, at least for the moment, to pay
its debts as they become due.  However, overindebtedness also gives rise to the156
statutory duty on directors to file for insolvency as soon as it occurs.  It has157
therefore been described as one of the “Ten Commandments for Business
Managers” to check the company’s liquidity and financial situation continuously and
to ensure that the insolvency of the company will be detected immediately.  158
This insolvency ground is not of major importance in practice, as it is very difficult
for a creditor to prove that a company is insolvent, while in the case of an application
by the debtor, imminent illiquidity is usually also already present, at the very least.159
The main importance of this ground lies in the fact that it results in the duty of
directors to apply for liquidation, while imminent illiquidity does not.  160
As part of its efforts to deal with the global financial crisis, the German
government passed legislation in 2008 to stabilise the financial markets and to limit
corporate insolvencies.  In terms of this Act  the wording of § 19(2) was amended161 162
for a limited period stretching from 18 October 2008 (the date on which the Act came
into force) until 31 December 2010. The original intention was that from 1 January
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 By the Gesetz zur Erleichterung der Sanierung von Unternehmen vom 18.9.2009.163
 My emphasis.164
 However, directors can still be held liable for any payments made by the company after it has165
become overindebted (or illiquid) unless these payments were made with the care that one would
expect of a skilled businessman: § 64 GmbHG and § 92(2) AktG. 
 Section 22(1)(b): see Chapter 2, part 3.5.1.2. However, Regulation 21(3) of the draft Companies166
Regulations, 2010 does seem to provide for this possibility.
 Braun Commentary at 191 par 657.167
2011, when the financial crisis was expected to be over the worst, the wording will
revert to the position as discussed above. However, new legislation was approved
in 2009 to extend the original period by another three years to 31 December 2013.163
The temporary § 19(2) now provides that overindebtedness is present when the
assets of the debtor no longer cover its existing debts unless, in the circumstances,
it is highly probable that the business will continue to operate.  This definition164
reflects the views of the Federal High Court referred to above that the mere existence
of a positive prognosis for the continuation of the business automatically excludes
overindebtedness as grounds for an insolvency order. It may be assumed that this
amendment also relieves the directors of their duty to apply for an insolvency order
as soon as the company’s liabilities exceed its assets, on condition that in spite of the
company’s insolvency, there is a strong probability that the company will be able to
continue operating its business.  This provision is a clear acknowledgement by the165
legislature (although it needed a global financial crisis to get it to that point) that an
insolvent company with the potential to survive should sometimes be allowed to trade
itself out of insolvency without any intervention by the courts and outside of the
formal insolvency process. This should be noted by the South African legislature,
which has placed a total and unconditional ban on insolvent trading in the Companies
Act of 2008 without considering the possibility that insolvent companies can, and in
practice often do, trade themselves out of temporary insolvency.166
2.5 Procedure to commence insolvency proceedings
2.5.1 Provisional order
Although it is not explicitly termed as such in the InsO, insolvency proceedings are
divided into provisional and final proceedings.  As soon as the application for an167
insolvency order has been filed, the court must be satisfied that the application is
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 As stipulated in § 14(1): see the discussion above. 168
 Prima facie evidence is provided by affidavit and supporting documents. However, conclusive proof169
of his claim must be supplied by a creditor whose application is based solely on this claim: Braun
Commentary at 94 par 172. 
 W immer and Ahrens Frankfurter Kommentar at 165.170
 According to Hess Insolvenzrecht at 637, these measures may be ordered even before the court171
decides on the preliminary question of whether the application is admissible.
 § 21(1). The debtor may immediately file an objection to the order.172
 Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 7.173
 Bertram and Gottwald Insolvenzrechtshandbuch at 285.174
 Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 271.175
admissible, which requires the applicant to prove his locus standi to bring the
application  and provide at least prima facie evidence of one of the grounds for the168
opening of insolvency proceedings.  This is an important safeguard to prevent an169
unfounded application from causing the irreparable damage to a debtor that
unavoidably follows once the court orders any of the protective measures discussed
below and the publicity that it requires.  170
If the court finds the application prima facie admissible,  it must take all171
necessary and reasonable steps to preserve the estate and to prevent any change
in the assets of the debtor that may prejudice the creditors, until a decision is made
whether to grant the insolvency order.  These provisions are also intended to172
increase the chances of a successful rescue as much as possible by keeping the
debtor’s assets together for the duration of the opening stages and allowing the
provisional administrator to use these assets to continue carrying on the business.173
This provision is an indication that, contrary to the previous position, the legislature
now recognises the fact that closing down a business prematurely must be avoided
because reviving it later will be a very costly exercise.  174
The provisional order is not therefore a provisional insolvency order as such but
entails measures to safeguard the debtor’s assets against diminution by creditors or
by the debtor in the period between the hearing of the application and the final order
by the court.  However, as will be seen in the ensuing discussion, the effects can175
be very similar to those of a provisional insolvency order. These measures are
regarded as necessary because it often takes several months before the court has
completed its investigations into the existence of a valid ground for an insolvency
order and the general financial situation of the debtor, after which it is able to rule on
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 Braun Commentary at 102 par 214; Flessner “Germany” at 322.176
 § 21(2)1. The qualifications, powers and duties of the provisional administrator are discussed in part177
2.7.1 below from which the far-reaching effects of these measures will become clear.
 Flessner “Germany” at 322; Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 270.178
 The term must be understood in the wide sense of any juristic act in respect of the debtor’s179
corporeal and incorporeal assets: Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 178.
 A so-called “strong” provisional insolvency administration: Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger180
Kommentar at 271. See part 2.7.1.1.1 below on the difference between a strong and a weak insolvency
administrator.
 § 21(2)2. This constitutes the so-called “weak provisional insolvency administration”: Schmidt and181
Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 271.
 Braun Commentary at 103 par 217.182
 Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 274.183
 Braun Commentary at 103 par 222. See part 2.3.2 above on imminent liquidity as a ground for184
insolvency proceedings.
the insolvency application itself.  It is noteworthy, however, that these far-reaching176
interventions may be ordered in spite of the fact that no insolvency order, not even
a provisional one, has been issued as yet and may never be issued if the court
eventually refuses the application for commencement of insolvency proceedings. The
legal status of the debtor therefore has not yet been changed to that of an insolvent
with the usual resulting limits on his legal capacity. 
Apart from the general enabling provision in § 21(1) referred to in the previous
paragraphs, five radical measures that the court may order at this preliminary stage
are specified in § 21(2). 
The most drastic measure of these is the appointment of a provisional insolvency
administrator to take control of and manage the debtor’s assets.  This is the option177
usually chosen by the court in business insolvencies to allow the provisional
administrator to run the business of the debtor.  This may be combined with a general178
prohibition on any disposition  or transfer by the debtor  or, alternatively, ordering that179 180
dispositions by the debtor will be subject to the consent of the provisional
administrator.  An overall ban on any transactions by the debtor in respect of his assets181
does not require the appointment of a provisional administrator if the business has
already stopped trading  but would under other circumstances be senseless although182
not prohibited by law because the debtor would still have the assets under his (physical)
control.  Such appointment is, however, recommended where the debtor applies for an183
insolvency order based on imminent illiquidity.  Whereas it is usually essential to184
appoint a provisional administrator in cases where the complete financial situation of the
debtor cannot easily be assessed, or where the reliability or trustworthiness of the debtor
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 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 175.185
 Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 272.186
 § 23(1). However, performance to the debtor by a person who was unaware of the order will187
discharge the obligation. 
 § 23(2). The Commercial Register is the equivalent of the Companies Register in South Africa.188
W here applicable, restrictions on property transfers must also be entered in the land register, registers
of ships and ships under construction and the register of liens on aircraft: § 23(3). 
 Braun Commentary at 103 par 220.189
 § 135(1) of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code); Braun Commentary at 103 par 221. § 24(1)190
read with § 81 clearly provides that only a transfer of property in contravention of a general prohibition
or of the condition that all transfers must be approved by the provisional administrator will be invalid.
 Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 274.191
 § 21(2)3; Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 277.192
 Braun Commentary at 104 par 226.193
is in doubt,  such an appointment can also be necessary simply because there are185
substantial assets that need to be protected, and even a trustworthy debtor often does
not have sufficient knowledge of insolvency law to do so.  186
An order in terms of § 21(2) prohibiting or limiting the power of the debtor to deal
with his assets, or appointing a provisional administrator, must be published and
served on the debtor personally as well as on the provisional insolvency administrator
and any person who owes any obligation to the debtor. All obligations to the debtor
must then be met in accordance with the court order.  If the debtor is a company,187
such an order must also be entered in the Commercial Register.  188
Although not specifically mentioned in the Code, the court may also order more
limited restrictions on dispositions by the debtor, such as prohibiting the debtor from
surrendering movable goods to a secured creditor or collecting outstanding debts
from the debtor’s own creditors, or making only specific dispositions, such as loan
agreements, subject to the approval of the provisional administrator.  However,189
specified prohibitions, as opposed to general ones, have the disadvantage that bona
fide acquiring parties are protected in the case of a disposition and transfer by the
debtor in contravention of the prohibition.  As a result, these provisions are hardly190
ever used in practice.  191
Another important possible measure stipulated in the Code is an order to stay
or temporarily stay all executions against the debtor because such a stay does not
follow automatically as a result of either the insolvency application or the appointment
of a provisional administrator.  Even execution by individual creditors who hold192
security for their claims against the debtor is included in the stay.  The provision193
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 § 30d of the Zwangversteigerungsgesetz (Act on the Compulsory Auction of Immovable Property)194
inserted by § 20(4) of the Einführungsgesetz zur Insolvenzordnung of 5 October 1994; Bertram and
Gottwald Insolvenzrechtshandbuch at 258-259; Braun Commentary at 104 par 227.
 § 21(2)4 read with §§ 99 and 101(1).195
 Braun Commentary at 105 par 230.196
 § 101(1).197
 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 176.198
 § 99, which provides for such an order after insolvency proceedings have commenced, specifically199
states that mail must be redirected to the insolvency administrator who will be entitled to open and read
it to ascertain whether it is related to the assets of the debtor. 
 By the Gesetz zur Vereinfachung des Insolvenzverfahrens, 2007: see part 1 above.200
 § 21(2)5. The assets are identified as those which could be subject to § 166 if insolvency201
proceedings are opened. § 166 allows the insolvency administrator to sell such movables although
subject to the creditors’ preferential rights to payment.
 § 21(2)5.202
 Braun Commentary at 105 par 234.203
 § 21(1); Braun Commentary at 105 par 234.204
does, however, specifically exclude individual executions involving immovable
property from the stay. Such measures can be included in a temporary stay only by
an order of the court of execution on application by the provisional administrator.194
The fourth possibility specified in the InsO provides for an order that the mail of the
debtor may be temporarily intercepted.  Electronic messages such as emails and text195
messages are included in mail that may be intercepted,  and, in the case of a corporate196
debtor, also the mail of every director.  The intention is to obtain information about the197
debtor’s assets and to prevent detrimental actions. This type of order becomes
necessary if the debtor obstructs the work of the provisional administrator or fails to give
full information about his assets and liabilities.  Such an order will necessitate the198
appointment of a provisional administrator, as the mail will be redirected to him.  199
The last measure was only recently added  and provides for an order that all200
or some specific movables which are not in the possession of creditors but are
subject to security rights in their favour may not be realised or seized by them and
may be used for the continued running of the debtor’s business in so far as these
assets may be of substantial importance to the business.  However, creditors must201
be compensated on an ongoing basis for losses in the value of their security resulting
from the use of these assets.202
The protection of the interests of creditors is regarded as so important that the
courts do not recognise an automatic right of the debtor to be heard before ordering
these protective measures.  However, the debtor has an immediate right of appeal203
against the order.  If these measures are revoked by the court, this must be204
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 § 25(1).205
 § 21(3).206
 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 179.207
 § 21(3) read with § 98(3).208
 § 98(3).209
 § 20, read with §§ 97, 98 and 101. This duty continues to exist for the duration of the insolvency210
proceedings.
 § 20(1) read with § 98(1). An uncooperative debtor may also be arrested and detained (§ 98(2)).211
 Braun Commentary at 100 par 203.212
 Flessner “Germany” at 320.213
 § 13(2).214
published mutatis mutandis in the manner prescribed by § 23(1) for the publication
of an order imposing any restrictions on transfer of assets by the debtor or
appointment of a provisional insolvency administrator.  205
If the measures taken by the court prove inadequate to prevent the dissipation
of the debtor’s assets, the debtor, or in the case of a company, its directors may be
summoned to appear before the court and may then, as a last resort, be arrested
and detained after being heard.  This measure is intended to force the debtor to co-206
operate but is also helpful in preventing a debtor from harming the estate, for
example by removing assets to another country.  As soon as the reasons for207
ordering the detention cease to exist, the order must be rescinded.  An immediate208
appeal is available against both the detention order and a refusal by the court to
revoke the order when the reasons for it have disappeared.  209
As soon as the court finds that the application for insolvency proceedings is
admissible, there is a duty on the directors and employees of the company, as well as
on anyone who had been a director or employee of the company in the two years before
the application was made, to supply the court with all such information that may be
necessary for the court to come to a decision whether to grant the insolvency order.210
The court may order that this information be supplied by way of an affidavit to ensure that
it is truthful.  The reasoning behind these provisions is that the debtor’s intimate211
knowledge of the business will facilitate and speed up the proceedings.  212
2.5.2 Final order commencing insolvency proceedings
An application for the commencement of insolvency proceedings is heard in
chambers, and opens with a formal decision signed by the judge.  The application213
may be withdrawn until such time as the court grants or refuses the application.214
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 Their role can therefore be compared with that played by officials in the office of the Master of the215
High Court in judicial management: see Chapter 2, parts 2.5 and 2.7. It is not clear who will fulfil this
role in the new business rescue proceedings: see Chapter 2, parts 3.5 and 3.7. 
 Braun Commentary at 63 par 29.216
 Braun Commentary at 111 par 254. If a provisional administrator is appointed, he may be tasked217
with investigating whether the debtor’s property will cover these costs: see part 2.5.1.1 below. The court
and subsequently the meeting of creditors may decide to establish a creditors’ committee to represent
secured, major and small creditors as well as employees if they hold substantial claims, to assist and
supervise the administrator: §§ 67-79.
 § 26(1). The Insolvenzordnungsänderungsgesetz, 2001 inserted §§ 4a-4d into the InsO to assist218
individual debtors in cases of insufficient assets. 
 § 26(3).219
 § 26(3).220
 § 69(1)5. of the GmbHG (for private limited companies) and § 262(1)4. of the AktG (for public221
companies).
The decision whether insolvency proceedings should be opened is made by a judge
because it entails the review and evaluation of evidence to decide whether the
requirements for starting insolvency proceedings are present. However, once the
application for the opening of these proceedings is granted, most of the subsequent
judicial duties are executed by the insolvency court’s administrative officials  under215
the supervision of the judge, whose involvement is thereby kept to a minimum.216
It is the duty of the court to determine whether there are sufficient assets to pay
the costs of the insolvency proceedings as listed in § 54, namely court fees as well
as the remuneration earned and expenses incurred by the provisional insolvency
administrator, the insolvency administrator and the creditors’ committee.  Even if217
the other requirements regarding the locus standi of the applicant and the grounds
for an order to commence insolvency proceedings are met, the court must refuse to
grant the order if the debtor’s assets will probably not be sufficient to cover the costs
of the proceedings. The only exception to this strict rule is if a sufficient amount of
money is advanced (for example, by a creditor who is the applicant) to cover all the
costs.  The person making such an advance may claim it from any person who,218
contrary to the provisions of insolvency or company law, wrongfully and in breach of
his duties, failed to apply for insolvency proceedings.  In the case of a company,219
this liability would usually attach to the individual directors. If such a director disputes
that he acted unlawfully and in breach of his duties by not applying, the onus is on
him to prove this defence.  220
The refusal of a court to grant an insolvency order on the grounds of insufficient
assets is fatal to a company because it results in the dissolution of the company.221
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 Braun Commentary at 111 par 254.222
 § 27(1). See further part 2.7.1.1 below. A trustee (Sachwalter) instead of an insolvency administrator223
will be appointed if the court grants the debtor’s application for self-administration: see part 2.7.2 below.
 § 27(2). 224
 § 27(3).225
 § 28(1). The procedure for filing of claims as prescribed by § 174 requires that claims and226
supporting documents must be filed with the insolvency administrator – a measure designed to lessen
the administrative burden on the insolvency courts and their officials. 
 § 28(2).227
 § 28(2).228
 § 28(3).229
 In terms of § 38 all creditors who had claims against the debtor on the date that insolvency230
proceedings were opened will be recognised as creditors of the insolvency proceedings. 
 § 156(1) prescribes the topics on which the administrator must report at this meeting, namely the231
financial situation of the debtor and the reasons for these problems, the chances of keeping the
Once again, the disadvantages of a unitary procedure and an emphasis on the
protection of creditors’ interests are clearly shown, since it is the interests of creditors
that underpin this prescriptive provision.  A court is thus not permitted to take into222
consideration the future prospects of the company to pay the costs if it is allowed to
continue trading as part of a rescue attempt. 
If an insolvency order is granted by the court, the order must contain the name,
registration number, type and place of business of the debtor company, the name
and address of the insolvency administrator (who is simultaneously appointed by the
court)  and the exact moment when the insolvency proceedings commence.  If no223 224
exact time is provided in the order, insolvency proceedings will be deemed to have
commenced at noon of the day on which the order was issued.  225
The insolvency order also contains the specific period (not less than two weeks
or more than three months) within which creditors are required to file their claims with
the insolvency administrator.  Furthermore, creditors are ordered to furnish the226
insolvency administrator with full details of any security they may be holding over
movable assets of the debtor, without delay.  Should a creditor fail to furnish this227
information or disclose it too late through his own fault, he will be liable for any
consequent damages.  The order commencing insolvency proceedings also directs228
persons who have obligations towards the insolvent debtor to render performance
to the insolvency administrator and not to the insolvent.229
As part of the order opening insolvency proceedings and after considering the
specific circumstances of the case, the court determines the dates on which two
important meetings of creditors  will be held. At the first meeting (the report meeting),230 231
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debtor’s business or part of it, possibilities for an insolvency plan and the present outlook for payment
of creditors’ claims. The debtor, creditors, works council and the representatives of management must
be given an opportunity at this meeting to comment on the administrator’s report: § 156(2). 
 § 29(1)1.This meeting is referred to in the InsO as the report meeting.232
 In terms of §§ 76-77 every creditor who has reported his claim to the insolvency administrator233
(except for lower-ranking claims) and whose claim is not disputed has a vote based on the value of his
claim, including a secured creditor who has a vote for the full amount of his secured claim. A resolution
is valid if taken by the majority in value of creditors present and voting at the meeting. 
 Discussed in part 2.8 below.234
 § 157. Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 16 explain that in practice the decision to235
close down the business is usually already taken during the opening proceedings and would therefore
effectively have been taken long before this meeting. 
 W immer and Ahrens Frankfurter Kommentar at 1365.236
 § 29(1)2.237
 § 29(2).238
 § 30(1). § 9 allows publication by electronic means but § 30(1) specifically also requires publication239
in the official Federal Gazette (Bundesanzeiger).
 § 30(2). § 8 allows service by ordinary mail but the court may order formal service if it is deemed240
necessary: Braun Commentary at 86 par 137. 
which should preferably take place within six weeks but may not be held more than three
months after the insolvency order,  the creditors decide,  on the basis of a report by232 233
the insolvency administrator, on the continuation of the insolvency proceedings, whether
the debtor’s business should be closed down or continued and whether an insolvency
plan  should be drawn up.  This absolute right of veto that creditors have over234 235
whether the business will be allowed to continue trading, irrespective of the intentions of
management when applying for the commencement of insolvency proceedings, has
been given as one of the reasons why company boards have been reluctant to apply at
an early stage in the company’s financial distress: although they may believe that the
company can still be rescued, the creditors have the power to force the company into
regular liquidation. Therefore, even if initiated by the debtor with the specific aim of
rescuing the business, the outcome of insolvency proceedings is impossible to predict
because of the creditors’ autonomy over the insolvency plan procedure.  236
The second meeting (the verification meeting) must be set down for a date not less
than one week and not more than two months after the expiry of the period for filing
claims against the insolvent debtor, and is intended for the verification of filed claims.237
In fairly uncomplicated cases the meetings may take place simultaneously.  238
The insolvency order must be published by the Registrar of the insolvency
court  and served individually on the insolvent, his debtors and creditors.  The239 240
Registrar has to send to the authority responsible for the Commercial Register, a
copy of an order opening insolvency proceedings as well as of an order refusing the
GERMANY-276-
 § 31. In a South African situation this would be the Registrar of Companies.241
 § 32.242
 § 33.243
 Braun Commentary at 114 par 265.244
 § 34(1).245
 § 34(2). A successful appeal and resultant repeal of the insolvency order must also be published246
mutatis mutandis as prescribed by § 200 regulating the publication of an order terminating the
insolvency proceedings after completion of the process: § 34(3).
 See Chapter 2, parts 2.6 and 3.6 respectively.247
application because of insufficient assets and liquidating the company.  The241
opening of insolvency proceedings is also entered into the Land Register against any
land or rights to land owned by the debtor,  and into the registers for ships, ships242
under construction and liens on aircraft where applicable.  The aim is to prevent the243
insolvent from disposing of assets to bona fide purchasers, as no transfer of
ownership can be registered once these entries have been made.  The registers244
are open for inspection to the public, and a potential purchaser may use these
registers to ascertain whether the seller is entitled to sell the asset.
An immediate appeal against the court’s refusal to grant an order for the
commencement of insolvency proceedings is available to the applicant and also to
the debtor if the order is refused because of insufficient assets.  For a debtor245
company the latter is particularly important, as it leads to automatic liquidation of the
company if the order of the court stands. The debtor also has the right to an
immediate appeal if the insolvency order is granted.  246
2.6 The moratorium
Unlike the situation in South Africa where a general moratorium on all summonses,
actions and legal proceedings (including enforcement measures) against the
company during judicial management may be ordered by the court, and will follow
automatically on the commencement of business rescue proceedings,  the InsO247
differentiates in its provisions between a stay on the enforcement of claims against
the insolvent debtor on the one hand, and on the other, a moratorium on other legal
proceedings or actions in general.
2.6.1 Civil legal proceedings
As soon as insolvency proceedings are instituted, any pending civil case to which the
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 § 240 of the Civil Procedure Code.248
 § 85(1) of the InsO. 249
 § 85(2).250
 As regulated by §§ 47-52, such as claims in terms of a reservation of ownership, pledge or lien. 251
 § 86(1). The claims payable as administration costs are set out in § 55 and include liabilities under252
mutual contracts that the administrator has chosen to continue in terms of § 103 (referred to below).
 The so-called “Teilungsmassegegenstreit”: Braun Commentary at 203 par 715.253
 § 87. 254
 The filing of claims against the insolvent estate is regulated by §§ 174-187.255
 Braun Commentary at 199 par 696.256
debtor is a party and which involves assets that will form part of the insolvent estate
is automatically suspended until the court issues an insolvency order or the case is
otherwise closed.  However, once insolvency proceedings have commenced, the248
administrator may decide whether he wants to join and continue on behalf of the
estate any civil case in which the debtor is the plaintiff and which affects the assets
of the estate.  If he decides not to do so, the debtor and the defendant may249
continue the case.  250
The insolvency administrator or the plaintiff may also continue with a pending
civil case in which the debtor is the defendant and in which the plaintiff claims
specific movable or immovable property from the estate,  or payment of a claim251
payable in full as part of the administration costs.  Only these specified actions are252
regulated by § 86 and all of them concern claims that, if the plaintiff is successful, will
have the effect of reducing the size of the estate available for distribution.  253
All other creditors who have claims against the insolvent estate may enforce their
claims only in accordance with the provisions of the InsO.  This means that ordinary254
creditors for whom no special provision has been made can only institute their claims
against the estate by filing these claims with the administrator in accordance with the
prescribed procedure.  255
Legal proceedings that are instituted after commencement of insolvency
proceedings are not specifically regulated by the InsO. This is not deemed necessary as
a result of § 80(1), which provides for vesting the debtor’s right to manage and transfer
the assets of the insolvent estate in the administrator, as well as the prescribed
procedures in the InsO for dealing with claims and liabilities of the estate.  256
2.6.2 Stay of executions
The InsO provides for several different stays of execution in the course of insolvency
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 Authorised by § 21(2)3. This moratorium is discussed in part 2.5.1 above.257
 § 112(1). In terms of §§ 543(2) and 569(2) of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (the Civil Code, hereafter258
referred to as the BGB), a lessor would normally have this right after a tenant or lessee has missed two
payments. 
 § 112(2).259
 Insolvency creditors are creditors as described in §§ 38 and 39, being those who had established260
claims against the debtor at the time of commencement of the insolvency proceedings and subordinate
creditors as listed in § 39. Secured creditors are thus excluded.
 § 89(1). 261
 Bertram and Gottwald Insolvenzrechtshandbuch at 530; Braun Insolvenzordnung at 623.262
 § 88.263
 In terms of § 131: Braun Insolvenzordnung at 619.264
 Braun Insolvenzordnung at 623.265
proceedings. The first one is the stay or temporary stay on any measures of
execution against the debtor that may be ordered by the court during the provisional
period after an application for the commencement of insolvency proceedings has
been made and until the court decides whether to grant the order.257
Another measure that could be regarded as creating a limited stay in the initial
stages of the insolvency application is found in the provision that as soon as an
application for commencement of insolvency proceedings has been filed, no contract of
rent or lease over movable or immovable property may be cancelled by the lessor
because of non-payment of the rent  or the worsening financial position of the lessee.258 259
Once an order for commencement of insolvency proceedings has been issued
by the court, and for the duration of these proceedings, no executions by individual
insolvency creditors  are allowed on any assets of the debtor, irrespective of260
whether these assets form part of the insolvent estate or not.  Not only executions261
commencing after the opening of the insolvency proceedings are prohibited, but also
those that were commenced but not completed before the start of the proceedings.262
Furthermore, any security obtained by an insolvency creditor through execution
against the assets of the insolvent estate within one month before the insolvency
application was brought, or after it was brought, will become void on the
commencement of the insolvency proceedings.  Payments as a result of execution263
are not covered by this provision, but in most cases will be subject to an action to be
set aside as impeachable dispositions.  This stay will obviously facilitate any effort264
by the administrator to continue the business of the debtor since assets that are
important for the continuation of the business will be retained. Both civil claims and
official ones are included in the stay.265
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 In terms of § 53 the costs of the insolvency proceedings (being court costs and remuneration of the266
provisional and final insolvency administrators and members of the creditors’ committee: § 54), as well
as costs arising from the administration of the estate as set out in § 55, are classified as estate
liabilities and as such must be paid first and in full from estate assets. I will hereafter refer to them all
collectively as administration costs. 
 § 90(1).267
 Braun Insolvenzordnung at 628. These claims are referred to as imposed or inherited (“oktroyierte”)268
debts, as opposed to those debts voluntarily incurred by the administrator (“gewillkürten Masse-
verbindlichkeiten”): Begründung RegE Zu § 101: Balz and Landfermann Insolvenzgesetze at 170. 
 Bertram and Gottwald Insolvenzrechtshandbuch at 538.269
 In terms of § 90(2).270
 This must be interpreted to mean that both parties have to perform in terms of the contract, although271
the value of their obligations need not be equal: Braun Insolvenzordnung at 696. 
 According to § 279, the insolvent debtor will have this right in the case of self-administration (ordered272
in terms of § 98 and loosely based on the principle of debtor in possession found in Chapter 11
reorganisations in the USA), although he should exercise his choice in consultation with the appointed
trustee.
 This was taken over from § 17 of the Konkursordnung (KO) (repealed and substituted by the InsO)273
although this particular provision had been one of the most controversial provisions when part of the
previous legislation: W agner “Vertragsverhältnisse” at 338. Contracts regulated specifically by another
provision are excluded, such as fixed date transactions with a market or stock exchange price (§ 104);
sale by the debtor of a movable article subject to a retention of title (§ 107); contracts for the lease of
immovable property (§§ 109-111) and employment contracts (§ 113).
 Bertram and Gottwald Insolvenzrechtshandbuch at 592.274
A special stay of execution effective for a period of six months from the
commencement of insolvency proceedings applies to claims classified as costs of the
estate  but which did not arise as a result of any juristic act by the administrator.266 267
The legislature intended this provision to protect the insolvency administrator, at least
during the initial phase of the insolvency procedure, from claims that he had neither
incurred by any of his actions nor been able to prevent but that would break up the
insolvent estate and hamper or even prevent any rescue attempt.  Most importantly,268
this provision prevents the immediate withdrawal of cash assets that are critical to
enabling a debt-ridden business to survive in the early stages.  269
However, three types of liabilities that enjoy preference as administration costs
are specifically excluded from the abovementioned stay of six months.  The first are270
those liabilities that arise from an uncompleted mutual  contract that the271
administrator has chosen to continue. 
The general principle applicable to uncompleted contracts is contained in § 103,
which provides the insolvency administrator  with an express choice whether or not to272
fulfil a wholly or partially uncompleted contract.  The administrator may ensure the273
continuation of the contract, even against the will of the other contracting party, and in
spite of the debtor’s having been in breach of the agreement before insolvency.274
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 Braun Commentary at 226-227 par 842. In terms of the decision of the Federal Supreme Court of275
25.04.2002 (BGH NZI 2002, 375) insolvency proceedings do not terminate the mutual claims of the
contracting parties, but merely their enforceability which is revived, although now against the estate,
by the administrator’s choice to continue the contract.
 § 55(1)2. The application of § 103 is qualified by a special provision in respect of divisible contracts:276
in terms of § 105 any claim by the other contracting party for counter performance based on that party’s
partial performance before insolvency will only be an ordinary claim against the insolvent estate, in spite
of the administrator’s demand for performance of the outstanding obligations. This means that § 103
will apply only to that part of a divisible contract that is uncompleted on the date of insolvency.
 § 53.277
 § 103(2).278
 § 121(1) BGB.279
 Hess Insolvenzrecht Band I at 1732-1723.280
 § 103(2). Braun Insolvenzordnung at 706-707. If the insolvency administrator decides not to perform281
the insolvent debtor’s obligations under the contract, the other contracting party may prove a concurrent
claim against the estate for damages suffered as a result of non-performance of the contract: § 103(2).
 Section 136(2) of the Companies Act 2008 discussed in Chapter 2, part 3.6.282
Should an administrator choose to perform under an uncompleted contract, he steps into
the shoes of the debtor and must therefore deliver full performance on behalf of the
estate exactly as the debtor would have had to do.  Obligations arising from275
uncompleted contracts that the insolvency administrator chooses to complete are
specifically classified as costs of the insolvent estate  and enjoy a preferent right to276
payment from the insolvent estate.277
The other contracting party has been given the right to demand that the insolvency
administrator immediately exercise his right to choose between performance and
repudiation to end the uncertainty regarding the fate of the contract.  After receiving278
such a demand, the administrator must declare without delay whether he wishes to claim
performance of the contract. The words “without delay” should be interpreted with
reference to the Civil Code where they are defined to mean that there may not be any
culpable delay.  The length of the period that the insolvency administrator may use to279
make his decision will depend on how much time he needs to assess the advantages
and disadvantages for the insolvent estate of fulfilling the contract, which will often
include forming an opinion on whether to continue the business of the insolvent
temporarily.  Failure by an insolvency administrator to make his choice known to the280
other party after being called upon to do so is regarded as a refusal to perform, and the
administrator loses the right to demand performance of the contract.281
These very clear and unambiguous provisions regulating uncompleted contracts
are in stark contrast to the unclear and controversial provisions on this issue in the
South African business rescue proceedings.  282
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 § 90(2)2. In terms of § 108(1), rental and lease agreements of the debtor as lessor or lessee over283
immovable property or premises, as well as employment contracts, irrespective of whether the debtor
is the employer or employee, will continue after commencement of insolvency proceedings and must
be paid as administration costs. The administrator has not been given any choice in the matter but may
terminate the contract on any of the normal grounds for dismissal. If no shorter period has been agreed
on, § 113 requires notice of three months for termination of a service contract by either the
administrator or the other party. If the contract is ended prematurely by the administrator, the other
party has an ordinary claim for damages against the insolvent estate. 
 § 90(2)3.284
 Bertram and Gottwald Insolvenzrechtshandbuch at 539.285
 See part 2.5.1 above.286
 A provisional insolvency administrator is subject to the same provisions of the InsO as the final287
administrator regarding supervision of his activities by the insolvency court (§ 58), dismissal (§ 59),
personal liability for breach of his duties (§ 60), liability to creditors (§ 61), prescription of liabilities (§
62) and remuneration and expenses (§§ 63-66). W here relevant, these provisions will be discussed
below with reference to the final insolvency administrator. 
 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 190.288
The second type of administration costs excluded from the six-months’ stay are
those from long-term contracts of lease over immovable property and contracts of
employment after the first date on which the administrator could have legally
terminated these contracts but failed to do so.  283
The third group of administration costs exempted from the stay are those emanating
from a long-term contractual relationship where the administrator has claimed
performance from the other party in favour of the insolvent estate.  This provision is284
particularly important in respect of a claim for remuneration where the administrator has
terminated an employee’s contract but has continued to use his services.285
2.7 Managing the procedure
2.7.1 The provisional insolvency administrator and the insolvency
administrator
2.7.1.1 Appointment
2.7.1.1.1 The provisional insolvency administrator
As previously discussed in this Chapter,  an insolvency court may appoint a286
provisional insolvency administrator as one of the measures to preserve the estate
pending the court’s decision whether to open insolvency proceedings.  This is the287
codification of a practice that was developed during the previous legislative
dispensation although it lacked any statutory foundation.  Although the court has288
a discretion whether to appoint a provisional administrator, such appointment will
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 In terms of § 21(2)2. See part 2.5.1 and Braun Commentary at 103 par 222.289
 Braun Commentary at 103 par 222.290
 Braun Commentary at 107 par 241; Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 191;291
Remmert “Introduction” at 428.
 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 191.292
 § 22(1).293
 § 24(2) read with §§ 85(1) and 86.294
obviously be unavoidable if the court orders that all dispositions of his assets by the
debtor will be subject to the consent of a provisional administrator.  The289
appointment of a provisional administrator is also advisable where the debtor applies
for an insolvency order on the grounds of imminent illiquidity,  presumably to guard290
against further mismanagement and depletion of his assets by the debtor. A
provisional administrator will usually also be appointed by the court where it is
intended to continue the business of the debtor, even if there are no grounds for
doubting the trustworthiness or honesty of the debtor.
Although not found in the InsO itself, the terms “strong” (“starker”) or “weak”
(“schwacher”) insolvency administrator are used in practice to denote the powers
given to the provisional insolvency administrator by the court.  291
A strong provisional insolvency administrator is one who is given the sole
authority to dispose of the debtor’s assets while the debtor is deprived of all powers
to deal with his assets. This type of provisional administrator is usually appointed
where the court has evidence of fraud or other special circumstances that require
stringent security measures, and therefore it is not the standard procedure.  As a292
result, the powers and duties of a provisional administrator whose appointment is
combined with a general prohibition on dealings by the debtor are set out very
precisely in the InsO. It is firstly stated as his general duty to take over the
management and right of disposal over the debtor’s property.  This means that in293
the case of a corporate debtor, the provisional administrator will take over all the
management duties of the board of directors. He will effectively be running the
company and may even continue pending legal actions on behalf of the company as
plaintiff or defendant.294
The InsO divides this general duty of a provisional administrator into three
detailed sets of duties. He must: 
(i) safeguard and preserve the debtor’s property. Although he may use assets of the
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 Braun Commentary at 107 par 243.295
 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 197. 296
 Commentary at 107 par 244.297
 Braun Commentary at 107 par 244.298
 Braun Commentary at 108 par 247.299
 § 22(1)1-3.300
 Braun Commentary at 108 par 247.301
 Bertram and Gottwald Insolvenzrechtshandbuch at 267; Braun Commentary at 104 par 224;302
Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 203.
 Commentary at 63 par 32.303
debtor as security if necessary for the continuation of the business, he is not normally
entitled to realise the assets.  295
(ii) continue carrying on the business of the debtor until the court decides whether to
open insolvency proceedings. This is unless the court consents to the closure of the
business to avoid a significant diminution of assets because, for example, the
business is running at a loss.  Here the provisional administrator’s authority is296
limited to performing transactions in the ordinary course of business in order to keep
the business functioning as a going concern. However, Braun points out that the
provisional administrator’s duty to keep the business running may conflict with his
duty to preserve the debtor’s property, since it may be necessary for the success of
the business over the long term to be run at a loss for a short period.  If major297
losses are foreseen, the court will use its discretion to close the business wholly or
partially after it has been provided with all the necessary information.  298
(iii) ascertain whether the debtor’s assets will be sufficient to cover the costs of the
insolvency proceedings. This will also entail investigating whether there are voidable
transactions that could increase the estate’s ability to cover the insolvency costs.299
The court may furthermore also instruct the provisional administrator to provide an
expert opinion on the existence of a valid ground for the commencement of
insolvency proceedings as well as on the future prospects of the debtor’s business.300
If no provisional administrator is appointed, the court may request an independent
expert to provide his opinion on these matters.  301
In practice, the appointment of a strong provisional administrator is rare for
various reasons including the fact that such an appointment would mean that the
insolvent estate would have to incur additional costs.  Braun  also points out that302 303
although the legislature originally intended it to be the standard procedure, the
appointment of a strong provisional insolvency administrator creates a legal problem
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 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 203.304
 Braun Commentary at 108 par 246.305
 § 22(2).306
 § 22(3). §§ 97, 98 and 101, dealing with the debtor’s duties of co-operation and providing307
information after insolvency proceedings have started apply mutatis mutandis.
 § 22(3) read with § 101(1) and (2).308
regarding liabilities that arise during the period that he is in charge: whereas a weak
administrator does not have the authority to incur liabilities on behalf of the debtor but
only to approve those incurred by the debtor, all such liabilities become valid claims
against the insolvent estate because no insolvency proceedings have yet been
opened at the time they are incurred. However, the liabilities incurred by the strong
provisional administrator are also pre-insolvency debts but they have not been
incurred by the debtor, and are therefore more difficult to classify. In spite of this
difficulty, the claims are generally accepted to be valid against the insolvent estate.
Most provisional insolvency administrators, however, are so-called weak
administrators where the debtor retains the power to dispose of his property but requires
the consent of the provisional administrator to give effect to such dispositions.  This type304
of provisional administrator has only those duties specifically determined by the court in its
order. The court may deprive the debtor of the power to enter into certain types of
transactions, such as loan agreements or other specified dispositions, and these powers
will then be transferred to the insolvency administrator. His powers may also include the
running of the debtor’s business, particularly if it is a small to medium-sized business.305
The duties assigned by the court to the weak provisional administrator may not, however,
exceed the statutory duties imposed on the strong insolvency administrator.306
Every provisional insolvency administrator has the right to enter the business
premises of the debtor and to conduct investigations there. The debtor is compelled
to allow the provisional administrator to inspect his books and business papers, to
provide that administrator with all necessary information and to assist him in the
performance of his duties.  Where the debtor is a company, these obligations rest307
on the current directors and previous directors who vacated their office within the
preceding two years, as well as on current employees and previous employees who
left within the last two years.  308
If the appointment of a provisional insolvency administrator is revoked (usually
together with the other precautionary measures originally imposed by the court), he
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 § 25(2). Although the subsection refers specifically to the provisional insolvency administrator who309
has been vested with the right to deal with all the debtor’s property (that is, a strong provisional
administrator), Braun Commentary at 110 par 253 believes that for practical reasons it will also apply
to weak provisional administrators who have been vested with the right to effect specific dispositions.
 Although he is merely referred to as the insolvency administrator in the InsO, many commentators refer310
to him as the final insolvency administrator to differentiate him clearly from the provisional administrator. 
 § 27(1).311
 Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 695.312
 §§ 21(2)1 and 56. See part 2.7.1.2 below for a discussion of these requirements.313
 See part 2.7.1.1 above.314
 Braun Commentary at 63 par 31.315
 See part 2.7.1.2 below regarding these qualifications.316
 Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 696.317
 Judgment of 23.05.2006 ZInsO 2006, 765, discussed in detail in Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger318
Kommentar at 699-701, including later judgments of the court confirming this decision. 
 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 352; Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger319
Kommentar at 707.
must use the property administered by him to pay all costs and liabilities incurred by
him in the exercise of his duties before he vacates his office.  309
2.7.1.1.2 The (final) insolvency administrator
The insolvency court appoints the final  insolvency administrator as part of the order310
opening insolvency proceedings.  The insolvency administrator plays a pivotal role311
in the insolvency proceedings, and if a provisional insolvency administrator had
previously been appointed, he is usually subsequently appointed by the court to act
as the final insolvency administrator.  This practice ensures continuity and is greatly312
facilitated by the fact that the same requirements and qualifications for appointment
apply to both officials.  For the same reasons, if no provisional administrator had313
been appointed but the court had requested an insolvency expert’s opinion,  the314
court would inevitably appoint this expert as insolvency administrator.  315
The choice of insolvency administrator by the court takes place in two stages: the
insolvency judge first compiles a preselection list of qualified and willing candidates  from316
which the actual appointment is then made, which is the second stage.  In an important317
decision by the German Constitutional Court  it was held that each insolvency judge has318
the duty to compile a preselection list, using his own tried and tested criteria to determine
who qualifies for appointment, but has a wide discretion in his final choice of an insolvency
administrator and need not regularly or automatically appoint everybody on the list.
Therefore, an unsuccessful candidate cannot appeal against his omission from the
preselection list or demand his appointment to replace the appointed administrator.319
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 § 56(2).320
 § 57.321
 Braun Commentary at 161 par 491. The administrator must, for example, obtain the consent of the322
creditors’ committee (or creditors, if no committee has been appointed) to all “particularly important”
legal acts such as the sale of the business or part of it, or onerous loan contracts: § 160.
 Braun Commentary at 161 par 493.323
 Bertram and Gottwald Insolvenzrechtshandbuch at 268. 324
 Flessner “Germany” at 325.325
 § 57. This also applies to a new administrator appointed by the court after the previous one has died326
or been dismissed: Braun Commentary at 161 par 492. 
 Braun Commentary at 161 par 494. The InsO provides for dismissal of the insolvency administrator327
in § 59: see part 2.7.1.3 below. 
 The additional requirement of a majority in number was introduced by the amending legislation of328
2001 (see part 1 above) and is intended to prevent secured creditors with large claims (who have
voting rights for the total amount of their claims and not just for the unsecured part: § 76(2)) as well as
any other major creditors from imposing their will on the majority of creditors and abusing the process:
Braun Commentary at 161 par 492; W immer and Ahrens Frankfurter Kommentar at 8. 
 § 57. This decision is actually taken by the Registrar of the insolvency court: Braun Commentary at329
161 par 495.
The administrator must be given an official letter of appointment that he must
return to the insolvency court on termination of his office for whatever reason.  320
As a result of the priority given to the rights of creditors in insolvency
proceedings, irrespective of whether liquidation or rescue is envisaged, the creditors
are given the right to choose another insolvency administrator to replace the one
appointed by the court.  The creditors’ co-operation with and confidence in the321
insolvency administrator is regarded as an absolute requirement for the smooth
running of the insolvency process, as it is largely steered by them.  As a result, they322
are not required to justify their decision in choosing a replacement.  In most cases,323
however, the creditors accept the administrator appointed by the court,  and it is324
only in major insolvencies where creditors play a more active role than usual that the
court’s appointment of an insolvency administrator is sometimes challenged.  325
The creditors have this opportunity only once in respect of each administrator,
which is at the first meeting of creditors that takes place after the appointment of the
administrator by the court.  The reason for this limitation is to avoid a situation326
where the insolvency administrator’s independence and ability to carry out his duties
properly could be undermined by a creditor or creditors threatening to replace him
if they do not agree with him.  327
The new administrator must be chosen by the majority of the creditors in value
and number  who voted, and the court may refuse to confirm his appointment only328
if he is not suitable to take over the office.  Even so, any creditor has an immediate329
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 § 57. Full reasons must therefore be provided for a rejection because of the immediate right of330
appeal of the creditors: Braun Commentary at 162 par 496. 
 See part 2.8 below regarding the insolvency plan. The degree of supervision is determined by the331
court but is not affected by whether a creditors’ committee, which also exercises a supervisory function
has been appointed: Braun Commentary at 162 par 499.
 § 58(1). Normally the administrator will submit a report every six to twelve months: Braun332
Commentary at 163 par 503.
 Flessner “Germany” at 328.333
 Braun Commentary at 163 pars 501-502. Specific exceptions where the court may interfere with a334
business decision have also been created in the InsO, for example a decision by the insolvency
administrator to close the business which may be suspended at the request of the debtor until creditors
have had an opportunity to decide whether to give or withhold their consent: § 158(2). 
 § 58(2). An administrator who has been dismissed may also be fined in the same way if he fails to335
return assets of the insolvent estate: § 28(3).
 See Chapter 2, part 2.5.1. 336
right of appeal against the court’s refusal to confirm the appointment.330
The insolvency administrator (both provisional and final) is subject to the
supervision of the insolvency court for the duration of the insolvency proceedings,
that is, also during the implementation of an insolvency plan if there is one.  Thus331
the court may order him to furnish information on a specific issue or on his
management of the business and the insolvency proceedings at any time.  Although332
the duty of the court is mainly restricted to ensuring that the administrator fully
complies with the law, and not whether he is taking the correct business decisions,333
the court may intervene if, considered objectively, any measure causes losses to the
insolvent estate or the actions of the administrator are contrary to the purpose of the
insolvency proceedings.  334
Should the court find a dereliction of duty on the part of the administrator it may,
after a prior warning, impose a fine not exceeding € 25,000 on him, against which he
may immediately appeal.  335
2.7.1.2 Qualifications
The qualifications for appointment as an insolvency administrator are set out in §
56(1) and show some similarity to the requirements for appointment as trustee,
liquidator or judicial manager in South Africa in so far as no formal academic or
professional qualifications are required.  336
Although contained in one subsection, there are in fact four requirements that
a person has to meet to qualify for appointment as insolvency administrator, which
will be discussed hereunder.
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 The word “a” (“eine”) is generally understood to mean that only one administrator may be appointed337
at a time: Flessner “Germany” at 326; W immer and Ahrens Frankfurter Kommentar at 518. The final
government draft explained that the appointment of more than one administrator had proved to be
unnecessary in practice because he could employ other professionals to assist him. It would also avoid
the problem of having to demarcate the responsibilities of each administrator: Begründung RegE Zu
§ 65: Balz and Landfermann Insolvenzgesetze at 134. 
 Braun Commentary at 158 par 479. In terms of § 60 an insolvency administrator is personally liable338
to all parties to the proceedings (such as the debtor, creditors and reversionary heirs) for damages
caused by a culpable breach of any of his statutory duties or his failure to act with the care of a proper
and conscientious insolvency administrator. See further Braun Commentary at 166 par 520ff.
 Flessner “Germany” at 328.339
 Braun Insolvenzordnung at 445.340
 W immer and Ahrens Frankfurter Kommentar at 512 point out that the firm that dealt with the most341
insolvency cases in 2000 only had two insolvency administrators, which clearly shows that they did not
attend to every matter themselves.
 Braun Insolvenzordnung at 445 with reference to Art. 12, 3 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik342
Deutschland. This view is shared by W immer and Ahrens Frankfurter Kommentar at 512 and others
referred to there. 
2.7.1.2.1 Natural person
The InsO stipulates that only a  natural person can be appointed. Therefore, it is337
not possible to appoint a company or even a firm that will nominate an individual to
act. The parliamentary committee amended the original draft legislation that provided
for the appointment of firms, because they foresaw difficulties in respect of conflicts
of interest and the personal liability of the insolvency administrator for damages
caused by a breach of his duties.  The personal liability of the administrator is an338
important feature of the insolvency procedure and is widely regarded as the most
effective measure to ensure that he exercises his duties properly and carefully.  The339
specific individual must therefore be appointed directly. 
This decision has been criticised on the basis that an individual can also
experience a conflict of interests, especially when working as a partner in a firm (as
most do). On the other hand, there is nothing to prevent the members of a juristic
person from being held personally liable, and the argument that a firm may not be
able to pay damages because of solvency problems applies equally – if not more so
– to natural persons.  In practice, the reality is that an insolvency administrator will340
not do everything personally but will be assisted by others in the firm.  Furthermore,341
some doubt has been expressed about the constitutionality of this clause, as the
rights of juristic persons are also protected by the constitution.  342
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 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 349.343
 Flessner “Germany” at 326 notes that there are a number of insolvency experts with a countrywide344
reputation who are normally appointed by the courts in cases of large corporate insolvencies.
 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 349.345
 See Chapter 3, part 2.5.1.2 on the highly regulated profession of insolvency practitioner. 346
 Braun Insolvenzordnung at 446.347
 Previously known as the Arbeitskreis der Insolvenzverwalter Deutschland e.V. : W immer and Ahrens348
Frankfurter Kommentar at 517. 
 AG Hamburg, ZIP (2001) at 2147.349
 Braun Insolvenzordnung at 446-447 refers to several commentators who held this view, and so do350
W immer and Ahrens Frankfurter Kommentar at 517.
 “VID – Berufsgrundsätze der Insolvenzverwalter” published in Zeitschrift fur Wirtschaftsrecht (2006)351
at 2147.
2.7.1.2.2 Suitable for the specific case
The person must be a suitable candidate for appointment in the specific case. This
means that his experience and expertise must be sufficient for him to cope with the
particular intricacies and problems of the case, whether in respect of the law, business
or accounting, although he does not have to be a specific professional such as an
attorney, accountant or business manager.  For example, only a highly experienced343
and senior insolvency practitioner will be considered for appointment in a case involving
a large corporate debtor.  However, it is accepted that new entrants to the profession344
have to gain their experience in small and uncomplicated cases, and experience as an
insolvency administrator is thus not essential in all cases.  345
As a result of the fact that the office of insolvency administrator is not an officially
regulated profession as in England, for example,  the criteria for meeting this346
requirement have largely been set by legal commentators and the courts, as well as
by various professional organisations to which many insolvency administrators
belong.  Thus in 2001, the insolvency court in Hamburg held that the code of347
conduct accepted by the Verband der Insolvenzverwalter Deutschlands e.V. (VID),348
a voluntary professional organisation for insolvency administrators, could be used as
a concrete reflection of this requirement in the InsO.  The decision was severely349
criticised by some because it placed too much emphasis on the value of the code of
conduct, thereby raising mere “banalities” almost to the level of legislation, while
others, although recognising this danger, concluded that the end result of the court’s
use of the code was correct.  As a result of the criticism against their code of350
conduct, members of the VID approved a new set of professional rules for
administrators.  The organised attorneys’ profession also attempted to set criteria351
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 Fachanwalt für Insolvenzrecht: Braun Insolvenzordnung at 447. Nothing similar has been done by352
the professional bodies for chartered accountants or tax advisors from whose ranks appointments are
also made. 
 BverfG v 9.2.2005 – 1 BvR 2719/04; Köhler-Ma “Administrator Selection” at 1.353
 Braun Commentary at 160 par 489; Flessner “Germany” at 326; W immer and Ahrens Frankfurter354
Kommentar at 513.
 See Braun Insolvenzordnung at 447 regarding the rules for the admission and appointment of355
insolvency administrators drafted by them and their subsequent demand (later abandoned) for
legislative recognition of the profession of insolvency administrator. 
 Balz and Landfermann Insolvenzgesetze at XXXIV; Braun Commentary at 158-159 pars 481-482.356
 Braun Commentary at 160 par 489.357
 Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 698.358
for the appointment of attorneys as insolvency administrators by the creation of a
specialised profession for attorneys who are experts in insolvency law.  352
Thus, although at first sight it would seem that, as in the present situation of
insolvency practitioners in South Africa, the office of insolvency administrator is also
not limited to specific professionals such as accountants or lawyers, nothing could
be further from the truth. The German Constitutional Court has confirmed that acting
as an insolvency administrator is a separate and recognised profession in its own
right and therefore is not limited to lawyers or any other professionals,  but the fact353
is that almost 90 per cent of all appointed insolvency practitioners are lawyers, while
the rest are mainly tax advisers and auditors.  The simple reason for this is that the354
members of these professions who specialise in insolvency administrations are the
only persons who are able to meet all the requirements for appointment in most
cases. Professional organisations such as the Verband der Insolvenzverwalter
Deutschlands e.V. referred to above, and other interest groups of insolvency
administrators, for example the Gravenbrucher Kreis,  were started by and consist355
almost entirely of members of the legal profession.  Therefore, although356
membership of these organisations or of any professional organisation is not required
by the Code, the courts are unlikely to appoint a person with no such affiliation, and
in practice, lawyers who are specialised insolvency administrators are usually
appointed, especially in corporate insolvencies.  Several commentators have357
therefore expressed serious doubts about the correctness of the Constitutional
Court’s opinion, especially since many insolvency administrators, in addition to being
practising lawyers or accountants, are also involved in business rescues outside the
formal insolvency proceedings.  Once again this demonstrates the importance of358
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 See Chapter 2, part 3.7.1.2.359
 Braun Commentary at 159 par 483.360
 Braun Insolvenzordnung at 448.361
 Commentary at 159 par 484.362
 See Katz “Developments” at 39 who also pointed out this weakness in South African insolvency law363
where groups of companies are not treated as single entities in insolvency and where it is sometimes
mere coincidence which company happens to be the owner of the assets at the insolvency of one or
more of them. 
 Braun Commentary at 160 par 490.364
properly drafted regulations, and the recognition of an official regulator by the South
African Department of Trade and Industry for the profession of business rescue
practitioner.  359
2.7.1.2.3 Business experience
An insolvency administrator is specifically required to have business experience,
particularly in the type of business involved in the case for which he seeks
appointment.  This will enable him to manage the business if necessary and also360
to establish whether criminal activities or bad management caused the company’s
downfall. It has been suggested that when deciding on the business knowledge
required of an administrator in a particular case, the court should determine whether
this is a matter where the business should be liquidated and closed by an insolvency
lawyer, or whether it should be continued and needs economic and managerial skills
or whether there have been criminal activities requiring special knowledge.361
Braun  laments the fact that no special provisions exist for the appointment of one362
administrator where several independent but connected companies are concerned,
as money may have been unlawfully circulated among the companies.  363
2.7.1.2.4 Independent from creditors and the debtor
An insolvency administrator is required to be independent from the creditors as well
as from the debtor. This refers to financial independence from both the debtor and
the assets of the insolvent estate,  and, for example, disqualifies a major creditor364
or shareholder of the debtor as well as the debtor’s legal representative. It is
important that the insolvency administrator’s decisions should not be influenced by
any personal financial interests or effects. 
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 This was expressly stated by the drafters of the government draft in their explanatory notes:365
Begründung RegE Zu § 65: Balz and Landfermann Insolvenzgesetze at 134.
 Braun Insolvenzordnung at 446; Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 348.366
 Now known as the Verband der Insolvenzverwalter Deutschlands e.V. (VID): W immer and Ahrens367
Frankfurter Kommentar at 517.
 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 349. The complete code of conduct is368
reproduced on pages 354-356 of this textbook. 
 W immer and Ahrens Frankfurter Kommentar at 514-515.369
 See Chapter 2, part 3.7.1.2.4 on the potential problems of interpreting the South African provision.370
 By the Gesetz zur Vereinfachung des Insolvenzverfahrens (Act for the Simplification of Insolvency371
Proceedings) of 2007: see fn 27 above.
The independence of an individual is not, however, in doubt simply because he
is nominated by a creditor,  and neither is that of the drafter of an insolvency plan365
filed simultaneously with the debtor’s application for the opening of insolvency
proceedings or a potential insolvency administrator who has held preparatory
consultations with the debtor.  366
In November 2002, in an effort to clarify all the requirements, but with more focus
on independence, the Arbeitskreis der Insolvenzverwalter Deutschlands e.V.,  a367
voluntary association of attorneys who act as insolvency administrators, decided on a
code of conduct that provided detailed guidelines on this requirement.  Although the368
code is not legally binding, it is valuable in interpreting the legislation and in time could
encompass the generally accepted principles. Attorneys in particular have to guard
against a conflict of interests when they have acted for the insolvent debtor before
insolvency because appointment as insolvency administrator requires objectivity and the
duty to investigate and report on the debtor’s transactions before insolvency, while as
attorney he is bound to a professional duty not to disclose his client’s affairs.  369
All the guidelines that have developed in respect of this requirement may be of
assistance to South African lawyers in judging the independence of a business rescue
practitioner as required by the Companies Act of 2008, a provision that, because of its
lack of specifics, may be open to widely divergent interpretations and, strangely enough,
does not even require the practitioner to be independent from a creditor or creditors.370
2.7.1.2.5 Any willing individual
The fifth aspect is not so much a requirement for the individual administrator but
rather a directive to the insolvency court which was added to § 56(1) with effect from
1 July 2007.  This was as a result of the practice of the courts of making371
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 The principle of regionality – that an insolvency administrator whose place of business is situated372
in the court’s district should be appointed – was the subject of heated debates in the period before
2007, and it is still accepted that, in spite of modern communication technology, it may sometimes be
preferable to appoint a local person: Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 349.
 BverfG v 3.8.2004 – 1 BvR 135/00, NZI 2004, 574; ZInsO  2004, 913; Braun Insolvenzordnung at373
444-5. See Hess Insolvenzrecht at 100-101 on the history and legal problems in this matter. See also
Loubser AShareholders@ at 375 where a similar practice of the Master of the High Court in South Africa
to only appoint insolvency practitioners from “panels” is questioned as being probably unconstitutional.
 Runkel “Gläubiger” at 439.374
 § 56(1).375
 Braun Insolvenzordnung at 445.376
 Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 701.377
 Braun Commentary at 160 par 486. 378
 Braun Commentary at 159 par 482 and at 160 par 486.379
 Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 6.380
 Hamburger Kommentar at 6-7.381
appointments from closed lists that they had compiled of (mostly local)  insolvency372
practitioners with whose work they were familiar. After two insolvency administrators
took the matter to the Federal Constitutional Court, this practice was declared
unconstitutional.  The court held that the insolvency court should at least give every373
potential candidate a fair chance to be considered for the specific case, although it
does not mean that he can demand to be appointed as insolvency administrator.374
The subsection now specifically states that appointments must be made from all
persons who are willing to take on insolvency administrations. It is also possible for
an individual to limit his availability for appointment as insolvency administrator to
certain proceedings.  This allows an insolvency administrator to specialise in375
consumer insolvencies, for example, and declare this to the insolvency court.376
Selection of insolvency administrators is now made from open lists (which each judge
must compile independently),  and the judges look further than local candidates,377
especially where more complicated cases are involved which require special
business or international expertise.  Some insolvency judges also determine and378
disclose the criteria they will use for selection in a specific case.379
However, the fundamental problem, which is a serious shortage of experienced
insolvency administrators and the absence of appropriate and clear criteria for
inclusion in the list of potential candidates that should ideally be uniformly applied by
all insolvency courts in Germany, has not been addressed either by the Constitutional
Court or the amending legislation.  Schmidt and Ahrendt  point out that the380 381
insolvency courts do not have the capacity to develop such national uniform
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 The Bund-Länder-Arbeitsgruppe “Insolvenzrecht”: Braun Insolvenzordnung at 447.382
 By the Insolvenzrechts-Novelle of 2002: see Braun Insolvenzordnung at 448.383
 Abschlussbericht der Bund-Länder-Arbeitsgruppe “Insolvenzrecht” at 21, available at  <http://www.jm384
.nrw.de/JM/justizpolitik/schwerpunkte/insolvenzrecht/abschlussbericht.pdf> accessed on 2 February 2010.
 Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 707.385
 See part 2.9 regarding the end of insolvency proceedings.386
 § 59(1).387
standards, and as a result there is a real danger of inconsistency in the approach of
different courts. This has become visible primarily in two different approaches: some
courts have made a concerted effort to include as many names as possible in their
lists of candidates, while others are still using procedures that come very close to
creating a “closed shop”. Clearly, more specific regulation of the profession is
required to bring certainty to the matter, and this supports the decision of the South
African legislature to opt for regulation of the profession of business rescue
practitioner. It also emphasises the need for detailed and specific legislative
requirements for appointment as a business rescue practitioner to avoid the
confusion created by leaving these requirements too open or general in nature. 
The working group responsible for this amendment to the InsO  also expressed382
their support for a system similar to the one introduced in Austria in 2002,  which383
created an Internet-based list of potential insolvency administrators that was created and
administered by the private sector. The working group believed that such a list could be
of great value to the courts by providing information about and assisting in the choice of
an appropriate insolvency administrator.  This view was not shared by all, however, as384
some commentators believed it to be a failure: firstly, because it was impossible to verify
the information supplied by the aspirant administrators about themselves and, secondly,
because it created such a huge oversupply of possible candidates that it was impossible
for the courts to consider their choices from the whole group.  385
2.7.1.3 Vacation of or removal from office
The insolvency administrator’s office is terminated by his death or by order of the
court or when the insolvency proceedings come to an end.  The insolvency386
administrator may be removed from office on any serious grounds by the insolvency
court, either mero motu or on application by the administrator himself, the creditors’
committee or the creditors’ meeting.  Individual creditors, the debtor or any other387
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 Braun Commentary at 165 par 512.388
 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 362-363.389
 Braun Commentary at 165 par 514. In the case of the temporary disability of the insolvency390
administrator, it is preferable to appoint an administrator to take over his duties temporarily until he has
recovered, rather than permanently replacing him. Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar
at 362 also mention other serious grounds, such as negligent financial administration by the
administrator, inadequate management and personal problems that are not of a temporary nature.
 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 362.391
 Braun Commentary at 165 par 515.392
 W immer and Ahrens Frankfurter Kommentar at 531.393
 Runkel “Gläubiger” at 455.394
 § 59(1). An immediate appeal by the administrator against his dismissal is allowed, as well as an395
immediate appeal by the applicant(s) against the court’s refusal to dismiss: § 59(2).
parties are not entitled to bring such an application.  The court has a duty to388
investigate whether to remove an insolvency administrator mero motu as soon as it
becomes aware of any serious grounds, but it is often at the instigation of the debtor
or individual creditors who do not have the authority to apply to court for removal that
the court launches an investigation. In the last-mentioned case the court must
proceed with caution because individual debtors who were unsuccessful in their
efforts to have the administrator dismissed by the meeting or committee of creditors
are often only pursuing their selfish personal interests.  389
No specific grounds for dismissal are provided, and it is left to the court’s
discretion whether there are reasons serious enough for dismissal. These could vary
from the permanent disability or illness of the insolvency administrator to the breach
of his statutory duties.  Even where the administrator himself brings the application390
for removal, he has to provide proper reasons. However, it may rightly be questioned
whether there is any advantage for the proceedings in forcing an unwilling
administrator to remain in office, particularly as he cannot resign.391
Dismissal is regarded as a last resort and appropriate only if the administrator
is suspected of committing serious offences such as embezzlement, fraud or
bribery.  Insolvency administrators have also been dismissed for continuing the392
debtor’s business in direct contravention of a resolution of creditors, displaying a lack
of objectivity and independence, breaching the duty to report to creditors,  mixing393
money belonging to the insolvent estate with their own, and failure to draft an
insolvency plan 18 months after being ordered to do so by the creditors’ meeting.394
The administrator and the creditors’ representatives must be heard before a
decision is taken by the court whether to dismiss the insolvency administrator.  The395
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 § 59(2); W immer and Ahrens Frankfurter Kommentar at 532.396
 See parts 2.2.2 and 2.5.1.1 above. 397
 § 80(1). § 148(1) also orders the insolvency administrator to immediately take possession of all398
property forming part of the assets subject to the insolvency proceedings.
 Flessner “Germany” at 323.399
 § 81.400
 Braun Commentary at 191 par 657.401
 However, § 97(1) does offer some protection, as it prohibits the use of such incriminating402
information against him without his consent in a subsequent criminal trial or proceedings for an
administrative offence. 
insolvency court must provide reasons for its decision because the administrator has
an immediate right of appeal against a decision to dismiss, while the creditors’
committee or any individual creditor may appeal against a decision not to do so, the
last-mentioned only in cases where the application to dismiss was brought by the
creditors’ meeting.  396
2.7.2 Powers and duties of directors
2.7.2.1 Standard cases
It is apparent from the discussion of the provisional order and appointment of a
provisional insolvency administrator that the directors of a debtor company may be
divested of some or all their management powers before the insolvency proceedings
have even started.397
As soon as the commencement of insolvency proceedings has been ordered by
the court, the right to manage and deal with property forming part of the insolvent estate
is automatically transferred to the insolvency administrator.  This means that, although398
they are not removed from office, the directors of an insolvent company will no longer
have any right to manage the company’s business or dispose of any assets.  Any399
disposition in contravention of this prohibition will be invalid.  Furthermore, the office of400
insolvency administrator is of a highly personal nature, and as a result, he may not
delegate his functions to the directors (or to any other person) except for purely
administrative functions that are not related to the insolvency proceedings.401
Every director has a duty to disclose all relevant information (including
incriminating information that could cause criminal or administrative action to be
taken against him),  to support the administrator and to be available at all times,402
while the duty of disclosure also applies to every past director who vacated his office
GERMANY-297-
 § 97 read with § 101(1).403
 § 98.404
 Title 11, United States Code.405
 Braun Commentary at 483 par 2230.406
 The principle of debtor in possession means that the debtor (or its management) will ordinarily407
remain in possession and control of the estate and management of the business: Cowans Bankruptcy
Law at 134-135. 
 Epstein, Nickles and W hite Bankruptcy at 738 and 745.408
 The grounds are set out in detail in s 1104 of the United States Bankruptcy Code and mainly refer409
to instances of fraud and mismanagement by the debtor.
 § 270(1). 410
 § 270(1).411
 § 270(3).412
 Ehlers “Statutory Corporate Rescue” at 154.413
within two years before commencement of the insolvency proceedings.  If any of403
these persons refuse to co-operate, the court may order their detention until they
comply with the court’s request.404
2.7.2.2 Self-administration
The InsO provides for an exception to the above standard procedure of the company
being managed by an insolvency administrator. This exception, referred to as self-
administration, appears to be a remnant of the initial intention to model the InsO on
the United States Bankruptcy Code  and is loosely based on the principle of debtor405
in possession,  which is a distinctive feature of American insolvency law.406 407
However, unlike the American system where the appointment of a trustee to take
over the management of the debtor’s business is an extraordinary measure  that408
the court will order only under very specific and exceptional circumstances,  self-409
administration is an exceptional procedure under German insolvency law and the
debtor remains subject to supervision, albeit to a slightly lesser degree.
Self-administration must be ordered by the insolvency court at the same time
that the order commencing insolvency proceedings is issued.  A self-administration410
order allows the debtor to manage and dispose of the assets that are subject to the
insolvency proceedings, but under the supervision of a trustee  who is appointed411
instead of an insolvency administrator.  Therefore, the debtor is not given total412
control over his assets and affairs, and in reality self-administration is a highly
watered-down version  of the American system of debtor in possession where the413
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 The United States Bankruptcy Code explicitly gives the debtor in possession all the powers that a414
trustee would have if appointed: s 1107(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
 Commentary at 485 par 2243 and at 487 par 2251.415
 Braun Commentary at 487 par 2251.416
 § 274(1) read with § 56: see part 2.5.1.2 above. All the other provisions applicable to the insolvency417
administrator regarding supervision by the court, dismissal, personal liability for damages caused by
a wrongful breach of his duties, prescription of claims against him and remuneration have also been
made applicable to the trustee: § 274(1) read with §§ 58-60 and 62-65.
 § 274(1) read with § 57: see part 2.7.1.1 above. 418
 Braun Commentary at 488 par 2254.419
 § 274(2) read with § 22(3).420
 § 274(3).421
 § 272 regulating the revocation of the order is discussed below.422
 § 275(1). According to Braun Commentary at 489 par 2256, the description of business operations423
contained in § 343 of the Handelsgesetzbuch (Commercial Code), namely that it includes all business
that enables, promotes or maintains trade, should be used to ascertain what could be regarded as in
the course of business. It should then be divided into ordinary and non-ordinary business, based on
the articles of association or past business operations of the debtor company (par 2257). 
debtor has all the powers of a trustee.  According to Braun,  the system is based414 415
on the principle that the debtor may manage his current business while the trustee
controls the management; Braun believes the position of the trustee to be much
weaker than that of the administrator. 
There is almost no difference, however, between the legal position of the trustee
and that of the administrator.  The trustee is also appointed by the insolvency court416
and must meet the same requirements set for appointment as an insolvency
administrator.  As in the case of an insolvency administrator, the first meeting of417
creditors may also elect another trustee to replace the one appointed by the court.418
§ 274(2) entrusts the trustee with the duty to verify the debtor’s economic
situation and monitor the management of his business to prevent mismanagement
or transactions that could prejudice the creditors.  For this purpose he has the same419
rights of entry and inspection as a provisional administrator.  Should he find any420
evidence suggesting disadvantage to creditors as a result of self-administration, he
must immediately inform the court and the creditors.  The trustee does not have the421
power to apply for cancellation of the self-administration order, but it is assumed that
the creditors will do so once they have been informed of (potential) disadvantages.422
In spite of being nominally authorised to manage his own business, the debtor must
obtain the consent of the trustee to incur any liabilities that are not in the ordinary course
of his business.  The trustee may even object to transactions that are in the ordinary423
course of the business, in which case the debtor will also need his consent to those
GERMANY-299-
 § 275(1).424
 § 275(2).425
 Braun Commentary at 489 par 2258. See below for the discussion on § 274(3) regarding the426
trustee’s duty to report any potential disadvantages to creditors and § 272(1) on their right to demand
termination of self-administration.
 § 276.427
 In § 160(2).428
 § 276 read with § 164. 429
 § 277(1). The order must be published (§ 277(3)) to make it known as widely as possible.430
 In this case the court has a discretion: Braun Commentary at 491 par 2266.431
 § 277(2).432
 § 270(1). These would include the provisions regarding the first meeting of creditors and the433
appointment of a creditors’ committee: Braun Commentary at 484 par 2233. 
 § 270(3). See fn 242 and fn 243 regarding the endorsement of registers.434
transactions.  Furthermore, the trustee may insist that all payments should be made424
only to and by him.  Contravention by the debtor of any of these provisions does not425
affect the validity of the transactions, even if the other contracting party knew that the
trustee’s consent was lacking, but it will expose the debtor to the risk of having the order
authorising self-administration revoked by the court.426
In addition to requiring the approval of the trustee for some transactions, the debtor
must also obtain the consent of the creditors’ committee, if one has been appointed
(which is not compulsory), to transactions that are of particular importance to the
insolvency proceedings.  Some examples of such transactions are provided in the427
InsO  and include the sale of the business or its entire stock, immovable property to be428
sold by private sale, a loan agreement that will be secured by a considerable burden on
the assets in the insolvent estate, and bringing, joining or avoiding a court action
involving a considerable amount. Again, a transaction in contravention of these
provisions will not affect the validity of the contracts concerned.  As a group, the429
creditors may also apply to court for an order that the consent of the trustee must be
obtained for certain transactions, and the court will be compelled to grant the order
without any reasons having to be advanced by the creditors. Any such transaction
entered into without the required consent will be null and void.  The court may  grant430 431
a similar order on application by a single creditor, but the creditor must prove that the
order is urgently required to prevent prejudice to the creditors.  432
Unless the InsO provides otherwise, all the general provisions of the Code will
apply to self-administration proceedings.  Creditors must file their claims with the433
trustee, but no endorsements in respect of the insolvency proceedings are made in
the Land Register, ship or aircraft registers.434
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 § 279.436
 Braun Commentary at 492 par 2273.437
 The system of a works council (Betriebsrat) that every company employing five or more people must438
establish allows ordinary workers to be actively involved in structuring their personal and social
environment at plant level: see generally Du Plessis et al German Corporate Governance at 112-113
regarding the establishment and functions of the works councils.
 § 279 read with §§ 120, 122 and 126.439
 § 280 read with §§ 129-147. The latter sections regulate what we know in South African insolvency440
law as voidable or impeachable dispositions: see Bertelsmann et al Mars at 248ff. 
 § 284(1).441
 § 284(1).442
 § 284(2).443
 Braun Commentary at 484 par 2235.444
 § 270(2)1-2.445
The general provisions regarding uncompleted contracts  also apply, except that435
the debtor now has the same choice that the insolvency administrator usually has, which
is whether to perform or to repudiate the contract.  The debtor is supposed to exercise436
this right with the approval of the trustee, but failure to obtain such approval will not affect
the validity of the debtor’s actions.  However, the termination or amendment of an437
agreement with the works council  regulating employment conditions for employees438
and a decision to approach the Labour Court for termination of specific employment
contracts, will be legal and binding only if the trustee has consented thereto.  However,439
only the trustee, and not the debtor, has the power to dispute the validity of transactions
entered into by the debtor before insolvency.  440
Should the creditors decide that an insolvency plan must be put in place, they
have a choice whether to instruct the trustee or the debtor to do so.  If the441
instructions are directed to the debtor, the trustee must act as advisor.  The trustee442
must supervise the implementation of the insolvency plan in all cases.  443
Only the debtor is entitled to apply for self-administration and particularly where
the debtor is a company, this provision ensures that the directors and other managing
organs of the company are prepared to take responsibility for the continued running
of the business, as the proceedings would otherwise be doomed to failure.  Should444
the applicant for commencement of insolvency proceedings be a creditor, his consent
(but not that of the other creditors) to self-administration by the debtor is an absolute
requirement for such an order.  445
A further requirement is that the court must be satisfied that an order of self-
administration will not delay the process or cause any other disadvantages to the
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 § 270(2)3. See below for the negative influence this very onerous requirement has had on orders446
for self-administration. 
 Braun Commentary at 484 par 2237.447
 Braun Commentary at 484 par 2237. Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 2136-2137448
also list other indications that self-administration is not appropriate, such as failure by the company to
compile financial statements over several years, fruitless rescue attempts by the debtor’s management
and obvious procrastination in bringing an insolvency application. 
 Braun Commentary at 485 par 2239.449
 Braun Commentary at 485 par 2239.450
 Braun Commentary at 483 par 2232; Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 1165.451
 Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 2137.452
 Schmidt and Ahrendt Hamburger Kommentar at 2137-2138. 453
creditors.  To establish whether this requirement has been met, a comparison must446
be made between the expected course of self-administration and that of standard
proceedings, to establish whether any disadvantages for creditors can be foreseen
should self-administration be ordered by the court.  Circumstances that indicate the447
possibility of such disadvantages are where the debtor is unwilling to co-operate with
creditors, has contravened provisions of the insolvency legislation or appears to be
inexperienced or unreliable.  The onus is on the debtor to prove the absence of any448
foreseeable disadvantages to creditors and not on the court to establish whether
such circumstances exist.  However, this does not mean that the debtor has to449
show any particular advantages of self-administration over the standard procedure.450
In an effort to fulfil this condition, a corporate debtor that intends applying for self-
administration will usually (partially or completely) replace its board of directors and
managing director with insolvency and corporate rescue experts before the insolvency
application is heard by the court. This step is intended to convince uneasy creditors that
the necessary expertise to ensure the proper progress of self-administration is already
present.  However, doubts have been raised about the independence of these experts451
in managing the company and protecting the interests of the body of creditors because
they are often also involved as insolvency administrators in other cases. Supporters of
such a management change point out that the directors of a company will seldom have
the required knowledge of insolvency law to guarantee the proper running of the
proceedings, and an insolvent company will furthermore only be able to continue
operating in the market if a homogeneous management is in place.  Critics of this452
practice believe that there is a real risk of the new management only advancing the
interests of and being unduly influenced by the major creditors, such as banks, to whom
they owe their appointment in the first place.  A further valid criticism is that in some453
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 Braun Commentary at 485 par 2241.455
 § 271. An order for self-administration issued after commencement of insolvency proceedings must456
be published, as must the cancellation of such an order: § 273.
 § 272(1)1.457
 § 272(1)2 read with § 270(2)3.458
 § 272(2).459
 § 272(1)3.460
 Braun Commentary at 487 par 2248.461
 § 272(3).462
cases an insolvency expert who may not qualify for appointment as insolvency
administrator, for instance because of a lack of independence because of previous
services to the company, can be brought into the insolvency proceedings in this way.454
 In practice an application for self-administration is often preceded by a visit of the
debtor to the insolvency court to obtain the court’s prior agreement to the order. If the
application enjoys the support of the main creditors, their attendance at this meeting will
almost guarantee that the court will agree to self-administration.  The reason for this455
is found in § 271, which entitles the creditors to apply for self-administration by the debtor
if the debtor’s application has been refused by the insolvency court. The decision to bring
the application must be taken at the first meeting of creditors and the court is compelled
to order self-administration if requested by the creditors. The insolvency administrator
already appointed may be appointed as the trustee.456
The insolvency court must revoke the order allowing self-administration on
application by the creditors on the strength of a majority decision taken at any
creditors’ meeting and without their having to supply reasons for this decision.  A457
single secured or unsecured creditor may also apply but must prove that self-
administration can no longer be expected not to cause a delay or other disadvantage
to creditors, before the court will cancel the self-administration order.  Where the458
application is brought by a single creditor, the debtor has the right to be heard before
the court rules on the application and both the creditor and the debtor have an
immediate right of appeal against the decision of the court.  The court must also459
cancel the order on application by the debtor, and again the Code does not require
the debtor to provide any grounds for his application,  because self-administration460
clearly cannot be successful without the debtor’s support and commitment.  If the461
court revokes the self-administration order, the former trustee may be appointed as
insolvency administrator.  462
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 Ehlers “Statutory Corporate Rescue” at 174; Flessner “Germany” at 316.463
 See part 2.8.1 below.464
 Ehlers “Statutory Corporate Rescue” at 174-175. 465
 Häsemeyer Insolvenzrecht at 188. In 2002 self-administration was ordered in 235 cases, in 2003466
only 185 and in 2004 it dropped to 173: Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 1167.
 The legislature mainly intended self-administration to be available for smaller businesses, but in467
practice the exact opposite has happened, with most self-administration orders made in respect of big
corporations: W immer and Ahrens Frankfurter Kommentar at 1376.
 Ehlers “Statutory Corporate Rescue” at 175-176. 468
 Commentary at 483 par 2232.469
 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 1167.470
 Braun Insolvenzordnung at 1308.471
 See, however, Flessner “Germany” at 325, who believes that it should not be unfamiliar to472
insolvency practitioners, as it contains some elements of the previous compromise in terms of the
Vergleichsordnung: see part 1 above.
By allowing company boards to retain their management positions, the
introduction of self-administration was intended to encourage them to file for
insolvency at an early stage while the company still had sufficient liquidity to continue
the business and a successful rescue was still possible.  Coupled with the463
simultaneous filing of a pre-packaged plan,  it offers the possibility of retaining the464
expertise of the current management and effecting an outcome similar to an informal
out-of-court compromise but within the protection and structure of a formal insolvency
procedure which binds dissenting minority creditors.465
Unfortunately, and not quite unexpectedly, self-administration has rarely been
granted by the courts so far  and then mostly in very large corporate insolvencies466 467
such as Kirch Media, Herlitz and Babcock Borsig.  Braun  ascribes the readiness468 469
of the courts to grant the order in these cases to the international nature of their
businesses and to the fact that they had already appointed insolvency and
reorganisation experts to their management before applying for an insolvency order.
This step in particular was severely criticised by some commentators, who described
it as a form of “self-selection of the insolvency administrator”.  However, self-470
administration has been allowed more frequently in recent years, also in smaller
cases.  It is ironic that whereas self-administration is supposed to allow the present471
management to remain in place, their best chance of succeeding in an application
for self-administration is actually to replace themselves with insolvency administrators
before an insolvency order has even been issued.
The failure of self-administration to become more widely accepted in insolvency
proceedings has been partly due to the fact that it was a new and unknown procedure472
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This shows a strong similarity to the extremely conservative, almost hostile treatment by the courts of
judicial management when first introduced into South African law – one of the main reasons why
judicial management never became a widely accepted rescue measure: see Chapter 2, part 2.4.4. 
 Konkursordnung of 10 February 1877, Reichgesetzblatt (RGBl S. 351). 474
 See part 1 (Introduction) above. The Gravenbrucher Kreis (referred to in part 2.7.1.2.2 above) was475
specifically formed by successful insolvency administrators to oppose the recommendations of the
Insolvency Committee: see Balz and Landfermann Insolvenzgesetze at XXXIV. See also part 1, fn 11
above.
 Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 1163; Kamlah “German Insolvency Act” at 433.476
 W immer and Ahrens Frankfurter Kommentar at 13.477
 As required by § 270(2)3. See Braun Commentary at 483 par 2232.478
 See Chapter 2, part 2.3.4.479
and was consequently treated by both the courts and commentators with some suspicion
and misgivings  – this is, after all, the country where a substantial group of prominent473
insolvency lawyers strongly canvassed for the retention of the Bankruptcy Act  that was474
more than 100 years old, rather than the introduction of a new Insolvency Code.475
Indeed, during the reform process that preceded the introduction of the InsO a fierce
debate raged on whether it was appropriate or harmful to introduce self-administration.476
Debtors have also been to blame for the reluctance of the courts to order self-
administration: in spite of the possibility of applying for an insolvency order based on
imminent illiquidity, most debtors are already unable to pay their debts when they apply,
which results in a total loss of confidence in management, thereby effectively excluding
self-administration from even being considered.  477
Another reason already mentioned above for the small number of self-
administration orders is that the courts are reluctant to accept that such an order will
not prejudice the creditors in any way.  This requirement is reminiscent of the478
prerequisite that a court in South Africa may grant a judicial management order only
if satisfied that, inter alia, it would be just and equitable.  Both requirements are479
onerous, vague and thus open to wide interpretation, and almost impossible to prove
at an early stage, with the result that in Germany, as in South Africa, the courts are
generally unwilling to accept that this requirement has been met. Here again one
sees evidence that the InsO is primarily geared towards liquidation for the benefit of
creditors, and the aspect of business rescue appears to be an uncomfortable
appendage that does not fit in with the overall scheme of the Code. 
Therefore, in spite of the legislature’s best intentions to create a modern system
based on the liberal American model, self-administration has remained mostly a
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widely held that it has many advantages and thus the potential to become an important procedure, in
spite of the risks involved for creditors and the business of the debtor as a result of the obvious
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 “Germany” at 325; also Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 1165.481
 18 July 2007 Business Report at 22; Tashiro and Beissenhirtz “German Companies”. This is made482
possible by the wide interpretation of “centre of main interests” (COMI) of a company by the English
courts who look at the location where management decisions are taken (where the mind of
management is) rather than the visible commercial activities of the company: Ehlers “Statutory
Corporate Rescue” at 179. The COMI originates from the European Insolvency Code 1346/2000 of 29
May 2000, which has been introduced into the English Insolvency Act of 1986 as s 1(4): see Chapter
3, part 2.2 fn 36.
 Ehlers “Statutory Corporate Rescue” at 154.483
theoretical option that is tolerated in only a very limited number of highly exceptional
cases.  Flessner  maintains that the drafters of the Insolvency Code intended self-480 481
administration to be an exceptional procedure, although they refrained from including
a stipulation to that effect in the Code.
The decision by the German legislature not to favour rescue over liquidation but
to treat business rescue as merely an optional step in the insolvency proceedings
with the concomitant priority given to the creditors and their interests, as well as the
reluctance of the courts to allow self-administration, have also had another
unforeseen consequence: recently, several large German companies operating
internationally have chosen to move their headquarters to England when they
experience financial distress, in order to make use of the administration procedure
and the company voluntary arrangement to attempt a rescue of the company itself.482
This is surely an indication that there is a need for specific and dedicated corporate
rescue procedures that, while protecting the interests of creditors, have the rescue
of the business or corporation as their first priority. 
2.8 The insolvency plan
Before the enactment of the InsO, insolvency lawyers in Germany had developed the
system of “übertragende Sanierung” (reorganisation by transfer), which constituted
the only realistic option to rescue a debtor’s business but was not formally regulated
in insolvency law.  This procedure involved the sale of all the assets required to483
continue the debtor’s business (or part thereof) to a new entity specifically
incorporated or acquired for this purpose, and the consequent liquidation and
dissolution of the debtor company. The disadvantage of this procedure was that
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 § 613a of the Civil Code, which is the implementation of EC Directive 77/187/EEC, [1977] OJ L485
61/26. 
 Ehlers “Statutory Corporate Rescue” at 159 fn 32.486
 Flessner “Germany” at 348.487
 See in particular the discussion in part 2.4.2 on the reasons for the introduction of imminent illiquidity488
as a ground for an insolvency order. 
 See Flessner “Germany” at 349 regarding the potential financial burden of employee claims on an489
insolvent estate and the limits placed on them by the InsO. 
 Frankfurter Kommentar at 1361.490
some assets, particularly incorporeal assets such as official permits or long-term
contracts, could not be transferred to the new entity.  Another major disadvantage484
was that the transfer of a business or part thereof to a purchaser resulted in all
employment contracts, as well as claims of employees against the previous
employer, being transferred to the purchaser as well.  485
However, this disadvantage now substantially applies to a business or asset
transfer within insolvency proceedings as well, because Germany decided to exercise
the choice allowed by the EC Directive, in favour of also making these provisions
applicable to transfers after the commencement of insolvency proceedings.  This486
decision was taken in spite of strong lobbying during the reform process to exclude
operation of the rule during insolvency in order to facilitate the rescue of businesses.
The government based its decision on the belief that a business rescue attempted
during insolvency proceedings should not be given this advantage over a rescue
attempt outside insolvency.  The decision by the German legislature is regrettable487
and difficult to explain since some form of relief from this rule, especially if included
in an insolvency plan, would have made the option of a plan far more attractive. It is
also in direct contrast to the express desire of the legislature to encourage business
owners to apply for an insolvency order as soon as possible, and preferably before
actual insolvency or illiquidity occurs.  There can be no doubt that any attempted488
rescue of a business will invariably require retrenchments to save costs, and making
them just as difficult to effect inside insolvency, whether with or without an insolvency
plan, as outside insolvency, will not change this fact but merely add to the factors
working against attempting any rescue.  Wimmer and Ahrens  believe that the489 490
emphasis that has been placed on the retention of jobs has had the effect that the
public measures the success of an insolvency plan process purely on whether jobs
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major innovations of the InsO: Flessner “Germany” at 359. 
 § 217.493
 In terms of §§ 53-55.494
 Braun Commentary at 425 par 1816; Eickmann, Flessner et al Heidelberger Kommentar at 1053.495
 Title 11, United States Code.496
 Braun Commentary at 424 pars 1804-1811; Ehlers “Statutory Corporate Rescue” at 162-163.497
 Braun Insolvenzordnung at 1184.498
 See part 2.1 above.499
were saved, even if only over the short term, as is often the case. As a result, more
economically sound practices that should be part of an insolvency plan often have
to yield to the strong public pressure that the plan must primarily save jobs. 
Although a compromise was possible in terms of both the Konkursordnung and
the Vergleichsordnung, the high percentage of votes required by both pieces of
legislation for approval of the compromise was rarely reached and ensured that
composition did not present a viable alternative.491
The InsO therefore specifically addresses this deficiency by providing for the
option of an insolvency plan that may alter the normal course of events prescribed
by the Code for the payment of creditors’ secured  and unsecured claims, the492
liquidation and distribution of the debtor’s assets, and the liabilities of the debtor after
termination of the insolvency proceedings.  Claims that are payable as costs of the493
insolvency proceedings  are not included in the plan.  494 495
Although Chapter 11 of the American Bankruptcy Code  served as a model for496
the insolvency plan contained in the InsO, there are several differences between the
provisions regulating the respective plans. One of the fundamental differences is that,
whereas a Chapter 11 plan provides specifically for the reorganisation and thus
rescue of the corporate entity, the InsO allows almost complete freedom in the
contents and envisaged outcome of the plan, including liquidation, a sale of assets,
restructuring of the business or merely deferring payment of creditors’ claims, or any
combination of them.497
The submission of an insolvency plan is not compulsory, and if no plan is
submitted, the regular procedure of liquidation and dissolution of the company will be
followed. However, an insolvency plan may also provide for liquidation, particularly
in the context of an “übertragende Sanierung”.  As mentioned before,  the InsO498 499
does not favour either straightforward liquidation or the submission of an insolvency
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 Only in 539 cases in the first five years: Ehlers “Statutory Corporate Rescue” at 184. 505
plan, and it is left to the debtor and the insolvency administrator to decide on the
most appropriate course. The aim of the InsO is thus to give total autonomy to the
persons involved to decide on the best possible way deal with the debtor’s
insolvency.  None the less, Braun  classifies insolvency plans into the following500 501
six main groups:
(i) liquidation plans where assets are sold separately and the proceeds distributed to
creditors. This type of plan changes the normal procedure for the sale of assets by,
for example, providing for a longer period over which assets will be sold or the way
in which secured assets will be dealt with.  The end result remains the destruction502
and dissolution of the company as in a liquidation without an insolvency plan;  503
(ii) rescue plans where the aim is the survival of the corporate entity and continuation
of the business by the same entity. These plans would normally include a reduction
in or postponement of the payment of debts;504
(iii) transfer plans where the debtor’s assets are also sold, not individually as in a
liquidation plan, but as a unit to enable the new owner to continue the business or
part of it;
(iv) mixed plans, such as one providing for liquidation of part of the business that has
been suffering heavy losses but rescuing the viable part of the business; 
(v) other plans that do not regulate the way in which the assets should be dealt with,
but rather change the normal payments to creditors as regulated by statute by, for
example, exchanging monetary payments for other benefits; and
(vi) procedural plans amending the prescribed procedure or course of the insolvency
process, for example by providing that the business will be continued for a limited
period to complete a profitable contract and then liquidated, thereby increasing the
eventual payment to creditors.
In the first few years after the enactment of the InsO, very few insolvency plans
were filed.  The reason for this low rate is partly explained by the lack of a rescue505
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153 and 184; Häsemeyer Insolvenzrecht at 689-690.
culture in German insolvency law, where insolvency is still widely regarded as
shameful and an insolvent debtor treated with mistrust.  Therefore, the main506
purpose of insolvency proceedings has always been to ensure that the debtor pays
as much as possible to satisfy his liabilities and not to provide a way out for a
company in distress.  Another explanation is the simple fact that this was a new507
procedure and it was to be expected that it would take time to become a significant
feature of insolvency law in Germany.  However, in more recent times there has508
been a discernible change in this attitude,  and the provision of more than one509
option in the InsO to deal with a business in distress must in itself be regarded as
substantial progress.  510
It should come as no surprise that liquidation and the subsequent disposal of a
business as a going concern (often as part of an “übertragende Sanierung”), rather
than its reorganisation by way of an insolvency plan, continue to be the proceeding
favoured by insolvency practitioners in Germany.  Practitioners see little reason to511
choose reorganisation over liquidation, the procedure with which they are more
familiar, especially as there is very little incentive to choose the more complicated
and lengthy procedure required for an insolvency plan when the outcome is going to
be virtually the same in most cases.
An interesting comment on the German insolvency plan procedure was made
during its early stages and it is one that is also relevant to the South African situation
where there seems to be a great deal of optimism about the new business rescue
proceedings. This comment almost served as a warning that an insolvency plan
providing for the rescue of a business should be an instrument to intervene
extensively in the dysfunctional financial and managerial structure of the business
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and to improve and rectify it. It should not merely be the result of a rescue euphoria
that ignores the obstacles and insists on reviving a business that will soon become
insolvent again.  Almost the same sentiments were expressed by Schmidt,  who512 513
referred to some commentators’ mistaken belief that the Konkursordnung had been
a bad piece of legislation and that the legislative change introduced by the InsO
could guarantee that many insolvent businesses would be rescued.
 
2.8.1 Power to submit an insolvency plan
Only the insolvency administrator or the debtor may submit an insolvency plan to the
insolvency court.  Although the legislature initially also considered allowing514
shareholders holding at least 20 per cent of the company’s share capital as well as
creditors to submit an insolvency plan, the idea was abandoned in an effort to
simplify the procedure and to avoid the possibility of conflicting insolvency plans
being submitted by different groups of creditors.  515
However, although the shareholders of a company are not included in the plan
procedure, their co-operation will become unavoidable if the plan provides for the company
to remain in existence and continue its business: the legislation regulating the various
forms of corporate entities all require a resolution to continue the business by a prescribed
majority of the shareholders.  A plan that involves any change in ownership of the516
company, for example by raising new share capital, or any matter that requires a change
in the constitution of the company, will also be doomed if the shareholders do not agree,
and in such a case the plan would have to be made conditional on the necessary approval
being given by shareholders. Ehlers  regards this exclusion of shareholders as one of the517
obstacles to making the choice and implementation of an insolvency plan an attractive
option because uncooperative shareholders can obstruct a plan for quite irrational reasons
by, for example, refusing their consent to the cession of important contracts and licenses
to a new entity in the case of a restructuring by transfer.  518
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Flessner  points out that the decision to keep the shareholders out of the plan519
– a decision that he believes has never been adequately explained by the legislature
– will in many instances give those shareholders a veto over the insolvency plan, in
direct conflict with the principle that shareholders’ rights are the first to be eliminated
once a company is placed in insolvent liquidation and unable to pay all its debts.520
He finds it regrettable that this is one of the points on which the German system
differs noticeably from the Chapter 11 procedure in America. 
I submit that this issue reveals another major disadvantage of a rescue procedure
that is part of or linked to insolvency: in a dedicated and independent rescue procedure
the shareholders have a real interest in the outcome because a successful rescue will
prevent liquidation and the resultant complete eradication of their investment. Thus they
can (and should) be fully participating parties in the rescue proceedings, with the
necessary voting rights to approve or reject a rescue plan.521
The debtor may submit an insolvency plan simultaneously when filing the application
for an insolvency order: the so-called pre-packaged plan that can substantially shorten
the duration of the insolvency proceedings to as little as five or six weeks  and presents522
the debtor with a unique opportunity to steer the statutory insolvency process away from
liquidation.  Another advantage of submitting such a plan is that the intended results of523
the insolvency proceedings – particularly the reorganisation and continued existence of
the company and its business – are made clear to all interested parties at an early
stage.  This could limit some of the damage that a company’s reputation and future524
business prospects usually suffer when its financial problems are made public. In this
respect the procedure has a significant advantage over business rescue proceedings in
South Africa where no provision has been made for pre-packaged plans while several
provisions will actively discourage companies from attempting this measure, as it may
trigger hostile actions by other affected parties.525
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The insolvency administrator (but not the provisional administrator)  may also526
submit a plan, either on his own initiative or on the instructions of the creditors’
meeting. The administrator is obliged to give a full report to the first meeting of
creditors on the economic situation of the company, the reasons for its failure and his
assessment of the prospects of the company’s business (or part of it) being
continued, including the possibilities presented by an insolvency plan.  If the527
meeting instructs the administrator to draft an insolvency plan, he must do so within
a reasonable time,  which is not fixed by the legislation but must be determined528
according to the facts and complexity of the specific case.  529
There is some controversy over the extent to which the creditors’ meeting may
prescribe the contents of the plan to be drafted by the insolvency administrator, with
some commentators believing that the creditors may present the administrator with
a complete plan that he must submit.  The administrator retains his right to submit530
his own plan, however, and as a result, three competing insolvency plans may be
submitted: one by the debtor, another by the administrator and yet another by the
administrator but drafted according to the instructions of the meeting of creditors.531
The legislature seems to have assumed that where more than one plan has been
submitted, all but one will be abandoned or rejected in the course of the process.532
The insolvency administrator is in any event obliged to consult the creditors’
committee (if one has been appointed), the works council (Betriebsrat), a
representative of the company’s managing officers and the debtor on any plan
drafted by the administrator.  533
An insolvency plan submitted after the final meeting of creditors has been held
to approve the final distribution account of the administrator  will be ignored.534 535
Therefore, by implication a plan may be submitted at a fairly late stage in the
GERMANY-313-
 § 233. Frank “Insolvenzplan” at 1228 points out that, contrary to the wording of this provision, the536
application should be made before the realisation of assets has begun or the plan has been
jeopardised, otherwise it is probably too late to be effective.
 The prime example of such disadvantage mentioned in the explanatory notes to the draft legislation is537
where a sale of the business that would be to the advantage of the creditors would be blocked and
consequently fall through completely: Begründung RegE Zu 277: Balz and Landfermann Insolvenzgesetze
at 348.
 § 233.538
 Frank “Insolvenzplan” at 1229.539
 § 219. The attachments are discussed below.540
 W immer and Ahrens Frankfurter Kommentar at 1390 explain that this is the equivalent of the541
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 § 220(1).542
proceedings when realisation of the insolvent estate has already started. To increase
the chances of a successful business rescue as envisaged in the plan, which
requires that assets should be retained by the estate, the debtor or administrator may
apply to the insolvency court for an order suspending any further disposition and
distribution of assets from the estate in so far as it may jeopardise the execution of
an insolvency plan that has been submitted.  The court must, however, refuse or536
cancel such a suspension order if it will cause substantial disadvantage to the assets
in the estate  or if, with the consent of the creditors, the administrator requests that537
the disposition and distribution of assets be continued.  If the creditors want the538
realisation and distribution to continue, however, the court must refuse or rescind the
order without further investigation.  539
2.8.2 Contents of the plan
Although the details of the plan itself are not prescribed and the drafter of the plan is free
to design whatever plan seems appropriate, the InsO does prescribe that every
insolvency plan must consist of a descriptive or declaratory part and a constructive part,
and be accompanied by the attachments stipulated in §§ 229 and 230.  540
2.8.2.1 The descriptive part541
The descriptive part of the plan must explain the measures taken or still to be taken
after commencement of the insolvency proceedings to lay the groundwork for the
intended reorganisation of the parties’ rights.  It must also contain all other542
information regarding the basis and effects of the plan that creditors may require to
decide whether to approve the plan and that the court may need for confirmation
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thereof.  In particular it must contain a comparison between the results of a regular543
liquidation and those of the plan, enabling creditors to determine the extent to which
they will be better off as a result of the implementation of the insolvency plan.  544
This part usually starts with a preamble indicating the main objectives of the
insolvency plan, such as the continuation, transfer or breaking up of the business.545
It is also essential to include a history of the business and the reasons why it failed,
as well as detailed information on matters such as products, sales and financial
circumstances to demonstrate the viability of the business. This is necessary to
convince creditors to whom payment is deferred in terms of the plan that the
business has the potential to become successful and eventually pay their claims.546
2.8.2.2 The constructive part
The constructive part must explain how the legal position of the parties involved will
be altered by the insolvency plan.  For the purposes of this part of the plan, the547
creditors must be classified in different groups according to their legal standing,
namely secured creditors  (if their rights are to be affected),  non-lower-ranking548 549
creditors and every class of lower-ranking creditors  unless their claims are deemed550
to be waived in terms of § 225(1).  Based on the assumption that there will in most551
cases not be sufficient assets available to pay the lower-ranking creditors, their
claims are deemed waived unless the insolvency plan provides otherwise, and
therefore they will normally not be part of the insolvency plan.  552
The plan may create further subgroups by grouping together creditors with equal
rights and the same economic interests on condition that the groups are properly
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separated from each other and the criteria for their classification are indicated in the
plan.  Employees must be classified as a separate group if they are claiming553
substantial amounts as creditors of the estate,  while separate groups may also be554
formed for minor creditors.  555
The insolvency plan must indicate in detail how each group of creditors will be
affected: the amount by which their claims will be reduced, the duration of the
postponement of payments, the securities they will receive and any other applicable
provisions.  All members of a group must be offered the same rights unless all556
members of the group give their written consent to some of them being treated
differently.  557
If the plan provides for deferred payment to creditors from funds generated by
continuation of the debtor’s business, the constructive part may, and usually would,
also contain provisions for surveillance of the implementation of the plan after the
insolvency proceedings have formally ended.  It could take several years before558
these creditors are paid in full, and this measure is intended to ensure that the debtor
will fulfil his obligations to them. However, the surveillance period is restricted to three
years, after which the insolvency court will automatically terminate it if it is still in
force.  Payment of creditors’ claims by a company or other entity that was559
specifically incorporated to take over or continue the debtor’s business or a part of
it may also be included in the surveillance by a provision to that effect in the plan.560
The plan could also provide for surveillance of the debtor’s performance of any other
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 Braun Commentary at 475 par 2180.568
 § 269.569
 Braun Commentary at 474 par 2174.570
obligations under the plan.  The surveillance is normally carried out by the561
insolvency administrator under the supervision of the insolvency court, while the
creditors’ committee continues to protect the interests of the creditors.  During the562
period of surveillance, the administrator must report annually to the creditors’
committee and to the insolvency court on the progress and prospects of
implementation of the plan.  However, if any due performance is not or cannot be563
fulfilled, the administrator must immediately inform the insolvency court and the
creditors’ committee or, if there is none, all the creditors entitled to payment.  The564
creditors must then decide which measures to take.565
As an additional precaution, the constructive part of the plan may provide that
during the period of surveillance, specific transactions will require the consent of the
administrator to be valid and binding.  The plan may also provide for preferent566
status for claims based on loans taken up by the company during surveillance but
subject to a maximum amount.  567
The plan may provide for the appointment of a person other than the
administrator to carry out the surveillance, but in such a case the statutory provisions
are not applicable and no supervision by the insolvency court takes place.  568
It must be emphasised that since the surveillance takes place after the formal
termination of the insolvency proceedings, it does not form part of such proceedings.
For this reason, the costs must be paid by the debtor or the takeover company.569
Furthermore, it is only the payment of creditors’ claims in terms of the insolvency plan
that is monitored, and not the running of the debtor’s business.  570
Contrary to the provision in the Companies Act 2008 requiring that the business
rescue plan must stipulate the extent to which the company is to be released from
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payment of its debts,  the InsO has simplified the matter by simply providing that571
unless the plan provides otherwise, the debtor shall be discharged of any residual
obligations to creditors after paying them as stipulated in the plan.572
2.8.2.3 Attachments
The InsO provides for certain attachments that must accompany the insolvency plan
where applicable. The first attachment is required if the plan provides for the
satisfaction of creditors’ claims from the future earnings of the business that is to be
continued by the debtor or another person. This document must contain a list of all
assets (with their values) and liabilities of the business, as well as the expected
income and expenses of the company for the duration of the period until creditors
have been paid, and a financial plan showing how liquidity is to be maintained during
this period.  Although not specifically required by the InsO, a comparative account573
indicating what the financial situation would be if there were no plan and the business
were to be liquidated is also necessary. This is intended to assist both the creditors
and the court in deciding whether the insolvency plan would have a better outcome
than the ordinary liquidation of the business.  574
The second type of attachment is required if the insolvency plan provides for
creditors to acquire shares, membership or participation rights in a company. In this
case, a statement from each such creditor consenting to the transfer of these rights
to him must be attached to the insolvency plan.  The reason for this requirement is575
that the legislature wanted to ensure that no creditor would be forced against his will
to take up membership or participation rights in a company instead of being paid
cash for his claim.576
Finally, in the event of a third party’s agreeing to take over any obligations to the
creditors if the insolvency plan is approved, a statement by such third party in which
the details of these obligations are set out must accompany the insolvency plan.577
The legislature envisaged possibilities such as a holding company being willing to
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take over some debts of its subsidiary, or that a third party wishing to continue the
business would undertake to pay the company’s debts. The intention behind this
requirement of an explanatory statement is to ensure that creditors can judge the
exact extent of the obligations to be undertaken.  578
2.8.3 Approval of the plan
2.8.3.1 Preliminary review
Every plan submitted to the insolvency court is subjected to a preliminary examination
by the court to determine whether it meets the fundamental requirements of the InsO.
This is clearly aimed at putting a stop to unsuitable or unworkable plans right at the
beginning before too much time or money is wasted on them.
In terms of § 231(1), the insolvency court must mero motu reject an insolvency
plan that falls into one of the following categories:
(i) A plan that does not comply with the provisions regulating the right to submit a
plan or the prescribed contents,  if such defect cannot be rectified at all or within a579
reasonable time. If the defect can be corrected within a reasonable time, the court
will give a detailed description of the defect and indicate possible ways in which it
could be remedied, as well as set the time within which the plan must be rectified.580
(ii) A plan submitted by the debtor that obviously has no chance of being accepted
by the creditors or confirmed by the court. This ground applies only to an insolvency
plan submitted by the debtor, and it is clear from the wording that the court must be
quite certain that the creditors would not approve the plan.  One example of such581
a situation is where the plan provides for the continuation of the business by the
debtor although a large majority at a creditors’ meeting have already decided against
continuation of the business.  582
(iii) A plan submitted by the debtor providing for the payment of claims that obviously
cannot be met. The court will interfere with a plan that provides for payment from
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future income only if completely unrealistic assumptions or projections are made,
otherwise it will be left to the creditors to decide whether they find the plan
acceptable, because it is usually impossible to predict with any certainty whether the
debtor will be able to generate the future income stated in the plan.  583
From the above it is clear that a plan filed by the debtor is examined with far
greater care than one filed by the insolvency administrator, because the former is
regarded as more likely to be flawed.  However, some commentators have584
expressed doubts whether the insolvency court (officials) have the necessary
qualifications and training to judge the feasibility or acceptability to creditors of an
insolvency plan or to make any other economic assessment of the plan.  The lack585
of training and expertise of the insolvency court judges and officers is a recurring
theme in discussions on the guiding and supervising role they can or should play,
particularly when a business rescue is attempted. The general consensus seems to
be that there is no proper training and, because of the fairly small number of
insolvency cases in several court districts – in some about 20 cases per year, in
others less than 10 – specialisation in insolvency cases is almost impossible.  In586
addition, the insolvency courts are not adequately staffed to deal with the increasing
numbers of insolvency cases.  587
A plan submitted by a debtor whose previous plan was rejected by creditors or
not confirmed by the court or withdrawn by the debtor after the date for the meeting
to discuss the plan had already been published must also be rejected by the court
on application by the insolvency administrator.  The intention behind this limitation588
on the right of a debtor to submit a second insolvency plan is to prevent a debtor
from abusing the system to delay the process.  589
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 Braun Commentary at 443 par 1935; Frank “Insolvenzplan” at 1230-1231.595
 § 235(1). The meeting may not take place more than a month after publication of the date thereof.596
The creditors’ voting rights on the insolvency plan are also determined at this meeting according to §§
237-239 in terms of which secured creditors will only have a vote for the unsecured part of their claims
unless they have waived their security (or part of it). If their rights are to be affected by the plan, they
will have full voting rights in a separate group.
An order of court rejecting a plan on any of the above grounds is subject to an
immediate appeal by the person who submitted the plan.  590
2.8.3.2 Submission of comments on the insolvency plan
A plan that was not rejected by the court in the initial phase must be forwarded to several
stipulated persons or bodies with an accompanying invitation by the insolvency court to
submit their comments on the plan within a period determined by the court.  The plan591
must first be sent to the creditors’ committee (if one has been appointed), the works
council and the representative of the company’s managing officers, as well as to the
debtor if the plan was submitted by the administrator, and vice versa.  592
The court may also give an opportunity to submit comments on the plan to the
official professional body of the particular industry, trade, craft or agricultural sector
to which the debtor belongs, or to any other relevant body of experts.  593
As soon as the period for submission of comments has expired, the insolvency
plan and all comments received must be made available for the inspection of the
parties concerned.  The phrase “parties concerned” is interpreted very narrowly594
since the insolvency plan may contain confidential information about the business
and its future plans: this group is therefore limited mainly to persons who are entitled
to vote because their rights will be affected, being the ordinary creditors.  595
 
2.8.3.3 Approval of the plan
Every plan submitted to the insolvency court that has not been rejected during the
preliminary examination must be considered and voted on by the creditors at a
meeting arranged for this purpose by the insolvency court.  Individual notices of the596
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meeting, accompanied by a copy or summary of the plan, must be sent to all
creditors who have filed claims, as well as to secured creditors, the administrator, the
debtor, the works council and the representative of the company’s management.597
Although all plans may be considered at the same meeting, voting on each plan
must take place separately in the sequence determined by the court.  Even if a prior598
plan is approved by creditors, they must still discuss and vote on a later plan,
because an approved plan could be set aside later as a result of appeals and other
legal remedies.
Voting on the insolvency plan takes place separately in each group of creditors
with voting rights as identified in the constructive part of the insolvency plan.  One599
creditor may have a vote as a member of more than one group, for example in the
group of secured creditors (if his security rights are to be affected) as well as in the
group of ordinary creditors for the part of his claim that is not secured,  and need600
not even vote the same way in each group!  601
A majority of creditors both in value and in number of creditors voting in each
group must vote in favour of a plan to constitute approval.  Rejection by the majority602
in every group will result in termination of the proceedings.  603
However, if the majority of the groups have voted in favour of the plan, a group
without the required majority will be deemed to have consented to the plan on
condition that the creditors in this group will probably not be placed in a worse
financial position by the insolvency plan than they would be without this plan and they
are given reasonable participation in any further advantages flowing from the plan.604
“Reasonable participation” for the purposes of this provision is defined to mean that
no other creditor will receive more than the full amount of his claim in terms of the
plan, that neither a lower-ranking creditor nor the debtor or one of its members will
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receive any economic value, and that no creditor who would rank equally with these
creditors without a plan is placed in a better position by the plan.  The conditions605
set out in § 245 are both cumulative and absolute,  but it requires an economic606
assessment by the insolvency court which the court is widely believed not to be
competent to do.  This provision is derived from the American cram-down rules607 608
and intended to prevent abusive or arbitrary obstruction of the plan by creditors.609
It is thus generally referred to as the rule against obstruction.  610
Where none of the creditors in a specific group have voted, this group is also
deemed to have consented to the plan.611
If more than one plan is approved, the insolvency court determines which plan
is accepted, based on the majority in value and number of creditors who voted in
favour of the plan. If one plan is approved by the majority in number, and another by
a majority in value, the majority in value is decisive.  612
If the creditors indicate during the discussions that particular provisions of a plan
should be amended, the person who submitted the plan has the right to change the
plan accordingly, and creditors may then vote on the amended plan at the same
meeting.  This measure is intended to prevent unnecessary delays, but as these613
amendments would not have been published before the meeting, the right to amend
is limited to individual provisions while retaining the original core of the plan.614
The insolvency court may arrange a separate meeting for voting on the plan
within one month after the discussion meeting, but this is an exception to the normal
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procedure and should be used sparingly.  One instance where a separate meeting615
may be appropriate is when dealing with a major case that is very complex, and
another would be where substantial changes are made to the plan after the
discussions.616
The debtor’s consent to the plan is deemed to have been given unless he files an
objection in writing with either the insolvency court or, at the latest, at the creditors’
meeting convened for voting on the insolvency plan.  Even if the debtor objects in the617
prescribed manner, his objections may be disregarded if he is not disadvantaged by the
plan when compared to his situation without a plan and no creditor is to receive more
than the full amount of his claim.  In the case of a corporate debtor where the618
constitution of the company may have to be amended to give effect to a rescue plan,
however, the consent of the shareholders will be essential.619
2.8.3.4 Confirmation of the plan
The final step after the approval of the plan by the creditors and the debtor is its
confirmation by the insolvency court after hearing the insolvency administrator, the
creditors’ committee (if there is one), and the debtor.  The court will first ascertain620
whether the plan meets all the statutory requirements and whether the creditors and
the debtor have consented or are deemed to have consented to the plan as
prescribed by the InsO.  621
Furthermore, there are specific statutory grounds on which the court must refuse
confirmation: if preconditions set in the plan for confirmation have not been met;622
if any essential prescribed requirement regarding the contents and procedure in
dealing with the plan has not been adhered to and the defect cannot be rectified;623
if approval of the plan was effected by improper means, particularly by granting an
advantage to one creditor;  or if a creditor who filed a written objection to the plan624
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prior to or at the voting meeting applies for the plan to be rejected and can prove to
the court that he is likely to be worse off than he would have been without a plan.625
The last-mentioned provision is intended to protect a creditor who forms part of the
minority in a group and was therefore outvoted, but as all the creditors in one group
have to be treated the same, it is unlikely to occur very often that the majority would
have voted in favour of a plan that is prejudicial to them. The determination by the
court of an objecting creditor’s situation with and without a plan is the only economic
judgment the court is allowed to make on the plan: it may not otherwise pass
judgment on whether the plan is economically sensible or feasible.626
The decision to confirm or reject the plan, issued in the form of an order of
court,  must be announced at the voting meeting or at a special meeting convened627
for this purpose.  If the plan is confirmed, secured creditors and those creditors who628
have filed claims must be notified of the court’s decision and furnished with a copy
or summary of the essential contents of the plan.629
The creditors and debtor may bring an immediate appeal against the court order.630
Consequently, an insolvency plan, although confirmed by the court, will not come into
force before the statutory period for filing an appeal has expired or an appeal has been
finalised.  This unlimited right of appeal given to any aggrieved creditor, even if he has631
suffered no actual disadvantage, has been criticised by some commentators because
it can be abused to obstruct or undermine the reorganisation process. They are therefore
advocating a limited right of appeal available only to creditors who were financially
prejudiced by receiving less than they would have, had they been treated correctly.  632
 
2.8.4 Effects of confirmation
Final  confirmation of the insolvency plan has the immediate effect of binding all633
parties involved to its constructive part, including creditors who did not file their claims
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and any person who opposed the plan.  The creation, waiver, amendment or634
transfer of rights in objects or shares in terms of the insolvency plan automatically
take effect once the confirmation order is final, as do any undertakings on which they
are based.  However, where formal requirements are required for the transfer of635
rights, such as an entry in the land register for rights to immovable property, these
must be met before the rights vest in the transferee.636
A slightly curious provision is found in § 254(3) in terms of which a creditor who
receives more than he was entitled to in terms of the plan will not be liable for
restitution. This provision was explained by the government as being necessary inter
alia to enable the administrator to make full payment to secured creditors in order to
retain assets that are necessary for the continuation of the business.  It would seem637
as though an opportunity has been created by this provision for the unequal
treatment of creditors which is not allowed in the insolvency plan itself. I submit that
if unequal treatment of some creditors is necessary for the success of a
reorganisation in terms of an insolvency plan – something that the legislature
obviously anticipated and accepted – it should be possible to provide for this option
in the plan itself, because it is subject to approval by the creditors and it should be
left to them to decide whether they find this acceptable. 
Creditors whose rights were suspended or partly  waived in terms of the638
insolvency plan will no longer be bound to such suspension or waiver if the debtor
substantially defaults on his performance of the plan in regard to their claims.  The639
commencement of new insolvency proceedings against the debtor before the plan
has been fully performed will have the same effect for all such creditors.  640
In the case of a substantial default by the debtor to perform as required by the
plan, a creditor may also use the confirmed insolvency plan in which his claim has
been determined and accepted, to enforce execution against the debtor as if a
judgment has been issued against the debtor.  The plan may also be used as the641
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basis for execution against a third party who has undertaken in writing to guarantee
performance of the debtor’s obligations under the plan.  For these purposes the642
insolvency plan is placed on an equal footing with a formal judgment of the court. 
2.9 Termination of insolvency proceedings
The insolvency court decides on the termination of the insolvency proceedings as
soon as the insolvency plan has been finally confirmed.  The decision to terminate643
and the reasons therefor must be published,  while the debtor, the insolvency644
administrator and members of the creditors’ committee must receive prior notification
of the date on which the termination will become effective.645
Before the termination of the proceedings, the administrator must pay claims that
have been accepted and provide security for those that are being contested.646
Where the debtor is continuing the business, new liabilities will arise on a regular
basis, but these should not be taken into account when termination of the
proceedings is pending. The decision to terminate should thus include the
determination of a cut-off date for claims to be paid by the administrator.647
Termination of the proceedings has the effect of releasing the administrator and
members of the creditors’ committee from office and revesting the debtor with the right
to freely deal with his assets.  However, if the insolvency plan provides for the648
surveillance of the implementation of the plan,  the offices of the administrator, the649
creditors’ committee and the supervision of the insolvency court will continue for the
duration of the surveillance period.  The surveillance period may not exceed three650
years, as it will be terminated mero motu by the insolvency court after this period if it has
not already been terminated because all claims have been met or guaranteed.  651
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3 EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION
It is clear that in the German system the rescue of a company is not regarded as being
of prime importance, while the rescue of the business or a viable part thereof, by
whatever means this is achieved, is not an end in itself, but a means of obtaining a better
return for creditors where appropriate. Liquidation and the rescue of a business are
therefore not seen as alternative solutions for a company in financial distress, but merely
as two of the possible mechanisms that can be used alone or in any combination to
obtain the best results for creditors and conform to market principles. 
Any rescue attempt will unavoidably form part of insolvency proceedings, and the
interests of the creditors thus remain the main (if not the only) purpose even where
a rescue is attempted.  As a result, the shareholders are virtually ignored in the652
process, and no provision for the possible amendment of their rights exists. Ironically,
this omission enables shareholders to obstruct the successful implementation of
some insolvency plans. 
Some commentators believe that the advantages the new legislation should have
brought did not materialise, at least not in the early stages after the InsO came into
force, and they blame excessive bureaucracy, lack of coordination and information
and even selfish personal ambitions of the provincial legal authorities for this fact.653
This is a potential problem of which the South African authorities should be aware
when the new legislation comes into effect, particularly since the business rescue
proceedings are also new and the authority to regulate the new procedure is being
transferred from the Masters of the High Court in the Department of Justice and
Constitutional Development to an as yet undetermined official in the Department of
Trade and Industry. 
There are, however, some valuable lessons that South Africa can learn from the
German experience, perhaps the most important of which is that a new and foreign
procedure that is imposed upon another legal system, no matter how successful it
may be in its country of origin, will invariably meet with resistance and scepticism if
it does not conform to the prevailing legal norms and culture. In spite of the German
authorities’ hopes that the insolvency plan procedure and possible business rescue
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would become a successful alternative to liquidation, as is the case with Chapter 11
reorganisations in America on which they modelled their legislation, this has not
materialised, largely because of the suspicion and disapproval with which insolvency
has historically been viewed in Germany. Merely replacing one piece of legislation
with another will not change the culture and entrenched views of society.
Another extremely important point that we should note is that despite many years
of preparatory work and discussions on legal policy, and several drafts of the
legislation spanning many years, the new InsO still did not achieve satisfactory
solutions to all the challenges presented. Commentators blame this partly on the
influence of some interest groups, partly on political and parliamentary interventions
in the legislation but also on the fact that the legislation, although effecting major
changes to the law, may have been conceptualised and implemented too hastily.654
Considering the fact that the German reform process stretched over a period of
approximately 20 years from the appointment of the Insolvency Commission in 1978
until the InsO came into effect in 1999, this is in sharp contrast to the almost
unseemly haste with which the Companies Act of 2008, which introduced the new
South African business rescue proceedings, was rushed through Parliament in less
than six months after a very short and rather limited public consultation process of
just over a year.
There are also some specific aspects that deserve our attention when evaluating
the new South African business rescue proceedings. The first of these is that only the
debtor may file for insolvency on the grounds of imminent insolvency. This limitation
avoids the very real potential for abuse of the proceedings that has been created in
the South African legislation by allowing a wide range of individuals to file for
business rescue proceedings on any of the grounds.655
Another important point is that although the German system provides three
different grounds on which to base an application for the commencement of
insolvency proceedings, it is really only the inability to pay debts as they become due
(or illiquidity) that is generally used for this purpose. Even in applications based on
imminent illiquidity, debtors are usually already unable to pay their debts. The present
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inability to pay debts does not constitute a ground for the commencement of
business rescue proceedings in the South African procedure, and applications to
court will have to be based on the future inability of the company to pay its debts in
spite of the company clearly being unable to do so already.
The efforts of the German legislature to encourage company boards to apply on
the grounds of imminent illiquidity before it is too late to attempt a business rescue
have not been successful. This is partly due to the lack of any real incentives or
advantages for them to bring an early application, and partly to the fact that complete
control of the proceedings is taken over by the creditors.
A big advantage of the German procedure is that the necessary provisions have
been included in the legislation to facilitate prepackaged plans, thereby recognising
the important role they play in practice and their substantial advantages in facilitating
and shortening the duration of the proceedings. 
The fact that an order of court is required to commence proceedings, which is
unavoidable because these are insolvency proceedings, is an obvious disadvantage
and one of the reasons why German companies prefer to use the English corporate
rescue procedures because they are faster and allow them more control over the
course of the rescue attempt.
Although employees are protected in the case of a sale or transfer of the
business, they do not have voting rights in respect of the insolvency plan unless they
have substantial claims other than claims for remuneration. As a result, they are not
involved in the process except through representation by the works council. 
The lack of proper training and qualifications of the officials in insolvency courts
in particular is an obstacle, as they are not, for example, qualified to judge insolvency
plans and often have to use experts to advise them, which leads to delays and
additional costs. The issue of ensuring that officials in the government authority
dealing with business rescues are sufficiently qualified and trained to properly fulfil
their duties should therefore enjoy as much attention as the qualifications required
for a business rescue practitioner. 
Creditors have been given almost complete power over the course that the
proceedings will take, which is an inevitable result of the fact that these are
insolvency proceedings even if an attempt is made to rescue the business. Contrary
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to the debtor’s wishes or intentions, the creditors may decide that the debtor may not
continue trading and that assets may be realised and distributed even while the
debtor is attempting to draft a rescue plan which, eventually, they may also reject.
Specific provision has been made for the supervision of the implementation of
the insolvency plan up to three years after its approval. This will almost certainly
encourage creditors to approve a plan providing for the continued existence and
trading of a corporate debtor and the payment of their debts to be made out of future
earnings. As added security, in the case of non-performance by the debtor, a creditor
may use the confirmed insolvency plan to enforce execution against the debtor.
 W here a specific provision is quoted, the words that should be removed have been struck through,1
while new words and phrases are underlined.
 See, for example, Chapter 2, parts 3.8.3.4 and 3.8.5.2.1.75
 See Chapter 2, part 3.3.1.3
 See, for example, Chapter 2, parts 3.5.1.1, 3.5.2.1 and 3.8.3.1; and part 2.8.3.1 below.4
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
1 INTRODUCTION
In this Chapter I will recommend some legislative changes to Chapter 6 of the
Companies Act of 2008 which I believe will make it more acceptable and effective,
thereby increasing its chances of becoming the success that many in government,
business and practice hope it will be.  I will not attempt to address every aspect in1
Chapter 6 that I consider to be in need of improvement, but only some that I believe
to be important. Although this Chapter will thus inevitably focus on the imperfections
of Chapter 6, I trust that this will not be interpreted as an indication that there is
nothing to recommend the new procedures. They represent a genuine attempt on the
part of the government to assist the many struggling and failing companies to survive,
and I hope that in my discussions in the preceding chapters I have also indicated the
many positive aspects.
In general, Chapter 6 (and probably the rest of the Companies Act of 2008)
needs to be scrutinised for incorrect, conflicting and inconsistent terminology. The
wording should be improved to ensure that the provisions are clear, correct and
formulated in South African legal terminology with established and clear meanings.
Some of the general errors in Chapter 6 that need rectification are the often
confusing and incorrect reference to holders of securities when only shareholders are
meant;  not making a clear distinction between resolutions and actions to be taken2
by the board of directors and those to be taken by the company, that is, the
shareholders in general meeting;  the inconsistent use of “publish notice to” (an3
unfamiliar phrase in South African law), “publish” and “notify” when apparently the
same procedure is meant;  the reference to “holders of the majority of creditors’4
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voting interests” (which has even confused the drafters themselves)  rather than the5
far simpler South African terminology of “the majority in value of creditors”; and the
use of the words “debt forgiveness”, which is an American expression, instead of
using the entrenched South African legal term of “discharge of a debt”.    6
It must be clear that weaknesses and problems in the new business rescue
proceedings and in the compromise procedure should be identified and corrected as
soon as possible to avoid both procedures going the same route as judicial
management and being virtually ignored in practice. In the current global economic
crisis, it would be nothing short of a tragedy if the opportunity to establish a solid and
workable rescue procedure for companies were missed. Unfortunately, the process
of developing and drafting the provisions for business rescue proceedings and
compromises was completed in a fairly short time and probably much too hastily for a
completely new procedure.  The time allowed for comments and recommendations was7
almost certainly not sufficient, and as Keay  prophetically pointed out, a new rescue8
procedure in South Africa will only be successful if the proposals of academics and
members of legal and accounting professions are considered carefully and a reasonable
amount of time is given to the preparation of the final draft.
2 COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON BUSINESS RESCUE
PROCEEDINGS
2.1 Definition and purpose
Although the procedure is termed business rescue, I submit that it is mainly a procedure
designed to achieve the rescue of the company itself together with the viable part of its
business. This is clear not only from the statutory definition of business rescue
proceedings,  but also from the requirement of a reasonable prospect for rescuing the9
company that is set for the commencement of the procedure.  The decision by the10
legislature in favour of a dedicated rescue procedure that is housed in the Companies Act
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of 2008 and not in an Insolvency Act should be followed through by avoiding any
association with insolvency, and should not duplicate the outcomes that can be achieved
more quickly and cheaply by liquidation or any other insolvency procedure. The rescue of
a business without the rescue of the company itself can be achieved only by the sale of the
business, and since eventual liquidation of the company is then unavoidable, this can and
should be effected by directly placing the company in liquidation.  The only exception to11
this rule is if a prepackaged sale of the business or a major part of it is negotiated with a
purchaser before the commencement of the business rescue procedure, and completed
immediately after such commencement before the value or viability of the business is
affected by the negative connotations of business rescue. However, since the business
rescue practitioner is not given any powers to dispose of all or the greater part of a
company’s assets or undertaking unless as part of an adopted business rescue plan,  this12
option is unlikely to be used as effectively as in England.  To provide for the few cases13
where it might be used to rescue the business of the company, I have included this as an
alternative purpose of the business rescue procedure.    
However, the reference to the object of a better return for creditors in the
definition of business rescue proceedings is undesirable and not supported by the
wording of most of the provisions regulating the procedure.  The object of a better14
return for shareholders in an eventual liquidation is, as I have already pointed out,
quite meaningless,  and I therefore submit that the definition of this procedure15
should refer to one main purpose, namely the rescue of the corporate entity, and a
secondary one of rescuing the business or a major part of it. If at some later stage
this appears to be an unattainable object, in spite of initial indications to the contrary,
the procedure should be converted to liquidation. It should not be allowed to become
an alternative but more expensive and longer way to wind up a company.
The name of the procedure should also be changed to reflect the fact that its
main purpose is not to rescue the business or part of it, and my recommendation is
that the procedure should be termed “company supervision”, which is far preferable
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to the current confusing and cumbersome name of “business rescue proceedings”.16
This would also avoid the very problematic use of the word “proceedings” in the
name, and maybe also some of the uncertainty it creates on whether a full procedure
or merely court proceedings are meant when the same word is used in another
context.  However, I will continue to refer to “business rescue proceedings” and17
“business rescue practitioner” in this Chapter to refer to existing provisions of the
Companies Act of 2008 since it can also be used as a generic term for any business
rescue procedure, irrespective of the specific name it may be given. 
I recommend that section 128(1)(b), which contains the definition and purpose
of this procedure, should be amended to read as follows:
‘‘business rescue company supervision’’ means proceedings to facilitate the
rehabilitation of a procedure to rescue a company or the business of a company that is
financially distressed  by providing for –18
(i) the temporary supervision of the company, and of  the management of its19
affairs, business and property;
(ii) a temporary moratorium on the rights of claimants legal processes  against the20
company or in respect of property legally in its possession; and
(iii) the development and implementation, if approved, of a plan to rescue the
company by restructuring its affairs, business, property, debt and other liabilities,
and equity in a manner that maximises the likelihood of the company continuing
in existence as a going concern;   on a solvent  basis or, if it is not possible for21 22
the company to so continue in existence, to rescue the business of the company
or a major part thereof. results in a better return for the company’s creditors or
shareholders than would result from the immediate liquidation of the company.
The definition of “rescuing the company”  should be amended as follows:23
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‘‘rescuing, or rescue of, the company’’ means achieving the goal of the continued
existence of the company or, if that is not possible, of a major part of the company’s
business as a going concern, set out in paragraph (b)(iii) set out in the definition of
‘‘business rescue ’’;
2.2 Entities to which business rescue proceedings apply 
The procedure should be strictly limited to companies since its structure and
procedure have been specifically designed with companies in mind. The provision
that makes this procedure available to close corporations  is not only unnecessary24
in the light of the rescue procedure available in the Close Corporations Act itself,25
but may lead to extremely inappropriate and costly attempts by ill-advised members
of close corporations to use a procedure that is obviously far too onerous,
complicated, expensive and formal to be suitable for close corporations.  
Experience in England with company administration has shown that merely
making a procedure designed for companies applicable to other business forms,
such as partnerships, is not sufficient. Each and every provision has to be reworked
to adapt it to the particular structure and management of the other business form.26
This has not been done in the case of close corporations and will undoubtedly lead
to uncertainty and confusion regarding the exact meaning of many provisions and
requirements when applied to close corporations.
Item 6 of Schedule 3 to the Companies Act of 2008 should therefore be scrapped.
  
2.3 Power to initiate business rescue proceedings
The power of the board of directors to commence the proceedings by taking a
resolution to this effect and without having to approach the court is one of the most
important improvements on judicial management.  However, the heading of section27
129 of the Act which provides for this option should be amended to reflect the fact
that it is a board resolution, and not a company resolution, that is, a resolution by
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shareholders in general meeting, that is required.  The exclusion of shareholders28
from this possibility, contrary to the situation in England,  is not, I submit, a major29
disadvantage and need not be changed. 
However, I recommend that the board of directors should also be given the power
to apply to court for the commencement of business rescue proceedings, as has been
done in England,  because this would be the only way for them to initiate the procedure30
after liquidation proceedings have been started.  Since a director can be held personally31
liable to the company for damages because he “acquiesced” in the company’s trading
in insolvent circumstances,  the legislature should also consider following the example32
of Germany by allowing a single director to bring the application in his capacity as such.33
This would become particularly relevant if a positive duty to act within a specified period
after the company becomes insolvent is placed on directors.      34
On the other hand, the number of persons who have been given the power to apply
for a business rescue order seems unduly high.  The possibilities for abuse in allowing35
individual shareholders, and particularly trade unions and employees who are not
creditors of the company, to bring such an application are abundantly clear.  It is also36
unheard of in most other comparable systems.  Although individual members are also37
allowed to apply for judicial management,  the very onerous requirements for a judicial38
management order have always ensured that there was very little opportunity for abuse
of the procedure. Since almost no prior notification is required,  a vexatious or malicious39
application for judicial management would not be widely publicised before being refused
by the court, and would therefore cause limited harm to the reputation of the company.
The situation is completely different in business rescue proceedings where prior
notice of an intended application must be given to every affected person, that is, every
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shareholder, creditor and trade union or unrepresented employee.  In the light of the40
strong presence and influence of the trade union movement in government, it would be
unrealistic to expect the legislature to remove the right of trade unions to apply, but I
seriously recommend that the right of individual employees and shareholders to bring the
application should be scrapped. Furthermore, the risk of abuse of the procedure should
be limited by specifically providing for the liability of such an applicant for payment of
damages to the company.  For this purpose the wording of a similar provision in the41
Companies Act of 1973  in respect of a winding-up application should be inserted as42
section 131(4)(c):  
Whenever the court is satisfied that an application for an order placing a company under
supervision is an abuse of the court's procedure or is malicious or vexatious, the court
may allow the company forthwith to prove any damages which it may have sustained
by reason of the application and award it such compensation as the court may deem fit.
As a further precautionary measure against abuse, the right of trade unions to
demand access to a company’s financial statements for purposes of an application to
court for the commencement of business rescue proceedings should be limited.  Unless43
section 31(3) is amended to make it clear that only the published financial statements
of the company have to be supplied to the trade unions, only one such  request per year,
in total and not per trade union, should be allowed in respect of a specific company.44
2.4 Requirements for commencement of business rescue
proceedings 
2.4.1 Financially distressed
The future period within which the insolvency or inability of the company to pay its
debts is reasonably likely to occur should be increased from six to 12 months in the
definition of “financially distressed” to allow company boards in particular to take
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remedial action as soon as the first indications of future financial problems appear
and while there is still a chance of successfully averting the company’s failure.  45
Furthermore, I submit that the definition of “financially distressed” should be
broadened to include a deeming provision, thereby enabling creditors in particular to
satisfy the court on this requirement when applying for an order to commence the
procedure.  The deeming provisions of the Companies Act of 1973,  which refer to46 47
a company’s present inability to pay its debts, can serve as a basis, but will have to
be amended since the definition of “financially distressed” in the Companies Act of
2008 refers only to the future inability of the company to pay its debts. 
The current two alternatives for the requirement of financial distress when a court
orders the commencement of business rescue proceedings should be scrapped.48
The first alternative, namely the non-payment of liabilities relating to employment
matters, will be covered by the deeming provision in subsection (aa) below. The
duration of the period in which the company failed to pay these amounts is stipulated
as at least three months, to avoid a company being placed under supervision as a
result of missing one payment, accidentally or through no fault of its own. 
I submit that the other alternative, namely “otherwise just and equitable ... for
financial reasons”,  should be removed because it is vague, unclear and will almost49
certainly lead to interpretational problems. There is also no discernible reason for this
ground, particularly if the definition of “financially distressed” is widened as proposed
below. 
Therefore, I recommend that the amended definition should read as follows:
‘‘financially distressed’’, in reference to a particular company at any particular time,
means that –
(i) it appears to be reasonably unlikely that the company will be able to pay all of its
debts as they fall due and payable within the immediately ensuing six 12 months; or
(ii) it appears to be reasonably likely that the company will become insolvent within
the immediately ensuing six 12 months; or
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(iii) the company is deemed to be financially distressed because 
(aa) the company it has failed, for a period of at least three consecutive
months, to pay over any amounts in terms of an obligation under or in
terms of a public regulation, or contract, with respect to employment-
related matters;  or50
(bb) a creditor, by cession or otherwise, to whom the company is indebted in a sum
not less than one hundred ten thousand rand then due has served on the
company, by leaving the same at its registered office, a demand requiring the
company to pay the sum so due and the company or body corporate has for
three weeks thereafter neglected to pay the sum, or to secure or compound
for it to the reasonable satisfaction of the creditor;  or51
(cc) any process issued on a judgment, decree or order of any court in favour
of a creditor of the company is returned by the sheriff or the messenger
with an endorsement that he has not found sufficient disposable property
to satisfy the judgment, decree or order or that any disposable property
found did not upon sale satisfy such process.52
An amended definition of “financially distressed” will make it possible for this
requirement to be applied without any changes, irrespective of the way in which the
rescue procedure is commenced.
2.4.2 Reasonable prospect of rescuing the company
To avoid any uncertainty or confusion, the wording of this requirement should be
amended to distinguish it very clearly from the onerous requirement of a reasonable
probability in judicial management.  I would therefore recommend that this53
requirement for both the commencement of the procedure by a board resolution and
by an order of court should use the words “a reasonable possibility of rescuing the
company”.  Combined with the amended wording for the definition of “rescuing, or54
rescue of, the company” suggested above,  it would be clear that a reasonable55
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possibility should exist of either the company or a major part of its business
continuing in existence.  
2.5 Procedure to commence business rescue proceedings
2.5.1 Board resolution
2.5.1.1 Formalities and effects
As stated before, the power given to company boards to commence business rescue
proceedings by simply filing a resolution to this effect is a major improvement on
judicial management and could do much to encourage boards to use the procedure.
However, this is subject to the condition that certain amendments are made to the
provisions regulating this procedure.
Firstly, I have already explained that there is no reason why the resolution to
place the company under supervision and the appointment of the business rescue
practitioner by the board should be separated. It may safely be assumed that in most
cases company boards will take both resolutions at the same time.  Section 129(1)56
should therefore be amended by combining it with section 129(3)(b) as follows:
129(1) Subject to subsection (2)(a), the board of a company may resolve take a
resolution that the company voluntarily begin business rescue proceedings
and be placed the company placing the company under supervision and
appointing a business rescue practitioner (supervisor) who satisfies the
requirements of section 138 and has consented in writing to accept the
appointment, if the board has reasonable grounds to believe that –
In terms of section 129(2)(b) this resolution (including the appointment of the
business rescue practitioner) will have no force until it has been filed with the
Commission. Consequently, it will also be unnecessary to provide for the effect on
the rescue resolution if no practitioner is appointed within a specified time.  57
The second amendment that should be made is to the wording of section
129(2)(a) prohibiting the taking of such a resolution after liquidation proceedings have
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been “initiated”.  To avoid any uncertainty over the exact moment when such a58
prohibition takes effect, the subsection should be amended as follows:
(2) A resolution contemplated in subsection (1) –
(a) may not be adopted if liquidation proceedings winding up of the company by
the court have been initiated or the voluntary winding up of the company has
commenced; 
In respect of the many unnecessary and costly notices to affected persons that are
required after the board has taken a rescue resolution,  the following recommendations59
are made. Since the business rescue practitioner has to convene  meetings of creditors
and employees’ representatives within ten days after his appointment, he would have to
give notice of these meetings immediately after his appointment.  A substantial saving60
in costs would be achieved by only requiring one notice informing affected persons of the
resolution and also giving notice to creditors and employees of their respective meetings.
This could be achieved by amending section 129(3) as follows:
129(3) Within five business days after a company the board has adopted and filed a
resolution as contemplated in subsection (1), or such longer time as the
Commission, on application by the company board or practitioner may allow, the
company practitioner must (a) publish a notice of the resolution, and its effective
date, notify every affected person in the prescribed manner of  to–  
(a) the contents of the resolution  and its effective date, including with the61
notice a sworn statement of the facts relevant to the grounds on which the
board resolution was founded; and
(b) the date, time and place of, and agenda for the meetings of creditors and
representatives of employees to be held in terms of sections 147 and 148
respectively.
Section 129(4) which deals with the appointment of the practitioner and
notification thereof to affected persons, will thus fall away.  The risk of inadvertently62
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failing to comply fully with the formalities will also be greatly reduced by requiring only
one notice to affected persons. 
Considering the fact that section 129(5)(a) is both extreme and unclear in its
possible effects if the company fails to comply with any of the prescribed formalities,
I submit that it should be scrapped.  In terms of my recommendation the duty would63
now rest on the practitioner to notify all affected persons, and punitive steps can be
taken against him by the professional organisation in the case of culpable failure to
comply. The possibility of a court setting aside the board resolution if the formalities
of section 129(3) have not been complied with, gives the board the necessary
incentive to ensure that the practitioner complies with this duty.  64
The provision contained in section 129(5)(b) that a company may not take
another business rescue resolution within the next three months if it fails to comply
with these formalities should also be removed since the period is too short to be of
any significance.  65
Section 129(6) should be amended to make it clear that the company may not
take a resolution either to enter voluntary winding up or to apply to court for an order
winding up the company, if that is the intended meaning of the subsection:66
(4) A company that has adopted a resolution contemplated in this section may not67
adopt a resolution to begin a voluntary winding up of the company or to apply for
winding up of the company by the court liquidation proceedings, unless the
resolution has lapsed in terms of subsection (5), or until the business rescue
proceedings have ended as determined in accordance with section 132(2).
2.5.1.2 Failure to adopt a business rescue resolution.
It is clear that the damage that will almost certainly be caused by the notice that a
company is compelled to send in terms of section 129(7) to all affected persons if it
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decides not to take a business rescue resolution, far outweighs any possible benefits
that it could have for the company’s creditors, shareholders or employees.  For this68
reason it should be scrapped completely. 
If the legislature believes that the prohibition against insolvent trading in section
22(1)(b), and the potential civil and criminal liability of directors  for contravening this69
section, are not sufficient incentives, a provision similar to the one in the German
Insolvency Code which places a positive duty on the board to act within three weeks
after technical or commercial insolvency occurs may be considered.  Since financial70
distress refers to a future situation that may or may not occur in the next twelve
months and a director could be held personally liable for voting in favour of this
resolution if it later appears to have been unfounded,  the obligation to take a71
business rescue resolution should only arise if there is more than mere reasonable
grounds to believe that it would be appropriate. My recommendation for an amended
section 129(7) is therefore as follows:
(5) If the board majority of the directors of a company hasve reasonable grounds to72
believe and do believe that the company is financially distressed and that there is a
reasonable possibility of rescuing the company, but they board has not must adopted
a resolution contemplated in this section within three weeks after becoming aware
of the situation.  the board must deliver a written notice to each affected person,
setting out the criteria referred to in section 128(1)(e) that are applicable to the
company, and its reasons for not adopting a resolution contemplated in this section.
Any breach of this duty by the directors will automatically result in their potential
liability for damages to any person who has suffered a loss as a result of their failure
to act.  The amendment will also ensure that the board will not be forced to73
commence business rescue proceedings if the company cannot be rescued and
liquidation would be more appropriate.   74
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2.5.1.3 Objections to a business rescue resolution
2.5.1.3.1 Setting aside the business rescue resolution
In so far as the wording of section 130(1)(a) creates the impression that an
application to court for setting aside a business rescue resolution may be based on
the current circumstances of the company, and not those prevailing at the time that
the resolution was taken, it should be amended.  I also believe that such an75
application to court should only be allowed within a specified period after the
applicant has received notice of the resolution. This will prevent a situation where the
board and the practitioner are constantly involved in litigation defending the resolution
and also remove the permanent threat that the rescue procedure could be terminated
at any time by an affected person. It is unnecessary to give affected persons this
power for almost the entire duration of the procedure since the business rescue
practitioner is under an obligation to terminate the procedure if the circumstances no
longer warrant the continuation of the rescue attempt.  The following wording is76
recommended to incorporate all the above suggestions:
130(1) Subject to subsection (2), at any time after the adoption of a resolution in
terms of section 129 the adoption of a business rescue plan in terms of
section 152, an affected person may apply to court for an order –
(a) within three weeks after notice of the resolution has been given in terms of
section 129(3), for an order setting aside the resolution on the grounds that at
the time when the board took the resolution, –
(i) there is was no reasonable basis for believing that the company was
financially distressed;
(ii) there is was no reasonable prospect possibility for of rescuing the
company; or
(iii) the company has failed to satisfy the procedural requirements set out in
section 129;
Section 130(5), dealing with the powers of the court when such an application is
before it, should also be amended.  It is difficult to imagine the circumstances in which77
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a court would find it just and equitable to set aside a rescue resolution in spite of finding
that there was a reasonable basis for believing that the company was financially
distressed, that there was a reasonable possibility of rescuing the company and that all
the procedural requirements have been met.  The possibility of a court setting aside the78
resolution because it is regarded as just and equitable creates a substantial degree of
uncertainty. Any factor, even one unrelated to the procedure itself, could lead a court to
this view. Different courts would be influenced by different aspects, including the court’s
opinion on the desirability of a business rescue procedure, or sympathy towards creditors
or towards employees.  I recommend that section 130(5)(a)(ii) should be removed to79
restrict the court’s power to set aside the resolution on application by an affected person
to those instances where the resolution was taken improperly because the stipulated
requirements for a business rescue resolution were not present or the correct procedure
has not been followed. Furthermore, since the practitioner must convene meetings with
creditors and employees within ten days after his appointment, where he has to express
an opinion on whether there is a reasonable prospect of rescuing the company,  it80
should be left to him to comply with his statutory obligation to apply for the termination
of the rescue procedure if he comes to the conclusion that the company cannot be
rescued.  I submit that it is undesirable for a court to have the power to terminate the81
rescue proceedings at an early stage, on the application of possibly a single employee,
creditor or shareholder, even though the practitioner believes that it may succeed.
Should the legislature strongly believe that the practitioner should not be the only person
who may decide that the rescue proceedings should be terminated, this should be
separated from the application to set aside an improperly taken resolution. One
possibility is found in English law where the creditors may take a resolution instructing
the administrator to apply for the termination of administration.  This would avoid82
multiple applications brought by persons who want to obstruct the procedure for the
wrong reasons.
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I propose that section 130(5) should read as follows:
(5) When considering an application in terms of subsection (1)(a) to set aside the
company’s resolution, the court may –
(a) set aside the resolution (i) on any grounds set out in subsection (1); or
(ii) if, having regard to all of the evidence, the court considers that it is
otherwise just and equitable to do so; and
(b) afford the practitioner sufficient time to form an opinion whether or not
(i) the company appears to be financially distressed; or
(ii) there is a reasonable prospect of rescuing the company, and after
receiving a report from the practitioner, may set aside the company’s
resolution if the court concludes that the company is not financially
distressed, or there is no reasonable prospect of rescuing the
company; and
(cb) if it makes an order under paragraph (a) or (b) setting aside the company’s
resolution, make any further necessary and appropriate order, including –
(i) an order placing the company under liquidation; or
(ii) if the court has found that there were the board did not have no
reasonable grounds for believing that the company would be unlikely to
pay all of its debts as they became due and payable was financially
distressed, an order of costs against any director who voted in favour of
the resolution to commence business rescue proceedings, unless the
court is satisfied that the director acted in good faith. and on the basis
of information that the director was entitled to rely upon in terms of
section 76(4) and (5).
2.5.1.3.2 Replacing the business rescue practitioner
The many problems and uncertainties created by the provisions of section 130(1)(b)
and its apparent conflict with several other provisions  can quite easily be eliminated83
by two simple steps. First, all the grounds for removal of a business rescue
practitioner contained in section 130(1)(b) should be included as requirements for his
appointment in section 138(1).  I submit that section 130(1)(b) should then be84
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scrapped completely, as there would be no real need for its existence. In terms of
section 139(2) every affected person has the power to apply for the removal of the
practitioner if, among other things, he does not comply with the requirements of
section 138(1).  This provision applies to all business rescue practitioners, and there85
is no discernible reason for duplicating the conferment of this power where the
practitioner was appointed by the company’s board.
2.5.1.3.3 Requiring the practitioner to provide security
As has already been explained, it is an entrenched principle of South African law that
an individual who is appointed in a position such as that of the business rescue
practitioner and who will have control over substantial assets of another person must
always provide security for the proper performance of his duties.  As a member of86
a regulated profession it will be fairly easy for him to do so, and it is therefore
recommended that section 130(1)(c), which only requires security if so ordered by the
court, should be removed. The provision of security should be included in section
138(1) as one of the requirements for appointment.87
2.5.2 Court order to begin rescue proceedings
2.5.2.1 Notification of application
In view of the detrimental effects that the required prior notice of the application to
all affected persons will undoubtedly have,  my preference would be for only limited88
notification to be required, similar to the prior notice required for an application for an
administration order in England.  In such a case, prior notice would only be given to89
the company (if it is not the applicant), the Commission, the person nominated for
appointment as interim business rescue practitioner  and the applicant in any90
pending winding-up application.  91
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However, considering the determination of the trade union movement that trade
unions will be involved in every phase of business rescue proceedings right from the
beginning of the procedure, and the support they have from the Department of Trade
and Industry,  it is unlikely that a requirement of only limited notice will be acceptable92
to the legislature. Therefore, it is extremely important that the company should be
protected by an interim moratorium on any winding-up order, resolution for voluntary
winding up and any other legal processes, from the moment that the application is
presented to court by filing the papers with the Registrar of the court,  until the court93
grants an order placing the company under supervision or dismisses the
application.  At the same time, it is also essential that the provision stipulating the94
moment of commencement of business rescue proceedings by an order of court,95
and the one regulating an application for a business rescue order after “liquidation
proceedings” have commenced,  should be properly and clearly formulated as96
recommended below.        97
Finally, the wording of section 131(2)(b) should make it clear that notice must be
given only after the application has been presented to court. It would also be
advisable to stipulate the period within which affected persons should be notified. In
this respect the example of English law could be followed by requiring notice to be
given as soon as reasonably practicable but not less than five business days before
the date of the hearing.  It is also hoped that the regulations will provide for a less98
expensive way of giving notice, even if only to shareholders, by publication of the
notice in a daily newspaper or newspapers.99
2.5.2.2 Right of affected persons to participate in hearing
To prevent unnecessary costs and a long period of uncertainty, it is essential that the
court hearing should be finalised as soon as possible. This will become very difficult if too
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many litigants participate, filing long and complicated papers.  On the other hand, for100
reasons already stated above, it is highly unlikely that the legislature will be prepared to
exclude the trade unions and workers from participation, while creditors must, and
shareholders should, be given the opportunity to protect their interests. However, I would
recommend a provision similar to that in the company administration application in
England, which gives only a few specified persons an automatic right to appear or be
represented at the hearing, while all others have to obtain the permission of the court by
showing that they have an interest that justifies their participation.  Although the English101
courts are fairly lenient in recognising such an interest, it does at least enable them to
limit the number of participants if necessary. 
Section 131(3) would then read as follows:
The applicant, the company, one or more of its directors, any registered trade union
representing employees of the company, any person who has filed an application for the
winding up of the company and, with the permission of the court, any other Each
affected person who appears to have an interest justifying his appearance, may has a
right to participate in the hearing of an application in terms of this section.      
2.5.2.3 Application after liquidation has commenced
The provisions regarding the period within which an application for business rescue
proceedings may be made after “liquidation proceedings” have been commenced are
unsatisfactory and should be rephrased to clearly identify and limit this period.102
Furthermore, there is no need to suspend the application for winding up if a business
rescue order is issued, since the business rescue practitioner will have the duty to
apply for liquidation if the company cannot be rescued.  The court has the power103
to order the liquidation of the company if the application for a business rescue order
is refused,  and it is thus not really necessary for the original winding-up application104
to be revived. However, this part of the provision is retained to afford the original
applicant an opportunity to convince the court that such an order is necessary. 
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Therefore, I suggest that section 131(6) should be amended as follows: 
(6) If an application for winding up of the company has liquidation proceedings have
already been presented to the court commenced by or against the company but
not yet disposed of at the time an application is made in terms of subsection (1),
the application will suspend those liquidation proceedings until the application for
winding up will be –
(a) suspended until the court has adjudicated upon the application for
business rescue proceedings; and
(b) dismissed if the court makes the order applied for business rescue
proceedings.
To avoid any confusion regarding the position of a company that is already in
liquidation, the proviso at the beginning of section 131(1) should read as follows:
(1) Unless a company has adopted and filed a resolution contemplated in section
129, or a court has issued a final order of winding up in respect of the company
or the voluntary winding up of the company has commenced, an affected person
may apply to a court at any time for an order ...
2.5.2.4 Order during liquidation proceedings
As a result of the inconsistent use of terminology by the drafters of the Act, the word
“proceedings” could refer to court proceedings or a procedure such as liquidation or
business rescue. Since I regard it as highly undesirable to allow a business rescue
order to be made after the winding up of a company has commenced, it should also
be made clear in this subsection that a court may only order business rescue
proceedings instead of winding up, if winding up has not yet formally commenced.
I propose the following wording for section 131(7) by using section 427(3) of the
Companies Act of 1973 as an example:
(7) In addition to the powers of a court on an application contemplated in this section,
a When an application for the winding up of a company is made to court, or
legal proceedings to enforce any security have been instituted against a
company, a court may make an order contemplated in subsections (4)(a) or
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and (5) if satisfied that the requirements for such an order are met. applicable,
at any time during the course of any liquidation proceedings.
Such a provision may assist in creating a rescue culture in South Africa if courts
take up the challenge not to order the winding up of the company automatically when
a creditor applies for it, but to use their discretion and consider whether the company
is a good candidate for a rescue attempt. Although the courts also have this power
in the case of judicial management, the onerous requirements for a judicial
management order and the courts’ general disinclination to make such an order
prevented them from making use of this option.105
In this respect the South African courts have an advantage over their English
counterparts, which are not allowed to issue an administration order unless there is
a specific application for such an order before them.  It seems unnecessarily106
formalistic to restrict the discretion of the courts in this manner, especially if the
legislature is trying to develop a rescue culture, and it is also contrary to the specific
recommendations of the Cork Committee. German courts could perhaps be said to
have the easiest option since, as a result of their unitary procedure, they do not have
to make a decision on the direction the procedure will take.  However, this is also107
seen as a disadvantage because of the uncertainty whether creditors will decide in
favour of a rescue or not.108
2.5.2.5 Powers of the court
As explained before,  the two alternative grounds for financial distress on which a109
court may order the commencement of business rescue proceedings, are
unsatisfactory and should be removed from section 131(4).
The power of the court to order the liquidation of the company if it dismisses the
application for the commencement of business rescue proceedings must be
welcomed since this was not specifically authorised where an application for judicial
management was dismissed, and apparently also not included in the power of the
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court to make any order it may deem just.  Apart from the waste of costs and time110
caused by requiring a specific application for winding up to be made after dismissal
of the judicial management application, it also left the company vulnerable to
enforcement action by creditors until such time as an application could be made.
Courts in England also have the power to order the winding up of the company in
appropriate circumstances when hearing an application for an administration order.111
The power of the court to order business rescue proceedings when an application
is made by a director or shareholder in terms of section 163 for relief from oppressive or
prejudicial conduct seems quite drastic.  However, it is unlikely to be used very often,112
since not only will the applicant have to prove the prejudicial conduct, but the court will
also have to be satisfied that the circumstances for a business rescue order apply. The
advantage of this provision is that a court may order the commencement of business
rescue proceedings when an inherently sound company is managed in such an
oppressive and dictatorial way by one or more influential directors that the company is
in financial distress.  It could also provide a director who is not an affected person and113
may therefore not apply directly for business rescue proceedings to commence, with an
opportunity to achieve this result if appropriate.  However, it does not completely solve114
the problem for a director who is regularly outvoted by the majority on the board,
because there is no guarantee that the court will order business rescue proceedings to
commence, even if the circumstances required for such an order apply to the company.
2.5.2.6 Commencement of business rescue proceedings 
The uncertainty created by the wording of section 132(1)(b) regarding the specific
moment of commencement of business rescue proceedings by an order of court, and
the complications that would result if it commences before the relevant court order
is issued, have already been explained.  The relevant provisions of the English115
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Insolvency Act 1986 could serve as an example because of their clarity and the
discretion given to a court to order the commencement of administration at a time
different from the date on which the order is made.116
Therefore, I recommend that section 132(1) should be amended as follows:117
(1) Business rescue proceedings shall commence begin when –
(a)  the company –
(i)  files a resolution to placing itself under supervision and appointing
a business rescue practitioner in terms of section 129(3); or
(ii) applies to the court for consent to file a resolution in terms of section
129(5)(b);
(b) a person applies to the court for an makes an order placing the company
under supervision in terms of section 131(14(a)), unless a different time for
commencement is stipulated in the order. ; or
(c) during the course of liquidation proceedings, or proceedings to enforce a
security interest, a court makes an order placing the company under
supervision.
My recommendation that section 131(1)(c) should be scrapped is based on the
fact that there will no longer be any difference in the time of the commencement of
business rescue proceedings that start as a result of an order of court, irrespective
of whether the order results from an application for business rescue, for liquidation,
for enforcement action or for relief from oppressive conduct.
The unclear wording of section 131(8)(a) on the prohibition against a company
“placing itself in liquidation” during business rescue proceedings commenced by an
order of court should be improved by using an adapted version of the recommended
wording for section 129(6):         118
(8) A company that has been placed under supervision in terms of this section
(a) may not adopt a resolution placing itself to begin a voluntary winding up of
the company or to apply for winding up of the company by the court in
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liquidation until the business rescue proceedings have ended as
determined in accordance with section 132(2).119
Another example of the multiple and often unnecessary notices to affected
persons repeatedly required by the Act is found in section 131(8)(b), which compels
the company to inform each affected person of the business rescue order within five
business days after it has been issued.  Since every affected person has already120
been notified of the application,  and creditors and employees have to be notified121
by the practitioner of their respective meetings convened within ten days after the
order,  I submit that it is unnecessary and wasteful to notify every affected person122
of the order.
I therefore propose that section 131(8)(b) should be scrapped. The notices
convening the respective meetings of creditors and employees’ representatives will
serve as confirmation that the court order has been issued and shareholders, who
have already been informed of the application, will be notified of the meeting to
approve a rescue plan if their rights will be affected directly.123
2.6 The moratorium
2.6.1 Moratorium on legal proceedings
In terms of my recommendations, the business rescue procedure will formally
commence when the board resolution is filed or the relevant court order is issued.124
This is also the obvious moment when a moratorium on legal processes against the
company should become effective. However, it is clear that in the case of an
application to court for a business rescue order, the company needs protection from
enforcement action and other legal processes by creditors from the moment that the
intended application is made public (the filing of papers at the court) until the court
order is issued. This protection should be in the form of an interim moratorium that
protects the company from winding-up applications and other legal processes. 
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A company that is placed under supervision as a result of a board resolution will not
need this protection, as no prior notice to any person is required.  In the absence of any125
provision requiring the registration of the resolution before it becomes effective or any
power granted to the Commission to refuse the filing of the resolution, it may be assumed
that the resolution becomes effective the moment the resolution is filed at the Commission
and the final moratorium then takes effect. However, in the interests of clarity, I believe that
the wording of the final moratorium should also be improved and that winding-up orders
should be specifically and absolutely excluded.  An application for winding up while the126
company is under supervision should not even be possible with the consent of the
business rescue practitioner or the court. It should be allowed only after the business
rescue proceedings have been set aside or terminated as provided in the Act.
Therefore I recommend the following wording for section 133, based partly on the
moratorium that may be ordered in respect of a company under judicial management
and partly on the wording of the moratorium applicable to administration in English law:
133 Interim and general moratorium on legal proceedings against company
(1) From the moment that an application for the commencement of business rescue
proceedings has been filed with the court, until the business rescue proceedings
commence or the court has dismissed the application, no order may be made for the
winding up of the company and, except with the permission of the court and subject
to any conditions it may impose, no legal  proceedings, actions, or the execution of any
writs, summonses and other processes against the company may be instituted or
proceeded with.
(2) No order may be made for the winding up of a company that is under supervision.
(13) During business rescue proceedings, no legal proceeding, including enforcement
action, against the company, or in relation to any property belonging to the
company, or lawfully in its possession, may be commenced or proceeded with
in any forum, While a company is under supervision, no legal proceedings,
actions, or the execution of any writs, summonses and other processes against
the company may be instituted or proceeded with except –
(a) with the written consent of the practitioner;
(b) with the leave of the court and in accordance with any terms subject to any
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condition or requirement that the court considers suitable may impose;
(c) as a set-off against any claim made by the company in any legal
proceedings, irrespective whether those proceedings commenced before
or after the business rescue proceedings began;
(d) criminal proceedings against the company; or any of its directors or
officers; or
(e) proceedings concerning any property or right over which the company
exercises the powers of a trustee.
(24) During business rescue proceedings, a guarantee or surety by a company in
favour of any other person may not be enforced by any person against the
company except with leave of the court and in accordance with any terms the
court considers just and equitable in the circumstances.
(35) If any right to commence proceedings or otherwise assert a claim against a
company is subject to a time limit, the measurement of that time must be
suspended during the company’s business rescue proceedings. Prescription will
not run on any claim or right against a company while the company is under
supervision or protected by an interim moratorium.
2.6.2 Uncompleted contracts
The provision apparently giving a business rescue practitioner the right unilaterally
to amend, suspend or cancel a (presumably uncompleted) agreement is
objectionable in so many respects that it should be deleted almost entirely.127
Based on the provisions of the German InsO  and the common law principles128
regulating this issue in South African insolvency law, sections 136(2) and (3) should
be amended as follows:
(2) If, at the commencement of business rescue proceedings, the obligations in
terms of a contract to which the company is a party have not been performed in
full by the company or the other contracting party, except for obligations arising
out of a contract as described in Subject to sections 35A and 35B of the
Insolvency Act, 1936 (Act No. 24 of 1936) and a contract during business rescue
proceedings, the practitioner may cancel or suspend entirely, partially or
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conditionally any provision of an agreement to which the company is a party at
the commencement of the business rescue period, other than an agreement of
employment, the business rescue practitioner may, despite any provision of the
agreement to the contrary, choose –
(a) to perform the company’s unfulfilled obligations and claim the same from
the other contracting party; or
(b) to refuse to fulfil the contract;
by informing the other contracting party in writing of his decision within a
reasonable time after his appointment.
(3) Any The other party to an agreement that has been suspended or cancelled, or
any provision which has been suspended or cancelled, repudiated by the
business rescue practitioner in terms of subsection (2)(a) may assert a will have
a claim for damages against the company for breach of contract but may not
claim specific performance from the company.
If the business rescue practitioner chooses to continue the contract, this will form
part of the costs of the business rescue proceedings, but if he decides to repudiate the
contract, the claim for damages will not enjoy any preference. The amended version of
the two subsections at least makes it clear that no vested rights will be affected and that
the rightful owner of property in the possession of the company, for example as a result
of a contract of lease or a sale subject to retention of title by the seller, will have the right
to demand its return if the business rescue practitioner repudiates the contract. It will also
make it clear that no business rescue practitioner may unilaterally change the provisions
of a contract: he must either bind himself to the full contract or repudiate it.
2.7 Managing the procedure
2.7.1 The business rescue practitioner
2.7.1.1 Appointment
As explained above, the appointment of a business rescue practitioner by the board
should be combined with the resolution to place the company under supervision to
save time and costs and generally simplify the procedure.  129
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The apparent discretion given to the court whether to appoint an interim
practitioner when ordering the commencement of rescue proceedings is misleading
and should be rectified since the rescue cannot proceed without a practitioner.  The130
first part of section 131(5) should therefore be amended as follows: 
(5) If the court makes an order in terms of subsection (4)(a), the court may must
make a further order appointing as interim practitioner a person who satisfies the
requirements of section 138, and who has been nominated by the affected
person who applied in terms of subsection (1), subject to ratification by the
holders of a majority in value of the independent creditors’ voting interests at the
first meeting of creditors, as contemplated in section 147.
Regarding the replacement of a practitioner who has been removed by an order
of court,  I propose that the right to nominate a practitioner should properly be given131
to the person who applied for the order where applicable. Section 139(3) should thus
be amended as follows:
(3) The company, or the creditor who nominated the practitioner, as the case may be,
must appoint a new practitioner if a practitioner dies or resigns. If a practitioner or is
removed from office by an order of court, the court may must make a further order
appointing as interim practitioner a person who satisfies the requirements of section
138, and who has been nominated by the affected person who applied in terms of
subsection (1).  subject to the right of an affected person to bring a fresh application
in terms of section 130(1)(b) to set aside that new appointment.
Since this order may be issued when the business rescue proceedings are at an
advanced stage, I do not recommend an interim appointment that must first be
ratified by the creditors. Any affected person who has objections to the new business
rescue practitioner has the same right to apply for his removal.  132
2.7.1.2 Qualifications
The first issue that should be clarified in this respect is whether only individuals can
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be appointed as business rescue practitioners or whether juristic persons and
partnerships will be included as well.  I believe that all the other provisions in this133
regard favour the appointment of individuals only. The word “person” in section
138(1)  should therefore be replaced by “individual”.134 135
Furthermore I regard it as important that every practitioner should be required to
provide security for the proper performance of his duties.  This is a standard requirement136
not only for similar appointments in South African law but also in other legal systems. It
should therefore be added to section 138(1) as a requirement for appointment.
As explained before, the requirements for appointment as a business rescue
practitioner should as far as possible be aligned with the grounds for his removal. This
will not only bring clarity to the situation but also prevent requirements for appointment
being set indirectly by introducing them for the first time as grounds for removal.    137
2.7.1.2.1 Membership of a regulatory body
As indicated before, the present wording of this requirement merely refers to membership
of the profession (or, by implication, the professional body).  I submit that it should be138
made clear that it is not membership that is required but, like the requirement set in
England for insolvency practitioners and in accordance with the wording of the draft
regulations, the authority or accreditation to act as business rescue practitioner which
must be given by the regulatory body.  This is particularly important since the Act itself139
does not stipulate any requirements regarding qualifications, training or experience, and
it will be up to the regulatory authority to ensure that only properly skilled practitioners are
permitted to act. The accreditation can then be revoked in appropriate circumstances
where a business rescue practitioner has been guilty of objectionable behaviour. This is
of particular importance since there is no provision for an order of court disqualifying a
person from acting as a business rescue practitioner.
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2.7.1.2.2 Not subject to order of probation
This requirement is welcomed since any inappropriate behaviour as a director, even
if it is not sufficient to completely disqualify the individual from appointment as
director, would prevent his appointment as business rescue practitioner.   140
2.7.1.2.3 Not disqualified from acting as director
I agree that it would be highly undesirable to appoint an individual who is disqualified
from managing a company as director, to manage the business as business rescue
practitioner. However, it is difficult to understand why firstly, there is no provision for a
court to specifically disqualify a person from acting as business rescue practitioner and
secondly, why inappropriate behaviour as a director should not also lead directly to
disqualification from appointment as business rescue practitioner, as is the case in
English law.  Unfortunately, the wording of the English provisions differs substantially141
from that of the Companies Act of 2008 and cannot be used as a model for amendments
to the South African legislation.142
The linking of the qualifications for appointment as a business rescue practitioner
to the disqualifications relating to a director has created unnecessary confusion and
uncertainty.  I submit that this requirement will be improved by specifically listing all143
the disqualifications for business rescue practitioners.
2.7.1.2.4 No compromising relationship with company
In spite of its complicated wording,  this qualification requires nothing more than144
independence and the absence of any potential conflict of interests from the
business rescue practitioner. The requirement should be amended to correspond to
the much simpler wording of essentially the same requirement where it is listed
among the grounds for removal of the business rescue practitioner.  The amended145
wording should also make it clear that independence from the creditors is just as
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important as independence from the company itself. A less convoluted description
will also leave room for the circumstances of each case to be considered when
deciding whether there is a conflict of interests, and would also allow the professional
organisation to draft guidelines on how possible conflicts of interest should be
identified and handled.      146
 
2.7.1.2.5 Not related to person with compromising relationship
If the last-mentioned requirement is rephrased to cover any situation that could lead to
a conflict of interests or lack of independence, this requirement will become
unnecessary.  It will then be obvious that, for example, the spouse of a major147
shareholder or creditor of the company could probably not be regarded as independent.
In view of all my above-mentioned recommendations regarding the requirements
for appointment as a business rescue practitioner, I propose that section 138(1)
should be amended as follows:
138 Qualifications of practitioners
(1) An individual person may be appointed as the practitioner of a company only if
such individual person —
(a) is a member in good standing of, accredited to act as a business rescue
practitioner by a profession subject to regulation by a the regulatory
authority designated by the Minister for the a regulatory authority
regulation of the profession in terms of subsection (2);
(b) has the necessary skills and competencies required by the specific
circumstances of the company;  
(c) has given security to the satisfaction of the Commission for the proper
performance of his duties as business rescue practitioner;  
(d) is independent of the company and its creditors and free from any potential
conflict of interests; does not have any other relationship with the company
such as would lead a reasonable and informed third party to conclude that
the integrity, impartiality or objectivity of that person is compromised by
that relationship; and
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(e) is not related to a person who has a relationship contemplated in
paragraph (d)
(e) has not been declared to be disqualified from being appointed as a
business rescue practitioner in terms of section 139(2);148
(f) is not subject to an order of probation in terms of section 162(7);
(g) is not subject to an order declaring him a delinquent director in terms of
section 162(5); 
(c) would not be disqualified from acting as a director of the company in terms
of section 69(8);
(h) is not an insolvent; 
(i) is not a minor or an individual under any other legal disability;
(j) has not been removed from an office of trust on the grounds of misconduct
involving dishonesty; 
(k) has not been convicted, in the Republic or elsewhere, and imprisoned
without the option of a fine, or fined more than the prescribed amount, for
theft, fraud, forgery, perjury or an offence –
(i)  involving fraud, misrepresentation or dishonesty;
(ii)  in connection with the promotion, formation or management of a
company, or in connection with any act contemplated in section
69(2) or (5); or
(iii)  under this Act, the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 (Act 24 of 1936), the
Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984, the Competition Act 89 of 1998,
the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (Act No. 38 of 2001),
the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 (Act No. 36 of 2004), or
Chapter 2 of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Activities
Act 12 of 2004 (Act No. 12 of 2004).
Although sections 138(1)(f) to (k) should automatically lead to the cancellation
of an individual’s authority to act as a business rescue practitioner by the professional
organisation, the present uncertainty over the identity, exact powers and competency
of the body still to be appointed requires that the disqualifications should be
stipulated in the Act itself.  149
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2.7.1.3 Vacation of or removal from office
In terms of my recommendations, section 139 will be the only provision regulating the
removal of a practitioner by an order of court.  Although at least two of the grounds150
for removal reflect clearly objectionable and even criminal acts by a practitioner, the
court ordering his removal does not have the power to order that such an individual
is disqualified from future appointments. Therefore I propose that this power should
be added to the wording of section 129(2). The full text of section 129(1) and (2) with
the recommended amendments will be quoted after the discussion of the grounds
for removal.
2.7.1.3.1 Incompetence or failure to perform his duties
Since possession of the necessary skills and competence for the particular case is
now a requirement in terms of my proposed section 138(1)(b),  a lack of such skills151
or competence that is only discovered after the appointment of a particular
practitioner, will be covered by the grounds of a person no longer meeting the
requirements of section 138(1).  However, the failure to perform his duties at all will152
not necessarily be as a result of incompetence, and I submit that the second part of
this provision should be retained to allow the removal of a practitioner who fails to
perform his duties for any reason. It could be argued that the failure to perform his
duties is included in the next provision, namely the failure to perform his functions
with the proper degree of care and skill.  However, since I propose that the last-153
mentioned provision should be amended to refer to any breach of his fiduciary duties
or duties of care and skill,  it may be wiser to retain the failure to act at all, as154
separate grounds for removal of a business rescue practitioner.       
2.7.1.3.2 Failure to perform his functions with the proper degree of care
In my view, the fact that the full spectrum of directors’ duties has been made applicable
to business rescue practitioners indicates that the drafters of this provision intended to
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constitute a breach of any of those duties, including his fiduciary duties and the full duty
of care, skill and diligence as it is formulated in the relevant section describing directors’
duties, as grounds for his removal.  Furthermore, merely providing for possible personal155
liability for breach of his duties does not, I submit, offer sufficient protection to the
company and the affected persons; such a business rescue practitioner should not be
allowed to continue in office if the rescue procedure is still continuing.
A degree of overlapping exists between these and the last-mentioned grounds for
removal, since a lack of skill appears to be the same as incompetence. I submit that
it would have been preferable not to choose the shortcut by simply referring to the
duties of directors, but rather to list the relevant and specifically adapted duties as they
would apply to a business rescue practitioner. However, without any explanatory
document from the legislature it is difficult, if not impossible, to tell exactly which duties
were regarded as applicable and important for a business rescue practitioner to adhere
to. Under the circumstances I would strongly recommend that at least the liability for
insolvent trading should be specifically excluded by section 140(3)(b). In its amended
form the subsection should thus read as follows:
(3) During a company’s business rescue proceedings, the practitioner –
(a) is an officer of the court, and must report to the court in accordance
with any applicable rules of, or orders made by, the court; 
(b) has the responsibilities, duties and liabilities of a director of the
company, as set out in sections 75 to 77, with the exception of
section 77(3)(b);
Furthermore, the grounds for removal of a business rescue practitioner should
be reworded to make it clear that a breach of either his fiduciary duties or his duties
of care and skill could lead to his removal by the court.   
2.7.1.3.3 Engaging in illegal acts or conduct
Once again it has to be said that it is impossible to tell whether the drafters were
specifically referring to illegal conduct by the business rescue practitioner which
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related to his office or were performed in the exercise of his duties.  I submit that156
this provision is too vague to be of any value and is covered by the previous grounds
of a breach of fiduciary duties. If found guilty of a serious and relevant illegal act or
conduct, which should at least have been a requirement for removal under this
heading, a business rescue practitioner will probably not meet the requirements of
section 138(1) any longer,  or his authority to act will, it is hoped, be removed by the157
regulatory authority.  158
Therefore I believe this provision should be removed.  
2.7.1.3.4 No longer meeting the requirements contained in section 138(1)
The numerous specific requirements stated in section 138(1) should go a long way to
ensuring that a business rescue practitioner can be removed on these grounds if he
is found to be unwilling, unable or unsuitable to remain in office.  However, probably159
the most important aspect in this regard is that, in terms of my recommendations,
section 138(1) must specifically require that a member of the professional organisation
must be accredited to act as a business rescue practitioner. It will thus be possible for
the organisation to remove an individual from the profession for any unethical or
inappropriate behaviour, irrespective of whether it amounts to an illegal act. Once
accreditation to act as a business rescue practitioner has been revoked, he will
automatically no longer meet the requirements of section 138(1).
2.7.1.3.5 Conflict of interest or lack of independence
This aspect is covered by two other grounds for the removal of a business rescue
practitioner. Firstly, a business rescue practitioner’s independence and the absence
of any conflict of interests are requirements for appointment in terms of section
138(1), both in the original wording and in my recommended version.  Should the160
situation change, the business rescue practitioner will no longer meet the
requirements of section 138(1) and may be removed on those grounds. Secondly,
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acting as business rescue practitioner while his interests are in conflict with those of
the company is a clear breach of his fiduciary duties and also constitutes grounds for
his removal.161
2.7.1.3.6 Incapacity and inability to perform his duties
I submit that a business rescue practitioner who becomes incapacitated to such an
extent that he is unable to perform his duties should be removed immediately if he
cannot or will not resign.  It would be unreasonable to expect the affected company162
to wait for any period of time while the rescue proceedings and the financial situation
of the company become more precarious with every passing day. The uncertainties
surrounding the exact meaning of a “reasonable time” and when it can be said that he
is “unlikely” to regain his capacity make this part of the provision extremely undesirable.
In conclusion, I recommend that section 139(1) and (2) should be amended as
follows:  163
139 Removal and replacement of practitioner
(1) A practitioner may be removed only
(a) by a court order in terms of section 130; or
(b) as provided for in this section.
(2) Upon request of On application by an affected person, or on its own motion, the
court may remove a practitioner from office on any of the following grounds, and
may at the same time declare such practitioner to be incapable of being
appointed as a business rescue practitioner under this Act for life or for such
period as the court may determine:
(a) Incompetence or failure to perform his duties;
(b) breach of his fiduciary duties or failure to exercise the proper degree of
care, skill and diligence in the performance of the practitioner’s functions;
(c) engaging in illegal acts or conduct;
(dc) if the practitioner no longer satisfies the requirements set out in section
138(1); or
(e) conflict of interest or lack of independence; or
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(d) if the practitioner is incapacitated and unable to perform the functions of
that office., and is unlikely to regain that capacity within a reasonable time.
2.7.2 Powers and duties of directors
The retention in office of the directors may assist the practitioner in identifying the
company’s problems and devising an appropriate rescue plan by using their
experience and knowledge of the company.  This will obviously depend on the164
extent to which the directors were part of the company’s problems and contributed
to its precarious situation. However, the current uncertainty created by contradictory
provisions in regard to the powers of the directors during business rescue
proceedings will almost certainly give rise to a power struggle between the directors
and the business rescue practitioner, particularly if the business rescue practitioner
was not appointed by the board, or will result in directors’ hesitating to exercise even
their most routine duties.165
The appointment of a business rescue practitioner in all cases indicates a
decision by the legislature to retain the present principle in judicial management that
an outsider will be put in charge of the company during rescue proceedings, and it
should be clearly reflected in the relevant provisions. This is similar to the position of
the administrator in England  and the insolvency administrator in Germany  where166 167
the directors also remain in office but lose any powers that may conflict or interfere
with the task of the insolvency practitioner. The experience in Germany with the
mostly unsuccessful introduction of self-administration  proves that any attempt to168
introduce something similar to the debtor in possession procedure of the United
States which is completely alien to our legal culture and traditions, will almost
certainly fail.169
The directors are clearly absolved from liability for the breach of most of their
statutory fiduciary duties or duties of care and skill if they act according to the
express instructions of the business rescue practitioner and disclose any personal
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financial interests.  Their position is thus closer to that of directors in Germany who170
lose all powers to manage the company’s business or deal with its assets,  than to171
that of directors in England whose powers of management are restricted but who
retain their general powers as organs of the company and are consequently still
subject to their statutory and common-law duties.172
Most provisions relating to the powers of the directors during business rescue
proceedings clearly point towards the overall authority of the business rescue
practitioner to manage the company and its property and towards the limitation of
directors’ powers to those functions that are specifically delegated to them or
authorised by the business rescue practitioner, or that will not interfere with the duties
of the practitioner. 
However, the following provisions seem to contradict this situation and should
be amended. In section 128(1)(b)(i) where the procedure is defined, the word “of”
should be removed as indicated above in order to clarify that the proceedings provide
for the management of the company’s affairs, and not for the supervision of its
management.173
Since a director may be removed from office by the court because he has
obstructed the business rescue practitioner in the performance of his duties or
management of the company,  the duty not to do so should also be included in the174
list of conditions to which he is subject in the exercise of his duties and functions in
terms of section 137(2).   175
As in the case of the business rescue practitioner,  I submit that it is176
unreasonable to hold directors liable for insolvent trading during business rescue
proceedings, especially since they were possibly the ones who acted by commencing
business rescue proceedings. I thus propose that the reference to section 77(3)(b)
in section 137(2)(d) should be removed. 
Section 137(2) should consequently read as follows:   
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(2) During a company’s business rescue proceedings, each director of the company
–
(a) must continue to exercise the functions of director, subject to the authority
of the practitioner and without impeding the practitioner in the performance
of his powers and functions and the management of the company;
(b) has a duty to the company to exercise any management function within the
company in accordance with the express instructions or direction of the
practitioner, to the extent that it is reasonable to do so;
(c) remains bound by the requirements of section 75 concerning personal
financial interests of the director or a related person; and
(d) to the extent that the director acts in accordance with paragraphs (b) and
(c), is relieved from the duties of a director as set out in section 76, and the
liabilities set out in section 77, other than section 77(3)(a), (b) and (c).
        
2.8 The business rescue plan177
2.8.1 Power to submit a rescue plan
Although only the business rescue practitioner is allowed to submit a rescue plan, the
statutory duty placed on him to consult the management of the company and
affected persons compensates for the fact that the company or its management may
not submit a rescue plan.  However, it is not clear what remedy would be available178
to any of these parties if the business rescue practitioner does not consult them.   
2.8.2 Prescribed contents of a rescue plan
In general it must be said that the long lists of specific and often unnecessary
minimum information that must be included in a business rescue plan will add to the
costs of the procedure and will raise questions about the applicability or not of
insolvency law principles.  Since the plan may not, as it may in Germany,  provide179 180
for liquidation of the company, the many references to liquidation and insolvency law
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are, I submit, inappropriate. Furthermore, and in spite of requiring a substantial
amount of information, section 150(2) of the Companies Act of 2008 fails to require
other information that may be quite important for creditors to know, such as how the
rescue plan will be financed.
Any business rescue practitioner will know that he must provide sufficient
information to convince the affected persons whose approval of the plan is required,
to vote in favour of the plan. The details should be left for the business rescue
practitioner to decide in each appropriate case, depending on variables such as the
size of the company’s business, the number and total of creditors’ claims, the value
of the company’s assets and, quite importantly, whether the company can afford to
pay the various professionals whose services would have to be used to provide some
of the (often unnecessary) information. 
In this respect the prescribed information that the proposals of a company
administrator in England must contain can be used as an example.  In addition to181
the obvious details about the company, such as its name, address, registration
number and names of its directors and company secretary (not required by the
current provisions of the Companies Act of 2008), just a few basic items need be
prescribed as necessary for all rescue plans. Essentially, there must be a statement
of the company’s affairs, listing its assets and their value, and a list of creditors,
indicating the amount of each debt and any security held for this claim. Furthermore,
an explanation of the circumstances that caused the company’s financial problems
is necessary, as well as an indication of how these problems can be surmounted and
the company’s rescue be achieved.  As part of the last-mentioned explanation, the182
rescue plan will have to provide details on how the company’s rescue will be financed
and whether the financing is already in place. Where applicable, the full details of a
pre-packaged sale of the business should be disclosed.  Any other information183
should depend on the circumstances of each case and should not be prescribed or
compulsory because there is a big difference between the information that would be
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required in the case of a sale of the business of the company, and that of a merger
or the continued trading of the company.
The only other prescribed requirement that I recommend should be retained is
a slightly amended version of the certificate by the business rescue practitioner at the
end of the rescue plan as required by section 150(4):
(4) A proposed business rescue plan must conclude with a certificate by the
practitioner stating that any –
(a) actual information provided appears to be is, to the best of his knowledge
and belief, accurate, complete, and up to date; and
(b) any projections or estimates provided are estimates made in good faith on
the basis of factual information and assumptions as set out in the
statement.
2.8.3 Approval of the plan
2.8.3.1 Publication of the plan
Since it is now clear that the odd expression of “publish to” requires that a notice of
availability of the plan must be sent by the practitioner to all affected persons, and
not only to those who may vote on the plan, there is substantial room for
improvement in this requirement.  The usual objection of unnecessary duplication184
of notices and thus waste of costs can also be raised against this provision and the
one discussed under the next heading,  and it would seem only common sense to185
combine these two notices as it is done in England and Germany.  186
I would therefore recommend that section 150(5) be scrapped and the following
wording be used to combine the provisions of section 150(5) with sections 151(1) to (3):
151 Meeting to consider rescue plan determine future of company
(1) The business rescue plan must be published by the company w Within 25
business days after the date on which the practitioner was appointed, or such
longer time as may be allowed by (a) the court on application by the company
practitioner, or (b) by the holders of a majority in value of the creditors voting
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interests, the practitioner must send a copy of the proposed rescue plan to every
affected person.
(2) Each copy of the rescue plan must be accompanied by notice of a meeting to be
held not less than five and not more than ten business days after the date of
such notification, for the purpose of consideration of the proposed rescue plan
by creditors and, if applicable, by shareholders.
(3) The notice of the meeting must set out –   
(a) the date, time and place of the meeting;
(b) the agenda of the meeting; and
(c) a summary of the rights of affected persons to participate in and vote at
the meeting.
(4) The meeting contemplated in this section may be adjourned from time to time,
as necessary or expedient, until a decision regarding the company’s future has
been taken in accordance with sections 152 and 153.
2.8.3.2 Meeting of creditors and shareholders 
One aspect, caused by careless and inconsistent drafting, needs to be clarified in
relation to the meeting. This is the question as to exactly who may address the
meeting on behalf of employees. Since the words “the employees’ representatives”
in section 152(1)(c) apparently refer to the trade unions representing employees, as
well as to the representatives of employees who are not represented by a trade
union, I believe that it will be necessary to limit the number of representatives who
may speak on behalf of employees.  I submit that this subsection should be187
amended to provide for “an opportunity for the employees’ representatives one
representative from each registered trade union to which employees of the company
belong, and one representative on behalf of all employees who are not members of
a trade union, to address the meeting”.      
2.8.3.3 Approval by creditors
The requirement that more than 75 per cent in value of creditors who vote must vote
in favour of the plan may present a major obstacle to the adoption of business rescue
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plans in practice. The majority of creditors will in most cases hold at least some
security for their claims and will consequently hold the bulk of the votes since they
may vote on the full value of their claims, including the secured portions.  There188
would be little advantage for them in approving a plan postponing payment of their
claims, and in many cases it will become impossible to obtain the support of 75 per
cent in value of creditors. Since the Act is anything but clear on this aspect, it is even
possible that secured creditors will be able to vote on a plan without being bound in
any way by its provisions. Therefore, it is essential that the relevant provisions should
be amended either to exclude the votes of creditors on any secured portions of their
claims, or to make it clear to what extent secured creditors are bound by the plan.189
If they are bound, it may also be necessary to provide for voting by creditors in their
different groups, that is, secured, preferent or concurrent. 
The additional requirement that 50 per cent in value of independent creditors
must vote in favour of the plan is unnecessary.  There is no requirement that they190
must at least hold a specified minimum percentage of total claims, and this provision
could result in a small number of creditors, holding an even smaller percentage of the
claims against the company, being able to undermine the rescue attempt. This is a
particular risk for smaller family-owned companies and would be another deterring
factor when the board has to decide between liquidation and business rescue.
Section 152(2)(b) which contains this requirement, should, in my view, be scrapped,
and section 152(2)(a) should, I submit, be amended to require the approval of only
a simple majority in value of creditors based on the value of the unsecured part of
their claims.  
Furthermore, the references to the final adoption of the plan being dependent on
the satisfaction of any conditions after the required majorities have voted in its favour
must be removed from section 152(3)(b) and (c)(ii)(aa). Any conditions that have to
be fulfilled before the plan can be fully implemented, such as procuring post-
commencement finance, are part of the adopted plan and are the first steps to be
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taken by the practitioner in implementing the plan. The plan itself is either adopted
or not, but cannot be conditionally approved.         
2.8.3.4 Approval by shareholders
Since the Act clearly envisages that only one meeting for both creditors and
shareholders will be convened on the same date and at the same place,  section191
152(3)(c) should be amended to provide that the practitioner must, immediately after
approval by the creditors, call for a vote by the shareholders whose rights will be
altered by the plan.  192
The subsection should thus read as follows:
(3) If a proposed business rescue plan –
(a) ...
(b) ...
(c) does alter the rights of any class of holders of the company’s shares
securities –
(i) the practitioner must immediately hold a meeting of and call for a vote by
the holders of the class, or classes of securities shares whose rights would
be altered by the plan, them to approve the adoption of the proposed
business rescue plan;  
2.8.4 Effects of approval of the business rescue plan
I submit that, for the reasons already explained,  the plan itself cannot be193
conditional, but may contain some conditions that have to be fulfilled before the rest
of the plan can be implemented. Section 152(5)(a) is thus misleading by requiring the
fulfilment of “any conditions on which the business rescue plan is contingent” as if it
is separate from the implementation of the plan itself and not part of the plan. This
part of section 152(5) should thus be scrapped. Section 152(5)(b) should be
reworded to place a positive duty on the practitioner to implement the plan and not
merely to direct its implementation. However, the company should still be mentioned
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in order to provide for instances where the cooperation of shareholders or the board
is required or part of the plan can only be implemented after business rescue
proceedings have ended. This subsection should thus read as follows:
(5) The company, under the direction of the practitioner and the company must take
all necessary steps to
(a) attempt to satisfy any conditions on which the business rescue plan is
contingent; and
(b) implement the plan as adopted.
2.8.5 Effects of rejection of the business rescue plan
2.8.5.1 Powers of the rescue practitioner
Since it seems to be the intention that only the creditors should have the power to
approve the preparation of a revised plan,  section 153(1)(a)(i) should be amended194
to refer to “a vote of approval from the creditors of the company to prepare and
publish a revised plan”. 
Although the practitioner is instructed to adjourn the meeting if he or an affected
person intends applying to court to have the result of the vote set aside, there is no
provision compelling them to bring the application within a reasonable time or at all.195
It is possible that the duty to call a meeting within five days unless an application has
been made to court in that time is an attempt to restart the procedure if no application
is to be made after all, but this is not clear.
Assuming that all the options become available again if the court dismisses the
application or no application is made, it will be necessary to convene a meeting of
creditors and shareholders again. I propose that section 153(2) should be amended in
the following way to clarify the situation and to avoid an unnecessary meeting being
convened if the court does grant the order, resulting in the plan being approved.
(2) If the practitioner, acting in terms of subsection (1)(a)(ii), or an affected person,
acting in terms of subsection (1)(b)(i)(bb), informs the meeting that an application
will be made to the court as contemplated in those provisions, the practitioner
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must adjourn the meeting –
(a) for five business days, unless the contemplated application is made to the
court during that time; or
(ba) until the court has disposed of dismissed the contemplated application; or
(b) until a reasonable time has elapsed without the application having been
presented to court.
2.8.5.2 Powers of affected persons
Firstly, section 153(1)(b)(i)(aa) should be amended in the same way as section
153(1)(a)(i)  to make it clear that a vote of approval from only the creditors is196
necessary to require the practitioner to prepare a revised plan.  197
I submit that trade unions and employees who do not have voting rights as
creditors or shareholders of the company to approve or reject a rescue plan should
not be given this right through the backdoor by allowing them to apply for the setting
aside of votes of creditors or shareholders. This will effectively give them more rights
than shareholders who may lose more as a result of a failed rescue attempt than
employees would.
Section 153(1)(b)(ii), which allows any affected person to acquire the votes of
creditors and (possibly) shareholders, is one of the most disturbing and startling
provisions regulating business rescue proceedings.  As a result of the lack of any198
explanation or clarification of this provision, it could possibly enable the expropriation
without any compensation of a concurrent creditor’s claim or a shareholder’s shares.
I strongly recommend that this provision should be drastically amended to ensure
that its effects are fair, transparent and not in conflict with any acceptable and
entrenched principles of our law.
Therefore, I believe that the following amendment to section 153(1)(b) should be
made:
(b) If the practitioner does not take any action contemplated in paragraph (a) –
(i) any affected person present at the meeting and entitled to vote on the
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approval or rejection of the rescue plan, may –
(aa) call for a vote of approval from the creditors of the company holders
of voting interests requiring the practitioner to prepare and publish
a revised plan; or  
(bb) apply to the court to set aside the result of the vote by the holders of
voting interests or shareholders, as the case may be, on the grounds
that it was inappropriate; or
  (ii) any affected person, or combination of affected persons, may make a
binding offer to purchase the voting interests of one or more creditors or
the shares of one or more shareholders who opposed adoption of the
business rescue plan. at a value independently and expertly determined,
on the request of the practitioner, to be a fair and reasonable estimate of
the return to that person, or those persons, if the company were to be
liquidated.
Section 153(6) which provides for an application to court to review the
determination of the value of the votes to be bought in terms of this provision, should
accordingly be scrapped completely.
I specifically make no reference to any formula or procedure to determine the
price to be offered, as the offeror should be free to offer the amount that he is
prepared to pay, while the offeree should be free to refuse an offer that he believes
to be inadequate.  
2.8.5.3 No action taken by either the practitioner or affected persons
I submit that if no action is taken after a rescue plan has been rejected, it is obvious
that there is no reasonable prospect for the company to be rescued. In such a case
the business rescue practitioner is surely still under the obligation to apply to court
for an order discontinuing the rescue proceedings and placing the company into
liquidation.  The requirement that the business rescue practitioner must merely file199
a notice of termination in these circumstances is in conflict with this obligation and
it should be removed. If the legislature considers it necessary to make it clear that the
CONCLUSION-378-
 See part 2.5.1.3 above.200
 See Chapter 2, part 3.9.1.1.201
 See Chapter 2, parts 3.9.1.1 and 3.9.1.2.202
 In part 2.8.5.3.203
 See Chapter 2, part 3.9.2.204
business rescue practitioner is still under a duty to apply for liquidation in this case,
section 153(5) should be amended as follows:
(5) If no person takes any action contemplated in subsection (1), the practitioner
must promptly file a notice of the termination of the business rescue proceedings
act according to the provisions of section 141(2)(a). 
  
2.9 Termination of business rescue proceedings
2.9.1 Termination by order of court
The setting aside of a board resolution to commence rescue proceedings has already
been dealt with.  Section 81(1)(b), which authorises the court to liquidate a solvent200
company on application by the practitioner if there is no reasonable prospect of a
rescue, is not only unnecessary but also creates confusion. Therefore,  I propose that
it should be deleted.  Section 141(2)(a) places a very clear duty on a practitioner201
to apply to court to terminate the business rescue proceedings and to issue an order
for the winding up the company if there is no reasonable prospect that the company
will be rescued.  I submit that this is sufficient to clarify the court’s powers in this202
regard, and since there is no reference to whether the company must be solvent or
insolvent, it is unnecessary to stipulate that elsewhere.      
2.9.2 Termination by filing a notice
As explained above,  there is no reason why a business rescue practitioner should203
be absolved from his duty in terms of section 141(2)(a) to apply for an order
discontinuing the business rescue proceedings and placing the company into
liquidation if a rescue plan is rejected and no further action is taken.  It may safely204
be assumed that in such a case the company has no reasonable chances of being
rescued and liquidation is the only viable option. In this case I submit that merely
filing a notice of termination and leaving the company hanging is inappropriate. 
CONCLUSION-379-
 See Chapter 2, part 3.9.2.205
 See Chapter 2, part 3.9.3.206
 See Chapter 2, part 3.9.1.2 regarding the misleading use of the word “converting”.207
 See part 2.8.5.3 above.208
 See Chapter 2, part 3.8.4.209
Although I believe that the practitioner should be obliged to apply for liquidation,
the power created in section 81(1)(c)(i) for a creditor to apply for liquidation in these
circumstances should be retained to provide for those instances where a business
rescue practitioner fails to do so or is not convinced that a rescue of the company is
no longer reasonably possible.  However, the reference in section 81(1)(c)(i) to205
section 132(2)(b) should be deleted, since a notice of termination will now only be
filed if the company is no longer in financial distress. Allowing a creditor to base his
application for liquidation of the company on this situation seems unduly harsh, since
it only applies to rescue proceedings that were commenced by a resolution of the
board. Considering the pressure on boards to take such a resolution at the first signs
of potential problems, it is extremely unfair, I submit, to punish them for taking the
resolution if they manage to avert the expected financial disaster or in hindsight prove
to have been too pessimistic about the company’s future.      
2.9.3 Termination as a result of rejection or implementation of a business
rescue plan
The misleading provision in section 132(2)(c)(i) that creates the impression that the
mere inaction of affected persons after rejection of a rescue plan will terminate
business rescue proceedings must be deleted.  This situation is now covered by206
section 132(2)(a)(ii), in terms of which business rescue proceedings are terminated
by an order of court “converting” them into liquidation proceedings.  Strictly207
speaking, the court does not order a conversion of the proceedings, but, in
accordance with the application by the business rescue practitioner, will order the
discontinuing of the business rescue proceedings and then order the liquidation of
the company.     208
Section 132(2)(c)(ii) will remain intact since business rescue proceedings do
indeed end when the practitioner files a notice of substantial implementation of the
plan in terms of section 152(8).209
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2.10 Final analysis of business rescue proceedings
South African company law has a long history of business rescue, dating back to the
first Companies Act of 1926 when the legislature displayed an insight far ahead of
its time by recognising the need for a formal statutory procedure to allow distressed
but deserving companies some breathing space to overcome their problems.
However, the fact that the new business rescue procedure introduced by the
Companies Act of 2008 was not the first attempt at a statutory corporate rescue
procedure in South Africa and that it will succeed judicial management, was both an
advantage and a disadvantage for the new procedure. 
It was an advantage because after many years of experience with judicial
management, we knew exactly what its weaknesses were and where judicial
management got it wrong. We were thus in a position to avoid these pitfalls in
designing a new business rescue procedure and rectify previous mistakes. Another
advantage, although not readily acknowledged by most critics of judicial
management, is that in spite of its shortcomings, judicial management is in many
ways a well-constructed procedure regulated by clear, detailed and mostly
unambiguous provisions in the Companies Act of 1973. Therefore, the possibility also
existed for the drafters of the provisions regulating the new procedure to identify and
take over some important provisions from judicial management, or at least to be
made aware of what needed to be regulated. Unfortunately, however, the
Department of Trade and Industry to a large extent neutralised these advantages by
choosing to use the services of foreign consultants, who lacked any real knowledge
of or insight into judicial management, to draft this legislation.
The disadvantage of succeeding judicial management is that, because judicial
management was widely perceived to be a failure, no rescue culture has developed
in South Africa, and informal workouts or liquidation is still the automatic choice in
most cases of financial distress of a company. The attitudes to judicial management
will invariably affect any new business rescue procedure and cause it to be viewed
with some scepticism. It will require a concerted effort by the courts and major
creditors such as banks, to be supportive and sympathetic in their treatment of the
new procedure, in order to convince company boards to accept and use it. A
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substantial success rate of rescue attempts, driven by properly qualified, ethical and
expert business rescue practitioners, will also help to change the present culture of
liquidation being the statutory procedure of choice.
Another problem faced by the Department of Trade and Industry, which was
clearly illustrated by the submissions to the Portfolio Committee, was that each of the
various interest groups focussed only on their own interests. COSATU, for example,
insisted on more rights for employees of companies in financial distress, while other
groups saw this as a major impediment to a successful rescue procedure. There is
thus a real risk that we may lose sight of the bigger picture by trying to establish
whether a particular provision is better for employees, creditors, directors or
shareholders. There should be only one test, and that is whether a particular
provision or measure would increase the chances of a successful rescue of a
company, because that will ultimately be to the advantage of everybody.
Unfortunately, one cannot escape the impression that the new business rescue
proceedings are often characterised by an unsympathetic attitude to shareholders and
a distrust of company management. Many provisions seem to be based on the
assumption that shareholders are rich capitalists who do not need any assistance or
support when trying to rescue the company and that only the employees need
protection. While this may have been true when judicial management was introduced
into South African law for the first time, it is not a true reflection of the current situation.
It is a widely accepted fact that the major providers of capital to South African companies
are the institutional investors who are investing the pension fund contributions and
savings of ordinary workers. If a company fails, many more workers than those who were
actively employed by the company could thus lose their livelihood.
The legislature also seems to have forgotten that this is not a liquidation of the
company and that the company is quite possibly not insolvent or unable to pay its
debts, and may not even become so. There is a disturbing and inappropriate
confusion and mixing of principles of corporate and contractual law, on the one hand,
and insolvency law, on the other. The legislature decided to separate corporate
rescue from insolvency law and should remain consistent and true to this principle
in the provisions regulating corporate rescue proceedings. If the legislature does not
have sufficient confidence in the possibility of successful company or business
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rescues, then business rescue proceedings should be removed from the Companies
Act of 2008 and become part of a future consolidated Insolvency Act.
The first bold steps have been taken to provide the framework for a new and
more successful rescue procedure for viable companies and their businesses. It will
require good faith and trust from all stakeholders, including the legislature, to make
this work in practice.   
3 COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE 
COMPROMISE WITH CREDITORS
3.1 General comments
Considering the successful use of the present section 311 compromise procedure as a
corporate or business rescue measure,  the decision by the legislature to provide for210
a compromise specifically intended for this purpose is a welcome addition. Unfortunately,
however, the legislature failed to incorporate the biggest potential advantage of this type
of procedure for a company that is not yet financially distressed but approaching that
point. This advantage is to address the problem in a fast, effective and fairly confidential
procedure which will bind all the affected creditors once the required majority has
approved the compromise, without the costs or the stigma attached to a formal
insolvency or rescue procedure. Instead, the legislature could once again not resist the
temptation to regulate the procedure down to the finest detail.  211
Furthermore, the new compromise procedure also perpetuates two major
disadvantages of the section 311 compromise of the Companies Act of 1973, namely
the lack of a moratorium to protect the company  and the requirement that an212
adopted proposal will be subject to the approval of the court.213
3.2 The moratorium
The failure to provide for any form of moratorium to protect a company that is not in
liquidation, from enforcement by creditors of their claims in the period between
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informing them of the proposed compromise (and thus of the company’s precarious
financial situation) until the compromise becomes binding on them, is a serious
weakness of the new procedure and removes one of its main advantages over an
unregulated common-law compromise with creditors.  This omission is surprising214
in the light of the well-documented initial failure of company voluntary arrangements
in England as a result of the lack of a moratorium and the resulting amendments
made to the procedure to remedy this shortcoming.  215
The Companies Act of 2008 does not require that the proposal for a compromise
must be filed with any authority or office as required by the provisions regulating the
company voluntary arrangement in England and which marks the commencement
of the moratorium.  Therefore, the obvious moment for a moratorium to begin in the216
South African compromise procedure is when a copy of the proposal and notice of
the meeting are delivered to creditors.  I do not recommend that the moratorium217
should be limited to a specific type or size of company as it presently is in England,218
but should be the automatic result of any proposal for a compromise. The
moratorium should provide the same protection as in the case of business rescue
proceedings, and I therefore propose the introduction of the following subsection in
section 155 based on the recommended wording for the interim moratorium in
business rescue proceedings.           219
From the moment that the notice and a copy of the proposal have been sent to creditors
in terms of subsection (2) above, until the proposal has been adopted or rejected by the
creditors or relevant class of creditors, no application or order may be made for the
winding up of the company and, except with the permission of the court and subject to
any conditions it may impose, no legal proceedings, actions, or the execution of any
writs, summonses and other processes against the company may be instituted or
proceeded with.
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3.3 Prescribed contents of a proposal
The almost identical requirements set for the contents of a compromise proposal as
for a business rescue plan are clearly inappropriate since a compromise is not a formal
rescue procedure and is specifically intended to be flexible, informal and fast.  220
In this respect I submit that the required contents for a company voluntary
arrangement in English law are far more realistic and practical, providing as much
flexibility as possible while ensuring that creditors have all the important information
they require in deciding whether to adopt a proposal or not.221
Therefore, I recommend that the currently prescribed contents of a proposal  in
section 155(3) should be scrapped and replaced by a shorter and less complicated
set of requirements. I submit that no more than the following information needs to be
prescribed in relation to the contents of a proposal:
(a) Why a compromise is being proposed and what the advantages for creditors
would be.
(b) A list of assets and their respective values, indicating which assets are subject
to security rights held by creditors, and which assets are to be excluded from the
compromise.
(c) A list of liabilities, indicating the amount and nature of each claim, and how they
will be met, modified, postponed or otherwise dealt with in terms of the
compromise. This will include details on any proposed moratorium as well as any
proposed discharge of debts and a conversion of debt to equity.  It will also,222
where applicable, indicate whether additional financing must or has been
arranged.
(d) The intended duration of the compromise, explaining how and when it will end.
(e) The proposed dates of payments to creditors and the estimated amounts of such
payments.
(f) The manner in which the company’s business will be conducted during the
course of the compromise.
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(g) Any conditions that must be satisfied before the proposal can come into
operation or be fully implemented.
Any other necessary information will be dictated by the circumstances of each
case and the nature of the proposals. I submit that, ideally, the directors should be
able to provide most of the information that the creditors need since the directors
themselves will be responsible for the implementation of the compromise. This will
also save time and costs and prevent too much prior publication of the company’s
financial problems and plans.    
3.4 Adoption of a compromise proposal
Section 155(6), which regulates the adoption of a proposal by the creditors is, I
submit, deficient in many respects and should be redrafted to clarify the many
uncertainties. Unfortunately, however, it is impossible to state with any certainty what
the legislature’s intention was and it is therefore also impossible to propose any
specific amendments.
If it is assumed that the legislature intended to bind the secured creditors to any
adopted and confirmed compromise with the general body of creditors and for that
reason included them in the voting process, this should be specifically stated. This
is necessary because it is an entrenched principle of our law that the security rights
of a creditor may not be affected without his specific and individual consent.  It will223
also be necessary to state whether the statutory preference rights of a creditor may
be changed by a compromise. Furthermore, the legislature will have to decide
whether creditors should vote in different groups, depending on whether their claims
are secured, preferential or concurrent, and whether each group must approve the
plan to make it binding on that specific group, if at all.
However, if the intention was that the rights of secured creditors should remain
unaffected by a compromise, it is difficult to explain why secured creditors, who
would often hold the majority of the votes, should be allowed to vote on a proposal
that will not affect them in any way. In this case it is imperative that secured creditors
should only be allowed to vote on the unsecured part of their claim.       
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 See Chapter 2, part 4.5.3.225
 See Chapter 3, part 3.5.3 in respect of such an application in England.226
 See Chapter 2, part 4.5.4.227
 See Chapter 2, part 4.5.4.228
Since a compromise is not heavily regulated, and the directors control the whole
procedure, it is surprising that the Act does not in this instance contain an additional
requirement that at least 50 per cent in value of independent creditors should have
voted in favour of the proposals.  I believe that it will provide at least some224
protection to creditors who may otherwise be forced by creditors connected to the
company into accepting extremely unfavourable conditions of payment.       
3.5 Approval of a compromise proposal
I submit that it is an unnecessary and costly burden to require approval of a
compromise proposal by the court.  It will also introduce an element of uncertainty225
into the process, since there is little indication of the grounds on which a court may
refuse to approve a proposal. If the necessary percentage of votes of creditors has
been obtained, there appears to be little advantage in involving the court, and this will
merely lead to delays and extra costs. I submit that sufficient protection against an
unfair or prejudicial compromise will be provided if a subsection is introduced into
section 155 allowing a creditor who was entitled to vote at the meeting, to apply to
court for the revocation or suspension of any decision taken at the meeting.  Such226
an application will have to be based on either the unfair prejudice of the applicant’s
interests by an adopted compromise, or a material irregularity at or in relation to the
meeting. The period within which such an application must be presented to court
must be limited to a specified number of days after the compromise was adopted or
the applicant became aware of the fact that a meeting had been held of which he not
been given notice.      
After acceptance of the compromise proposal by the creditors, nothing more
should be required than the filing of the compromise by the board with the
Commission within five business days, as is presently the case.  The requirement227
that a copy of the compromise should be attached to every copy of the Memorandum
of Incorporation of the company held at its registered office may be retained.228
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3.6 Final analysis of the compromise procedure
The decision to introduce a procedure allowing a company that is not necessarily
financially distressed to enter into a compromise with its creditors, thereby replacing
the more costly and onerous, but widely-used compromise in terms of section 311
of the Companies Act of 1973, must be welcomed.
Unfortunately, however, the new compromise procedure shares many of the
weaknesses identified in business rescue proceedings, and it appears as though the
legislature could not quite bring itself to move away from the formal procedure of the
current section 311 compromise. The new compromise with creditors in its present
form contains too many uncertainties and is too over-regulated to be regarded as a
major improvement on the current situation under the Companies Act of 1973. I
submit that the absence of any provision for a moratorium to protect the company
while it is negotiating a compromise, as well as the rigidity and formality of the
prescribed contents and procedure of a compromise, constitute major stumbling
blocks that will almost certainly prevent the successful implementation of this
procedure. 
Apart from the specific amendments that are necessary, a major reconsideration
is required on exactly what the procedure is meant to achieve and how best to do
this. The new compromise procedure cannot fulfil its potential role as either a pre-
emptive move against a company’s possible collapse or a faster and less onerous
way out of liquidation, until a firm official policy is determined on exactly what this role
is supposed to be.
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